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Previous studies that have examined the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on syndicated loans have ignored potential differences between lending banks by explicitly or implicitly aggregating all lenders together and focusing on borrower characteristics. One must jointly consider both borrower and lender to fully understand the complex role of the syndicate during this period. We consider the identity of the lender, with a focus on five major US banks that failed and their five corresponding acquirers. Our results highlight the distinct roles of investment and commercial banks and facilitate an understanding of relationship and transactional‐based lending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies that have examined the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on syndicated loans have ignored potential differences between lending banks by explicitly or implicitly aggregating all lenders together and focusing on borrower characteristics. One must jointly consider both borrower and lender to fully understand the complex role of the syndicate during this period. We consider the identity of the lender, with a focus on five major US banks that failed and their five corresponding acquirers. Our results highlight the distinct roles of investment and commercial banks and facilitate an understanding of relationship and transactional‐based lending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent financial crisis presents an opportunity to examine stock market reactions to syndicated loan decisions reached by borrowers and lenders regarding loan type and loan purpose. We find that during the crisis, the renegotiation flexibility provided by revolving credit is positively valued, whereas during the low-interest-rate period following the crisis, both revolving and term loans are viewed favorably. We also examine information asymmetry effects and find that after the crisis, low-creditworthy borrowers generate a positive market response, but during the crisis, high-creditworthy borrowers are viewed positively and low-creditworthy borrowers are punished by the market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]