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In this paper we derive a multi-choice TU game from r-replica of exchange economy with continuous, concave and monetary utility functions, and prove that the cores of the games converge to a subset of the set of Edgeworth equilibria of exchange economy as r approaches to infinity. We prove that the dominance core of each balanced multi-choice TU game, where each player has identical activity level r, coincides with the dominance core of its corresponding r-replica of exchange economy. We also give an extension of the concept of the cover of the game proposed by Shapley and Shubik (J Econ Theory 1: 9-25, 1969) to multi-choice TU games and derive some sufficient conditions for the nonemptyness of the core of multi-choice TU game by using the relationship among replica economies, multi-choice TU games and their covers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debreu and Scarf (Int Econ Rev 4:235-246, ) proved that for an exchange economy or a production economy with the same production set for all coalitions, under some standard assumptions, an Edgeworth equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium, and Florenzano (J Math Anal Appl 153:18-36, ) proved that for such an economy, any allocation in the fuzzy core is an Edgeworth equilibrium. These results are extended to coalition production economies where each coalition can have a different production set. In fact, we establish the coincidence of the fuzzy core, the set of Edgeworth equilibria, and the set of competitive equilibria in a coalition production economy under some standard assumptions. We then prove the existence of the fuzzy core in such a coalition production economy by using a fuzzy extension of Scarf's core existence theorem, thereby establishing the existence of Edgeworth equilibria and competitive equilibria in such economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this paper is to provide some new cooperative characterizations and optimality properties of competitive equilibria supported by non-linear prices. The general framework is that of economies whose commodity space is an ordered topological vector space which need not be a vector lattice. The central notion of equilibrium is the one of personalized equilibrium introduced by Aliprantis et al. (J Econ Theory 100:22-72, ). Following Herves-Beloso and Moreno-Garcia (J Math Econ 44:697-706, ), the veto power of the grand coalition is exploited in the original economy and in a suitable family of economies associated to the original one. The use of Aubin coalitions allows us to connect results with the arbitrage free condition due to non-linear supporting prices. The use of rational allocations allows us to dispense with Lyapunov convexity theorem. Applications are provided in connection with strategic market games and economies with asymmetric information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce an analog of an Edgeworth equilibrium for a class of multiregional economic systems. We analyze the game-theoretic aspects of the coalition stability of regional development plans and establish a quite general existence theorem for an Edgeworth equilibrium. We discuss the questions of coincidence of the set of these equilibria with the fuzzy core and the set of theWalrasian equilibria of the multiregional systemin question.Our methods rest on a systematic accounting for the polyhedrality of the sets of balanced coalition plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the existence of equilibria for double infinite eonomies. S.F. Richard and S. Srivastava have established the existence of equilibria for economies with infinitely countable consumers when commodity space is L ∞ ( M, M, μ). However, most Banach Lattices as commodity spaces haven’t interior points in their positive cones, so their result can’t be applied to many cases. We here consider a general Banach Lattice as commodity space and introduce a concept of equiproperness on preferences. Under the assumption the existence of equilibrium for economy is established. Finally, we examine the existence of equilibria for production economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proves core-equivalence theorems for exchange economies without ordered preferences, defined on locally convex Riesz commodity spaces such that the price space is a lattice. Properness assumptions are borrowed from some recent equilibrium existence results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper studies pure exchange economies with infinite-dimensional commodity spaces in the setting of Riesz dual systems. Several new concepts of equilibrium are introduced. An allocation (x1,…,xm) is said to be (a) an Edgeworth equilibrium whenever it belongs to the core of every n-fold replication of the economy; (b) an approximate quasiequilibrium whenever for every ϵ > 0 there exists some price p ≠ 0 with p· ω = 1 (where ω = Σ ωi is the total endowment) and with x ⩾ ixi implying p· x ⩾ p· ωi - ϵ; and (c) an extended Walrasian equilibrium whenever it is a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to an extended price system (i.e., with respect to a price system whose values are extended real numbers). The major results of the paper are the following. (i) If [0, ω] is weakly compact, then Edgeworth equilibria exist. (ii) An allocation is an Edgeworth equilibrium if and only if it is an approximate quasiequilibrium (and also if and only if it is an extended Walrasian equilibrium). (iii) If preferences are uniformly proper, then every Edgeworth equilibrium is a quasiequilibrium. (iv) There exists a two person exchange economy with empty core on C[0, 1] such that preferences are norm continuous, strongly monotone, strictly convex, and uniformly proper, and each agent's endowment is strictly positive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]