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As artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled social robots continue to enter our lifeworlds, we will need to grapple with challenges to assumptions about our relationship to and even with these technological objects. This essay works at the intersection of social robotics, legal studies, and human–machine communication to explore the concept of ownership in human–machine relations. In particular, we draw on more-than-human approaches to ask: To what extent should (need) we retire the concept of ownership in the context of AI-enabled social robots? With a particular emphasis on companion robots, we explore alternatives to the ownership modality by investigating concepts such as personhood, a degrees-of-relationship perspective, and a situational approach to understanding human–robot relationships. The goal is to re-imagine human–robot relationships beyond legal confinements by engaging a pragmatic perspective that supplements existing philosophical approaches. We conclude the paper by discussing practical implications of our proposed perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "The promise of monsters" explores the ethical and political implications of monsters in Mary Shelley's works, particularly "Frankenstein" and "The Last Man." It delves into the idea that monsters challenge and define the limits of human community, with Victor Frankenstein representing a moral failing and Lionel Verney in "The Last Man" existing outside ethics and politics. The text highlights how Shelley's narratives confront the terminal limits of human responsibility and community, ultimately delivering on the promise of monsters as a disruptive force in Western imaginations. [Extracted from the article]

In this brief response to Mark Coeckelbergh's contribution, I demonstrate how the author introduces an important shift in the way we approach technology. Instead of focusing on the new and often-times dramatic existential vulnerabilities supposedly introduced by technological innovation, Coeckelbergh targets the way technology already transforms our existential vulnerabilities. And I show how this shift in focus has three very important consequences: (1) a different way to ask about and investigate the question concerning technology, (2) the importance of hacking as a mode of responding to this question and (3) the significance of questioning as a philosophical project., Author(s): David J. Gunkel [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (Aff1) 0000 0000 9003 8934, grid.261128.e, Northern Illinois University, , Dekalb, IL, USA The main objective of Mark Coeckelbergh's 'The Art of Living [...]

This essay examines whether and to what extent the "other" in communicative interactions may be otherwise than another human subject and the moral opportunities and challenges this alteration would make available to us. Toward this end, the analysis proceeds in five steps or movements. The first reviews the way the discipline of communication has typically perceived and theorized the role and function of technology. The second and third parts investigate the critical challenges that emerging technology, such as artificial intelligence applications and robots, poses to this standard instrumentalist way of thinking. The fourth part introduces an alternative called "relational ethics," which effectively flips the script on the usual way of proceeding. And the fifth part presents and responds to one important and notable objection to this alternative. The goal in all of this is not to complicate things but to introduce and formulate a techno-ethics that is more agile in its response to the opportunities and challenges of the 21st century and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I reply to the four critical articles that were provided in response to my book Deconstruction (MIT Press 2021). It proceeds in four steps: (1) I begin with a reply to Stanisław Chankowski’s use of the psychoanalytic term “fetishistic denial” to describe the formal character of the text. (2) I then engage with the criticism supplied by Piotr Kozak, who questions deconstruction’s theory of truth (or its lack thereof). (3) From this, I take-up and respond to Przemysław Nowakowski’s proposal that deconstruction might provide a way to reimagine the interdisciplinarity of cognitive science. And (4) I conclude with a response to Michał Piekarski’s mashup of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Derrida, which supplies a reading of these two thinkers that is arguably greater than the sum of the parts. The objective of the reply is not to offer a defense of myself or my text but to engage with these interesting and insightful reviews in a way that opens the space for productive dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Investigates the legacy, logic, and consequences of the appellation "the new world of cyberspace" that connects cyberspace to the Columbian voyages of discovery and the larger network of European expansionism. Engages in a critical investigation of the colonial logic implied by this seemingly innocent taxonomy, and examines its deployment in and significance for current research. (SR)

One of the enduring concerns of moral philosophy is deciding who or what is deserving of ethical consideration. This special issue of Philosophy and Technology investigates whether and to what extent machines, of various designs and configurations, can or should be considered moral subjects, defined here as either a moral agent, a moral patient, or both. The articles that comprise the issue were competitively selected from papers initially prepared for and presented at a symposium on this subject matter convened during the AISB/IACAP 2012 World Congress, held in at the University of Birmingham in Birmingham, UK. Keywords Artificial intelligence * Ethics * Moral agency * Moral patiency * Roboethics, Moral philosophy, although historically defined in different ways by different intellectual traditions, is essentially about intersubjectivity. That is, it concerns actions between and involving at least two entities. 'When reduced [...]

This essay responds to the machine question in the affirmative, arguing that artifacts, like robots, AI, and other autonomous systems, can no longer be legitimately excluded from moral consideration. The demonstration of this thesis proceeds in four parts or movements. The first and second parts approach the subject by investigating the two constitutive components of the ethical relationship--moral agency and patiency. In the process, they each demonstrate failure. This occurs not because the machine is somehow unable to achieve what is considered necessary and sufficient to be a moral agent or patient but because the characterization of agency and patiency already fail to accommodate others. The third and fourth parts respond to this problem by considering two recent alternatives--the all-encompassing ontocentric approach of Luciano Floridi's information ethics and Emmanuel Levinas's eccentric ethics of otherness. Both alternatives, despite considerable promise to reconfigure the scope of moral thinking by addressing previously excluded others, like the machine, also fail but for other reasons. Consequently, the essay concludes not by accommodating the alterity of the machine to the requirements of moral philosophy but by questioning the systemic limitations of moral reasoning, requiring not just an extension of rights to machines, but a thorough examination of the way moral standing has been configured in the first place. Keywords Artificial intelligence . Ethics . Machine ethics . Animal ethics . Information ethics, 1 Introduction One of the enduring concerns of moral philosophy is determining who or what is deserving of ethical consideration. Although initially limited to 'other men,' the practice of ethics [...]

This article discusses the the influence of technology on human communication. Topics include the dehumanization of society and the deconstruction of communication.

This essay seeks to make a case for deconstruction as a kind of critical intervention for responding to and dealing with the opportunities and challenges of the 21st century and beyond. Toward this end, it proceeds in three steps or movements. (1) The first part will deconstruct deconstruction, deliberately employing what will be revealed as an inaccurate vernacular understanding of the term in order to extract a more precise and technical characterization of the concept. (2) The second part will investigate the constitutive elements of deconstruction, focusing attention on its two-step procedure, which has been deliberately designed to be a kind of distortion of Hegelian dialectics. (3) Finally, the third part will examine the opportunities and the challenges of the theory and practice of deconstruction indicating how and why it can be considered a critical intervention, albeit one that is not without its own potential problems and vulnerabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The great technological achievements in the recent past regarding artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and computer science make it very likely, according to many experts in the field, that we will see the advent of intelligent and autonomous robots that either match or supersede human capabilities in the midterm (within the next 50 years) or long term (within the next 100–300 years). Accordingly, this article has two main goals. First, we discuss some of the problems related to ascribing moral status to intelligent robots, and we examine three philosophical approaches—the Kantian approach, the relational approach, and the indirect duties approach—that are currently used in machine ethics to determine the moral status of intelligent robots. Second, we seek to raise broader awareness among moral philosophers of the important debates in machine ethics that will eventually affect how we conceive of key concepts and approaches in ethics and moral philosophy. The effects of intelligent and autonomous robots on our traditional ethical and moral theories and concepts will be substantial and will force us to revise and reconsider many established understandings. Therefore, it is essential to turn attention to debates over machine ethics now so that we can be better prepared to respond to the opportunities and challenges of the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robots have the potential to transform our existing categorical distinctions between "property" and "persons." Previous research has demonstrated that humans naturally anthropomorphize them, and this tendency may be amplified when a robot is subject to abuse. Simultaneously, robots give rise to hopes and fears about the future and our place in it. However, most available evidence on these mechanisms is either anecdotal, or based on a small number of laboratory studies with limited ecological validity. The present work aims to bridge this gap through examining responses of participants (N = 160) to four popular online videos of a leading robotics company (Boston Dynamics) and one more familiar vacuum cleaning robot (Roomba). Our results suggest that unexpectedly human-like abilities might provide more potent cues to mind perception than appearance, whereas appearance may attract more compassion and protection. Exposure to advanced robots significantly influences attitudes toward future artificial intelligence. We discuss the need for more research examining groundbreaking robotics outside the laboratory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented in which the author reflects on the philosophical concept of "I" and how it forms his response to the essay "Remixing the 'I'" by Mark Amerika. He discusses the philosophical history of the concept, with reference to the work of French philosopher René Descartes as well as German philosopher Immanuel Kant and his book "The Critique of Judgment." Particular attention is given to the phrase "cogito ergo sum," meaning "I think, I am," used by Descartes to prove a person, and the "I," exists. Other topics covered include modernism, identity, and language.

One of the fundamental concerns regarding communication media is accuracy or truth. This essay takes up and investigates this issue, which has, in the wake of the recent U.S. presidential election and the arrival of "the post-truth era," become increasingly important. It does not, however, examine any particular truth or the truth that is conveyed by any specific medium. Instead it seeks to uncover and investigate the general concept of truth that has defined both the act of mediation and the efforts of communication studies. What will have been discovered in the course of the examination is that the standard understanding of truth, which is developed in and comes to us through the mediation of various influential texts in the history of thought, is not, strictly speaking, true or accurate. In response to this problem, we will introduce and develop another formulation of truth that is more "truthful" to the concept of media communication and the exigencies of mediation. To put it in a kind of short hand formula, it could be said that the objective of the investigation is to demonstrate the truth of the following statement: The truth of media is disclosed in the medium of truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the concept of remix and the opportunities and challenges of this content creation practice in artistic and creative professions. Topics discussed include the moral and aesthetic value of this practice, the innovations in algorithmic content generation and computational creativity, and the music "Girl Wants (to Say Goodbye to) Rock and Roll" by Mark Vidler.

The article focuses on the concept of Internet of Things (IoT). It mentions that digital media and the Internet helped in changing the life of people. It mentions that the network connected people for we communicating through e-mail, share ideas and exchange data. It offers information on ‘computer-mediated communication’ (CMC).

Critical responses to remix have pulled in two seemingly opposite directions. On one side, there are the utopian plagiarists, copyleftists, and remix fans and prosumers who celebrate the practice as a new and original way for creating and distributing media content. On the opposing side, there are the detractors and critics. According to this group, the sampling and recombining of pre-existing material is nothing more than a cheap and easy way of recycling the work of others, perpetrated by what are arguably talentless hacks who really have nothing new to say. This essay does not choose sides in the existing remix debate but 1) deconstructs the shared assumptions and values mobilized by both sides and 2) synthesizes a new axiology that is designed to deal with and respond to the opportunities and challenges of the twenty-first century and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented of mashups, a media phenomena, which is created by Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek. It defines mashup as a digital media practice which recombines popular songs, web data, and films to fabricate new products. It mentions the success of the reviled audio mashups "The Grey Album," by disc jockey (DJ) Danger Mouse which include 12 song recording by musicians such as Jay-Z and the Beatles.