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Abstract Non-Technical Summary Climate stabilization requires scaling-up technologies to capture and store carbon. Carbon removal could be very profitable, and some of the agents best placed to benefit are ‘carbon majors’, i.e. fossil fuel companies. We argue that in ordinary circumstances only agents without significant historical climate responsibilities would be entitled to the full benefits from carbon removal. Under non-ideal conditions, carbon majors might be entitled to benefit, provided that no other agent could remove similar quantities of carbon at similar costs. This burden of proof is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities. Technical Summary Climate stabilization requires scaling up technologies to capture and store carbon. Some of the agents best placed to profit from carbon removal are ‘carbon majors’, especially fossil fuel companies. Yet incentivizing carbon majors to undertake carbon removal poses an ethical dilemma: carbon majors have made significant historical contributions to climate change and have significantly benefitted from such contributions without being made to compensate for resulting climate harm. This is why it seems unfair to reward them with additional economic benefits. However, carbon majors possess the technological skills and infrastructure to upscale carbon removal efficiently. We argue that in ordinary circumstances, only agents without significant climate responsibilities would be morally entitled to fully benefit from carbon removal. Yet under non-ideal conditions, it might be permissible to reward carbon majors if no other agent were capable of removing as much carbon at similar costs and on similar timeframes. We believe this argument faces an imposing burden of proof that is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities. In more favorable circumstances, including those of most OECD countries, rewarding carbon majors without having them pay for their historical climate responsibilities remains impermissible. Social Media Summary Rewarding carbon majors to undertake carbon dioxide removal is unjust due to their historical climate responsibilities. Where possible, governments should empower other agents to remove CO2.

In der gegebenen globalen Governance-Struktur stellen souveräne Einzelstaaten die zentralen kollektiven Akteure dar, die Verantwortung für einen zeitnahen und effektiven Klimaschutz übernehmen müssen. Dieser Aufsatz vertritt die These, dass die Differenzierung der Einzelstaaten zumutbaren Verantwortung die Bedingungen berücksichtigen sollte, aufgrund derer sie als kollektivverantwortungsfähige Akteure verstanden werden können. Dies gilt sowohl mit Blick auf ihre historische Verantwortung für die Verursachung des Klimawandels als auch im Hinblick auf die Zukunft. Dabei ist für zeitnahen und effektiven Klimaschutz von zentraler Bedeutung, dass die Verantwortungsfähigkeit aller Mitgliedsstaaten der UNFCCC erhalten bleibt, damit sie als kollektive Akteure ihren differenzierten Beitrag leisten können.

This paper argues that an analysis of the dissatisfactory outcomes of international negotiations concerning climate change must take into account procedures of political decision‐making in democracies. Although the normative ideal of republican democracy has means of dealing with such dissatisfactory results, political processes in republican democracies take too much time and risk becoming stuck in tragic or dilemmatic decision structures when facing challenges such as climate change. Consequently, this paper discusses possibilities for redesigning republican democratic institutions to counter‐act these negative forces. However, all possibilities discussed either call into question the normative ideal of republican democracy itself or would take too much time to be realized.

In this paper, I argue for the following conclusions. First, quotas are not normative goals in themselves, but only a means to achieve non-discriminatory selection procedures. Second, in a democracy quotas are most plausibly used as a means to fill offices in those bodies which have a major impact on how well interests or discourses are translated into policy. Third, quotas for the young can be justified since, due to demographic development, their discourses tend to be marginalised. Fourth, youth quotas cannot be a means to ensure long-term policy-making, but they can enhance the legitimacy of longterm impacts from policy decisions taken today.