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The London 2012 Olympics are the catalyst for a renewed effort to create an effective Public-Private Partnership in the provision of national security and resilience. Valentina Soria explores the public sector's concerted effort to engage businesses in the planning and delivery of security, and the positive long-lasting effects this may have on the UK's security culture. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In 2006, the UK government deployed forces into Helmand as part of the ISAF expansion into southern Afghanistan. It did so with limited force levels; a strategic choice that was further criticised when the move 'up the valley' into the north of the province left UK forces thinly spread acrossa large and dangerous region. Helmand operations have cost over 360 lives, but there have been stabilisation gains. Nevertheless, important lessons remain to be learned about Britain's strategic policy-making from the decisions of 2005-06. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 9/11, the security investment in major sporting events has risen as terrorism remains at the top of the list of risks. Like other Games before it, London 2012 will not only have to deter threats to the event, but also ensure a lasting legacy for the national security infrastructure. The UK must embrace an inclusive, integrated approach that incorporates the best lessons of previous Olympic Games, and contributes to the improvement of major event security for future host nations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Five years since the 7/7 London bomb attacks and almost a decade after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the jihadist terror threat from violent extremists has evolved in significant ways, particularly as it affects the United Kingdom. Research indicates that one wave of terrorism directed at the UK has more or less run its course. But there is powerful circumstantial evidence to indicate that another phase may soon emerge and that it may be quite different from before. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have seen a significant number of terrorist plotters convicted in the UK. Few have successfully carried out their tasks. But their deadly intentions threaten the nation's security. The aftermath of these cases allows some conclusions to be drawn as to how potential operatives are radicalised, recruited and trained, and what this means for the British security forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]