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A proposito di origini, contesto e caratteristiche della traduzione dell’Agricola di Tacito ad opera del dotto piemontese G.F. Galeani Napione: pubblicata nel 1806, cioè in anni in cui ancora pareva prossima un’invasione dell’Inghilterra a partire dalla Francia, nelle ampie prefazione e postfazione indirettamente ma chiaramente dimostra di sostenere posizioni anglofile e antinapoleoniche, del tutto conformi a quelle proprie di Galeani Napione, limitatosi ad operare nell’ambito dell’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino negli anni dell’annessione del Piemonte alla Francia. Interessanti anche le scelte linguistiche e stilistiche avverse al Davanzati sostenute da Galeani Napione nel tradurre Tacito. Translating tacitus’ “agricola” during napoleonic era: the case of f. G. Galeani Napione The article considers origin, context and characteristics of the translation of Tacitus’ Agricola by the Piedmontese sometime politician and scholar G.F. Galeani Napione: it was published in 1806, that is, during a period when the invasion of England by France still seemed imminent. The extensive preface and afterword of the translation indirectly but clearly reveal Anglophile and anti-Napoleonic positions, completely in accordance with Galeani Napione noted stance. He worked as a scholar (without political role) at the Turin Academy of Sciences during the annexation of Piedmont by France. Also interesting are Napione’s linguistic and stylistic choices adopted in translating Tacitus, in comparison to the language and style of Bernardo Davanzati, the famous Florentine translator of Tacitus.

This paper provides experimental evidence on the relationship between social preferences and cognitive abilities, which we measure using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). We elicit social preferences by way of 24 dictatorial situations, in which the Dictator’s choice sets include i) standard Dictator games, where increasing the Dictator’s payoff yields a loss for the Recipient, ii) efficient Dicator games, where increasing the Dictator’s payoff also increases that the Recipient’s; as well as other situations in which iii) either the Dictator’s or iv) the Recipient’s monetary payoff is held constant. We partition our subject pool in three groups: reflective (scoring 2 or more in the CRT), impulsive (opting twice or more for the intuitive but wrong answers in the CRT) and the remainder. We find that impulsive Dictators show a marked inequity aversion attitude, especially in standard Dictator Games. By contrast, reflective Dictators show lower distributional concerns, except for the situations in which the Dictators’ payoff is held constant. In this case, reflective Dictators give significantly more.