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The European Union and the OSCE are security organizations in Europe that deal with the Ukraine war and the observance of the ceasefire in eastern Ukraine. The OSCE observed the situation on the ground and tried to achieve local ceasefires. The Russian invasion of Ukraine led to the evacuation of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and a discussion about the future of the organization with or without Russia. The OSCE observer mission at the Gukovo and Donetsk border crossings was not extended by the Russian delegation. The OSCE mission had to be terminated due to Russia's refusal to extend the mandate. [Extracted from the article]

NATO and Russia have given up on cooperative approaches and returned to deterrence; in parallel, arms control regimes are collapsing or eroding. Any deterrence relationship involves a danger of uncontrolled escalation, aggravated by uncertainty, sub-regional crises and a larger role for nuclear weapons. This article explores the possibilities for addressing these threats by means of sub-regional conventional arms control, combining disengagement with transparency and verification measures. Such an approach would address the real threat, mainly by adapting existing agreements, and would also be inexpensive in financial terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions. It says that was established on June 18, 2013 in Vienna, Austria by a dozen of research institutes. It mentions that it deals will all types of issues connected to the OSCE.

This article addresses the question of whether and to what degree an instrument of preventive diplomacy that does not have any coercive measures at its disposal, such as the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), can become "effective". The paper explores key terms such as "national minority" and "preventive diplomacy" and examines the way in which these terms were conceptualized by the HCNM itself. Further on, it elaborates what constitutes effectiveness in an international institution such as the HCNM. The research design focuses first on the triangular primary conflict constellation among a national minority, a nationalizing State and a kin-state as the independent variable and its impact on the dependent variable, the level of escalation. In a second step, the focus is on the efforts of the HCNM as the intervening variable. Three types of HCNM effectiveness are conceptualized: operational, substantive and normative. Subsequently, the applicability of this research instrument is shown through the example of three (groups of) national minorities: three cases of Russian-speaking minorities (in Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine), one case of a Hungarian minority (in Romania), and another of an Albanian minority (in Macedonia). The empirical data on these cases, which cover the period from 1993 to 2001, are taken from a research project on the effectiveness of the HCNM, which the author directed from 1999 to 2002. The purpose is not to carry out full-fledged country studies, but to demonstrate what kind of effectiveness the HCNM can achieve under which conditions, and where the limits of this effectiveness lie. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses efforts to elaborate confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). The Union of South American Nations has outlined CSBM categories including advance notification of defence exercises and exchange of information and transparency. A revised version of the Vienna Document was welcomed to address the role of arms controls and CSBMs in the security environment. The blockade of the Open Skies Consultative Commission is also addressed.

The article discusses conventional arms controls in Europe. Particular focus is given to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which serves as the framework for pan-European arms control, as well as the 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control. The prospects and challenges to arms control include the unresolved issue of missile defence cooperation and the territorial conflict in Georgia.

The article presents an obituary for Max van der Stoel, institution-builder of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) with the use of research and academic expertise for conflict prevention as its first High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCMN).

The article discusses the developments that led to the decision to convene the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) summit meeting to be held in Astana on December 1-2, 2010. The OSCE Ministerial Council (MC) made the decision on August 3, 2010, to provide participating states with the opportunity to address threats and challenges based on re-established cooperative security approach. It also analyzes which issues were addressed within the OSCE's Corfu process.

The article analyzes the principle of cooperative security and its implementation in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) region. It explores various problems that have led to the non-implementation of such principle, including intra-state conflicts, transnational threats and challenges and membership of states in various regional and international organizations. It also outlines some conclusions for future security dialogue and cooperation among the OSCE states, including linking such principles to problem-solving efforts.

The article discusses "OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century," a programmatic document on transnational threats released by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The document focuses on threats to security and stability in Europe. Factors that cause these threats include weak governance and inadequate democratic institutions.

The article presents an interview with Ambassador Wilhelm Höynck, former secretary general of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Questions addressed include the efforts of inter-OSCE calls for reforms and published reports on process recommendations, the political implications of the organization's involvement with European affairs, and the OSCE's focus on election monitoring.

The subject of this article is the changing balance between Russia's positive and negative interests in the Conference on/Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) as these have evolved in relation to Western policies on the OSCE and European security relations in general. Parallel to the decline of positive Russian interests in the CSCE/OSCE, an increase in negative attitudes can be observed, most of which concern the OSCE's activities in post-Soviet countries. While the Soviet Union was traditionally a reliable supporter of the CSCE, the Russian Federation, which initially pursued the same policy, has lost most of its sense of ownership in the OSCE. This change in Russian attitudes is critical for the Organisation's future, for an OSCE without active Russian participation would lose much of its raison d'être. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comments on the responsibility of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to address the emergence of new transnational threats and risks. Category of transnational threats; Actors associated with transnational risks; Considerations for effectively addressing the problem.

Focuses on the new forms and support structures for Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) field operations. Recognition of multifunctional civilian field operations as key asset and the most comparative advantage of the organization; Number of field operations run by the organization; Importance of the ability and collective will of participating States to engage in multilateral cooperation for function and effectiveness of OSCE field operations.

The article focuses on the failure of the 2011 Ministerial Council (MC) meeting of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to resolve key issues on transnational crimes, which was held in Vilnius, Lithuania. The author cites the worsening U.S.-Russian relation as a primordial reason for such failure. The MC meeting tackled but not adopted various draft decisions including issues on the threat of illicit drugs, cyberterrorism and human trafficking.