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This paper examines the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic and its related economic, fiscal, social and political fallout on cities and metropolitan regions. We assess the effect of the pandemic on urban economic geography at the intra- and inter-regional geographic scales in the context of four main forces: the social scarring instilled by the pandemic; the lockdown as a forced experiment; the need to secure the urban built environment against future risks; and changes in the urban form and system. At the macrogeographic scale, we argue the pandemic is unlikely to significantly alter the winner-take-all economic geography and spatial inequality of the global city system. At the microgeographic scale, however, we suggest that it may bring about a series of short-term and some longer-running social changes in the structure and morphology of cities, suburbs and metropolitan regions. The durability and extent of these changes will depend on the timeline and length of the pandemic.

This article examines the effect of formal and informal institutional settings and of the governance of inter-organizational relationships on innovation at the cluster level. The research primarily relies on quantitative methods, utilizing data obtained from a survey involving 115 firms and 12 in-depth interviews. Supplementary qualitative information from the interviews has also been incorporated into the analysis. The results support the hypothesis that innovative firms should consider not only the impact of different governance modes but also how these modes align with the existing local contexts. Failure to do so may result in firms becoming entrenched in the prevailing practices and products of a specific location. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impacts of climate change are unevenly distributed across territories. Less is known about the potential effects of climate policies aimed at mitigating the negative consequences of climate change while transitioning economies towards low-carbon standards. This paper presents an analytical framework for identifying and assessing the regional impacts of the green transition. We develop a Regional Green Transition Vulnerability Index, a composite measure of the regional vulnerability of European regions to the socio-economic reconfigurations prompted by the green transition. The index brings to light strong regional variations in vulnerability, with less developed, peri-urban and rural regions in Southern and Eastern Europe more exposed to the foreseeable changes brought about by the green transition. We also draw attention to the potential rise of pockets of growing 'green' discontent, especially if the green transition contributes, as is likely to be the case, to leaving already left-behind regions further behind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While in recent times many regions have flourished, many others are stuck—or are at risk of becoming stuck—in a development trap. Such regions experience decline in economic growth, employment, and productivity relative to their neighbors and to their own past trajectories. Prolonged periods in development traps are leading to political dissatisfaction and unrest. Such discontent is often translated into support for antisystem parties at the ballot box. In this article we study the link between the risk, intensity, and duration of regional development traps and the rise of discontent in the European Union (EU)—proxied by the support for Eurosceptic parties in national elections between 2013 and 2022—using an econometric analysis at a regional level. The results highlight the strong connection between being stuck in a development trap, often in middle- or high-income regions, and support for Eurosceptic parties. They also suggest that the longer the period of stagnation, the stronger the support for parties opposed to European integration. This relationship remains robust whether considering only the most extreme Eurosceptic parties or including parties with more moderate levels of Euroscepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decentralisation has frequently been sold as a means to increase well-being and development. Yet, questions remain as to whether decentralisation improves economic performance. This is possibly because decentralisation processes have often led to 'unfunded mandates', that is, a mismatch between the powers transferred to subnational tiers of government and the resources allocated to them. In this article, we analyse how unfunded mandates shape regional economic growth across 518 regions in 30 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries over the period 1997–2018. There is a negative, statistically significant, and robust impact of unfunded mandates on economic growth. This effect is higher in more politically and less fiscally decentralised regions and in regions with a higher level of wealth. Unfunded mandates thus represent a serious drag on the potential positive economic effect of political decentralisation. Hence, for those benefits to materialise, better not more decentralisation – ensuring that finance follows function – should be pursued. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

COVID-19 is mostly considered to have ravaged places with high levels of inequality and poverty. Yet, in the case of Europe, the evidence for this is limited. In this paper we address this gap in our knowledge by exploring how regional variations in poverty, wealth and interpersonal inequality have shaped COVID-19-related excess mortality. The results show that during the first 18 months of the pandemic there is no link between inequality and poverty, on the one hand, and the lethality of the disease, on the other. The geographical concentration of wealthy people is related to more, not less, excess mortality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Solitude is a rising phenomenon in the western world. The share of people affected by solitude has been rising for some time and the Covid-19 pandemic has further brought this trend to the fore. Yet, we know next to nothing about the aggregate subnational economic impact of the rise in solitude. In this paper, we analyse the consequences of solitude on regional economic performance across Europe, distinguishing between two of its key dimensions: alone living, proxied by the regional share of single-person households and loneliness, proxied by the aggregate share of social interactions. We find that solitude has important implications for economic development, but that these go in different directions. While alone living is a substantial driver of economic growth across European regions, high shares of lonely people undermine it. The connection of loneliness with economic growth is, however, dependent on the frequency of in-person meetings, with large shares of the population meeting others socially on a weekly basis, alongside a small percentage of people who never meet others, yielding the best economic returns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Special economic zones (SEZs) are a popular policy tool for the promotion of economic development. However, questions remain about their economic contribution and about what aspects of SEZ policies are most relevant to investors. This article sheds light on these issues by comparing SEZs across Africa, Asia and Latin America. We find that while investment decisions by foreign companies are driven by market access, political stability and low labour costs, adequate SEZ policies facilitate the attraction of investment. A good industrial infrastructure together with a strategic location and service provision within the zones draw investment. Fiscal incentives, by contrast, have a limited influence on investment decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Implicitly or explicitly, much innovation policy treats investments in research and development (R&D) as the main input to innovation. A large body of literature in innovation studies has challenged this, highlighting the role of external sources of innovation and of innovation based on learning by doing, using and interacting (DUI). Nonetheless, there has been limited empirical research on how firm-internal activities to promote DUI affect innovation, and on how important such activities are relative to internal R&D and to external sources of knowledge. We also know little about how internal DUI activities interact with internal R&D and with external knowledge sourcing. We address these gaps using Norwegian Community Innovation Survey data from 2010. We find that internal DUI is an important driver of new-to-market product innovation. Further, the results show partial substitution effects between internal DUI and internal R&D, as well as between internal DUI and external DUI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic change over the past 20 years has rendered many individuals and territories vulnerable, leading to greater interpersonal and interterritorial inequality. This rising inequality is seen as a root cause of populism. Yet, there is no comparative evidence as to whether this discontent is the consequence of localised interpersonal inequality or stagnant growth in 'left-behind' places. This article assesses the association between levels and changes in local GDP per capita and interpersonal inequality, and the rise of far-right populism in Europe and in the USA. The analysis—conducted at small region level for Europe and county level for the USA—shows that there are both similarities and differences in the factors connected to populist voting on both sides of the Atlantic. In the USA, neither interpersonal inequality nor economic decline can explain populist support on their own. However, these factors gain significance when considered together with the racial composition of the area. Counties with a large share of white population where economic growth has been stagnant and where inequalities have increased supported Donald Trump. Meanwhile, counties with a similar economic trajectory but with a higher share of minorities shunned populism. In Europe, the most significant factor behind the rise of far-right populism is economic decline. This effect is particularly large in areas with a high share of immigration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why have some territories performed better than others in the fight against COVID‐19? This paper uses a novel dataset on excess mortality, trust and political polarization for 165 European regions to explore the role of social and political divisions in the remarkable regional differences in excess mortality during the first wave of the COVID‐19 pandemic. First, we investigate whether regions characterized by a low social and political trust witnessed a higher excess mortality. Second, we argue that it is not only levels, but also polarization in trust among citizens – in particular, between government supporters and non‐supporters – that matters for understanding why people in some regions have adopted more pro‐healthy behaviour. Third, we explore the partisan make‐up of regional parliaments and the relationship between political division – or what we refer to as 'uncooperative politics'. We hypothesize that the ideological positioning – in particular those that lean more populist – and ideological polarization among political parties is also linked to higher mortality. Accounting for a host of potential confounders, we find robust support that regions with lower levels of both social and political trust are associated with higher excess mortality, along with citizen polarization in institutional trust in some models. On the ideological make‐up of regional parliaments, we find that, ceteris paribus, those that lean more 'tan' on the 'GAL‐TAN' spectrum yielded higher excess mortality. Moreover, although we find limited evidence of elite polarization driving excess deaths on the left‐right or GAL‐TAN spectrums, partisan differences on the attitudes towards the European Union demonstrated significantly higher deaths, which we argue proxies for (anti)populism. Overall, we find that both lower citizen‐level trust and populist elite‐level ideological characteristics of regional parliaments are associated with higher excess mortality in European regions during the first wave of the pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]