Search

Sustainability transitions are inevitable if we are to address the multiple crises in and caused by industrial agriculture. Despite the intent, there are few analyses of policy changes that enable sustainable agriculture; of the policy processes in particular. This paper analyses two cases of transition from the Union Government supported green revolution to biodiverse local and sustainable agriculture; cases of policy change evident in millet based agricultural programmes by two State Governments (Andhra Pradesh and Odisha) in India. A Laswellian in-context policy analysis reveals how the adverse social and ecological consequences of the green revolution in rainfed agriculture tracts in the country, was a key driver of these policy changes initiated by the State governments. The emergence of new and dispersed sub-national policy makers and regionally differentiated policy processes to address these consequences, mark significant institutional change. The re-definition of the policy problem by these new policy communities, led by civil society organizations and State Governments is enabled by new deliberative practices, a result of the substantive understanding of and the agency of rainfed agriculture and millets in these local agri-food systems. The new territorial identities forged within policy communities continue to confront the institutional rigidity of centralized consolidated agricultural knowledge and policy making. These decentralized policy processes and knowledge of and in the process are necessary for the transition to sustainable agri-food systems. They demand more academic and public engagement with institutional reform for sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The agricultural policy and science, which deals with the water quality in the states of Punjab and Haryana in India, is presented. Several case studies, tests on soil and scientific research evidences are illustrated.

The agricultural policy and science, which deals with the water quality in the states of Punjab and Haryana in India, is presented. Several case studies, tests on soil and scientific research evidences are illustrated.

This paper locates impact assessment research within the disciplinary constructs of agricultural economics, the institutions (rules of the game) and organizations (structures governed by these rules/norms) of agricultural innovation. The paper analyses the disciplinary limitations in impact assessment research. In the hard science culture of agricultural research the social sciences, closer to the reality of complex technological contexts, are less prestigious. Agricultural economics, the disciplinary root of impact assessment, imposes a major constraint by making institutional contexts and variations intractable and analysed at best as disturbances. Sophisticated econometric methodologies substitute for information on institutions, systems components and relationships. The paper presents an analytical framework to distinguish between the institutional and organizational variables in the agricultural innovation system. The case study of institutional and organizational change in Indian agricultural research and extension is used to demonstrate the role of institutions in determining the impact of agricultural science and technology. Impact assessment research is institutionally conditioned to look for end point consequences of research, such as yield increase, cost reduction, or farm income. This body of knowledge ignores crucial requirements such as the institutional framework (hierarchy for instance) and actors that facilitate these end point impacts. Mainstream impact assessment literature is not concerned about the important relationships among these institutions and actors, or about the impact of knowledge on these institutions and organizations. In the quest for end point consequences, estimated often as rates of return to investment, impact assessment has overlooked important requirements and relationships within agricultural innovation systems. An analysis of institutional learning using the key elements of an evaluation culture as proposed by program evaluators is used to demonstrate the need for impact assessment to engage with institutional questions and build the capacity for institutional learning. There is a felt need to move from impact assessment to a larger evaluation culture. Agricultural research evaluation has much to learn from regular program evaluation. This calls for more social science research besides neoclassical agricultural economics, and active interaction among the natural and social scientists, extensionists, farming communities, policy makers and other actors. Effective evaluation in general and impact assessment in particular depends on the institutional learning capacity of the actors, especially scientists and policy makers. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Examines the role of evaluation in promoting and sustaining professionalism in agricultural research organizations in India. Implication of the evaluation experience of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) for the institutionalization of professionalism; Analysis of specific evaluation experiences; Need for stringent evaluations in ICAR.

This article examines the crucial role of scientific expertise and authority, in evaluation as well as in research decision-making. The case of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) is used to demonstrate how the bureaucratic imperatives in a public research system can thwart the cause of scientific authority and accountability. Research decision-making is a function delegated to different points, or ‘nodes’, vested with scientific expertise and the power to make decisions. Scientific expertise is the basic asset used by the nodes, which may be individual scientists and⁄or groups, boards or organizations. Patronage or decision-making in the ICAR is, for the most part, vested in bureaucratic nodes, marking the dichotomy in the organization between scientific and administrative or financial decisionmaking. The concluding section of this article highlights the social reproduction of bureaucratic nodes, which perpetuates the marginalization of evaluation. The nodes in the ICAR rely on bureaucratic decision-making not validated by evaluations or assessments using scientific expertise. It is argued that stringent evaluation can replace bureaucratic authority with scientific expertise and authority, thereby bringing more accountability to the system of patronage of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents French-language abstracts related to evaluation.