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Need states are internal states that arise from deprivation of crucial biological stimuli. They direct motivation, independently of external learning. Despite their separate origin, they interact with reward processing systems that respond to external stimuli. This article aims to illuminate the functioning of the needing system through the lens of active inference, a framework for understanding brain and cognition. We propose that need states exert a pervasive influence on the organism, which in active inference terms translates to a "pervasive surprise"—a measure of the distance from the organism's preferred state. Crucially, we define needing as an active inference process that seeks to reduce this pervasive surprise. Through a series of simulations, we demonstrate that our proposal successfully captures key aspects of the phenomenology and neurobiology of needing. We show that as need states increase, the tendency to occupy preferred states strengthens, independently of external reward prediction. Furthermore, need states increase the precision of states (stimuli and actions) leading to preferred states, suggesting their ability to amplify the value of reward cues and rewards themselves. Collectively, our model and simulations provide valuable insights into the directional and underlying influence of need states, revealing how this influence amplifies the wanting or liking associated with relevant stimuli. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the limitations of reductionist approaches in neuroscientific research and the need for integrative brain models that consider the complex interactions between brain structures, the body, and the environment. The article presents a modular-integrative modeling approach that combines biological realism with functional performance. This approach involves encapsulating each component of the model as a module in an isolated environment, allowing for efficient integration of existing models and continuous refinement. The article emphasizes the importance of compatibility between modules and communication between components, achieved through a message broker and simulation coordinator. The modular-integrative modeling approach has potential applications in multisensory integration, multiscale dynamics, and embodied cognition. The article concludes by highlighting the need for a comprehensive understanding of brain structure, dynamics, and function, as well as the interplay between the brain, body, and environment. [Extracted from the article]

This paper considers neural representation through the lens of active inference, a normative framework for understanding brain function. It delves into how living organisms employ generative models to minimize the discrepancy between predictions and observations (as scored with variational free energy). The ensuing analysis suggests that the brain learns generative models to navigate the world adaptively, not (or not solely) to understand it. Different living organisms may possess an array of generative models, spanning from those that support action‐perception cycles to those that underwrite planning and imagination; namely, from explicit models that entail variables for predicting concurrent sensations, like objects, faces, or people—to action‐oriented models that predict action outcomes. It then elucidates how generative models and belief dynamics might link to neural representation and the implications of different types of generative models for understanding an agent's cognitive capabilities in relation to its ecological niche. The paper concludes with open questions regarding the evolution of generative models and the development of advanced cognitive abilities—and the gradual transition from pragmatic to detached neural representations. The analysis on offer foregrounds the diverse roles that generative models play in cognitive processes and the evolution of neural representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Processing faces accurately and efficiently is a key capability of humans and other animals that engage in sophisticated social tasks. Recent studies reported a decoupled coding for faces in the primate inferotemporal cortex, with two separate neural populations coding for the geometric position of (texture-free) facial landmarks and for the image texture at fixed landmark positions, respectively. Here, we formally assess the efficiency of this decoupled coding by appealing to the information-theoretic notion of description length, which quantifies the amount of information that is saved when encoding novel facial images, with a given precision. We show that despite decoupled coding describes the facial images in terms of two sets of principal components (of landmark shape and image texture), it is more efficient (i.e., yields more information compression) than the encoding in terms of the image principal components only, which corresponds to the widely used eigenface method. The advantage of decoupled coding over eigenface coding increases with image resolution and is especially prominent when coding variants of training set images that only differ in facial expressions. Moreover, we demonstrate that decoupled coding entails better performance in three different tasks: the representation of facial images, the (daydream) sampling of novel facial images, and the recognition of facial identities and gender. In summary, our study provides a first principle perspective on the efficiency and accuracy of the decoupled coding of facial stimuli reported in the primate inferotemporal cortex. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During ecological decisions, such as when foraging for food or selecting a weekend activity, we often have to balance the costs and benefits of exploiting known options versus exploring novel ones. Here, we ask how individuals address such cost-benefit tradeoffs during tasks in which we can either explore by ourselves or seek external advice from an oracle (e.g., a domain expert or recommendation system). To answer this question, we designed two studies in which participants chose between inquiring (at a cost) for expert advice from an oracle, or to search for options without guidance, under manipulations affecting the optimal choice. We found that participants showed a greater propensity to seek expert advice when it was instrumental to increase payoff (study A), and when it reduced choice uncertainty, above and beyond payoff maximization (study B). This latter result was especially apparent in participants with greater trait-level intolerance of uncertainty. Taken together, these results suggest that we seek expert advice for both economic goals (i.e., payoff maximization) and epistemic goals (i.e., uncertainty minimization) and that our decisions to ask or not ask for advice are sensitive to cost-benefit tradeoffs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Performing goal-directed movements requires mapping goals from extrinsic (workspace-relative) to intrinsic (body-relative) coordinates and then to motor signals. Mainstream approaches based on optimal control realize the mappings by minimizing cost functions, which is computationally demanding. Instead, active inference uses generative models to produce sensory predictions, which allows a cheaper inversion to the motor signals. However, devising generative models to control complex kinematic chains like the human body is challenging.Weintroduce an active inference architecture that affords a simple but effective mapping from extrinsic to intrinsic coordinates via inference and easily scales up to drive complex kinematic chains. Rich goals can be specified in both intrinsic and extrinsic coordinates using attractive or repulsive forces. The proposed model reproduces sophisticated bodily movements and paves the way for computationally efficient and biologically plausible control of actuated systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Balancing habitual and deliberate forms of choice entails a comparison of their respective merits--the former being faster but inflexible, and the latter slower but more versatile. Here, we show that arbitration between these two forms of control can be derived from first principles within an Active Inference scheme. We illustrate our arguments with simulations that reproduce rodent spatial decisions in T-mazes. In this context, deliberation has been associated with vicarious trial and error (VTE) behavior (i.e., the fact that rodents sometimes stop at decision points as if deliberating between choice alternatives), whose neurophysiological correlates are "forward sweeps" of hippocampal place cells in the arms of the maze under consideration. Crucially, forward sweeps arise early in learning and disappear shortly after, marking a transition from deliberative to habitual choice. Our simulations show that this transition emerges as the optimal solution to the trade-off between policies that maximize reward or extrinsic value (habitual policies) and those that also consider the epistemic value of exploratory behavior (deliberative or epistemic policies)--the latter requiring VTE and the retrieval of episodic information via forward sweeps. We thus offer a novel perspective on the optimality principles that engender forward sweeps and VTE, and on their role on deliberate choice.