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The president's party normally loses seats in the House of Representatives during US midterm elections. While many studies have examined the causes of seat loss, one area often mentioned by media pundits but not examined in midterm elections is the role of presidential agendas. In this paper, I examine whether legislative success is costly for the president's party during midterm elections. I find passing a larger number of legislative items and passing a larger percentage of the president's agenda costs the president's party seats in the midterm election. However, the president's party only suffers this penalty when the president's party also controls Congress. The president's party is not punished for legislative success when the president serves under divided government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The group-centered theory of party development provides a new theoretical framework for understanding early party development. Specifically, it provides a logical framework to understand why early state legislators were motivated to engage in partisan gerrymandering during a period without national organizations. I use Pennsylvania as a case study to determine if partisanship influenced the creation of congressional district maps in 1802, 1812, and 1822. Using county-level congressional election returns and state legislative journals, I provide evidence of strategic partisan gerrymandering by the Democratic-Republicans during each apportionment year. I also show that the Federalist minority in Pennsylvania knew the national political impact of the process and attempted to influence congressional maps for their own partisan advantage. Lastly, I demonstrate how multi-member districts were the Democratic-Republicans' weapon of choice to engage in partisan gerrymandering throughout the period. These results highlight the connection between state legislatures and congressional party politics during the first party era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past experience in elective office has always been the best predictor of congressional candidate success in elections. These "quality" candidates come into elections with experience fundraising, name recognition, and general knowledge about how to run a successful campaign. Yet, recent congressional elections have seen an increase in the electoral success of inexperienced candidates. As past experience in office may no longer be valued as it once was, how are these experienced candidates marketing themselves to voters? Are they still leaning into their past experience in elected office or are they more likely to emphasize other occupations and experiences? We expect candidates brand themselves, emphasizing different experiences, based on the type of election they are in and who they are running against. In order to test these expectations, this paper examines all available biography pages of experienced candidates who ran in congressional primaries in 2022. We find clear partisan differences in what candidates past occupational backgrounds they highlight. We find mixed evidence that decisions about what occupations to emphasize vary based on electoral dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increase in elite-level polarization and the changing partisan nature of elections to the U.S. House led scholars to posit that candidate characteristics are minor considerations in determining these election outcomes. However, it is not clear if these trends extend to the U.S. Senate or if candidate considerations have lost the relatively minor predictive power they exhibited during the 2010s, particularly as partisanship continued to rise as a predictor of election outcomes. Using historical data on elections to the U.S. House and Senate from 1900 to the recent 2022 midterm elections, we test whether the incumbency advantage and candidate quality differentials are still salient predictors of congressional elections. We find that the incumbency advantage largely disappeared as a salient component of election outcomes for both chambers as partisanship increasingly shapes these outcomes. By contrast, we find that candidate quality differentials, while waning, still can play a considerable role in shaping congressional election outcomes, particularly in the Senate. We conclude by showing that the declining emergence of quality candidates may have played a pivotal role during the 2022 election cycle by costing Republicans control of the U.S. Senate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the months leading up to the 2022 midterms, Republicans believed a variety of factors were working in their favor including inflation and overall state of the economy, redistricting, and Biden's low levels of public approval. After the electoral dust settled, Republicans won a narrow majority in the House, but actually lost a seat in the Senate. Why did Republicans fail to fully capitalize on the specific midterm conditions that historically have favored the out-party? This paper examines the results of the 2022 primary and general elections, identifies electoral trends and themes, and considers the implications of the results in terms of prior congressional election research. Based on aggregate election data and survey-based evidence, it appears that former President Trump's enduring shadow over the midterms and the Supreme Court's decision in the Dobbs case hindered the Republicans' ability to win a larger share of seats in Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: We examine how congressional candidates use social media such as Twitter (X) to promote a political brand and connect with voters during campaigns. Methods: Using a mixed‐method, interdisciplinary approach, we first conduct a brand analysis using 22 candidates from 11 open‐seat races in 2020. We develop and test several hypotheses using our races from 2020 and the subsequent contests in these districts in 2022, as well as the universe of tweets from all congressional candidates from the 2020 and 2022 general election campaigns (n = 789,411). Results: We find the three prominent themes present in our brand analysis—the adoption of gender roles, the mimicking of Trump, and expressions of populism—persist when we examine the Twitter posts from congressional candidates in 2020 and 2022. Male and female candidates behave differently on Twitter as do Republicans and Democrats. Most Republican candidates, regardless of gender, mimic the Trump brand rife with populist themes. Conclusion: We integrate research from political science and communication studies to gain a better understanding of how congressional candidates present their political brand to voters. We raise new questions scholars from the social sciences must consider while studying these phenomena in a fast‐evolving political and social media landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does candidate ideology affect donors' contribution decisions in U.S. House elections? Studies of donor motivations have struggled with confounding of candidate, donor, and district characteristics in observational data and the difficulty of assessing trade-offs in surveys. We investigate how these factors affect contribution decisions using experimental vignettes administered to 7,000 verified midterm donors. While ideological congruence influences donors' likelihood of contributing to a candidate, district competitiveness and opponent extremity are equally important. Moreover, the response to ideology is asymmetric and heterogeneous: donors penalize more moderate candidates five times more heavily than more extreme candidates, with the most extreme donors exhibiting the greatest preference for candidates even more extreme than themselves. Republicans also exhibit a greater relative preference for extremism than Democrats, although partisan differences are smaller than differences by donor extremism. Our findings suggest that strategic considerations matter, and donors incentivize candidate extremism even more than previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines voting in the 2022 United States congressional elections, contests that were widely expected to produce a sizable defeat for Democratic candidates for largely economic reasons. Based on a representative national probability sample of voters interviewed in both 2020 and 2022, individuals who changed their vote from one party's congressional candidate to another party's candidate did not do so in response to the salience of inflation or declining economic conditions. Instead, we find strong evidence that views on abortion were central to shifting votes in the midterm elections. Americans who favored (opposed) legal abortions were more likely to shift from voting for Republican (Democratic) candidates in 2020 to Democratic (Republican) candidates in 2022. Since a larger number of Americans supported than opposed legal abortions, the combination of these shifts ultimately improved the electoral prospects of Democratic candidates. New voters were especially likely to weigh abortion views heavily in their vote-shifting calculus. Likewise, those respondents whose confidence in the US Supreme Court declined from 2020 to 2022 were more likely to shift from voting for Republican to Democratic congressional candidates. We provide direct empirical evidence that changes in support for the Supreme Court, a nonpartisan branch of the federal government, are implicated in partisan voting behavior in another branch of government. We explore the implications of these findings for prevalent assumptions about how economic conditions influence voting, as well as for the relationship between the judiciary and electoral politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: A shift of Latino voters to Republican Party candidates has been observed in recent years. Past research on presidential elections supports the idea that borderlands counties vote differently than other counties in borderlands states and tend to favor Democratic Party candidates. This study explores congressional voting patterns in the Texas borderlands. Methods: Using county‐level data for Texas counties in 2010 and 2022, this study examines Republican congressional voting as a function of (1) borderlands cultural and economic context, (2) economic conditions, (3) social contact, and (4) religious adherence. We contribute to existing scholarship by proposing that there are three district border subregions. Results: Overall, this study finds increased levels of support for Republican congressional candidates in the borderlands region. However, when subregions are compared, those counties with economic linkages to Mexico and rural Tejano counties are more likely to vote for Democratic Party candidates in 2010 and 2022. The West Texas borderlands region, however, is no longer distinctive from other Texas counties in terms of voting patterns in 2022. Conclusion: Voters in the predominantly Latino Texas borderlands are increasingly voting for Republican congressional candidates suggesting a change in partisan attachment. The effects of foreign‐born arrivals and rising economic optimism in the borderlands may lead to more voting for Republican candidates. However, current economic realities and linkages as well as past social and political marginalization may continue to make borderlands voters distinct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a modified spatial-voting rule to explain why congressional candidates adopt more extreme ideological positions than their constituents' preferences. Our model accepts the standard spatial-voting model with one critical exception: voters in the same party as a candidate tolerate extremism without imposing an electoral penalty. This, in turn, creates “leeway” for candidates to adopt extreme positions as they increasingly depend on voters from their own party. Electoral simulations demonstrate that a key election-level implication of this model is that it explains candidate polarization without relying on institutional factors like primary elections. Finally, we show that asymmetry in perceptual bias is one possible mechanism and that real-world patterns of ideological representation are consistent with our simulation results.

Appearances of elected officials on cable news have become a regular feature of American politics. Do candidates going on cable news see a subsequent bump in fundraising? We evaluate all television appearances for every major party candidate running for the House from 2009–2020 on CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News. We match these with FEC records of every individual campaign contribution made during the same period. We find evidence that candidates who appear on cable news do see a spike in fundraising on the day of the appearance. We find incumbents raise more money from in-state donors while nonincumbents see a bump from out-of-state donors. Also, this money comes more from appearances in primetime slots, not daytime appearances. Given that candidates see a bump in fundraising for TV appearances, it remains likely that this facet of American politics will persist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last several elections, numerous high-profile candidates for the U.S. Senate have raised a majority of their campaign funds from donors who reside in a different state. These efforts have garnered substantial media coverage and have been fodder for attacks by the candidate's opponents. Despite the increased attention to the role of out-of-state donors, it is not clear if these cases are outliers or if this is now common practice in our more nationalized electoral environment. In this paper, we examine trends in Senate candidate's fundraising from out-of-state donors between 2000 and 2020. We find that there has been a general increase over time in Senate candidates' reliance on out-of-state donations. There is, however, variation in terms of who relies heavily upon the support of a more national donor base. A Senate candidate's share of out-of-state donations varies with factors like incumbency, electoral competition, and geography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social science has established that political parties have been indispensable to American democracy and their most active members as keepers of the democratic flame. The aftermath of the 2020 presidential election raised questions about the role of the parties in protecting democracy, particularly the fundamental democratic norm of "loser's consent." We argue that recent political developments—close elections, ideological polarization, participatory party nominations, and changes in campaign finance and media—have worked to undermine the parties' commitment to loser's consent. We use recent survey data to show that party activists no longer demonstrate greater commitment than do ordinary citizens to democratic norms—especially to loser's consent. We also examine how parties and voters responded to the post-2020 crisis of democratic legitimacy, finding that both parties prioritized their political interests over democratic health. However, a small number of voters did deviate from normal partisanship and helped to shore up American democracy in the 2022 elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Congressional district lines in many US states are drawn by partisan actors, raising concerns about gerrymandering. To separate the partisan effects of redistricting from the effects of other factors including geography and redistricting rules, we compare possible party compositions of the US House under the enacted plan to those under a set of alternative simulated plans that serve as a nonpartisan baseline. We find that partisan gerrymandering is widespread in the 2020 redistricting cycle, but most of the electoral bias it creates cancels at the national level, giving Republicans two additional seats on average. Geography and redistricting rules separately contribute a moderate pro-Republican bias. Finally, we find that partisan gerrymandering reduces electoral competition and makes the partisan composition of the US House less responsive to shifts in the national vote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the positions Members of Congress take on important aspects of public policy, voters’ preferences on those issues, and individual-level voting behavior in congressional elections. Minimal evidence of issue accountability is found, and its form is different from that reported in previous research. The central implication is that representatives appear to have a good deal of discretion to take positions—at least with respect to voters—without paying an electoral penalty. The “electoral blind spot” (Bawn et al. Perspect Polit 10(3):571–597, 2012) in congressional elections may be substantial.

Growing evidence suggests that extreme candidates perform worse, in part because their party's share of turnout declines. But does candidate ideology affect the decision of whether to abstain in a House race among voters who already turned out in the presidential election? I examine the relationship between candidates' ideology and voter abstention in the House contest, reporting two main results. First, fewer voters abstain in elections featuring more ideologically polarized House candidates. A consideration of party effects reveals more nuance, however: In most cases, roll‐off is lower when extreme candidates run, but the effect of an extreme Republican is substantially larger than that of an extreme Democrat. Further analysis suggests that decreased roll‐off is probably due to extreme candidates mobilizing out‐partisans. My results suggest that allowing for the possibility of voter abstention is an important theoretical addition to understanding the behavioral effects of extremist candidates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The belief that a military veteran candidate receives an electoral benefit at the polls based on a history of military service remains a widely held assumption in American politics. However, this assumption of a veteran electoral bonus has rarely been studied by scholars and the limited literature displays mixed results. This article presents the findings of a new study that addresses the mixed results in the literature and presents evidence that demonstrates that certain types of military veteran candidates do gain a veteran bonus in congressional elections. This advantage over nonveterans is conditioned by party, the type of race, and the nature of military service. By analyzing general election races for the United States Senate over 34 years (1982–2016), the study uncovers support for Democratic candidates with military service receiving an electoral bonus at the polls. This electoral bonus is most widely enjoyed by Democratic veterans in open Senate races and with experience in deployed warzones. The key findings suggest that previous conclusions in the literature with respect to establishing a veteran bonus in congressional elections should be reexamined to expand the time period of analysis, restructure the characterization of military experience beyond a binary variable, and include both House and Senate elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Out-of-state donors' contributions represent a growing share of fundraising receipts for House candidates. This raises the question of whether out-of-state contributions simply represent more money flowing to the campaigns' coffers or whether these monies could be worth more than their outright cash value. Using campaign finance data from the U.S. Federal Election Commission 2010-2018, I examine both the fundraising and electoral impacts of non-incumbent House candidates' receipt of these funds using structural equation modeling, a matching analysis, and a regression analysis. I uncover evidence that out-of-state contributions are an indication of the candidate's integration into the extended party network (EPN) finding they are closely tied to interest group support. Out-of-state contributions are also found to have a positive impact on non-incumbent House candidates' competitiveness, which likely stems from the broader support of the EPN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disproportionate rates of congressional representation based on gender and race are especially stark considering the symbolic and substantive meaning derived from descriptive representation (Mansbridge 1999). Using an original data set consisting of candidate demographics, district characteristics, and campaign finance reports, we analyze an understudied barrier to representation: unequal access to campaign receipts. We argue that it is the simultaneous gendering and racialization of the campaign finance system that produces gaps in campaign fundraising and representation (Crenshaw 1989). Our results underscore the limitations of unitary approaches which conclude that women no longer face a disadvantage in campaign fundraising. Unequal access to campaign receipts serve as a barrier to the descriptive representation of women of color. By analyzing the interaction of both race and gender on campaign receipt totals in U.S. House elections from 2010 to 2018, we assert the path to representation is not equal for all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to numerous studies, candidates’ looks predict voters’ choices—a finding that raises concerns about voter competence and about the quality of elected officials. This potentially worrisome finding, however, is observational and therefore vulnerable to alternative explanations. To better test the appearance effect, we conducted two experiments. Just before primary and general elections for various offices, we randomly assigned voters to receive ballots with and without candidate photos. Simply showing voters these pictures increased the vote for appearance-advantaged candidates. Experimental evidence therefore supports the view that candidates’ looks could influence some voters. In general elections, we find that high-knowledge voters appear immune to this influence, while low-knowledge voters use appearance as a low-information heuristic. In primaries, however, candidate appearance influences even high-knowledge and strongly partisan voters.

In this paper, we test the optimal position taking strategy for senators running for reelection vis-à-vis their party's president. Using data from a survey experiment conducted using a national sample, we examine the responses towards three hypothetical Democrats: (i) 'embracing' or supportive of Barack Obama (ii.) ambiguous about their attitude towards Obama (iii.) 'eschewing' or opposed to Obama. Comparing participants exposed to the ambiguous and the embracing Democrat, we find some evidence of a difference in candidate preference, but little evidence to suggest that the strategy gains votes. Comparing participants exposed to the eschewing Democrat to the embracing Democrat, we find that the strategy does yield some gains but these are offset by losses amongst the base. Overall, these findings suggest that the optimal reelection strategy for Democratic candidates is to remain supportive, unless they are running in areas with a high concentration of Republicans—then the eschew strategy can yield some gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As attempts to combat partisan gerrymandering transition from proposals to the Supreme Court to state-based districting commissions, it is time to ask two questions. First, how well did commissions in the 2010 round of redistricting perform as neutral decision makers? We answer that question with applications to each of the three independent commissions (AZ, CA, and WA) and four other commission forms (IA, NJ, NY, and VA) in place for post-2010. We take as the neutrality criterion the idea that a commission would produce a district plan that comports with a partisan outcome that could be expected from a set of approximately 10,000 computer generated plans adhering to minimalist constraints of contiguity, compactness, and equal populations. Our results indicate three of seven commissions produced suspect results that redounded to the benefit of one party or the other: pro- Democrat in Arizona; pro-Republican in New Jersey and Virginia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: This article seeks to understand the effect unified government has on seat loss in midterm elections. Methods: Using data from the 1950 to 2018 midterm elections, I use Ordinary Least Squares regression models to determine the effect of unified government on seat loss. Results: I find that unified government increases the number of seats a president's party loses during a midterm election. In addition, unified government reduces the number of seats saved by presidential approval and increases surge and decline effects. Conclusion: Unified government explains why Democrats have traditionally performed worse during midterm elections. The results also indicate that rather than a surge and decline, midterm elections are a counter‐surge to the surge in support the president's party receives in the previous presidential election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are female candidates less likely than male candidates to attract votes or win elections? We conduct a large-n longitudinal analysis employing survey and observational data from every two-party congressional race over a 12-year period (2006–2018) and connect individual-level theory and evidence with aggregate-level results. We demonstrate that candidate gender significantly influences congressional vote-choice and election outcomes. Holding other variables constant, we show that male Republican and male independent voters are significantly less likely to vote for female Democratic candidates, but do not assess a similar penalty on female Republican candidates. Perceived ideological distance does not explain the lack of support for female Democrats—however, variation in candidate quality does: Female Democratic candidates can attract the support of male Republican and male independent voters when they have a qualifications advantage, but are penalized when they are merely "as qualified." At the aggregate-level, female Democratic candidates with a qualifications advantage are as likely as males to win elections; but are significantly less likely than males to win when qualifications are held constant. The proportion of male Republicans and male independents in a district determines the extent of the penalty, with women's electoral prospects declining as this proportion increases. Women can win, but they need to be highly qualified and strategic about the races in which they emerge. These findings contribute to our understanding of the micro- and macro-level factors that shape women's electoral fortunes; and advance the goal of representational equality by helping candidates and campaigns concentrate their efforts on the most winnable voters and districts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Racial/ethnic minorities and women continue to be underrepresented in public office in the United States. Here, we evaluate the role of general election political party support for women and minorities in structuring these inequalities, as a key part of general election success is support from party networks. With detailed data on party support and the demographics of congressional candidates, we use two difference-in-differences strategies to leverage within-district and candidate-constant change over time. Thus, we are able to separate the effect of race/ethnicity and gender from other factors we demonstrate to be associated with party support. We find that, all else equal, Democratic and Republican minority nominees do not receive less support than their white counterparts. We also find that white women receive more party support from Democrats than Democratic men or minority women in the general election and that this support is more responsive to changes in electoral competitiveness. These findings suggest that party elites may provide additional support to candidates from underrepresented groups in the general election to broaden their appeal to voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a new data set of state political party bylaws and demographics of state party chairs, I evaluate whether women were more likely to run for Congress during the 2018 midterm elections from parties with higher levels of gender diversity. I construct three measures of gender diversity, whether each party was chaired by a woman, granted committee membership to an allied women's group, and required gender parity among their committee members. Democratic parties are more likely to be chaired by a woman and to require gender parity among their members, but Republican parties are more likely to grant membership to allied women's groups. Considering the implications of these rules, I find Democratic women were more likely to run for Congress representing parties that grant membership to an allied women's group and parties chaired by a woman. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is tough‐on‐China campaign rhetoric cheap talk or a signal of policy attention? Analyzing China‐related campaign advertisements during the 2010 midterm elections and subsequent cosponsorship of China‐related bills, we find that campaign ads are a noisy predictor of legislative attention. Challengers who attacked on China were more likely to cosponsor China‐related legislation, while incumbents who were attacked for being soft on China took tougher positions on China after reelection. By demonstrating the correspondence between anti‐China campaign appeals and subsequent legislative attention, our findings add to a growing body of evidence linking campaign rhetoric to members' legislative agendas. This research note provides the first evidence demonstrating the connection between campaign appeals and legislative attention on a foreign policy issue like China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2020 elections brought to an end one of the most divisive and historic campaigns in the modern era. Former Vice President Joe Biden was elected the 46th President of the United States with the largest number of votes ever cast in a presidential election, defeating incumbent President Donald Trump in the process. The record turnout was especially remarkable in light of the ongoing pandemic surrounding COVID-19 and the roughly 236,000 Americans who had died of the virus prior to the election. This article examines the electoral context of the 2020 elections focusing on elections in both the House and Senate. More specifically, this article examines the candidates, electoral conditions, trends, and outcomes in the primaries as well as the general election. In doing so, we provide a comprehensive descriptive analysis of the climate and outcome of the 2020 congressional elections. Finally, the article closes with a discussion of the broader implications of the election outcomes on both the incoming 117th Congress as well as the upcoming 2022 midterm election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study of the 2018 congressional midterms demonstrates how voting patterns and political attitudes vary across a spectrum of urban and rural areas in the United States. Rural America is no more a monolith than is urban America. The rural-urban gradient is better represented by a continuum than a dichotomy. This is evident in the voting results in 2018, just as it was in 2016. We found that the political tipping point lies beyond major metropolitan areas, in the suburban counties of smaller metropolitan areas. Democrats enjoyed even greater success in densely populated urban areas in 2018 than in 2016. Residents of these urban areas display distinctive and consistent social and political attitudes across a range of scales. At the other end of the continuum in remote rural areas, Republican candidates continued to command voter support despite the challenging national political environment. Voters in these rural regions expressed social and political attitudes diametrically opposed to their counterparts in large urban cores. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the enduring connection of localism and place-based roots shared between many elected leaders and their constituents, which previous work has either ignored or improperly specified. I argue that representatives of the U.S. House with these roots—meaning authentic, lived experience in their districts prior to their officeholding—sustain more supportive constituencies in primary election stage. Using an original 7-point index of local biographical characteristics of incumbents seeking renomination from 2002 to 2018, I find that deeply-rooted incumbents are less than half as likely to receive a primary challenge, and on average perform more than 5 percentage points better in their primary elections when they are challenged. These gains take place even after taking district partisanship, national political conditions, incumbent ideology, and other primary factors into account, and should induce scholars to reconsider the importance of local representation even amidst a nationalizing political culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research asserts that coalitions of party leaders, interest groups, and activists will cooperate to support the nomination of mutually acceptable candidates in primary elections. In this article, I utilize an original data set containing FEC contributions and expenditures data for 1648 candidates who ran in open seat primary elections for the US House from 2006 to 2016 to measure the extent and effects of coordination among interest groups and party organizations. I find that Democratic-aligned interest groups and party leaders coordinate more often and with a more positive substantive effect than their Republican counterparts. Moreover, I provide evidence that, with the advent of super PACs in the second half of the 2010 primary cycle, a small number of interest groups can act as a latent threat to broader coalitions that unite behind a candidate using independent expenditures to outspend the broader coalitions. This increased resource parity has tangible representational consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Losing elections is a political reality for most candidates. While much fanfare was made of the historic number of women who won in 2018, three times as many women ran and lost. And although we know much about the reasons that motivate women to run in the first, far less is known about the decision-making processes of women who lose and run again. How do women who were once motivated rebound for another campaign and election? We address this question, working with a unique, exploratory data set of interviews with women who ran for Congress in 2018 and lost. Our analysis offers some important insights on how women who rebound think about their loss, and their decision-making processes. We find compelling evidence that women's paths to office continue to differ from men's, reminding us of the shortcomings of a one-size-fits-all model for candidate emergence or reemergence. We conclude with the foundation of a gendered theory of electoral persistence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The record high number of women who ran for the U.S. Congress during the midterm elections led many journalists to proclaim 2018 as another "Year of the Woman." Although not every female candidate was successful, this large number of women running for office provides the opportunity to advance our understanding of the ways in which women present themselves to their voters. Using the "Biography" pages of more than 1,500 2018 congressional campaign websites, we use a structural topic model to examine how these candidates present themselves to their constituencies. In doing this, we find great variance in the presentation styles of women running for Congress in 2018. We also find that prior political experience, more so than gender, is the primary driver in influencing how candidates (both men and women) present themselves. Experienced candidates use similar styles that highlight their past political work while amateur candidates are more likely to use "values-driven" language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Non-constituent donors constitute an increasingly important fundraising base for members of the U.S. House. These donors are theorized to be seeking "surrogate representation" by buying additional representation rather than relying solely upon representation provided by their own House members. However, precisely why they contribute in this way remains unclear. Using data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES) 2008–2014 in a series of logistic models, I investigate whether self-reported donors make contributions to House races outside of their home states for policy or partisan reasons. I uncover evidence that surrogate seekers make their out-of-state contributions to recover partisan representation and to gain additional partisan and policy representation. Further, conservative issue stances significantly increase the likelihood of out-of-state giving more so than liberal stances suggesting conservative donors have less difficulty identifying surrogate representatives. Taken together, the results suggest surrogate seekers are strategic and politically sophisticated with respect to their giving choices and motivations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The 2018 House midterm elections were notable for the number of female candidates who ran and for the extraordinary sums of campaign funds these candidates raised. Both were fueled by the women's marches of 2017 and 2018, the #MeToo movement, and intense opposition to Trump (Adkins and Dulio 2020; Herrnson et al. 2020; Jacobson 2019). In this paper, we explore the intersection of these two phenomena. We show that non-incumbent Democrats, particularly women, running in U.S. House races in 2018 were especially successful raising small donations. Examining preliminary data for the 2019–20 cycle, we then show that the new Democratic freshmen elected in 2018—now incumbents—have sustained their small-dollar fundraising efforts, with women again outpacing men. We conclude by discussing the extent to which heightened reliance on small donations may mark a durable shift in fundraising practices and if so, how such a shift might impact the future politics of the House. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the longstanding underrepresentation of blacks in Congress, political science research has not settled on the cause. While there is increasing evidence that racial attitudes affect vote choice in today's congressional elections, how this effect interacts with the race of the candidates is unknown. This study addresses this debate by analyzing novel survey, census, and candidate data from the Obama era of congressional elections (2010–2016) to test whether racially prejudiced attitudes held by whites decrease their likelihood of supporting black Democratic candidates and Democratic candidates as a whole. In line with theoretical predictions, this paper finds that Democratic House candidates are less likely to receive votes among white voters with strong racial resentment toward blacks, and black Democratic candidates fare even worse. These findings help to explain the persistence of black legislative underrepresentation and contribute to theories of partisan racial realignment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though African-American and Latino electoral success in state legislative and congressional elections continues to occur almost entirely in majority-minority districts, minorities now have new opportunities in districts that are only 40–50% minority. This success can primarily be explained in terms of a curvilinear model that generates a "sweet spot" of maximum likelihood of minority candidate electoral success as a function of minority population share of the district and the proportion of the district that votes Republican. Past racial redistricting legal challenges often focused on cracking concentrated racial minorities to prevent the creation of majority-minority districts. Future lawsuits may also follow in the steps of recent successful court challenges against racially motivated packing that resulted in the reduction of minority population percentage in a previously majority-minority district in order to enhance minority opportunity in an adjacent non-majority-minority district. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whereas the preponderance of studies on public appeals evaluates their impacts on mass public opinion, we investigate behavioral responses—in particular, the willingness of donors to contribute to candidates for public office. As appeals, we identify and code the online messages from all 2018 candidates for Congress, winners and losers alike, about both Donald Trump himself and his signature policy initiative, immigration reform; and as behavioral responses, we track candidates' daily itemized fundraising totals. What Republican candidates for Congress say about Trump, we find, bears significantly on their ability to raise money. In the immediate aftermath of complimenting the president, Republicans secured a modest increase in fundraising; when they criticized him, however, they promptly suffered a substantial decline. We do not observe comparable evidence for Democratic candidates. Our findings are robust to a wide variety of measurement and modeling strategies, and expand our understanding of the political stakes of public appeals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of important limitations in using observed contribution behavior or surveys to assess how donors respond to candidate issue positions, we present novel experimental evidence about how habitual donors (individuals who contribute above average amounts, multiple times, and in consecutive elections) respond to candidate issue positions. Using a vignette design, we provide causal evidence about the support for two types of divergence from typical candidate issue position bundles—being too extreme or bipartisan. We show "typical" candidates outperform all others in terms of likelihood of attracting donations, primary votes, and general election votes. We also find that donors' responsiveness to positions vis-à-vis a non-donor sample is not solely driven by partisan intensity and key demographics (i.e., high educated, high income, age, etc.). These results provide evidence that party-consistent positioning among candidates and incumbents may be reinforced by donors' opposition to issue positions that diverge from the party-standard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of gender-ideology stereotypes suggest that voters evaluate male and female candidates in different ways, yet data limitations have hindered an analysis of candidate ideology, sex, and actual election outcomes. This article draws on a new dataset of male and female primary and general election candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives from 1980 to 2012. I find little evidence that the relationship between ideology and victory patterns differs for male and female candidates. Neither Republican nor Democratic women experience distinct electoral fates than ideologically similar men. Candidate sex and ideology do interact in other ways, however; Democratic women are more liberal than their male counterparts, and they are advantaged in primaries over Republican women as well as Democratic men. The findings have important implications for contemporary patterns of women's representation, and they extend our understanding of gender bias and neutrality in American elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En este artículo analizamos una parte de la nor-matividad que rige a las candidaturas indepen-dientes (ci) para diputados locales en México. Por un lado, examinamos el porcentaje de firmas de apoyo ciudadano que exige la ley y el tiempo que se otorga para obtenerlo. Por el otro, mostramos evidencia sobre la implementación de este nuevo derecho político en las elecciones para diputados locales de 2015 y 2016. Los objetivos son desta-car la diferencia normativa y práctica entre los es-tados, medir el nivel de dificultad para lograr el registro como candidato independiente y, mediante la comparación de dos casos similares, destacar algunas variables que podrían explicar la disparidad en el número de este tipo de candidatos. / This paper analyzes part of the legislation on independent candidates for local congressional seats in Mexico. The author examines the number of signatures required and the time constraints for placing a candidate on the ballot and explain how this new political right was exercised in the 2015 and 2016 local congressional elections. The objectives are to underline the normative and practical differences among different states, measure the level of difficulty in registering independent candidates, and, by comparing two similar cases, point out a few variables that might explain the disparity in the number of this kind of candidacies.

Do Americans care how much money congressional candidates earn? We conducted three experiments to examine how candidates' incomes affect voters' perceptions of the candidates' traits and ultimately their vote intention. Subjects evaluated otherwise identical candidates with annual incomes randomly varying between $75,000, $3 million, and a candidate with no income information provided. Results from the three experiments are remarkably similar. Subjects viewed the $3 million earner as significantly more intelligent than the candidate with no income information provided, but this benefit of high income was overshadowed by significant biases against the $3 million candidate. Subjects consistently viewed the $3 million earner as less honest, less caring, and less representative of them than the other candidates. Ultimately, subjects were less likely to say they would vote for the $3 million candidate. These findings demonstrate that the campaign advantages that high‐income candidates enjoy are somewhat offset by voters' initial bias against them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers have long investigated the conditions that promote the unambiguous communication of issues in political campaigns; however, previous research has been largely theoretic or has only tested ambiguous communication on a limited range of issues. We address these gaps, making three principal contributions. First, we provide an extensive empirical test of ambiguous communication, scoring every issue addressed on website "issues pages" from House candidates in 2014. Second, we accomplish this by using a supervised learning content analysis procedure that allows us to score a large volume of text based on a smaller subset of hand-coded text. This allows us to not only examine whether candidates comment on an issue but also the clarity of their message. Third, this article provides empirical support for how candidates' communication strategies are shaped not only by the candidates' personal characteristics but also the characteristics of the district. We find that district heterogeneity is an important predictor of ambiguous communication. Evidence also indicates that issue ownership and ideological extremity play a decisive role in the decision to "go vague." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]