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Hamas’s invasion of Israel on 7 October 2023, with the attendant massacre of some 1,200 Israelis and the occupation of population centres and military bases – something that no Arab army has done since the 1948 war – posed unprecedented challenges to Israel’s socio-political and security establishments. Based on Chief-of-Staff Eisenkot’s 2018 doctrinal manifesto ‘The IDF’s Strategy’, this article assesses Israel’s national security principles and the doctrines for the use of force in an attempt to evaluate whether its political and military actions were aligned with these doctrines during the 2023–24 war with Hamas, and to determine the strategy’s value and possible gaps. It concludes that while the political and military responses appear consistent with the outlined principles, unexpected problems like hostage dilemmas and urban warfare complexities present unforeseen challenges not directly addressed by the manifesto. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does violent military coercion work alongside liberal democratic values in contemporary iterations of imperialism? This article shows how the less‐than‐lethal paradigm occludes death and perpetuates extreme forms of both deadly and not‐deadly military coercion in Iraq. Key to the 2003 invasion and subsequent counterinsurgency in Iraq, the less‐than‐lethal paradigm extends across military doctrine and US popular discourse. Based on the idea that killing is an undesirable way to dominate, the less‐than‐lethal paradigm is not necessarily benevolent or less deadly; instead, it is a legal, discursive, and logistical maneuver to minimize the political power of death and dying on the global stage. Decentering death, the less‐than‐lethal paradigm rebrands violence by reframing war as a precondition for peace, minimizing killing and death, disseminating nonkilling forms of coercion, and assigning responsibility to others for violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The editorial in the Journal of Strategic Studies discusses the challenges to traditional warfare assumptions posed by conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. It focuses on the need for doctrinal review and change in military organizations, with articles examining issues such as vertical implementation of military doctrine, disagreements within and across militaries, and the concept of 'total defense' during the Cold War. The editorial also highlights the critical role of the center of gravity concept in military doctrine and the limitations of counterinsurgency doctrine in complex conflicts like Afghanistan. [Extracted from the article]

Why do armed forces sometimes write doctrines that are inconsistent across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war? Using interviews to uncover how the Swedish Armed Forces implemented their 2016 military strategic doctrine, this study develops a theoretical concept of vertical implementation and explores why and under what conditions it varies. The findings suggest a tendency of lower levels to ignore superordinate doctrine; however, formal processes, actor attitudes, and doctrinal content seem to affect vertical implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military doctrine is a form of organisational knowledge. Scholars argue that beneath written doctrine lies a set of deeply held beliefs about war and warfare that do not change even if the written doctrine does. This article explores the relationship between written military doctrine, the underlying beliefs about doctrine that govern its interpretation and application, and ultimately how militaries operate. The analysis is based on fieldwork at a NATO division and 33 interviews with commanders and senior staff officers. It suggests a typology that can be used to understand variances in doctrine and operational differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The center of gravity (COG) is a crucial concept in both strategic studies and military planning, yet its ambiguous and incoherent nature has repeatedly led to abundant confusion. In particular, its relation to both Clausewitz and the German Schwerpunkt tradition remains poorly understood. This article addresses these shortcomings by tracing both Schwerpunkt and COG in German and US military doctrine, respectively. Comparing the two concepts across several dimensions, the article not only finds that both have evolved considerably over time, but also that while having a common origin, they are ultimately based on different approaches, assumptions, and traditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the evolution of UK military doctrine on counterintelligence (CI), one of the more consistently troubled aspects of military doctrine in general and intelligence doctrine in particular. We argue that current UK and NATO CI doctrine are in thrall to a deeply problematic defining concept in TESSOC (Terrorism, Espionage, Sabotage, Subversion and Organised Crime) that conflates an intractably diverse assortment of security threats under CI. Furthermore, TESSOC is the latest embodiment of a slow, century-long oscillation between two different basic concepts of CI. The first focuses purely on human threat vectors (referred to here as Human Threat CI or HTCI) while the latter entails a more comprehensive, all-source range of adversary technical and open as well as human source intelligence activities (designated Multidisciplinary CI or MDCI in US doctrine). That oscillation is driven largely by the balance between conventional and asymmetrical operations in defence priorities and recent campaign experience. TESSOC is a legacy of the recent, pre-Russo-Ukraine War emphasis on counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Consequently, UK and allied military counterintelligence doctrine are entering the second quarter of the 21st Century fundamentally ill-equipped to cope with strategic peers and their use of full-spectrum and hybrid strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the system of joint doctrine development in the Czech Armed Forces (CAF) focused on the operational level of command and control, including the implementation of the NATO doctrines into national conditions. Among others, it was found that the structure and content of the Czech doctrines are not systematically set. Allied doctrines are introduced either by rewriting them into the Czech version or by introducing them in the full English version. In both cases, it might cause inconsistency in military terminology. The Coordinating Committee as the only supervisory body does not have the authority to streamline the process of producing military publications. The most important paper recommendations include alignment of the Czech doctrinal framework with the NATO architecture, adoption of Allied doctrines in the English version including the national specifics, or redistribution of competencies within the processing group. Notwithstanding, the above-mentioned proposals, which indicated high impact, require crucial steps to be taken to implement them.

This Article uses civil-military relations theory, an interdisciplinary academic theory, to inform a critique of the Supreme Court's military deference doctrine. National security leaders noted in late 2022 that we are in a moment where civil-military relations are backsliding. Civil-military relations theory requires robust civilian oversight of the military in a functioning democracy. The Article discusses the language and arguments that underpin the military deference doctrine and argues that using national security deference or congressional deference while focusing on civilian decision-making and the exercise of oversight of the military, rather than deference to military decision-making itself, would be a more responsible approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of URVIO - Revista Latinoamericana de Seguridad Ciudadana is the property of FLACSO - Ecuador (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Nuova Rivista Storica is the property of Societa Editrice Dante Alighieri s.r.l. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The main goal of this paper is to present and compare the main developments in the Russian wars in Ukraine and Syria by considering the main patterns, parallels, and changing trajectories that could shed more light onto both of these war zones, which are highly interlinked due to Russia's leading role in both. It analytically, comparatively, and contemplatively approaches those developments by highlighting multiple similarities and the main differences in global responses to these conflicts. Both conflicts should be seen as highly unpredictable, dynamic, and unnecessarily extended asymmetric proxy wars in which global powers test their new military doctrines and their competitors' responses to their unconventional actions and other unsolicited and indirect interferences in the local dynamism of both wars. Unlike in Syria, the Ukrainian war zone is wholly transformative and ready for the adoption of partial hybridization and the utilization of the new software-defined warfare in combination with conventional weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of SIRIUS - Zeitschrift fur Strategische Analysen is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Recent events have made it much more likely that the United States (U.S.) and its allies could wage an unconventional warfare campaign in a future international armed conflict. Should this occur, the conflict will--between many of the States involved--be governed by the most controversial portions of Additional Protocol I, including Article 44's rules limiting the need for partisans to wear uniforms. While the U.S. is not a Party to Additional Protocol I, U.S. practitioners cannot ignore the Protocol. By understanding how the Protocol applies to Parties, the U.S. will see many benefits, including increased protections for friendly partisans, and incur necessary costs, including limits on its ability to try enemy fighters. Failure to understand the protocol, however, will undermine the combatant immunity enjoyed by the U.S. Armed Forces and their allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay investigates the progression of artillery prior to and during the First World War, and examines how soldiers' and nurses' experiences of combat were transformed by the development of artillery. Psychological trauma caused by prolonged artillery bombardments, the cause and cost of attritional warfare, and the devastation of environment are also explained. It highlights the link between technology and the artillery experiences, asserting its ability to transform military doctrine, societal expectations, and responses to adversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the policy world, the idea of ideational robustness deals with why and how policy elements can be maintained over time and the implications this has for government strategy and activity. Past approaches to ideas and their influence on public policy stressed the disparate roles of multiple policy mechanisms such as path dependency or the nature of policy networks in either driving policy change forward or ensuring persistence of a policy. Ideational robustness on the other hand allows for the possibility of some changes occurring in policy environments and components while motivating cognitive and normative policy ideas are adapted and retained. While ideational persistence has often been identified as a source of policy stability, the possibility that some ideas allow lesser or greater levels of change in policy components while basic policy content remains more or less intact (ideational robustness) is much less well understood. The article reviews the literature on policy change and stability which highlights the influence of different policy processes on overall policy dynamics and the role played by policy learning in promoting ideational robustness. Using evidence from military doctrines and procurement in Canada and Australia, the study finds that the two countries drew different defence policy lessons from the end of the Cold War which contributed heavily to the extent of robustness of their defence policy ideas. The case studies show that ideational robustness is important but also that its study must be combined with that of other policy mechanisms and processes in order to explain overall policy change patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the topic of building resilience in critical infrastructure in the face of asymmetric threats and terrorism. It focuses on legislative trends in Poland regarding the implementation of the CER Directive, which involves standardization and certification of organizational and technical solutions. The article discusses the evolving nature of asymmetric threats and terrorism, emphasizing the importance of effective risk management and various methodologies and standards that can aid in assessing and managing emerging risks. It also highlights the challenges faced by critical infrastructure in maintaining resilience and adapting to changing security environments. The article concludes by emphasizing the need for legislative regularisation to address emerging risks and intensifying hybrid activities. [Extracted from the article]

The genesis of Soviet airborne military doctrine occurred in the early 1930s, a period characterized by intense intellectual ferment in Soviet military affairs. Soviet receptivity to the idea of air assault was a part of greater Soviet interest in experimentation with new military ideas to restore offensive dominance to the battlefield. The first use of airborne forces in their proper role occurred during the Soviet occupation of Romanian Bessarabia in June 1940. After the start of World War II in the East, the Red Army dispatches a large number of paratroopers behind „enemy lines”, including those under Romanian administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of the aircraft as a means of combat has changed both the strategies and the tactics of waging wars, determining in a relatively short time major changes at the level of the forces doctrines, organization and training, their management, as well as command and control arrangements. At the same time, the aircraft has proved to be an important vector of progress and human civilization in the technical, economic, social and cultural fields, playing an important role in both war and peace. The ability of the air force to fulfil its role in a war or in military operations depends on the science and skill in harnessing the components of air power. The evolution of these components over time is reflected by the history of military art, which highlights both continuity and tradition as well as innovation. Moreover, it points out the similarities and differences, draws the necessary conclusions, which, filtered by military thinking, give the opportunity to formulate new rules and principles to be inserted in military doctrines and regulations, in training and education plans, as well as in economic development strategies and policies, including the defence and aeronautical industries, both civilian and military. The Romanian aviation has adapted, since the first use of the aircraft as a weapon, to the new reality of the battlefield, and this article is aimed at presenting the evolution of the concepts of its use in the first half of the 20th century, the principles of the use of aviation in battle, as well as the lessons learned following the participation of the Romanian military aviation in the campaigns of the two world conflagrations. To meet this purpose, the method of studying historical documents is employed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transformation of military doctrines in the context of asymmetric conflicts is an imperative to maintain the relevance and effectiveness of the military response to contemporary threats. This transformation requires a holistic approach that integrates technological innovations, international cooperation, interoperability, reflecting the dynamics and complexity of the global security environment. Military doctrine requires a foundation based on a thorough analysis of the existing threats and potential risks, provided that the asymmetric conflict imposes the need for a quick and adaptable reaction. Asymmetric conflicts differ from classic conflicts by involving a number of actors, and the integration of these actors in the planning and execution of military strategies can support post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts, thus strengthening the resilience of communities and states facing asymmetric threats. Therefore, adapting military doctrines to the specifics of asymmetric conflicts is an ongoing process, which requires a flexible approach that allows military forces to respond effectively to a wide range of threats in a constantly changing security environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current pace of People's Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) modernisation drive manifests China’s intentions for the future outlook of the Asia Pacific region. It is not only employing sophisticated weapon systems in service of PLAN to improve its efficiency but also reforming its military doctrine to cope with the current geopolitical and geostrategic realities of the region. On the one hand, China is flexing its muscles to expand its sphere of influence while on the other hand, it is trying to deny reach of the rival powers to its backyard. A closer analysis of the pattern of weapon acquisition by PLAN, and its A2AD and Offensive Defense policy divulge its strategy of regional domination which has security implications for the regional states. Drawing on the Offensive Realism theory, this paper analyses the PLAN struggle for absolute security by developing both offensive and defensive weapons. It further looks into geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic complexities and, the overall regional security architecture being affected by the rapid PLAN modernisation drive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Colombia's military doctrine is being questioned as the country's armed conflict has evolved. President Gustavo Petro has promised a new approach, including negotiations with armed groups and a shift away from aggressive military strategies. However, progress has been mixed, with negotiations having varying outcomes and violence in conflict regions persisting. Petro's strategy combines military deployment and peacebuilding, but concerns remain about the effectiveness of a militarized approach. The government is also addressing the increase in cocaine production and the control of criminal armed groups in rural areas. The new military doctrine prioritizes protecting civilians and targeting the financial activities of these groups. However, challenges persist, such as the lack of trust in the military and the need for long-term investment and state-building. The United States supports Petro's peace efforts, but there are critics both domestically and internationally. Despite the challenges, there is an opportunity for genuine peacebuilding by establishing trust with affected communities and respecting their human rights. [Extracted from the article]

United States space policy has largely reflected the outlook of a major power. The key distinguishing feature of such a state is their willingness to proactively reshape and engage with international regimes and organizations. They do this to protect their strategic goals and national interest. US space policy has historically been shaped by geopolitical tensions and rivalries. Its space policy is an extension of the military doctrines and strategies that it subsequently developed. The article examines different periods since the start of the space race. These periods reflect how US space policy has adapted to meet new challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores the evolution of Russian military doctrines in Europe over three distinct phases: the Gerasimov Doctrine (2013-2019), the Gerasimov Doctrine 2.0 (2019-2022), and the newly adopted doctrine (2022-present), that falls under the controlling chaos theory. The Gerasimov Doctrine, known for its hybrid warfare tactics, cyberattacks, and propaganda measures, aimed to destabilize European security. However, this doctrine was not solely implemented by the Russian Ministry of Defense; it was part of a broader plan orchestrated by Russian leader Vladimir Putin to maintain influence over the EuroAtlantic region. During the implementation of Gerasimov Doctrine 2.0, Russian tactics shifted, reflecting the adaptability of their strategies, by using offensive cyber-attacks which affected the Ukrainian critical infrastructure. The current doctrine aims at creating social chaos in the Euro-Atlantic region, emphasizing on the creation of artificial chaos while maintaining a degree of regional control. The current article aims to analyze the evolution of the three military doctrines and the underlying reasons for these shifts, with implications for Euro-Atlantic security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article assess how acts of counter-proliferation have formed a niche doctrine for military action against threatening nuclear weapon programs from non-nuclear weapon states and the application of this doctrine to future nuclear threats. Topics include a discussion of the Caroline Doctrine and attempts to expand or modify it for the nuclear age, why states would want a nuclear weapon, and concerns in the U.S., European Union and Israel about Iran's effort to build a nuclear weapon.

"The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps: Defining Iran's Military Doctrine" by Alma Keshavarz provides a detailed analysis of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its role in Iran's hybrid warfare strategy. The book explores the historical development of the IRGC, its relationship with the Iranian government, and its influence on domestic and foreign policies. Keshavarz argues that the IRGC has become the sole proprietor of Iran's foreign policy priorities and is deeply embedded in the Iranian economy. The book also discusses the Quds Force, the IRGC's special operations unit, and its relationship with the Supreme Leader. Keshavarz concludes by offering policy recommendations for dealing with the IRGC's hybrid warfare strategies, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive and long-term approach. Overall, the book provides valuable insights for policymakers and academics studying Middle Eastern security issues. [Extracted from the article]

Volume number 90 of the Strategic Impact journal contains five articles that cover various topics related to political-military issues, EU policies and strategies, geopolitics and geostrategy, defense and security concepts, and the terrorist threat. The articles provide insights into the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the adaptation of military doctrines to asymmetric conflicts, the implications of independent states for international peace and security, the importance of soft power strategies, and the process of Islamic radicalization. The journal is an open-access, peer-reviewed publication that focuses on strategic defense and security studies and is indexed in international databases. It is distributed free of charge to institutions in the field of security and defense. [Extracted from the article]

This article discusses how Israel's military doctrines have changed over time. It highlights the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah and the lessons learned from it. The article explains that Israel aimed to avoid a war of attrition and instead focused on disproportionate strikes against the enemy's weak points. It also mentions the operations led by the war cabinet, including Operation Nily, Operation Amalek, and Operation Dahiya. The article raises questions about the effectiveness of these military strategies and emphasizes the need for justice and peace in the region. [Extracted from the article]

Britain has long provided military assistance to help develop and support the local armed forces of its dominions, colonies and other parts of its Empire. This was not done out of benevolence but as part of Britain's efforts to encourage its partners to be responsible for their own security. This article describes an unusual case of such assistance, which was provided to help establish Abu Dhabi's air force in the 1967–1971 period. The Abu Dhabi ruler's decision to only engage contract officers, rather than seconded officers, had a profound effect on the shape of the military assistance provided by Britain. Unlike most training, advising, assisting and mentoring missions, Britain provided no training nor mentoring, and only limited advice. Its greatest contribution was assistance with the recruitment for Abu Dhabi of both soon-to-retire and already retired British officers. These findings have relevance for current British doctrine on military assistance, notably in relation to the more effective use of contract officers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Written military doctrines are generally seen as declaration of intent and strategic objectives by military forces. Pakistan has typically stayed averse to the trend of formal military doctrines owing to its strategic culture. However, in a first precedent Pakistan Navy released a formal military service doctrine in 2018. Yet it remained short of being a truly comprehensive formal naval doctrine. This article explores the naval doctrinal developments in Pakistan since the end of last century, its relationship with the ensuing major power competition in the Indian Ocean region, and its possible implications on doctrinal development in Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of modern technologies, especially in the space or cyber fields, brought a new interpretation of conflicts, based on modern systems and decisions adapted to these novelties. It is through these considerations that the changing nature of conflicts has presented challenges to traditional military doctrines and strategies. The multi-domain operations approach is used by NATO to identify the unique strengths and capabilities of each force category. By identifying these capabilities, the Alliance is able to create plans that maximize the effectiveness of each force category and enable a more effective response to potential threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the Russian concept of war has evolved significantly. Its aim is to seek a change in the global balance of power. The subject of discussion in this article is the issue of war in the Russian military doctrine, the specificity of the hybrid war, the probability of Russian military intervention, and the question of building strategic independence. The author used a complementary cognition paradigm that allows combining the process of cognition with the functions of science. The considerations focused on the activities related to the annexation of Crimea in 2014.The research presents the Russian perspective of contemporary armed conflict which examines the experience of the Russian armed forces and the particularity of modern military operations. The key elements of the hybrid war were identified and the basis of Russian strategic independence which the ruling elite, in fact, was striving to achieve, was indicated. From the Russian point of view with regard to the armed conflict, there is a conviction that it is necessary to comprehensively use military, political and economic information as well as asymmetric actions. Russia is systematically rebuilding its armed forces since it has ambitions to play a significant role in the international environment; and the armed forces facilitate: articulating its opinions, deterring, and demonstrating its importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article tells the extraordinary story of Fiorenzo Capriotti, the man behind the sinking of the Egyptian flagship the Emir Farouk in October 1948 and the birth of the Israeli navy commando unit. Using the same unconventional technique that the Italian navy special assault unit Decima Flottiglia MAS had pioneered against the British in World War II, the embryonic Israeli navy was able to defeat Egypt's superior numbers and weaponry. Not only did Capriotti play a key role in the founding of the Israeli navy commando unit, but he also made a significant contribution in shaping the doctrine that the Israeli navy should overcome the unfavourable balance of power through the superiority of its naval commando units. The sinking of Emir Farouk in fact consolidated the notion that the Israeli navy should compensate for its small size relative to most of its enemies through greater agility and firepower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The willingness of defence departments to select the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for their fifth-generation multirole fighter has frequently been analyzed as stemming from the close historical connections allies such as Japan or Canada have with the United States. However, such an approach glosses over or ignores the operation of military procurement processes which are more idiosyncratic and subject to many pushes and pulls from different actors and directions. This article compares the experiences of Australia and Canada in procuring the JSF. Both countries are British Commonwealth members, with a long history of supporting western, and in particular, US alliances. But while Australia has secured its F-35 procurement and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has already received its F-35s, Canada has only recently overcome a lengthy F-35 procurement battle that remains mired in controversy and will not deliver to the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) an aircraft for several years yet. This comparative case study between Australian and Canadian defence priorities offers a new explanation for this disparity of procurement success based on the need to both create and maintain alignment between government strategic defence policy and military service doctrine if major platform purchasing decisions are to survive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Doctrines are considered a key component of military power, shaping the ways in which armed forces organize and operate. This study critically examines the assumption that armed forces can change their practices by writing formal doctrine. The study addresses the research problem of why some formal doctrines are implemented and others are rejected. It does so by developing and testing a novel theoretical framework on doctrinal implementation through a comparative case study on rejection of the US Army 1976 Active Defense doctrine and successful implementation of the 1982 AirLand Battle doctrine. The study shows that contrary to popular beliefs, the actual concepts within a formal doctrine do not seem crucial for whether it is implemented or rejected. Rather, cultural coherence and inclusive creation seem crucial in this regard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Large-scale military platform procurement is an essential but understudied component of the policy studies of megaprojects. Procurement decisions in this area, from ships to aircraft, are examples of a specific type of often very expensive purchases which feature complex multi-actor and multiyear processes characterized by high degrees of conflict between actors over purchases and planning horizons. This study of military procurement efforts of this type demonstrates the importance of maintaining policy 'alignment' between governments and service providers for successful megaproject procurement to occur and suggests several strategies for accomplishing this that can be applied to similar large-scale but nondefense-related projects, ranging from hydroelectric dams to high-speed railway development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1991, when they regained their independence, the Baltic States have made a concerted effort to become part of the Western alliance system. The article is based on the idea that the primary reason for this orientation cannot be explained solely by normative elements such as identity or culture. Undoubtedly, the West has always been a world to which these countries in question did not belong. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the main priority of the Baltic States, which are categorised as small states, is to preserve their independence. As a result of their historical experiences, Russia is the biggest obstacle that the Baltic countries see in front of these goals. In order to balance the renewed and intensely felt Russian threat, the West has been seen as the only real strategic choice for the region’s countries. This article argues that the countries of the region have no alternative option in this process, which resulted in membership in NATO and the EU. Indeed, historical experience has shown that these countries’ strategic choices, such as bandwagoning to preserve their independence, which would mean aligning with the threatener, or avoiding being the centre of attention of the adversary by remaining neutral have not yielded results. Therefore, this article aims to try to understand the logic of the Baltic states’ strategic choices based on the balance of threat theory. This is because by turning towards the West, the countries of the region have sought to balance not Russian power but the threat they perceive from this country.

The purpose of this article is to evaluate the fact that India's orthodox offensive doctrine has made its army a more inefficient tool even in the face of radical changes in India's strategic geographical position, and in this context, why the innovation movements of the Indian army in the recent period will be more inefficient with this doctrine. The primary assumption in this article, in which it is discussed that India can use its regional and global interests and power more efficiently with a new doctrine, is the central assumption of India's current military doctrine in the recent period when India has implemented a new dimension of its non-alignment policy on a more global scale in its foreign policy. Strategic cooperation, indigenization movements, and foreign policy programs aiming to reduce foreign dependency will not make the Indian military productive. The risks and opportunities that will arise from developing a new military doctrine and vision should be discussed within the framework of a new doctrine. Considering all these limitations and inferences, this article consists of three parts. The first chapter examines the history of India's military strategy in the context of India's orthodox doctrine of aggression to secure its ground forces. In the second part, the developments that overturned the security paradigms of India in the 21st century and the failure of the military policies followed in the static environment afterwards, and the causes and consequences of this failure are analyzed. In the last part, some analyzes and implications are made for why India's military power will fail if it insists on the current doctrine and for a new modern military doctrine that should be created so that breakthroughs can result in efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper analyzes and compares the impact of the 1968 Prague Spring on military and strategic thinking in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. A great change in the Czechoslovakian military caused Memorandum 68, a proposal of domestic military doctrine which consistently took into account the vital security interests of Czechoslovakia in international relations at that time. The document was mainly based on the inviolability of Czechoslovak territory and the right of its nations to defend their own existence regardless of the superpower interests of the Soviet Union. At the same time Yugoslavia began to develop its own doctrine of the General People's Defence and Social Self-Protection, which emphasized its total nature, creating the reality of the concept of a "nation in arms," which attached great importance to soldiers and the art of soldiering in Y ugoslavia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even after the First World War, the British and German armies remained strongly influenced by Clausewitz, for whom personality rather than mass was the best means to reduce friction. This article explores how this was reflected in their military doctrine between the two world wars. The German regulations showed a clear alignment with Clausewitz's thinking. The British tended to focus on the characteristics Clausewitz had argued were necessary for the troops, rather than for their commanders. The campaigns of 1939/40 caused the Germans to place even greater emphasis on boldness, while the British focused on steadiness and caution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What started as opportunistic operations has gradually given rise to Israel's prevailing military doctrine of Inter-War Campaigns (IWC). This article provides a comprehensive analysis of a phenomenon that has shaped conflicts in the Middle East, one that has been overlooked in the literature. The IWC utilises advantageous conditions to formulate continuous military campaigns below the threshold of severe conflict. This article argues that the IWC creates and manages limited competitive conflicts intended to mitigate adversaries' force buildup in preparation for war. It provides the first account of the doctrine's development, analyses its enabling factors, and discusses its degree of success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Apartheid-era South African military (SADF) underwent dramatic peacetime changes, from a small and underfunded expeditionary element of Commonwealth forces in the 1950s to a regime bulwark with regional capabilities under 'Total Strategy' in the mid-1970s. By comparing internal assessments, changes in the SADF's official view of future wars are traced through security crises of the 1960s and 1970s. Shifting future war perceptions were shaped by the interplay of organizational-political needs during crises of legitimacy for the military. These shifts in future war perception motivated strategic and operational-tactical doctrinal change and shaped the military's view of security crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bulletin of Ablai Khan KazUIRandWL: Series 'International Relations & Regional Studies' is the property of Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations & World Languages and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

One of the many reasons for the failure of the Israel Defence Forces' (IDF) in the Second Lebanon War was the concept of Systemic Operational Design (SOD), translated into de facto military doctrine. The story of the rise and fall of the SOD idea is a warning sign for all militaries faced with "modern" and "fashionable" ideas. The purpose of this paper is therefore to describe and evaluate the Systemic Operational Design created and introduced into the IDF by Brigadier General Shimon Naveh and the Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI). The study is based on the literature created by the State of Israel, the IDF, and its main proponent Shimon Naveh, as well as other militaries (mainly the US Army). This theoretical background is confronted with the IDF's operations during the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and their effects on the war's outcome. The over intellectualised, ambiguous, and not properly structured concept of the SOD, introduced as the IDF's doctrine and approach to operations, led to military failure (which also had more root causes) in Lebanon. A study of the SOD failure should lead to a careful approach being taken to all new military concepts and ideas. Both change and continuation need to be properly balanced and evaluated, while enhanced military effectiveness could be of great value. At the same time, the impact of concepts which are not well anchored in military science/history and untested, like the SOD, could be devastating for militaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article highlights the range of problems concerning the level of physical training of future officers of the Border Guard Service of Ukraine. The purpose of the article was to analyze the peculiarities of physical training of border guard cadets before and after the full-scale invasion. Methods: The methods used in the research were both theoretical and practical. The results of the research were processed due to the comparative analysis. Results: The recorded changes were taken into account in the content of the Draft Military Doctrine of Ukraine and in the developed Instructions for the Physical Training of Border Guard Officers; in the work educational programs devoted to physical training, personnel policy of the law enforcement agency and the quality of the relevant training sessions, improving the level of physical training of future border guard officers. Conclusions: The connection between the quality and the content of physical training of future border guard officers in terms of the effectiveness of defensive as well as dynamics and potential of offensive operations during the war was proved subsequent to the results of the research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]