Search

Over the last several months, Turkish politics have been roiled by the 'Kurdish opening' launched by the governing AKP (Justice and Development Party). Though admittedly vague in its content, this [...]

This article analyzes the case of Turkey and theorizes about the causal mechanisms that can explain discursive transformations through which dominant perceptions of ethnic identities are suppressed, revived, and remade. Systematic content analysis of a major Turkish newspaper from 1984 through 1998, comparisons across subperiods, in-depth interviews with prominent journalists. and detailed examination of the historical events constitute the empirical analysis. Arguing that the state elites did not form a monolithic group, it is shown that the transformation of the mainstream discourse during the 1990s occurred after several reversals, relatively swiftly, and at least partly despite resistance from within the state. The Kurdistan Worker's Party conflict; shifting instrumental elite beliefs: breakdown of cooperation among moderates: external developments, including those in Iraq; and cascade mechanisms played causal roles. The explanation contributes to a multidisciplinary body of literatures on public-political discourse, cascade theories of social-political change, ethnic conflict, democratization. Turkey, and Kurds and derives policy implications. Keywords: public discourse; cascades; democratic transition: Turkey; Kurds; Iraq; ethnic conflict

"Pernicious polarization" – the division of society into mutually distrustful Us versus Them camps in which political identity becomes a social identity – fosters autocratization by incentivizing citizens and political actors alike to endorse non-democratic action. An exploratory analysis of new V-Dem data on polarization indeed shows the negative relationship between the level of political polarization and liberal democracy ratings. How can pernicious polarization be avoided or reversed once present? By drawing on an endogenous explanation of polarization, where the decisions and actions of both opposition actors and incumbents contribute to its evolution, we focus on the question of what democratic opposition actors can do to stop or reverse pernicious polarization. Based on insights from examples across the world and deductive theory-building, along with illustrative cases, we offer a typology of potential opposition goals, strategies and tools, and then analyse how these may affect polarization and in turn democratic quality at early and late stages. We identify goals as either generative or preservative, and we argue that "active-depolarizing" and "transformative-repolarizing" strategies are more promising than "passive-depolarizing" and "reciprocal polarizing" strategies to improve a country's resilience to autocratizing pressures. The specific tools employed to pursue these goals and strategies are also crucial, though the effectiveness of available institutional accountability and mobilizational tools will change as the process of polarization advances. The emerging literatıres on opposition strategies to democratize electoral autocracies and to improve the resilience of democracies should incorporate their impact on polarization as a critical intervening variable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As political and societal polarization deepens, democracies are under stress around the world. This article examines the complex relationship and causal direction between democracy and polarization and posits three theoretical possibilities: (1) polarization contributes to democratic backsliding and decay, (2) polarization results from democratic crisis, and (3) polarization contributes to democratic deepening. We argue “politics” is central to polarization and identify as a key feature of the process of polarization the manner in which it simplifies the normal complexity of politics and social relations. Polarization does so by aligning otherwise unrelated divisions, emasculating cross-cutting cleavages, and dividing society and politics into two separate, opposing, and unyielding blocks. As such, it often has pernicious consequences for democracy, emerging as an intended or unintended consequence of political interest–based and purposeful political mobilization. Polarization over the very concept of democracy may also be the product of democratic crisis. Finally, in certain circumstances, polarization may strengthen democratic institutions and citizen choice. The article then introduces the articles in this issue that address these three theoretical and empirical possibilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that a common pattern and set of dynamics characterizes severe political and societal polarization in different contexts around the world, with pernicious consequences for democracy. Moving beyond the conventional conceptualization of polarization as ideological distance between political parties and candidates, we offer a conceptualization of polarization highlighting its inherently relational nature and its instrumental political use. Polarization is a process whereby the normal multiplicity of differences in a society increasingly align along a single dimension and people increasingly perceive and describe politics and society in terms of “Us” versus “Them.” The politics and discourse of opposition and the social–psychological intergroup conflict dynamics produced by this alignment are a main source of the risks polarization generates for democracy, although we recognize that it can also produce opportunities for democracy. We argue that contemporary examples of polarization follow a frequent pattern whereby polarization is activated when major groups in society mobilize politically to achieve fundamental changes in structures, institutions, and power relations. Hence, newly constructed cleavages are appearing that underlie polarization and are not easily measured with the conventional Left–Right ideological scale. We identify three possible negative outcomes for democracy—“gridlock and careening,” “democratic erosion or collapse under new elites and dominant groups,” and “democratic erosion or collapse with old elites and dominant groups,” and one possible positive outcome—“reformed democracy.” Drawing on literature in psychology and political science, the article posits a set of causal mechanisms linking polarization to harm to democracy and illustrates the common patterns and pernicious consequences for democracy in four country cases: varying warning signs of democratic erosion in Hungary and the United States, and growing authoritarianism in Turkey and Venezuela. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What do we learn from Turkey and Tunisia regarding the relationship between political Islamism and democratization? Variables identified by current research such as autonomy, “moderation”, and cooperation with secular actors can cut both ways depending on various political-institutional conditions and prerogatives. Particularly, the article argues that preoccupation with “conquering the state from within as opposed to democratizing it” has been a key priority and intervening variable undermining the democratizing potential of the main Turkish and Tunisian political Islamic actors – primarily the AKP and Ennahda. These actors have prioritized acceptance by and ownership of their respective nation states over other goals and strategies, such as revolutionary takeover or Islamization of the state and confrontations with state elites. This has led to a relative neglect of designing and building institutions, whether for Islamic or democratic transformation. Hence, while contributing to democratization at various stages, these actors have a predisposition to adopt and regenerate, reframe and at times augment the authoritarian properties of their states. Research should ask how secular and religious actors can agree on institutions of vertical and horizontal state accountability that would help to address the past and present sources of the interest of political Islamists in conquering rather than democratizing the state. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Turkey’s ‘authoritarian turn’ in recent years indicates a democratic breakdown that can best be analysed by analytically distinguishing between two simultaneous developments. The first is the reproduction of Turkey’s long-existing semi-democratic regime – which the article calls old authoritarianism – in a new historical and dominant political–ideological context and under an Islamist-leaning government. The second is the emergence of a new type of authoritarianism – dubbed new authoritarianism – that is in many respects unprecedented for Turkey, is in need of better comprehension and displays important parallels with contemporary troubles of democracy in the world. Focusing on political society and institutions is insufficient to adequately examine the emergent authoritarian regime, for example to identify it as a regime type, to explain its popular support and to foresee how durable and repressive, and to what extent party-based rather than personalistic, it may become. It is necessary to combine insights from the new political economy of welfare, transition and communication with those from political and institutional democratization. Doing so suggests that new authoritarianism generates a new kind of state–society relationship where, paradoxically, political power becomes simultaneously more particularistic, personalized and mass-based. Hence, new authoritarianism has democratizing potential, but can also become more oppressive than any other regime Turkey has previously experienced. Oscillation between these two outcomes is also possible. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Case studies of Turkey are typically read and cited as narratives of the Turkish case itself, suppliers of case-specific data, or at best, applications of more general theories. They are not perceived as theory-testing, producing, or even informing exercises. While this tendency partly results from the institutional, geographical–cultural, and methodological biases of extant social sciences, scholars may also be to blame for neglecting theory-development or for producing descriptive narratives. How can Turkish Studies scholars successfully contribute to general theory-development in their respective disciplines? The main value of Turkey for producing theory may lie in its rare combination of many qualities and in its temporal and regional variations. Thus, this article argues that, besides small-N and large-N comparative studies, the most promising way Turkish Studies can engage in theory-building may be by examining Turkey as a theory-developing critical case, i.e. as a crucial or, pathway or within-unit comparative case. For this, scholars would carefully design their studies as theory-infirming, theory-confirming, or theory-producing crucial case studies, utilize temporal and cross-sectional comparisons, and pay special attention to causal mechanisms, sequences, and processes. By using evidence from publications that draw on the Turkish case, the article shows that, since the 1990s, scholars have produced more research published in highly ranked journals of comparative politics, international relations and area studies. They also generate more single case studies with general theoretical ambitions and more visibility but so far with unclear actual theoretical impact. The article discusses some qualities of Turkey which make it a promising critical case for theory-development and how studying it this way can also help to achieve a better understanding of Turkey itself. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Based on a within-case comparative analysis of Turkish democratization since the 1920s and data on elite values, this article develops a general theoretical framework to better explain the moderation of religious and secular politics and democratization. First, it is maintained that the content of moderation and its effects on democracy will vary across countries depending on its domestic and international context – called a country's “centre” – and political rivals’ reactions. Second, moderation can further democratization only insofar as it happens with a democratic centre. Third, absent a democratic centre, moderation may involve adoption, retention and reproduction of the centre's undemocratic attributes. In such cases, the challenge of democratization is not moderation per se but the construction of a new, democratic centre by transcending the existing centre. Fourth, moderation is interactive between religious and secular actors, multidimensional and reversible. Turkish democratization began with the moderation of authoritarian-secular actors, but generated only a semi-democracy because the changes were not institutionalized through explicit and formal compromises to produce a fully democratic centre. Turkish political Islamism moderated during the 1990s. But, despite major achievements, democratization remained ambiguous under the rule of moderate Islamists because they compromised and associated themselves with the semi-democratic centre, and secular-religious cooperation failed while some secular actors de-moderated. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An essay is presented that reviews the book "Secular State and Religious Society: Two Forces in Play in Turkey," edited by Berna Turam. Topics include Turkey's secular laiklik form of government in relation to democracy, the notion of a secularist state and Islamic civil society, and religious toleration in Turkey.

From a conceptual-theoretical as well as political perspective, this essay examines the interrelationships between the identity and foreign policy dimensions of Turkey's Kurdish question and makes policy recommendations. Recent domestic and regional developments present both opportunities and great risks for Turkey's social, political and territorial cohesion, peace and stability. In order to utilize the opportunities, Turkey needs to simultaneously achieve two goals. Domestically, it needs to successfully continue its present peace process and achieve genuine democratization. This process should culminate in a state of affairs whereby the complex social and political questions underlying the Kurdish question can be processed through the mechanisms of normal democratic politics and with the participation of legitimate Kurdish political actors. In foreign policy, Turkey should consolidate its improved relations with regional Kurds based on interdependence and its redline should be the emergence of a hostile Kurdish statehood in the region, not Kurdish self-rule per se. This, however, should be done without alienating Arabs by defending any particular status for Iraqi or Syrian Kurds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do political-Islamic elites need to be democrats for participation in democracy, how do their values compare to secular elites’, and how do their values change through participation and affect democratization itself? A comparative-systematic content analysis of three Islamic-conservative and two pro-secular Turkish newspapers over nine years shows that, overall, political-Islamic elites adopt democratic political values. Furthermore, they began to view that liberal-democratic rights and freedoms serve their interests. However, value democratization, and, thus, moderation and democratization, is not a linear and inexorable process automatically resulting from participation or socioeconomic development. It occurs through ruptures such as conflicts with secular actors, and interdependently through the interactions of secular and religious actors. Hence, religious actors’ adoption of more democracy may paradoxically make some secular actors less democratic. The consolidation of pluralistic democracy requires the emergence of both religious and secular democrats by resolving complex problems of commitment, and of clashes in areas like social pluralism where Islamic values are less open to change. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article presents a systematic content analysis of three religious-conservative and two pro-secular newspapers in 1996-2004 in Turkey, and discusses some findings and their implications regarding elite values and democratization: considerable internal pluralism within both religious-conservative and pro-secular elites; general consensus on democracy but not on democratic norms' application to specific issues and groups other than one's own; a division of values on religion, secularism, and social pluralism; political value change in favor of liberal democracy but social conservatism among religious-conservative elites; fragmentation and relative cynicism, but not necessarily authoritarianism, among pro-secular elites; weak ideational change on the Kurdish issue. The article argues that the press plays a significant political role as a site where elite values change or are reproduced through discussion, deliberation, or silence. Values affect and are affected by political developments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the importance and implications of a debate in Turkey over the meaning, social-political role and regulation of Turkey's ethnic cultural diversity, especially that of its Kurdish component. Background on the evolution of Turkish nationalism; Information on several books that exemplify and contribute to the debate; Dominance of the defensive-nationalist perspective over the major texts, practices and discourse of the state.