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This paper aims to connect two debates about the relation among language, reasoning and thought that belong to different theoretical and disciplinary fields, but that are closely linked. On the one hand, the philosophical debate about logical pluralism. And, on the other hand, the linguistic debate around the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. We propose a hypothesis compatible with a version of logical pluralism and linguistic relativism that makes it possible to explain the differences between thoughts expressed in different languages. This hypothesis, at the same time, supports the possibility of understanding and even translating different logical and linguistic variants. From a position akin to logical expressivism, we claim that there exists a proto-logic underlying all natural languages. The minimal logical operators proper of this proto-logic can be made explicit in a precise way in different formal systems. This gives rise to logical pluralism. We also offered an empirically informed philosophical argument in favor of this hypothesis.

In this paper, I present a formal reconstruction of the classical argument for fatalism set forth by Aristotle in On Interpretation 9. From there, I expose two different formal solutions for avoiding the unwanted conclusion based on the traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s rejection of the Principle of Bivalence: On the one hand, Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic and, on the other hand, supervaluation semantics. I also address some criticisms made against these two proposals. To finish, I remark on some alternative interpretations of Aristotle’s intentions maintaining that the Stagirite philosopher rejected fatalism without abandoning the Principle of Bivalence.

El objetivo central de esta investigación consiste en analizar el sesgo a mi favor en dos tareas de evaluación de argumentos: la primera vinculada al paradigma del razonamiento formal y la segunda vinculada al paradigma del razonamiento informal. Para cumplir este objetivo, elaboramos y aplicamos una prueba de razonamiento que combina tareas de razonamiento formal con tareas de razonamiento informal. La prueba fue administrada de manera virtual a un total de 138 participantes. Los resultados obtenidos permitieron confirmar las dos hipótesis del estudio, a saber, que los mecanismos motivacionales prevalecen sobre la habilidad lógica en las tareas de evaluación de argumentos (tanto deductivos como no deductivos) y que el sesgo a mi favor se acentúa significativamente en las tareas de razonamiento informal.

En este artículo, realizamos una evaluación crítica de diferentes estrategias empleadas para reducir el sesgo a mi favor. Este sesgo cognitivo ha sido caracterizado como la tendencia a producir y evaluar argumentos de manera influenciada por las propias opiniones e ideologías. Proponemos una división en dos grandes conjuntos de estrategias: un primer conjunto, vinculado a las teorías de los procesos cognitivos duales, que apunta a mejorar las habilidades del razonamiento en solitario y un segundo conjunto, vinculado a las teorías evolucionistas sobre el pensamiento humano, que se basa en el intercambio de puntos de vista en contextos dialógicos de argumentación. Mostramos que estos dos conjuntos de estrategias están enfocados en activar el mismo tipo de procesos cognitivos, sólo que mientras que el primero intenta hacerlo mediante instrucciones directas para activar estos procesos en el razonamiento en solitario, el segundo lo hace mediante el intercambio argumentativo con pares. Asimismo, argumentamos que las estrategias pertenecientes al segundo conjunto pueden resultar más promisorias puesto que esta manera de razonar con pares podría replicarse con posterioridad en otras situaciones y contextos de producción y evaluación de argumentos. Finalmente, destacamos la importancia de seguir explorando estrategias destinadas a estimular las prácticas metacognitivas.

Myside bias has been characterized as the tendency for people to produce and evaluate arguments in a manner biased towards their ideology. The main objective of this paper is to analyze myside bias in an argument evaluation task. We constructed a test composed of two parts: a Likert-style questionnaire about personal attitudes and an argument evaluation task. Two controversial topics were employed for constructing this reasoning test namely, legalizing abortion and lowering the minimum age of criminal responsibility. Participants (N=247) were recruited from a secondary school and two universities in Córdoba, Argentina. We found a significant correlation between opinions regarding legalizing abortion and the assessment of arguments about abortion. However, we found a weak correlation between the Likert-score obtained regarding the age of criminal responsibility and the argument evaluation task towards that topic. Besides, we analyze the relation among myside bias and two variables of interest: educational level and formal instruction in logic. Regarding educational level, we haven't found a significant difference between the results obtained by secondary students participants and by university students participants. Regarding formal instruction in logic, we found that myside bias diminishes among participants with more training in logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]