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An incubator with a simulated udder was constructed using information on piglet-sensory stimuli preferences. Neonatal piglets were randomly assigned to water in troughs (푛 = 38), milk-replacer (푛 = 36) or bovine-colostrum in simulated udder (푛 = 39). Weight was measured at 0, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8 hours, and rectal temperature at 0, 0.5, 1, 2 and 8 hours. An interaction between time and treatment affected weight change (푝 < 0.001), where all piglets lost weight during the first hour., Piglets with access to water continued loosing weight (82.1 ± 32.8 g over 8 h), milk-replacer-piglets gained 88.6 ± 53.2 g and bovine-colostrum-piglets gained 55.7 ± 66.5 g over 8 h. Overall, piglets with access to the simulated udder gained weight during their first eight hours postpartum. An interaction between temperature at first handling and time (푝 < 0.001) as well as an interaction between time and treatment (푝 < 0.001) affected temperature. Further development of the method could reduce the need for nurse sows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on the resource curse suggests that countries with large natural resource rents and weak institutions may experience rent seeking conflicts among different groups, potentially resulting in high inequality and welfare losses. While agricultural land has so far been categorized as a diffuse resource with low economic value, this categorization may no longer be appropriate, because demand for land is currently on the rise, and may continue to increase in the future. This study presents and discusses recent theoretical and empirical approaches to analyzing the effects of high-value agricultural land on rent seeking and rent distribution. Results suggest that the potential for small scale farmers to organize and obtain political power determines the extent of rent seeking and rent distribution, and that while more democratic institutions may increase the share of rents going to the farmers, they may have adverse welfare effects, because they may increase the competition for rents among groups, and hence the amount of resources spent on rent seeking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent increases in demand for agricultural land has fuelled academic, as well as public, interest in the potential effects of high value agricultural land, particularly in developing countries. The dominating question seems to be: will increasing demand for agricultural land imply land grabbing or rural development? This article finds empirical support for a proposed theory which suggests that the extent of agricultural rent-seeking, in the form of large-scale land acquisitions, is determined by the relative political power of an elite and a farmer group. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]