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The emergence of social networking sites offers protest movements new ways to mobilize for action and draw attention to their issues. However, relying on social media also creates challenges, as social media follow their own principles. If protest movements want to be visible in news feeds, they have to adapt to so-called social media logic, as originally postulated in mediatization research. The principles of social media have been conceptualized. However, there is a lack of empirical research on how political actors perceive and orient to this logic, how they learn about it, and the consequences for mobilization (i.e., communicating protest issues as well as taking protest action). As protest movements are an integral part of modern democracies, use social media somewhat intensively, and usually build on a fluid network structure that allows us to examine adaptation processes in greater detail, they are particularly suitable for addressing these questions. Semi-structured interviews with activists organizing protest actions or managing social media accounts from 29 movement organizations in Germany (N = 33) revealed that protest movements have internalized social media logic and paid attention to not only the design but also the timing of posts to suit algorithms. The protest organizations generally built on their experience with social media. The degree to which they followed these principles was based on available resources. Limits of this adaptation arose, for example, if sensitive or negative content rarely produced likes or, increasingly, personalization evoked a presumed hierarchy within the movements.

The Covid-19 pandemic was accompanied by a massive increase of the supply and demand for pandemic-related information. Similarly, conspiracy theories about the origins and functions of the Covid-19 virus flourished during the early stages of the pandemic. The present study draws on a nationally representative sample of the German population aged 18+ (N = 1,207) to investigate factors that are associated with people’s susceptibility to believe in such theories. We draw on research from sociology, political science, and communication to predict that factors related to relative deprivation, political radicalism, and the consumption of alternative news on websites, video platforms, Social Network Sites, and messenger services are associated with an increased belief in Covid-19 conspiracy theories. The data largely supports our assumptions. Additionally, we show that the strength of belief in Covid-19 conspiracy theories is associated with reduced vaccination intentions, which suggests detrimental real-world health consequences of such a belief.

Der Beitrag untersucht medienbezogene Einstellungen und das Ausmaß des Verschwörungsglaubens von Menschen mit AfD-Wahlpräferenz. Er greift die Debatte über Kampfbegriffe wie „Lügenpresse“ und „Systemmedien“ auf und erweitert die Radikalisierungsforschung um einen kommunikationswissenschaftlichen Zugang. Dafür verwendet er das Konzept des „Medienzynismus“. Es bezeichnet ein Einstellungsmuster mit verschwörungsideologischen Zügen: Journalist*innen werden als Lügner und System-Kollaborateure betrachtet. Der Beitrag analysiert auch die Mediennutzung von Menschen mit AfD-Präferenz sowie ihre Einstellungen zu Gewalt. Die Basis bilden vier Bevölkerungsumfragen aus den Jahren 2016 bis 2019. Die Daten wurden in Regressionsanalysen und mit einem Strukturgleichungsmodell ausgewertet. Dabei zeigt sich die Radikalität der AfD-Gruppe: Bei ihr sind Medienzynismus und Verschwörungsglaube stark ausgeprägt. Dies geht mit einer überdurchschnittlichen Nutzung „alternativer“ Medien und einem höheren Verständnis für die Anwendung von Gewalt einher. Die Studie findet keine eindeutigen Hinweise für eine sich verschärfende Radikalisierung im Zeitverlauf, aber auch keine Abschwächung. Die Befunde stützen Befürchtungen, dass der Verschwörungsglaube mit einer Affinität zu Gewalt verbunden und die Radikalisierung durch eine spezifische Mediennutzung gefördert werden kann.

The “privacy calculus” approach to studying online privacy implies that willingness to engage in disclosures on social network sites (SNSs) depends on evaluation of the resulting risks and benefits. In this article, we propose that cultural factors influence the perception of privacy risks and social gratifications. Based on survey data collected from participants from five countries (Germany [ n = 740], the Netherlands [ n = 89], the United Kingdom [ n = 67], the United States [ n = 489], and China [ n = 165]), we successfully replicated the privacy calculus. Furthermore, we found that culture plays an important role: As expected, people from cultures ranking high in individualism found it less important to generate social gratifications on SNSs as compared to people from collectivist-oriented countries. However, the latter placed greater emphasis on privacy risks—presumably to safeguard the collective. Furthermore, we identified uncertainty avoidance to be a cultural dimension crucially influencing the perception of SNS risks and benefits. As expected, people from cultures ranking high in uncertainty avoidance found privacy risks to be more important when making privacy-related disclosure decisions. At the same time, these participants ascribed lower importance to social gratifications—possibly because social encounters are perceived to be less controllable in the social media environment.

Addressing the lack of population-based data the purpose of this representative study was to assess procrastination and its associations with distress and life satisfaction across the life span. A representative German community sample (1,350 women; 1,177 men) between the ages of 14 and 95 years was examined by the short form of the General Procrastination Scale (GPS-K; 1) and standardized scales of perceived stress, depression, anxiety, fatigue and life satisfaction. As hypothesized, procrastination was highest in the youngest cohort (14-29 years). Only in the youngest and most procrastinating cohort (aged 14 to 29 years), men procrastinated more than women. As we had further hypothesized, procrastination was consistently associated with higher stress, more depression, anxiety, fatigue and reduced satisfaction across life domains, especially regarding work and income. Associations were also found with lack of a partnership and unemployment. Findings are discussed with regard to potential developmental and cohort effects. While procrastination appears to be a pervasive indicator for maladjustment, longitudinal analyses in high-risk samples (e.g. late adolescence, unemployment) are needed to identify means and mechanisms of procrastinating.

Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Wirtschaftsberichterstattung deutscher Tageszeitungen zur Finanzkrise 2008 vor dem Hintergrund der Framing-Theorie. Er verfolgt dabei drei Hauptziele: Erstens: Die Identifizierung von Frames (Deutungsmustern) in der Berichterstattung. Zweitens: Die Beschreibung des Auftretens dieser Frames im Zeitverlauf und ihrer Verteilung über verschiedene Medien. Drittens: Die Untersuchung des inter-medialen Einflusses, den die Medien aufeinander ausübten. Für dieses dritte Forschungsinteresse wird das Konzept des Inter-Media Frame Transfers vorgeschlagen. Um den genannten Zielen nachgehen zu können, wird ein Mehrmethodendesign aus qualitativer und quantitativer Inhaltsanalyse sowie einer ARIMA-Zeitreihenanalyse angewendet. Ergebnisse: Im Untersuchungszeitraum werden insgesamt acht Hauptdeutungsmuster für die Finanzkrise identifiziert, von denen sich das Muster der Systembedrohung als Leitinterpretation durchsetzt. Es werden unterschiedliche Frame-Profile für die untersuchten Medien erstellt und einzelne Frames maßgeblich einzelnen Medien zugeordnet. Es werden Indizien für einen Inter-Media Frame Transfer gefunden.

The integration of formerly isolated theoretical concepts is probably one of the most challenging tasks in the development of media effects theory. While agenda setting has already been linked to priming and framing via the concept of second level agenda-setting, this article takes a closer look into perceptual phenomena within the agenda-setting process, thus linking micro-level psychological theories with macro-level theories of political communication. Starting with third-person perceptions, we argue that part of the agenda-setting function of the mass media is to inform recipients what other people believe to be important. Along these lines of thought, a theoretical model of agenda-setting effects is outlined in which perceptual components play an important role in the conceived process of media influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]