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Introduction: Abnormal self-experiences are a common feature of major depression despite their absence from current diagnostic manuals. Current diagnostic criteria leave us with an impoverished conception of depressive disorders, and they fail to exploit the diverse experiential alterations that might be useful for understanding and diagnosing patients, and last but not least for explaining the aetiology of these disorders. Although some phenomenological descriptions of abnormal self-experiences in major depression are available, further research is needed to validate these through detailed clinical interviews. Methods: To characterize these phenomena in more detail and to verify and consolidate previous accounts, we conducted a qualitative study using the Consensual Qualitative Research method. Results: Our findings identified three categories of abnormal self-experiences: (1) impossibility to project oneself forward, (2) not recognizing one’s self, and (3) losing control on one’s self. Conclusion: Before delving into these results, we briefly described how the self is conceptualized in phenomenological psychopathology and explored in the literature on the self-experience in major depression. After discussing our results in the light of recent and contemporary phenomenological literature, we suggest that the inability to recognize otherness as part of oneself – which is the core of depressive experiences – ends in specific symptoms of depersonalization that differ from schizophrenic ones. We conclude that the self-experience, and in particular narrative identity, is central to the development and maintenance of depression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The psychopathological analysis of hysteria is a victim of narrow conceptualizations. Among these is the inscription of hysteria in the feminine sphere, about body and sexuality, which incentivized conceptual reductionism. Hysteria has been mainly considered a gendered pathology, almost exclusively female, and it has been associated with cultural and/or religious features over time rather than treated as a psychopathological world. Further, hysteria has been dominated by conceptual inaccuracies and indecision, not only in terms of clinical features but also in terms of its definition. For this reason, it seems necessary to “undress” hysteria from this feminization, sexualization, and corporealization with which it has been abundantly clothed over the years. “Undressing” hysteria will make possible a reconfiguring and deconstructing of the explanatory-causal model of Charcot and Freud. However, if we take out this cultural heritage, the stigma accompanying this diagnosis, and the weight of the enormous historical tradition that hysteria carries, the world of hysteria continues to constitute a domain full of complexity and nosographic challenges. Hysteria has been considered a sum of psychological behaviors and states illustrated by drama, mystery, or falsity. The difficulty in understanding the multiple somatic manifestations which characterize this clinical condition created several controversies and much confusion. In the current nosography, the personological component of hysteria has been separated from its symptomatic manifestation, in the Histrionic Personality Disorder and Conversion Disorder categories, respectively. This segmentation by descriptive nosography does contribute to a unitary understanding of the phenomenon and, consequently, of daily clinical practice. Clinical complexity can be grasped and deciphered only if the symptom is inscribed in the patient’s lifeworld and his/her subjective life history. Clinical practice is thus thought of in terms of a structural aggregation of a homogeneous set of phenomena, together constituting a specific way of being in the world. The starting point of this article is the evident modalities characterizing this life-world, taking care not to confuse the point of origin with the point of expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The aim of the study was to provide a qualitative analysis of anomalous bodily experiences (ABEs) of persons affected by feeding and eating disorders (FEDs). In particular, this study aimed to refine the description of bodily experiences in persons with FEDs so as to improve their treatment. Sampling and Methods: This is a naturalistic explorative study on a group of 29 patients affected by FED in psychotherapeutic treatment and 12 healthy controls. We asked the participants to write a letter on the way they experience their body. Later, we analysed their letters by means of consensual qualitative research. Results: All patients (29) reported at least 1 ABE. The main categories identified are (1) body-obstacle (the body interposes between the person and the world); (2) body-tyrant (the body imposes itself on the will of the person); (3) body-hyper-visible (the body is experienced as an exposed object); (4) body-geometric (the body is experienced or associated with a geometric form); and (5) body-numerical (the body is defined by numbers). All these categories are present in the clinical group, and they are absent in the control group. Conclusion: To grasp the experiential nuances of ABEs is relevant to understand the disorder of embodied self-hood and personal identity in these patients and thus to refine clinical treatment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Depressive disorders, despite being classified as mood or affective disorders, are known to include disturbances in the experience of body, space, time, and intersubjectivity. However, current diagnostic manuals largely ignore these aspects of depressive experience. In this article, we use phenomenological accounts of embodiment as a theoretical foundation for a qualitative study of abnormal body phenomena (ABP) in depressive disorders. Methods: 550 patients affected by schizophrenic and affective disorders were interviewed in a clinical setting. Interviews sought to uncover the qualitative features of experiences through self-descriptions. Clinical files were subsequently digitized and re-examined using consensual qualitative research. Results: Ninety-nine out of 100 patients with MDD reported at least one ABP. From cross-analysis of the MDD sample, we obtained 4 general categories of ABP, 3 of which had additional subcategories. The 4 categories include slowed embodied temporality (N = 90), anomalous vital rhythms (N = 82), worries about one's body (N = 22), and body deformation (N = 47). Conclusions: The results provide empirical evidence in support of theoretical discussions of embodiment in MDD found in the work of classical and contemporary phenomenologists. The findings also provide nuanced insight into the experience of persons living with MDD. Some categories of ABP, like slowed embodied temporality, can help to finely characterize psychomotor retardation or the so-called "medically unexplained symptoms" (MUS). This fine-tuned characterization can help to connect MUS to neuropsychological and neurobiological (e.g., alterations of interoceptive processes linked to anomalies of the brain resting-state hypothesis) and inflammatory (e.g., studies linking environmental stressors, inflammation mediators, and neurovegetative and affective symptoms) models of MDD. Our results can also support a pathogenic model of MDD, which posits, on the phenomenal level, ABP as the point of departure for the development of secondary symptoms including cognitive elaborations of these, namely, delusions about the body. Moreover, some of the categories, when contrasted with phenomenological qualitative studies of other disorders, provide conceptual resources of differential diagnosis and of identifying a "depressive core syndrome." For example, findings within category 4, deformation of the body, provide resources for using ABP to distinguish between MDD and schizophrenia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abnormal space experience (ASE) is a common feature of schizophrenia, despite its absence from current diagnostic manuals. Phenomenological psychopathologists have investigated this experiential disturbance, but these studies were typically based on anecdotal evidence from limited clinical interactions. To better understand the nature of ASE in schizophrenia and attempt to validate previous phenomenological accounts, we conducted a qualitative study of 301 people with schizophrenia. Clinical files were analyzed by means of Consensual Qualitative Research, an inductive method for analyzing descriptions of lived experience. Our main findings can be summed up as follows: (1) ASEs are a relevant feature in schizophrenia (70.1% of patients reported at least 1 ASE). (2) ASE in schizophrenia are characterized by 5 main categories of phenomena (listed from more represented to less represented): (a) experiences of strangeness and unfamiliarity (eg "Everything appeared weird. Face distorted, world looks terrible, nasty"); (b) experiences of centrality/invasion of peripersonal space (eg "Handkerchief on scaffolding: message telling him something"); (c) alteration of the quality of things (eg "Buildings leaning down"); (d) alteration of the quality of the environment (eg "Person sitting six feet away seemed to be at an infinite distance"); and (e) itemization and perceptive salience (eg "All patients [in ward] have bright eyes"). (3) ASEs are much more frequent in acute (91.9%) than in chronic (28.15%) schizophrenia patients. Moreover, our findings further empirical support for phenomenological accounts of schizophrenia, including those developed by Jaspers, Binswanger, Minkowski, and Conrad, among others and provide the background for translational research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Schizophrenia patients frequently display an array of abnormal bodily phenomena (ABPs). There is literature to suggest that the presence of ABPs may be representative of a fundamental disruption of the embodied and prereflexive state of selfhood and hence be relevant for the development of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. ABPs have been considered as trait features of vulnerability to psychosis and may have value as potential markers for early detection, target symptoms for prevention and predictors of clinical outcomes. This longitudinal cohort study aimed to explore: (1) the prevalence of ABPs in first episode psychosis, (2) their longitudinal stability, (3) how ABPs compare with data from patients with enduring psychosis, and (4) how aspects of disorders of self-experience (DSEs) and ABPs and the corresponding instruments relate to each other. Sixteen patients were recruited from an early intervention in psychosis service. They were assessed with a series of structured and semi-structured interviews at point of entry, after 6 months and 12 months of follow-up. A variety of ABPs and DSEs were displayed in all study subjects, associated with high levels of core psychotic symptoms and reduced with treatment over time. Compared with findings of both acute and chronic schizophrenia patients, the prevalence of ABPs seems to be representative of severity and acuteness of the illness. Two factors were identified with stable trait characteristics and might be of predictive value for the course of the illness. Further studies with bigger samples are needed to further test the value of ABPs as early markers of detection and predictors of clinical course. The association between DSEs and ABPs warrants further investigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a previous paper, we discussed a model that considers abnormal eating behaviour epiphenomena of a more profound disorder of lived corporeality and identity (Stanghellini and Mancini, this issue). The core idea is that persons with FEDs experience their own body first and foremost as an object being looked at by another, rather than coenaesthetically or from a first-person perspective. In this paper, alienation from one's own emotions, disgust and shame for one's body of persons with FED, will be discussed in the light of the embodiment and identity model of FED. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to define and describe the main phenomenological dimensions of the life-world of persons prone to Feeding and Eating Disorders (FEDs), within the framework of a model that considers abnormal eating behaviour an epiphenomenon of a more profound disorder of lived corporeality and identity. The core idea is that persons with FEDs experience their own body first and foremost as an object being looked at by another, rather than coenaesthetically or from a firstperson perspective. Alienation from one's own body and the need to feel oneself only through the gaze of the others can be illuminated by looking at it in the light of the Sartrean concept of feeling a lived-body-for-others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an explorative study on values of 25 patients affected by borderline personality disorder interviewed in a clinical setting (phenomenological-dynamic psychotherapy) and re-classified following Consensual Qualitative Research. We identified three main categories of values: recognition (the importance for attention, acknowledgment, commendation and acceptance by the other), authenticity (the importance of absolute emotional fusion with the other), and immediacy (the importance of instantaneous, hic et nunc satisfaction of one's needs/desires). Each of these values expresses a kind of 'logic', namely the logic of intimacy (the other's closeness as indispensable for defining oneself and establish/reinforce one's selfhood and identity), spontaneity (over-reliance on feelings unrestricted by social norms undermining their intensity), and instantaneity (glorification of 'now-moments'/execration of procrastination draining the vitality of feelings). The borderline person lives an emotional normativity constituted by the intensity of feelings under the spell of a frustrated normativity since they enter into a collision with the hypocrisy of common-sense ethical norms and social rules and conventions, as well as by potential conflicts with the feelings of the other. Acknowledging the values affirmed by borderline persons may help to better understand their condition - that is, to grasp 'what it is like' and make sense of the phenomena that affect them - and particularly to find a logic in their otherwise irrational and incomprehensible self-defeating behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article builds on and extends the 'optical-coenaesthetic disproportion' (OCDisp) hypothesis of feeding and eating disorders (FEDs) matching data obtained through clinical research with laboratory evidence from neuroscience and neuropsychological studies. The OCDisp hypothesis, developed through the assessment in clinical setting of bodily experience using the IDentity and EAting (IDEA) disorder questionnaire, argues that in persons with FED the internal perception of one's embodied self (i.e., coenaesthesia) is deeply affected (their possibility to feel themselves is weakened or threatened by coenaesthopathic and emotional paroxysms; their bodily feelings are discontinuous over time), and as a compensation to it, these persons experience their own body as an object that is looked at by others. To FED persons, their body is principally given to them as an object 'to be seen.' The other's look serves as an optical prosthesis to cope with hypo- and dis-coenaesthesia and as a device through which persons with FED can define themselves and attenuate the anxiety produced by the conflicts between being-oneself and being-for-others. After describing the OCDisp hypothesis, we will gather evidence supporting it with neuroscience studies on FED. Our focus will be on data pointing to dampened multisensory integration of interoceptive and esteroceptive signals, demonstrating a predominance of the visual afferents toward signals arising within the body. In the final part of the article, we will show consistencies but also draw distinctions between our clinical hypothesis and neuroscience-based data and hypotheses and draft a potential agenda for translational research inspired by these. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent book Cristopher Bollas, one of the greatest contemporary psychoanalysts, tells about how he began to bring together phenomenology and psychoanalysis in the clinical setting at the beginning of his career. Working with psychotic patients, he realized that it was first necessary to "absorb" their view of reality before being able to reflect on the mad scenarios of psychosis. In what world did they live? How did they perceive it? Only by "mirroring" this back to the patients was it possible to offer them the experience of being in front of someone trying to understand their world view. Today, phenomenology has been spreading over psychoanalysis more than one can think it did in the past. The aim of this paper is to review and discuss the most relevant theoretical-clinical areas characterizing contemporary psychoanalysis in which phenomenology can claim a legitimate (or still illegitimate for someone) position. The main areas that will be discussed are: (a) the larger relational system or field in which human experience is continually shaped, i.e., the intersubjective matrix in which we are embedded; (b) the capacity to think about the "what" of the patients' experience, rather than the "why" (especially with the most severely disturbed ones); and (c) the crisis of the primacy of interpretation in the analytical technique. Obviously, this review does not have the ambition to be exhaustive. Rather, it just wants to (re)open the discussion on a still controversial but very current topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenological psychopathology is a body of scientific knowledge on which the clinical practice of psychiatry is based since the first decades of the twentieth century, a method to assess the patient's abnormal experiences from their own perspective, and more importantly, a science responsible for delimiting the object of psychiatry. Recently, the frontiers of phenomenological psychopathology have expanded to the productive development of therapeutic strategies that target the whole of existence in their actions. In this article, we present an overview of the current state of this discipline, summing up some of its key concepts, and highlighting its importance to clinical psychiatry today. Phenomenological psychopathology understands mental disorders as modifications of the main dimensions of the life-world: lived time, lived space, lived body, intersubjectivity, and selfhood. Psychopathological symptoms are the expression of a dialectical modification of the proportions of certain domains of the life-world or of the lived experience. The far-reaching relevance of the concepts of proportion and dialectics for the clinical agenda is explored. The article presents two contemporary models for clinical practice based on phenomenological psychopathology: Dialectical-proportional oriented approach and Person-centered dialectic approach (P.H.D. method). The main characteristics of these approaches are considered, as well as the new perspectives they bring to the challenges of psychiatric care in the twentieth-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Phenomenological psychopathology, through theoretical and idiographic studies, conceptualizes major depressive disorder (MDD) as a disorder of time experience. Investigations on abnormal time experience (ATE) in MDD adopting methodologies requested by the standards of empirical sciences are still lacking. Our study aimed to provide a qualitative analysis, on an empirical ground and on a large scale, of narratives of temporal experiences of persons affected by MDD. Methods: We interviewed 550 consecutive patients affected by affective and schizophrenic disorders. Clinical files were analysed by means of consensual qualitative research. Results: Out of 100 MDD patients, 96 reported at least 1 ATE. The principal categories of ATE are vital retardation- the experience of a stagnation of endogenous vital processes (37 patients), the experience of present and future dominated by the past (29 patients) and the experience of the slackening of the flow of time (25 patients). A comparison with ATE in schizophrenia patients showed that in MDD, unlike in schizophrenia, there is no disarticulation of time experience (disorder of temporal synthesis ) but rather a disorder of conation or inhibition of becoming. Limitations: The interview style was not meant to make a quantitative assessment ("false negatives" cannot be excluded). Conclusions: Our findings confirm the relevance of distinctive features of ATE in MDD, support the hypothesis of an intrinsic disordered temporal structure in depressive symptoms and may have direct implications in clinical practice, especially in relation to differential diagnosis, setting the boundaries between "true" and milder forms of depression and neurobiological research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we discuss the philosophical and psychopathological background of Domain 3, Other persons, of the Examination of Anomalous World Experiences (EAWE). The EAWE interview aims to describe the manifold phenomena of the schizophrenic lifeworld in all of their concrete and distinctive features, thus complementing a more abstract, symptom-focused approach. Domain 3, Other persons, focuses specifically on subjectively experienced interpersonal disturbances that may be especially common in schizophrenia. The aim of this domain, as with the rest of the EAWE, is to provide clinicians and researchers with a systematic orientation toward, or knowledge of, patients' experiences, so that the experiential universe of schizophrenia can be clarified in terms of the particular feel, meaning, and value it has for the patient. To help provide a context for EAWE Domain 3, Other persons, we propose a definition of "intersubjectivity" (IS) and "dissociality." The former is the ability to understand other persons, that is, the basis of our capacity to experience people and social situations as meaningful. IS relies both on perceptive-intuitive as well as cognitive-computational resources. Dissociality addresses the core psychopathological nucleus characterizing the quality of abnormal IS in persons with schizophrenia and covers several dimensions, including disturbances of both perceptive-intuitive and cognitive-computational capacities. The most typical perceptive-intuitive abnormality is hypoattunement, that is, the lack of interpersonal resonance and difficulties in grasping or immediately understanding others' mental states. The most characteristic cognitive-computational anomaly is social hyperreflexivity, especially an algorithmic conception of sociality (an observational/ ethological attitude aimed to develop an explicit, often rule- based personal method for participating in social transactions). Other anomalous interpersonal experiences, such as emotional and behavioral responses to others, are also discussed in relation to this core of dissociality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eating Disorders (EDs) show a multifactorial etiopathogenesis including environmental, psychological and biological factors. In the present study, we propose a model of interactions between genetic vulnerability—represented by Fat Mass and Obesity-Associated (FTO) gene—and stable psychopathological traits, such as bodily disorders and emotion dysregulation for EDs patients. The distribution of a polymorphism of the FTO (rs9939609 T>A) was evaluated in a series of 250 EDs patients and in a group of 119 healthy control subjects. Clinical data were collected through a face-to-face interview and several self-reported questionnaires were applied, including the Emotional Eating Scale and the IDentity and EAting disorders (IDEA) questionnaire for bodily disorders and self-identity. The A-allele was associated with an increased vulnerability to EDs (AA+AT genotypes frequency 72.8% in EDs vs. 52.9% in controls). The presence of the A-allele was associated with binge eating behavior, higher emotional eating and higher IDEA scores. Finally, the FTO rs9939609 SNP was found to influence the relationship between these variables, as an association between disorder of corporeality and emotional eating was found only in A-allele carriers. A-allele seems to represent a potential additive risk factor for EDs persons, with bodily disorders to develop emotional eating and binge eating behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We provide here the first bottom-up review of the lived experience of mental disorders in adolescents co-designed, co-conducted and co-written by experts by experience and academics. We screened first-person accounts within and outside the medical field, and discussed them in collaborative workshops involving numerous experts by experience - representing different genders, ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and continents - and their family members and carers. Subsequently, the material was enriched by phenomenologically informed perspectives and shared with all collaborators. The inner subjective experience of adolescents is described for mood disorders, psychotic disorders, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, autism spectrum disorders, anxiety disorders, eating disorders, externalizing disorders, and self-harm behaviors. The recollection of individuals' past histories also indexes the prodromal (often transdiagnostic) features predating the psychiatric diagnosis. The experience of adolescents with mental disorders in the wider society is described with respect to their family, their school and peers, and the social and cultural context. Furthermore, their lived experience of mental health care is described with respect to receiving a diagnosis of mental disorder, accessing mental health support, receiving psychopharmacological treatment, receiving psychotherapy, experiencing peer support and mental health activism, and achieving recovery. These findings can impact clinical practice, research, and the whole society. We hope that this co-designed, co-conducted and co-written journey can help us maintain our commitment to protecting adolescents' fragile mental health, and can help them develop into a healthy, fulfilling and contributing adult life., (© 2024 World Psychiatric Association.)

We provide here the first bottom-up review of the lived experience of depression, co-written by experts by experience and academics. First-person accounts within and outside the medical field were screened and discussed in collaborative workshops involving numerous individuals with lived experience of depression, family members and carers, representing a global network of organizations. The material was enriched by phenomenologically informed perspectives and shared with all collaborators in a cloud-based system. The subjective world of depression was characterized by an altered experience of emotions and body (feeling overwhelmed by negative emotions, unable to experience positive emotions, stuck in a heavy aching body drained of energy, detached from the mind, the body and the world); an altered experience of the self (losing sense of purpose and existential hope, mismatch between the past and the depressed self, feeling painfully incarcerated, losing control over one's thoughts, losing the capacity to act on the world; feeling numb, empty, non-existent, dead, and dreaming of death as a possible escape route); and an altered experience of time (experiencing an alteration of vital biorhythms, an overwhelming past, a stagnation of the present, and the impossibility of the future). The experience of depression in the social and cultural context was characterized by altered interpersonal experiences (struggling with communication, feeling loneliness and estrangement, perceiving stigma and stereotypes), and varied across different cultures, ethnic or racial minorities, and genders. The subjective perception of recovery varied (feeling contrasting attitudes towards recovery, recognizing recovery as a journey, recognizing one's vulnerability and the need for professional help), as did the experience of receiving pharmacotherapy, psychotherapy, and social as well as physical health interventions. These findings can inform clinical practice, research and education. This journey in the lived experience of depression can also help us to understand the nature of our own emotions and feelings, what is to believe in something, what is to hope, and what is to be a living human being., (© 2023 World Psychiatric Association.)

This is an explorative study on values of 25 patients affected by borderline personality disorder interviewed in a clinical setting (phenomenological-dynamic psychotherapy) and re-classified following Consensual Qualitative Research. We identified three main categories of values: recognition (the importance for attention, acknowledgment, commendation and acceptance by the other), authenticity (the importance of absolute emotional fusion with the other), and immediacy (the importance of instantaneous, hic et nunc satisfaction of one's needs/desires). Each of these values expresses a kind of 'logic', namely the logic of intimacy (the other's closeness as indispensable for defining oneself and establish/reinforce one's selfhood and identity), spontaneity (over-reliance on feelings unrestricted by social norms undermining their intensity), and instantaneity (glorification of 'now-moments'/execration of procrastination draining the vitality of feelings). The borderline person lives an emotional normativity constituted by the intensity of feelings under the spell of a frustrated normativity since they enter into a collision with the hypocrisy of common-sense ethical norms and social rules and conventions, as well as by potential conflicts with the feelings of the other. Acknowledging the values affirmed by borderline persons may help to better understand their condition - that is, to grasp 'what it is like' and make sense of the phenomena that affect them - and particularly to find a logic in their otherwise irrational and incomprehensible self-defeating behavior., (©Copyright: the Author(s).)