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Altruistic behavior, i.e., promoting the welfare of others at a cost to oneself, is subserved by the integration of various social, affective, and economic factors represented in extensive brain regions. However, it is unclear how different regions interact to process/integrate information regarding the helper's interest and recipient's need when deciding whether to behave altruistically. Here we combined an interactive game with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to characterize the neural network underlying the processing/integration of self-interest and other-need. At the behavioral level, high self-risk decreased helping behavior and high other-need increased helping behavior. At the neural level, activity in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) were positively associated with self-risk levels, and activity in right inferior parietal lobe (rIPL) and rDLPFC were negatively associated with other-need levels. Dynamic causal modeling further suggested that both MPFC and rIPL were extrinsically connected to rDLPFC; high self-risk enhanced the effective connectivity from MPFC to rDLPFC, and the modulatory effect of other-need on the connectivity from rIPL to rDLPFC positively correlated with the modulatory effect of other-need on individuals’ helping rate. Two tDCS experiments provided causal evidence that rDLPFC affects both self-interest and other-need concerns, and rIPL selectively affects the other-need concerns. These findings suggest a crucial role of the MPFC-IPL-DLPFC network during altruistic decision-making, with rDLPFC as a central node for integrating and modulating motives regarding self-interest and other-need.

Promises are crucial for maintaining trust in social hierarchies. It is well known that not all promises are kept; yet the effect of social status on responses to promises being kept or broken is far from understood, as are the neural processes underlying this effect. Here we manipulated participants’ social status before measuring their investment behavior as Investor in iterated Trust Game (TG). Participants decided how much to invest in their partners, who acted as Trustees in TG, after being informed that their partners of higher or lower social status either promised to return half of the multiplied sum (4 × invested amount), did not promise, or had no opportunity to promise. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded when the participants saw the Trustees’ decisions in which the partners always returned half of the time, regardless of the experimental conditions. Trustee decisions to return or not after promising to do so were defined as honesty and dishonesty, respectively. Behaviorally, participants invested more when Trustees promised than when Trustees had no opportunity to promise, and this effect was greater for higher status than lower status Trustees. Neurally, when viewing Trustees’ return decisions, participants’ medial frontal negativity (MFN) responses (250–310 ms post onset) were more negative when Trustees did not return than when they did return, suggesting that not returning was an expectancy violation. P300 responses were only sensitive to higher status return feedback, and were more positive-going for higher status partner returns than for lower status partner returns, suggesting that higher status returns may have been more rewarding/motivationally significant. Importantly, only participants in low subjective socioeconomic status (SES) evidenced an increased P300 effect for higher status than lower status honesty (honesty – dishonesty), suggesting that higher status honesty was especially rewarding/motivationally significant for participants with low SES. Taken together, our results suggest that in an earlier time window, MFN encodes return valence, regardless of honesty or social status, which are addressed in a later cognitive appraisal process (P300). Our findings suggest that social status influences honesty perception at both a behavioral and neural level, and that subjective SES may modulate this effect.

Social hierarchy exists in almost all social species and affects everything from resource allocation to the development of intelligence. Previous studies showed that status within a social hierarchy influences the perceived fairness of income allocation. However, the effect of one’s social status on economic decisions is far from clear, as are the neural processes underlying these decisions. In this study, we dynamically manipulated participants’ social status and analyzed their behavior as recipients in the ultimatum game, during which event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Behavioral results showed that acceptance rates for offers increased with the fairness level of offers. Importantly, participants were less likely to accept unfair offers when they were endowed with high status than with low status. In addition, cues indicating low status elicited a more positive P2 than cues indicating high status in an earlier time window (170 – 240 ms), and cues indicating high status elicited a more negative N400 than did cues indicating low status in a later time window (350 – 520 ms). During the actual reception of offers, the late positivity potential (LPP, 400 – 700 ms) for unfair offers was more positive in the high status condition than in the low status condition, suggesting a decreased arousal for unfair offers during low status. These findings suggest a strong role of social status in modulating individual behavioral and neural responses to fairness.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0150206.].

This study aimed to validate a Chinese's adaption of the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire for children (CERQ-Ck). This self-report instrument evaluates nine cognitive emotion regulation strategies that can be used by children after experiencing a negative life event. The CERQ-Ck was evaluated in a sample of 1403 elementary students between the ages of 9 and 11 by using cluster sampling. All the item-correlation coefficients for CERQ-Ck were above 0.30. The internal consistencies of the nine factors suggested moderate reliability (0.66 to 0.73). Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) indicated that the current version had the same structure as the original instrument (Tucker-Lewis index = 0.912, comparative fit index = 0.922, root mean square error of approximation = 0.032, standardized root mean square residual = 0.044). A second-order factor and a third-order factor structure were also found. Test-retest correlations (0.53 to 0.70, ps < 0.01) over a period of 1 month, which ranged from acceptable to moderately strong were obtained from a random and stratified subsample of elementary students (N = 76). In addition, we analyzed convergent validity in relation to CERQ-Ck and the Chinese version of the Children's Depression Inventory model dimensions with a subsample of 1083 elementary students. Multiple-group CFA confirmed the measurement invariance for both the male and female groups (ΔCFI < 0.01, ΔRMSEA < 0.015). Overall, results indicate that CERQ-Ck has similar psychometric properties to the original instrument as well as with adequate reliability and validity to investigate the nine cognitive emotion regulation strategies during late childhood developmental periods.