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Does the hierarchical relationship between the district courts and the courts of appeals influence decision making at the trial level? Do these judges anticipate responses by appellate panels and condition their decisions based on these expectations? Using a sample of district court cases from 1925 to 1996 that were subsequently reviewed by the courts of appeals, and incorporating a strategic choice statistical framework, I discover that the district courts are constrained by the anticipated responses of the appeals courts. However, this conclusion is not apparent if one analyzes the data using traditional maximum likelihood raethods. Only when empirical analyses specifically model underlying strategic relationships does one discover this constraint. If the federal trial judges anticipate a negative response on appeal, then they curtail their ideological influences (the magnitude of influence decreases by approximately one-half). This pattern remains consistent when one examines civil liberties and economic cases, but not for criminal cases. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary appears to exert a significant constraint on the district courts. Keywords: U.S. district courts; U.S. courts of appeals; federal judiciary; trial courts; judicial decision making; precedent; strategic anticipation

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00623.x Byline: Kirk A. Randazzo (1) Author Affiliation: (1)University of Kentucky

Executing the Constitution: Putting the President Back into the Constitution. Edited by Christopher S. Kelley. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. 256 PP. As the introduction of Executing [...]

In the wake of the September 11th attacks, questions regarding the relationship of civil liberties to foreign affairs have received renewed salience within our society. This paper reviews historical patterns of decision-making in the U.S. Supreme Court and the courts of appeals when confronted with questions of individual rights versus the government's ability to engage in foreign relations. Using an original dataset of federal cases from 1946 to 2000, this Article examines the influence of competing preferences and constraints (i.e., individual rights versus security) on judicial behavior. The empirical results indicate that traditional notions of ideology and preferences over security concerns significantly affect the federal judicial system. However; examinations of individual court levels reveal that the lower courts respond more to security concerns, whereas the Supreme Court is influenced solely by ideological proclivities. Scholars of the judiciary who do not account for these additional dimensions may not adequately capture the complete decision-making processes across the judicial system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]