Search

In a workforce characterized by constant disruption across social, economic, and environmental domains, as well as widespread employee suffering in the form of stress, burnout, and disengagement, both scholars and leaders have called for business to undergo transformative change in an effort to bring about collective flourishing. Drawing inspiration from Buddhist philosophy and research on the communicative constitution of organizations, we present a new theory that explains how organizations can foster a positive form of organizing—what we term humanistic organizing—through a tripartite framework of mindful organizational communication. Our theory demonstrates that transforming organizations to become more humanistic is a matter of rethinking an organization's underlying ethos, grounding that new ethos in humanistic principles, and then: (a) embedding the wisdom of this new ethos in organizational communication, (b) intentionally drawing on this wisdom in everyday talk and text, and (c) ethically enacting this wisdom in the form of ongoing organizing practices, which may include revising the preexisting organizing practices. We illustrate our theory through two case illustrations: one that reflects an organization that has demonstrated humanistic organizing from its inception, and another that reflects an organization that underwent a transformative process to become more humanistic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reasons behind the failure of some efforts to build trust among stakeholders are investigated. Findings show that creating trust with one group may damage it with another and that integrity is insufficient. The relevance of difference factors to various stakeholders is analyzed.

The emergence of innovative business models suggests that the foundational assumptions of competitive capitalism are increasingly in doubt. Business schools, however, appear to be followers rather than leaders in this historical moment of social change. While consumers and businesses are experimenting with new models of capitalism, business schools have been slow to change. What role should business schools play in this emerging new era of purpose-driven capitalism and business with purpose? We explore this question in conversation with six global experts, three in academia and three in practice, who are leading this change. The experts conclude that business must serve the needs of humanity rather than the needs of business. Business schools, therefore, need to reduce their emphasis on how to make businesses more rational and efficient and should instead focus on how businesses can help address more fundamental questions of the human condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we present the results of an evaluation of a new paradigm for the undergraduate "Introduction to Management" course. Included is an overview of the basic principles of the pedagogy, the learning objectives of the course, and the process of evaluating those goals and outcomes. We developed a course that integrated the Jesuit values along the learning dimensions of knowing, doing and being by focusing on improving students' self-awareness, emotional and spiritual intelligence, and mindfulness. Complementing this focus on personal growth was a skills-based approach to help students improve their capacities for conflict resolution and managing their psychological and physical well-being. We found that our students, (n > 600), reported higher levels of emotional stability, higher levels of well-being, and an increased sense of purpose and personal engagement in the world, after completing the course. These results were self-reported despite lower scores on traditional teaching evaluations (3.8/5). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In assembly of short responses, noted scholars—including former presidents of the Academy of Management (AOM)—share their perspectives on the events related to AOM leadership following EO13769. The pieces are reflections on the micro-level aspects of leadership and the ethical and moral choices therein. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores how contingency misfit can possibly be compensated. The paper particularly focuses on stakeholder enactment as a dynamic adaptation mechanism to overcome configurational misfit. By analyzing data from 238 firms located in eight countries, our study shows that stakeholder enactment can indeed buffer for contingency misfit. Enactment of internal stakeholders buffers the structure-strategy misfit, while enactment of external stakeholders buffers both the environment-organization misfit and structure-strategy misfit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public trust in business, defined as the degree to which the public—meaning society at large—trusts business in general, is largely understudied. This article suggests four domains of existing trust research from which scholars of public trust in business can draw. The authors then propose four main hypotheses, which aim to predict the determinants of public trust, and test these hypotheses using a factorial vignette methodology. These results will provide scholars with more direction as this article is, to the authors' knowledge, one of the first empirical studies of public trust. Furthermore, the study will enable those companies interested in increasing public trust to understand better respective determinants of public trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how both corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be improved by using insights from complexity theory. Complexity theory reveals that decentralized governance architecture is required for firms to absorb competently the increased intricacies, variety of variables, and objectives introduced by CSR. The current predominant form of centralized governance based on command-and-control hierarchies copes with complexities by reducing data inputs. This approach results in firms reducing their objectives, concerns, and insights about CSR. Firms with a decentralized “network” form of governance architecture are used to illustrate how the data inputs of each manager can be reduced through the decomposition of decision-making labor to improve the capability of the firm to intelligently absorb and manage complexity. Network governance also introduces a division of powers with stakeholders to facilitate information flow and strengthen incentives to manage the enterprise to enhance both shareholder value and CSR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We sketch out two basic paradigms informing banking practice: the economistic paradigm focusing on profit maximization and the humanistic one, serving the common good. We then highlight paradigmatic cases to explore how each of these business models fared during the quasi-natural experiment of the financial crisis. We find that many humanistic banks outperformed traditional economistic banks. Despite the uneven playing field humanistic banks fared remarkably well with regard to traditional financial performance judgements, muting criticisms of competitiveness. We find that overall both paradigms can provide a basis for successful banking as long as social and financial value generation are blended. We conclude by providing lessons learned for better banking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

10.2 trillion dollars have been lost in the US alone in the first two years after Lehman Brothers collapse. In its wake 45% of world's wealth has been destroyed and three of the largest bankruptcies in the US have occurred. Just as the majority of observers thought lessons from Enron had been learned, crisis had struck again. Massive government intervention, the collapse of the banking system, and public outrage at the missteps of executives have highlighted once more the weaknesses of mainstream corporate governance systems. Contrary to popular opinion the principal cause of the crisis was not sub-prime mortgage defaults but a failure of corporate governance, states the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants. While the OECD is brainstorming new corporate governance codes, public policy makers are calling for more comprehensive and tougher regulation. How likely will those changes help to prevent a future crisis? Not very likely, we argue, unless we fundamentally rethink the underlying failures inherent to the Anglo- Saxon structure of corporate governance and regulation. In the following article, we thus examine the systemic shortcomings of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance that arise from too much power being vested in a single board. We also lay out alternative governance models based on the natural science of communication and control. We then identify why a single board cannot adequately and reliably control the complex firms that wield influence over our lives. Examples of alternative models provide evidence that managers can design governance architectures that significantly reduce the risk of systematic blind spots, and the ensuing massive wealth destruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The various crises require a different paradigm for business theory and practice. For this special issue contributors were asked to conceptualize such an alternative paradigm and propose and discuss heretofore unnamed phenomena. We present six contributions from renowned experts in the field that argue for a shift in perspective of management and organizational research and practice to allow us to conceptualize a life-conducive economic system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we review the challenges to the current economic system and then proceed by presenting two competing paradigms--the economistic and humanistic paradigms of business. We then develop the consequences of the humanistic view for the theory and practice of the firm with regard to global sustainability. We examine paradigmatic differences regarding business strategy, governance structures, leadership styles, and organizational culture, and illustrate them based on global case examples. In this manner, we contribute to the discussion of alternative theories for global sustainability, centering the debate on authentic human needs and the consequences of such for management theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Banks failed in 2008 because individuals with knowledge of risks were not connected to individuals who had the incentive and power to take corrective action. Evidence of this problem is provided by reports from the Lehman liquidator and The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. Improved communications and control within and between banks, their regulators and stakeholders can be achieved with network governance. Lawmakers and/or regulators can introduce network governance by requiring bank shareholders to amend corporate constitutions to introduce a division of power with checks and balances with stakeholders, who can take on the role of supplementary and/or co-regulators. Such decentralized regulatory architecture is how simple living creatures sustain their existence in complex, dynamic and unpredictable environments without suffering communication errors and/or overload. The natural science of control and communication identified in 1948 by Wiener explains why centralized control and communication systems are not found in nature. This science of regulatory systems explains why regulators and large firms fail to reliably manage, regulate or govern complexity. Examples of large network-governed firms provide evidence that they obtain sustainable operating advantages over business cycles. This indicates how natural systems provide design criteria to enhance the efficacy of business operations, governance and regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Perspective Research Question/Issue: What were the reasons for poor risk management on the board level before and during the financial crisis? Were there systemic information processing problems that an alternative board design could alleviate? Research Findings/Insights: Using an information processing perspective, we identify two reasons for boards failing to manage risk well during the financial crisis: (1) board members did not have access to relevant information on the risks management incurred because they had no control over information supply; and (2) board members were unable to process the available risk-related information, and lacked incentives or power to influence managerial decision making. Based on insights from cybernetics and decision making theory, we suggest increasing board level information processing and decision making capabilities by including multiple boards for different stakeholders to create a division of power and labor. We label this alternative structure network governance and posit that it allows superior risk management. Theoretical/Academic Implications: The paper illustrates that the unitary board structure's systemic shortcomings increase the likelihood of poor risk management at the board level. The solutions proposed are an important theoretical advancement of the discussion on ongoing board failure in increasingly complex business environments. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This paper is one of few providing actual recommendations based on a systemic insight. Enlightened shareholders and/or managers could introduce network governance by amending corporate constitutions. Regulators should require firms considered too big to fail to adopt network governance or pay the cost for regulators establishing a risk-monitoring unit in each firm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]