Search

This is a dialogue between Lisa and Max on Dag Prawitz's work concerning the concept of deductive validity. Lisa first explains Prawitz's criticisms of the presently prevailing non‐epistemic analyses of validity. Then Lisa describes three different ways in which Prawitz attempted to develop an epistemic concept of validity. Max asks questions for clarification, raises some objections and compares Prawitz's three approaches with other lines of thought. Two inference rules are specially discussed: disjunction introduction and ex contradictione quodlibet. Max and Lisa view Prawitz's contribution as part of a variegated, ongoing research pursuing an explication of the concept of validity, which began with the Socratic and Platonic distinction between merely persuasive arguments and good arguments and with Aristotle's definition of syllogism. Throughout the history of philosophy, logicians have aimed at clarifying a pre‐theoretic idea of good deduction and have proposed, criticized, refined, adjusted precise theoretical concepts of validity. Prawitz has criticized current views about validity, has advanced new proposals and revised them. His work is an important chapter of the long pursuit of the concept of validity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the remarkable advances in behavioral and brain sciences over the last decades, the mind-body (brain) problem is still an open debate and one of the most intriguing questions for both cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind. Traditional approaches have conceived this problem in terms of a contrast between physicalist monism and Cartesian dualism. However, since the late sixties, the landscape of philosophical views on the problem has become more varied and complex. The Multiple Realization Thesis (MRT) claims that mental properties can be (or are) realized, and mental processes can be (or are) implemented by neural correlates of different kinds. Thus, MRT challenges the psychoneural type-identity theory and the corresponding reductionism. Many philosophers have acknowledged the a priori plausibility of MRT. However, the existence of empirical evidence in favor of intraspecific, human multiple realizations of mental processes and properties is still controversial. Here, we illustrate some cases that provide empirical evidence in support of MRT. Recently, it has been proposed that foveal agnosic vision, like peripheral vision, can be restored by increasing object parts' spacing (Crutch and Warrington, 2007; Strappini et al., 2017b). Agnosic fovea and normal periphery are both limited by crowding, which impairs object recognition, and provides the signature of visual integration. Here, we define a psychological property of restored object identification, and we cross-reference the data of visually impaired patients with different etiologies. In particular, we compare the data of two stroke patients, two patients with posterior cortical atrophy, six cases of strabismic amblyopia, and one case with restored sight. We also compare these patients with unimpaired subjects tested in the periphery. We show that integration (i.e., restored recognition) seems to describe quite accurately the visual performance in all these cases. Whereas the patients have different etiologies and different neural correlates, the unimpaired subjects have no neural damage. Thus, similarity in the psychological property given the differences in the neural substrate can be interpreted in relation to MRT and provide evidence in its support. Finally, we will frame our contribution within the current debate concerning MRT providing new and compelling empirical evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alberto Coffa used the phrase “the Copernican turn in semantics” to denote a revolutionary transformation of philosophical views about the connection between the meanings of words and the acceptability of sentences and arguments containing those words. According to the new conception resulting from the Copernican turn, here called “the Copernican view”, rules of use are constitutive of the meanings of words. This view has been linked with two doctrines: (A) the instances of meaning-constitutive rules are analytically and a priori true or valid; (B) to grasp a meaning is to accept its rules. The pros and cons of different versions of the Copernican view, ascribable to Wittgenstein, Carnap, Gentzen, Dummett, Prawitz, Boghossian and other authors, will be weighed. A new version will be proposed, which implies neither (A) nor (B). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]