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Copyright of IUSTA is the property of Universidad Santo Tomas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo hacer un análisis crítico de las cargas probatorias establecidas en la sentencia de unificación 2019-CE-SUJ-4-009 del 6 de noviembre de 2019, en lo que respecta al impuesto de alumbrado público a fin de identificar los an­tecedentes jurisprudenciales que concretaron las reglas de interpretación y de esta forma estudiar su correspondencia con la normatividad existente y las reglas generales que en materia probatoria resultan aplicables al procedimiento tributario y contencioso tributar­io para, finalmente, evaluar la vigencia y necesidad de las reglas de interpretación dadas por la Sección Cuarta del Consejo de Estado.

El presente trabajo está dedicado al análisis de la ausencia de regulación de la regla del estándar probatorio en el ordenamiento procesal civil cubano, toda vez que resulta necesario ante los cambios que se avecinan con la reforma procesal en nuestro país, de ahí que se proyecte una fundamentación teórica en cuanto a la necesidad de regulación de una regla de aplicación de suficiencia probatoria tanto para la Audiencia Preliminar como para la práctica de prueba de los procesos de conocimientos.

Copyright of Estudios de Derecho is the property of Estudios de Derecho and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Jurídica Piélagus is the property of Universidad Surcolombiana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Ius et Praxis (07172877) is the property of Universidad de Talca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

En este artículo damos los fundamentos jurídicos de por qué resulta plenamente legítimo que el Tribunal Constitucional chileno se pronuncie sobre algunos aspectos de las Normas Chilenas sobre Fertilidad, en lo que concierne a la entrega de anticonceptivos de emergencia. En este fallo, el Tribunal Constitucional determinó que las normas contenidas en el Decreto Supremo N° 48, de 26 de enero de 2007, del Ministerio de Salud son –desde el punto de vista jurídico– incompatibles con nuestras normas constitucionales. El segundo aspecto que analizamos desde el punto de vista jurídico es a quién corresponde el peso de la prueba. A nuestro parecer, lo que se prueba en cualquier juicio son hechos positivos, no hechos negativos, y quien debe probar es quien alega la ocurrencia de estos hechos. En consecuencia, consideramos que el Tribunal Constitucional debió haber exigido que los recurrentes probaran que el levonorgestrel impide el implante o anidación de un óvulo fecundado y no exigir al recurrido probar un hecho negativo, cual es que el mencionado producto no impide esta anidación. Reflexionamos además sobre ciertas imprecisiones del fallo, como aquellas relacionadas con el comienzo de la vida humana y la constitucionalidad de la consejería a menores.

The dynamic burden of proof theories are part of a generalized era in procedural law in which relativity and mutability are meant to rule. In this particular situation, lawyers should ask themselves about what could be their role towards change. The interpretation of constitutional principles has been expanded to such an extent that almost any interpretation of procedural rides are accepted. In this sense, this essay is meant to reevaluate the basis of the dynamic burden of proof doctrine by evaluating and comparing the modal weight of the principles involved to better understand which should prevail. The defendants of this theories note subtle differences in order to defend the possible aberrations of their doctrine; however, we think that the difference is more in lawyer's minds rather than reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of the chaotic scenario that exists in Colombian case law regarding civil liability for damages caused by medical services, this article presents an analytical and critical overview of the positions adopted by Colombian jurisprudence (in ordinary and administrative litigation) in regards to medical liability, in order to take a personal position in this matter. To this end, the following items are analyzed: (i) traditional elements that result in civil liability, (ii) the nature of medical liability: contractual or tort liability, (iii) and the controversial issue of the burden of proof, both in terms of fault (or wrongful services) and in terms of the chain of causation between negligence and damages. In the end, it is accepted that while the elements shaping traditional medical liability do not oblige the application of any evidentiary theory in particular, the constitutional principle of equity does require applying the theory of the "dynamic burdens of proof" when proving the fault, as well as lightening the burden of proof on the causal bond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]