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Assessment through new technology has gained a firm foothold within the university system in the last decade. This paper summarizes the experiences that have been made during the introduction of digital examination over the past two years at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden. The experiences are divided between three different perspectives; the teachers, the students and the administrators. From the teachers perspective the experiences have been very positive--less time have been allocated to grading written exams, the grades are perceived as more just and the saved time can be spent on increasing the quality on other parts of the courses. From a student perspective the experiences have been very positive as well--most students are enjoying the fact that they get the results much quicker, that they can edit their answers on the exam easier and that the grades are more just. The experiences from the final perspective--that from the administrators' point of view--are far more complex. Some parts of the administrative system encouraged the introduction of digital examination, whereas other parts tried to stop it, using different measures. The paper concludes with some advice on implementing changes in written exams, based on the experiences from the Swedish case.

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The paper reports on the utilization of the “good cop, bad cop” negotiation strategy in ongoing investor–venture relationships. Four cases of business angel – venture involvement are studied over a period of several years. Earlier research on the good cop, bad cop strategy has described its efficiency in obtaining maximum distribution in short-term distributive bargaining. This has been explained as a result of the emotional contrast effect unlocked by the sequence of interaction with the bad cop followed by interaction with the good cop. In an ongoing investment relationship, other rules apply. The present findings suggest that only a business angel who is already trusted can become a good cop – by virtue of introducing a bad cop. This is explained as a way of conducting negotiations without destroying the trust that has been built over time in the business angel–venture relationship. The strategy provides a scapegoat for the negativity associated with the negotiations. The bad cop assumes the blame, while the good cop is still trusted and can remain in the relationship, with less risk of being the target of any retained hostility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Business angels play an important role in the development and growth of many entrepreneurial ventures. They provide not only capital, but also much needed business know-how and connections to customers and other financiers that are pivotal for the success of the firm. The relationship between the business angel and the entrepreneurial team evolves over time, starting with a due diligence process and the formulation of a contract. In this paper we are interested in the post-investment phase of the relationship, and how the business angel abstracts different cues that the relationship is experiencing problems. From interviews with experienced business angels in very different settings and from very different backgrounds, six different cues have emerged as indicators that something is amiss in the relationship. These cues have the following themes; the outright rebellion, the strange report, missing deadlines, history revision, changing information flows and going underground. The majority of the business angels that we have interviewed claimed that these cues have different meanings and that some are more detrimental to the relationship than other. For instance, the outright rebellion and the urge to re-negotiate the contract are looked upon as serious breaches of the trust in the relationship. Strange reports and missing deadlines on the other hand, tend to activate the business angel and trigger some kind of action on his part, but initially with sustained trust. Earlier studies have used either the agent-principal approach or the procedural justice perspective when they have studied the relationship between investor and entrepreneur. Usually papers take one or the other as their point of departure for a study, where the first focuses on control and monitoring and the other on trust building initiatives. However, from our interviews it seems as though they complement each other in the relationship over time. When everything is going as planned the control and monitoring activities are kept at a minimum, with weekly or monthly progress reports, instead the trust building activities dominate. When a cue emerges, the trust building process comes to a halt and the control and monitoring activities gain the upper hand. Before the business angel has identified the problem and together with the entrepreneurial team worked out a solution, everything else is put on hold. Some time after the incident, control and monitoring activities will be higher than usual, before everything gets back to normal. The findings in this paper fit well within the theoretical framework put forward by Shepherd and Zacharakis (2001). In their model, they see communication as a moderating factor on the other three; commitment and consistency, being fair and just and obtaining a good fit between investor and entrepreneur. In our interviews it is clear that an open and frequent communication is a necessary condition for the development of a trusting relationship. Hence, most cues of a deteriorating relationship have to do with problems in communicating with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]