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The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) bills itself as an alliance. It is seen as Russia's hedge to NATO, yet it often acts in an inconsistent manner vis-a-vis its members when they face crisis situations. These situations are complicated by the fact that the alliance engages in a policy of strategic ambiguity without making a firm commitment to either side of a dispute. Since Russia often acts as a security guarantor on a bilateral level for these states, staying in the alliance may become counterproductive. In order to prevent defection of its members and assuage their fears of abandonment, while maintaining this unofficial policy of strategic ambiguity, and thus help the alliance patron, Russia, avoid entanglement, reassurances are needed. These reassurances come in the form of sunk costs, specifically joint annual military exercise, and the 2022 intervention in Kazakhstan. These sunk costs by the CSTO enhance its reputation for reliability, while maintaining its policy of strategic ambiguity. They reassure its members, assuaging their fear of abandonment, and keeping them invested in the alliance. This will be shown through the use of process tracing in a case study that examines an internal alliance dilemma with two of the organization's members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Russia have a demonstrable record of coordinating their votes at the United Nations Security Council over the past 12 years. China, in particular, has coordinated its vetoes to align with Russia, while Russia still uses its veto in isolation of other states, except for Chinese abstentions. It is widely acknowledged in the literature on Chinese–Russian foreign relations that the two states are in a strategic partnership; however, there is open debate as to how long this partnership can be sustained. Both China and Russia seem to value the partnership, but trust-building is needed to sustain it due to the growing power imbalance between them. One way that trust can be built is through costly signalling, which provides reassurances to the receiving state that the signaller has benign intentions. This article argues that China is engaged in costly signalling to Russia by aligning its votes with Moscow at the expense of angering the other permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, France and the United Kingdom—which in turn sours the relations between them. China is attempting to reassure Russia, the weaker partner, that it still values their friendship, and Russia has reciprocated by relying more on China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has long been assumed that security communities form in the international system based on at least two criteria, having a strong collective identity and mutual trust among their members. Security is gleaned through mutual trust, while community coalesces around a strong collective identity and shared values. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization exhibits traits of a security community, where its structure is designed to institutionalize mutual trust, but the organization lacks a cohesive collective identity, especially since the inclusion of India and Pakistan into the organization, which has caused a weakening in the Russia-China driven identity within the intergovernmental organization. This paper examines how the SCO can function as a security community, arguing that a strong collective identity is only a sufficient condition for the establishment of a security community, mutual trust being the only ingredient necessary for a security community to form. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's naval modernisation program has been seen as China's path toward a blue water naval capacity designed to challenge American global hegemony. While China does reap the benefits of maritime trade, especially along its eastern seaboard, it is also through that eastern seaboard that China is vulnerable to invasion and encirclement. To prevent this encirclement China has built up its navy, including its anti-access and area denial capabilities, as well as adding two aircraft carriers to its surface fleet. The PLAN's modernisation effort, therefore, is defensive in nature, and not an attempt by China to build a blue water naval capacity to challenge directly the United States, or its allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is now a major power in the international system. One axiom of the realist theory on international politics is that states will acquire power to ensure their own position and security within the system. One effective way Major or Great Powers have done this is through alliance building. Historically, China has not had much success in cultivating long-standing alliances; however, cooperation between it and its neighbor Russia have deepened. This paper, using structural and defensive realism as theoretical framework on how and why states form alliances, explores the potential China-Russia military alliance. This paper looks at both balancing power and balancing threat as justifications for Great Powers to form alliances. As both a powerful state and a potential threat, the United States serves as the prime impetus for both Russia and China to align with each other. Whether the US is an actual threat to both Russia and China is immaterial, rather it is the perception by both China and Russia that the US's military strength and stated policy of promoting democratic norms and values represent a threat to the established leadership in both countries. China is in a unique position as a near peer competitor to the US; however, with few natural allies Russia is still powerful but in a relative state of decline. Both countries benefit from an alliance to counteract American influence within their zones of influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]