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In this paper, I argue that the many-worlds theory, even if it is arguably the mathematically most straightforward realist reading of quantum formalism, even if it is arguably local and deterministic, is not universally regarded as the best realist quantum theory because it provides a type of explanation that is not universally accepted. Since people disagree about what desiderata a satisfactory physical theory should possess, they also disagree about which explanatory schema one should look for in a theory, and this leads different people to different options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to investigate the so-called paradox of deterministic probabilities: in a deterministic world, all probabilities should be subjective; however, they also seem to play important explanatory and predictive roles which suggest they are objective. The problem is then to understand what these deterministic probabilities are. Recent proposed solutions of this paradox are the Mentaculus vision, the range account of probability and a version of frequentism based on typicality. All these approaches aim at defining deterministic objective probabilities as to make them compatible with determinism. In this paper, I argue that one can think of the equivalent of subjective and objective deterministic probabilities in terms of typicality. Also, I show that only what I identify with objective probabilities plays the necessary explanatory and predictive roles, while the subjective components essentially guide beliefs. In this way, the paradox is solved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I investigate, within the framework of realistic interpretations of the wave function in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, the mathematical and physical nature of the wave function. I argue against the view that mathematically the wave function is a two-component scalar field on configuration space. First, I review how this view makes quantum mechanics non-Galilei invariant and yields the wrong classical limit. Moreover, I argue that interpreting the wave function as a ray, in agreement with many physicists, ensures that Galilei invariance is preserved. In addition, I discuss how the wave function behaves more similarly to a gauge potential than to a field. Finally, I show how this favours a nomological rather than an ontological view of the wave function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a response by the author to the reaction of Meir Hemmo and Orly Shenker to the review he made for the book "The Road to Maxwell's Demon: Conceptual Foundations of Statistical Mechanics." He discusses the concern of Hemmo and Shenker on the review, passage from which Hemmo and Shenker quote in their response to the review, and clarification of issues in the foundations of statistical mechanics.