1. Coal-Biomass Co-firing within Renewable Portfolio Standards: Strategic Adoption by Heterogeneous Firms and Emissions Implications
- Author
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Valqui, Brayam, Webster, Mort D., Sun, Shanxia, and Hertel, Thomas W.
- Subjects
Power plants -- Case studies -- Models ,Game theory -- Case studies -- Models ,Electric power-plants -- Case studies -- Models ,Coal-fired power plants -- Case studies -- Models ,Air quality management -- Standards -- Case studies -- Models ,Emissions (Pollution) -- Case studies -- Models ,Alternative energy sources -- Case studies -- Models ,Business ,Economics ,Petroleum, energy and mining industries - Abstract
As electricity from coal declines, co-firing coal plants with biomass has been proposed to extend coal unit life, increase production, and reduce carbon emissions. Previous studies reach conflicting conclusions on whether coal biomass co-firing would result in a net increase or decrease in carbon emissions. We explore whether biomass co-firing would decrease emissions using a novel framework that includes two critical features of electricity markets: strategic adoption decisions by firms and intertemporal constraints on power plant operations. We apply this framework to a case study based on the Midwestern U.S. electricity market and show that profit maximizing firms will retrofit mid-efficiency coal units, rather than the most or least efficient units. We demonstrate that, contrary to expectations, this strategy leads to a net increase in system-wide carbon emissions under high carbon prices because of the other generators displaced by co-firing units. Keywords: Electricity markets, Game theory, Technology adoption. Equilibrium framework, Environmental regulations, 1. INTRODUCTION The electric power sector is in the process of a major transition in its composition of fuels, technologies, and regulatory environment, and this transition is likely to accelerate [...]
- Published
- 2023
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