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Abstract In many countries, standardized math tests are important for achieving academic success. Here, we examine whether content of items, the story that explains a mathematical question, biases performance of low-SES students. In a large-scale cohort study of Trends in International Mathematics and Science Studies (TIMSS)—including data from 58 countries from students in grades 4 and 8 (N = 5501,165)—we examine whether item content that is more likely related to challenges for low-SES students (money, food, social relationships) improves their performance, compared with their average math performance. Results show that low-SES students scored lower on items with this specific content than expected based on an individual’s average performance. The effect sizes are substantial: on average, the chance to answer correctly is 18% lower. From a hidden talents approach, these results are unexpected. However, they align with other theoretical frameworks such as scarcity mindset, providing new insights for fair testing.

There has been significant progress in understanding the effects of childhood poverty on neurocognitive development. This progress has captured the attention of policymakers and promoted progressive policy reform. However, the prevailing emphasis on the harms associated with childhood poverty may have inadvertently perpetuated a deficit-based narrative, focused on the presumed shortcomings of children and families in poverty. This focus can have unintended consequences for policy (e.g., overlooking strengths) as well as public discourse (e.g., focusing on individual rather than systemic factors). Here, we join scientists across disciplines in arguing for a more well-rounded, “strength-based” approach, which incorporates the positive and/or adaptive developmental responses to experiences of social disadvantage. Specifically, we first show the value of this approach in understanding normative brain development across diverse human environments. We then highlight its application to educational and social policy, explore pitfalls and ethical considerations, and offer practical solutions to conducting strength-based research responsibly. Our paper re-ignites old and recent calls for a strength-based paradigm shift, with a focus on its application to developmental cognitive neuroscience. We also offer a unique perspective from a new generation of early-career researchers engaged in this work, several of whom themselves have grown up in conditions of poverty. Ultimately, we argue that a balanced strength-based scientific approach will be essential to building more effective policies.

In the wake of the replication crisis, there have been calls to increase the clarity and precision of theory in the social sciences. Here, we argue that the effects of these calls may be limited due to incentives favoring ambiguous theory. Intentionally or not, scientists can exploit theoretical ambiguities to make support for a claim appear stronger than it is. Practices include theory stretching, interpreting an ambiguous claim more expansively to absorb data outside of the scope of the original claim, and post-hoc precision, interpreting an ambiguous claim more narrowly so it appears more precisely aligned with the data. These practices lead to the overestimation of evidence for the original claim and create the appearance of consistent support and progressive research programs, which may in turn be rewarded by journals, funding agencies, and hiring committees. Selection for ambiguous research can occur even when scientists act in good faith. Although ambiguity might be inevitable or even useful in the early stages of theory construction, scientists should aim for increased clarity as knowledge advances. Science benefits from transparently communicating about known ambiguities. To attain transparency about ambiguity, we provide a set of recommendations for authors, reviewers, and journals. We conclude with suggestions for research on how scientists use strategic ambiguity to advance their careers and the ways in which norms, incentives, and practices favor strategic ambiguity. Our paper ends with a simple mathematical model exploring the conditions in which high-ambiguity theories are favored over low-ambiguity theories, providing a basis for future analyses.

Childhood adversity can lead to cognitive deficits or enhancements, depending on many factors. Though progress has been made, two challenges prevent us from integrating and better understanding these patterns. First, studies commonly use and interpret raw performance differences, such as response times, which conflate different stages of cognitive processing. Second, most studies either isolate or aggregate abilities, obscuring the degree to which individual differences reflect task-general (shared) or task-specific (unique) processes. We addressed these challenges using Drift Diffusion Modeling (DDM) and structural equation modeling (SEM). Leveraging a large, representative sample of 9--10 year-olds from the Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development (ABCD) study, we examined how two forms of adversity--material deprivation and household threat--were associated with performance on tasks measuring processing speed, inhibition, attention shifting, and mental rotation. Using DDM, we decomposed performance on each task into three distinct stages of processing: speed of information uptake, response caution, and stimulus encoding/response execution. Using SEM, we isolated task-general and task-specific variances in each processing stage and estimated their associations with the two forms of adversity. Youth with more exposure to household threat (but not material deprivation) showed slower task-general processing speed, but showed intact task-specific abilities. In addition, youth with more exposure to household threat tended to respond more cautiously in general. These findings suggest that traditional assessments might overestimate the extent to which childhood adversity reduces specific abilities. By combining DDM and SEM approaches, we can develop a more nuanced understanding of how adversity affects different aspects of youth's cognitive performance.

In the past decade, there has been monumental progress in our understanding of the neurobiological basis of sensitive periods. Little is known, however, about the evolution of sensitive periods. Recent studies have started to address this gap. Biologists have built mathematical models exploring the environmental conditions in which sensitive periods are likely to evolve. These models investigate how mechanisms of plasticity can respond optimally to experience during an individual’s lifetime. This paper discusses the central tenets, insights, and predictions of these models, in relation to empirical work on humans and other animals. We also discuss which future models are needed to improve the bridge between theory and data, advancing their synergy. Our paper is written in an accessible manner and for a broad audience. We hope our work will contribute to recently emerging connections between the fields of developmental neuroscience and evolutionary biology. Keywords: Sensitive periods, Critical periods, Evolution, Plasticity, Development, Formal modeling

We used a Face-in-the-Crowd task to examine whether hostile environments predict enhanced detection of anger, and whether such enhanced cognition occurs for a different negative emotion, sadness, as well. We conducted a well-powered, preregistered study in 100 college students and 100 individuals from a community sample with greater exposure to hostile environments. At the group level, the community sample was less accurate at detecting both angry and sad faces than students; and, only students discriminated anger more accurately than sadness. At the individual level, having experienced more violence did not predict enhanced anger detection accuracy. In general, participants had a lower threshold (i.e., a more liberal criterion) for detecting emotion in response to anger than sadness. And, students had a higher threshold (i.e., a more conservative criterion) for detecting emotion than the community sample in response to both anger and sadness. Overall, these findings contradict our hypothesis that exposure to hostile environments predicts enhanced danger detection. Rather, our community sample was more prone to over-perceiving emotions, consistent with previous studies showing bias in threat-exposed populations. Future work is needed to tease apart the conditions in which people exposed to social danger show enhanced accuracy or bias in their perception of emotions.

The present contribution highlights the importance of context while investigating dishonesty in collaborative settings.