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The OSCE Moscow Mechanism is one of the generally little-known mechanisms, established in 1991 to facilitate resolution of a particular question or problem relating to the human dimension of the OSCE. This article aims to highlight its role and significant potential to identify relevant patterns of behaviour supported by collected information and evidence on violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations that need urgent attention by the international community. Its flexibility and short reactionary time serves to promptly document developments and make them publicly available to inform further actions. At the same time, the mechanism in practice encounters a number of challenges, such as lack of cooperation from the States "under investigation", very short missions' deadlines for submission of their findings and rather limited (technical) support by the designated OSCE Institution, the ODIHR. This article discusses the mechanism as such and then looks into the two of its reports from 2022 concerning the situation following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and their impact within the OSCE and beyond. It provides some general conclusions and suggestions on possible improvements of the mechanism going forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This book examines the dynamics of national and regional security in the age of Zeitenwende amid polarization and conflict management. Through a comparative analysis, the authors reveal the intricate problems of border dynamics and practice in cases of border disputes and conflicts in the member states of the OSCE. The authors offer their approaches on how to peacefully settle the disputed borders, which can be supported by the EU, the NATO and the OSCE. It can be of significant help in preventing security crises and conflicts. In this regard, a number of solutions that can affect the Russian-Ukraine war and the settlement of RussiaUkraine relations are highlighted. From the author’s approach, it becomes clear that various European countries and international organizations should play an active role in the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis and the strengthening of European security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The strengths and weaknesses of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine are analyzed including the effectiveness of the organization's activities in resolving modern international conflicts, as well as its opportunities and challenges in this process. The OSCE SMM activities in Ukraine are investigated, mainly its institutional and procedural dimensions. Emphasis is placed on the idea that the OSCE is the main and only international governmental institution that promptly responds to the emergence of conflicts, uses already developed methods for their solution, and provides all members with information on compliance with the agreement by the parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Policy Insight discusses what was the world's largest dedicated third‐party ceasefire monitoring operation, the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), which, until the Russian invasion in early 2022, oversaw a ceasefire in Ukraine. Although it may now seem obvious to conclude that the SMM failed to deter conflict escalation, this once‐heralded, 'model' mission provides insights for the design and implementation of other ceasefire monitoring efforts. This Policy Insight argues that the limitations and differing interpretations of the SMM's mandate, an inability to attribute responsibility for violations, and a failure to act in response to violations substantially weakened the practice of ceasefire monitoring in Ukraine. Still, important lessons can be identified for future monitoring work, whether in Ukraine or elsewhere, including agreeing on the mechanisms for consequences when violations occur, better understanding the limitations of remote sensing technology in monitoring, and establishing more robust planning for mission suspension, evacuation, and termination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both the United Nations and the OSCE are working to improve their peace operations technologically. While the emphasis is more often placed on new collection tools (e.g., satellite imagery, UAVs, night-vision tools, etc.), the challenge remains to exploit the imagery and the copious other data that has been collected. By examining the software and evolving methods used by UN operations and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, we evaluate two often neglected steps of the information/intelligence cycle: analysis and dissemination. Lessons are drawn from both UN and OSCE experience in war-torn locations. Both organizations still need to establish strong and effective data-analysis and -sharing systems within their missions, and to find better ways to share information with the conflicting parties, and with humanitarian partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the development of OSCE mediation and provides elements to explain the ups and downs over time. The origins of OSCE mediation date back to the inception of the organisation during the Cold War period. However, it only became a mediator in the 1990s, playing different roles. This work suffered in the 2000s as the OSCE's relevance was increasingly questioned. In recent years, the OSCE has seen renewed growth, owing to a political commitment by participating States to strengthen its mediation capacities and because of the leading role it took on in mediating the crisis in and around Ukraine. While this is a significant development, this article argues that the OSCE's mediation role is likely to be limited, focusing on the niche of managing established formats and local conflict prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how increased tensions between Russia and the West in the wake of the Ukraine crisis impact the conflict management work of the OSCE. It first looks at Russian perspectives of the OSCE and focuses on how these changed in the post-2014 period. It then proceeds with an overview of implications resulting from geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West that could positively or negatively affect the role of the OSCE in conflict management in the long term. The article ends by laying out 4 scenarios on how the situation and the OSCE could evolve and argues that in the near future a continuation of the status quo is most probable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the Lisbon Treaty's modifications in the foreign and security policy domain, the EU has frequently relied on third parties to address external conflicts and crises. Using the Ukrainian conflict as a case study, this article adopts the orchestration model to explain why and how the EU enlists intermediary actors over which it has no formal control to pursue its objectives. It finds that in this conflict the EU outsourced part of its crisis management activities to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe because it lacked the civilian and military capabilities, as well as the regulatory competence and reputation to challenge Russia. Indeed, the Ukrainian case shows that orchestration has emerged as a crucial governance arrangement for the functioning of EU crisis management, raising serious questions about the EU overall capacity to act as a security provider in an international system marred by contestation and hard security concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

THE STRATEGY FOR MOLDOVA IS VERY CONFUSED: FROM A UNITARY STATE, A CONFEDERATION, AND FEDERATION TO THE REUNION WITH ROMANIA. ANYWAY, "THE MESEBERG INITIATIVE" PROPOSES THE POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONSULTING MECHANISM ON SECURITY ISSUES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION-THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. THIS ARRANGEMENT IS WITHOUT ROMANIA. IN UKRAINE, CRIMEA AND THE DONBAS REGION STATUS IS VERY CONFUSED, ALSO. IN THE CASE OF THE CIVIL WAR IN UKRAINE, THE EFFORTS OF MEDIATION SANCTIONS AND NEGOTIATION HAVE MADE CERTAIN STEPS, ON THE INITIATIVE OF GERMANY AND FRANCE, COMPLEMENTED BY THE OSCE. "THE NORMANDY FORMAT" - RUSSIA, GERMANY, FRANCE AND UKRAINE - CAN SUPERVISE THE COMPLIANCE AND THE IMPLEMENTATION THE ARRANGEMENT, AND CAN INVITE USA TO PARTICIPATE. HOWEVER, IS NOT USUAL TO IGNORE THE USA AND THE GREAT BRITTANY IN THIS VERY HOT ISSUE NOT ONLY FOR EUROPE BUT FOR THE ENTIRE WORLD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2015, the OSCE will commemorate two seminal dates: the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 25th anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a new Europe. This study takes these seminal dates for the OSCE as well as the current dramatic Ukrainian crisis as starting points to analyze three questions: How has Russia's relationship and role with/within the OSCE evolved throughout the years? Which role has the OSCE been playing in European security governance? How does the Ukrainian crisis affect Russia's OSCE policy and what does it mean for the OSCE? Studying Russia's OSCE policy is key to understand the OSCE's role as a framework for security governance in Europe with both its successes and failures. In order to answer these research questions, this study uses insights from (regional) security governance literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on several developments related to Organization for Security & Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) including the 20th anniversary of OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), OSCE Chairmanship by Ukraine in 2013, and riots in Russia in 1993. It presents information on the annual meeting of the OSCE Ministerial, which was held in Vilnius, Lithuania on December 6-7, 2012.

This article analyses the outcome of the 22nd osce Ministerial Council (mc) meeting, held in Belgrade on 3 and 4 December 2015, the year that the osce celebrated the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, its founding document. The article argues that the mc meeting was characterized by entrenched positions and that it illustrated the distrust and deep divides among the 57 osce participating States. The article explains that the negotiation process was overshadowed by the ongoing Ukraine crisis and by a number of bilateral conflicts between states. The author specifies some of the bilateral conflicts and shows how they took direct influence on the negotiation process and how they led to the fall of important draft documents. As a result, the Belgrade mc adopted only 5 declarations, among them on combating violent extremism and radicalization and on combating illicit drug trafficking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This piece examines practices of the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in dealing with secessionist entities in the post-Soviet space. The study specifically looks at the engagement of the two organizations with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and contested territories that seek secession from these ‘parent states’: South Ossetia, Transnistria and the Donbas region. Drawing on the organizations’ documents and a series of expert interviews with their representatives, the analysis uncovers the actual engagements of EU and OSCE field presences in the three countries, conceptualizes the organizations’ practices in approaching secessionist entities and provides possible explanations for the variance in the use of these practices. In doing so, the study contributes to the scholarly debate on international conflict management and state (non-)recognition in international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the outcome of the 21st OSCE Ministerial Council (MC) meeting, held in Basel, Switzerland, on 4 and 5 December 2014. The larger political context is taken into account, especially the crisis in and around Ukraine and the renewed confrontation between the West and Russia. The article provides an extensive analysis of all adopted decisions in the three security dimensions as well as of a number of draft documents that failed to reach consensus. The main documents that are analyzed include declarations on the Helsinki+40 process and on protracted conflicts, and decisions on countering kidnapping for ransom and terrorist foreign fighters, preventing corruption, improving disaster risk reduction, and on combating violence against women. The article concludes that the Swiss OSCE Chairmanship helped to reaffirm the OSCE'S role as the main forum for political dialogue between East and West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the OSCE, contemporary threats to security are more likely to arise from causes other than armed conflicts. The OSCE considers the list of potential security threats open and able to intersect the military, economic, and "human sphere." Yet, how open is this list and how open should it be? This paper tackles this question by examining the issue of whether discrimination and intolerance against LGBTQ populations can be considered a security threat that pertains to the human dimension of security. The current conflict in Ukraine illustrates the dangers of an expansive approach to framing security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper provides an analysis of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine within the multilateral attempt to manage or resolve the conflict in the Donets' Basin (Donbas). It aims to tentatively assess the SMM's influence on the de-escalation of the conflict during the Presidency of Petro Poroshenko, as a relatively closed political period. We explore the Mission's mandate, various evaluations of its operations and effectiveness, as well as the conflict participants' interaction with the Mission. The nature and dimension of the conflict have posed an, in its dimension, novel, yet, in its nature, not untypical challenge to the consensus-based OSCE. Despite the challenges of the Mission's specific scope and the limits placed on it by both Russian sabotage and a lack of resources, the SMM nevertheless managed, in 2014-2019, to contribute to de-escalation in the Donbas. Determinants of the net positive contribution of the SMM include its continued and large presence on the spot, the improvement of its reports on the situation in the conflict zone, as well as the development of more sophisticated monitoring methodologies and technologies over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bulletin of the 'Carol I' National Defence University / Buletinul Universitatii Nationale de Aparare 'Carol I' is the property of Carol I National Defence University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The feeling is widespread in the West that the post WWII normative international order has been under severe challenge since Russia's seizure of Crimea, now exacerbated by statements from the American president casting doubt on the institutions that underpin that order. Is there a future role for OSCE mediation as this order erodes? Study of the Ukraine crisis in light of other protracted conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union shows that the same challenges have existed for a generation. Because the conflicts were small, however, the international community chose to accept a fiction of convenience to isolate them from an otherwise functioning international order: the narrative that the separatists sought independence, not (as in reality) a re-drawing of post-Soviet borders. This isolation is under pressure both from the new experience in Ukraine and from the extension of ever-greater Russian control over the separatists, amounting to crypto-annexation, despite a backlash from Moscow's clients, including in Armenia. There is little likelihood of a resolution to the Ukraine crisis, including Russia's annexation of Crimea, and prospects for mediation to resolve the conflicts remain dim. However, continued talks may resolve some humanitarian issues and provide a release valve to prevent pressures boiling over into renewed open warfare. In 2015 the present author published an article outlining some effects of the Ukraine crisis on protracted conflicts in the OSCE area and on OSCE mediation in those conflicts. 1 He has been asked to revisit his assessment of that time in light of subsequent events in world politics (in particular the advent of a new administration in the United States) and in the region. The new developments give little cause for optimism that settlement in any of the conflicts is closer. Rather, the question for the OSCE is whether the international community, in view of the challenges posed by the Ukraine crisis, should continue to engage in the fictions that have allowed it to manage the conflicts since their beginnings in the collapsing Soviet Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seeking to place the SMM within the broader matrix of actors and initiatives involved in Ukraine, the contribution discusses the role of the OSCE SMM in supporting the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. The SMM has a role in monitoring, reporting and facilitating the implementation of the ceasefire elements in the Minsk Agreements, and interacts with a range of stakeholders across different levels. The contribution discusses some significant challenges and impediments to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, and looks at how the SMM's possibilities and limitations to monitor and report on the security related aspects of these Agreements are affected by such constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses miscellaneous topics related to the Ukrainian war crisis. Topics discussed include 40th anniversary celebration of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, closing of OSCE office in Baku, Azerbaijan and issues of violence from Ukrainian crisis in Macedonia. Other topics include coincidence of a commemorative event held in Helsinki, Finland with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

The article offers information related to Ukraine's leadership in the Organization for Security & Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It states that in January 2013, Ukraine has took over the OSCE chairmanship from Ireland. It says that OSCE's Human Dimension is deemed a critical part of Ukraine's chairmanship as the country is criticized for its treatment of political prisoners.

Abstract This article examines the efforts of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to manage tensions in Ukraine between the substantial Russian minority and the Ukrainian government, and to prevent potentially violent conflict in Crimea from 1994 to 2001, as well as the subsequent efforts to promote peace and stability. It questions why the HCNM was remarkably successful in crisis management from 1994 to 2001, especially in averting secessionism in Crimea, but was hampered in his efforts to achieve a solid foundation for durable peace through the creation of a robust system of minority rights protection. The central argument is that regional politics often preclude the construction of a minority rights regime that could otherwise provide the foundation for durable peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Hileya: Scientific Bulletin / Gileya is the property of GILEYA Publishing and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article examines the influence and reaction of the United States and the OSCE to the elections in Belarus, the aggression against Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and the destabilizing factor of Russia in the region. It is noted about the Moscow mechanism and the creation of the Crimean platform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The present conflict in Ukraine is considered one of the most significant crises in Europe since the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Moreover, it is taking place in a very specific area with special interests of external actors. The conflict, which has escalated into a war, has been regulated and, in fact, frozen, due to the participation of international organisations. This study focuses on the role of three European security organisations-- the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)--in the de-escalation and resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. The qualitative case study examines the ability of the selected organisations to take a position and enter the conflict. The study proves that the ability of an organisation to enter the conflict is, to a certain extent, determined by its position towards the conflict (resulting particularly from its membership) and by the tools available to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution examines mediation efforts undertaken by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the context of the current crisis in and around Ukraine. It describes the establishment and evolution of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) and the mediated peace talks on the conflict in eastern Ukraine – the Minsk Process. Drawing from the author's insider perspective, it sheds light on the unique aspects of the framework compared to classical mediation processes. It argues that, due to its connectivity with high-level diplomacy as well as its ability to adapt to a constantly evolving conflict, the Minsk Process represents a valuable, flexible, at times untypical, mediation framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This section offers information on political developments in the Organization for Security & Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE was allowed by Russia to observe the parliamentary elections on December 4, 2011. OSCE Ministerial held its annual meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania from December 6-7, 2011. It is stated that Ukraine could be isolated because from the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.

The paper evaluates the attempt to launch a National Dialogue process in Ukraine backed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from the perspective of its teleology, design and impact in the context of the aggravating internal divisions, problematic legitimacy of the post-Maidan leadership, Russia actively backing the forces in opposition to the interim government in Kiev and subversive of the integrity of the Ukrainian state, and peaked geopolitical tensions in the broader region. in the run up to the extraordinary presidential election in Ukraine scheduled for 25 May 2014, the OSCE backed the launching of a National Dialogue to prevent further escalation of the destructive and increasingly violent internal conflict. The efforts aimed at the consolidation of the Ukrainian political elite from across the country, including in the rebellious East and South regions, and across the political spectrum, also involving the party of the fugitive President Yanukovych. This endeavor, by the OSCE Swiss Chairmanship, provides insight into the opportunities and limitations of the top-down and elite-based approach to the National Dialogue in Ukraine, particularly in comparison with the local grassroots dialogue initiatives in the divided communities as well as the center-region dialogue formats, on the one hand, and with the extra-national formats of talks involving Ukraine and Russia, on the other. Besides, lack of the strategic sequencing and embeddedness of short-term objectives of the stakeholders to either keep or challenge the political status quo and long-term accommodation of political differences by the reformed political and administrative arrangements and national reconciliation prevented the National Dialogue from gaining the momentum, was prohibitive of its continuity and did not get traction with the population irrespective of the political preferences. There were objective reasons that prevented proper design and implementation of the dialogue, such as urgency, extreme polarisation and strong pressure on the post-Maidan leadership at the time from opposing constituents that ardently rejected dialogue, a factor that could not be ignored against the backdrop of the upcoming series of elections. However the OSCE political imperative had prevailed over the professional approach to the design and facilitation of the National Dialogue. In particular, no clear agenda that resonated with the diverse constituencies' actual needs and grievances was developed, no broad consultations had been held prior to the dialogue, disagreements between the stakeholders regarding the participation were not resolved, and the very design of the events, including media presence, was not conducive of the genuine deliberation and joint search for the mutually acceptable short-term and long-term trajectory of the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many conflicts, international ceasefire monitors are deployed to mitigate future violence. Increasingly, such monitors use satellite imagery, uncrewed aerial vehicles, and other camera-equipped assets to supplement, and sometimes substitute, human monitoring efforts to document ceasefire violations. To date, we know little about when and how such technology contributes to ceasefire compliance, with scholars offering diverging assessments of the effects. Integrating scholarship on the use of remote sensing in ceasefire monitoring with theories on the causal processes underlying ceasefire monitoring, this analytical essay offers a framework to assess the contribution of remote sensing to ceasefire compliance and illustrates the empirical application of this framework by examining the most technologically advanced ceasefire monitoring mission yet deployed, the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. Focusing on the period prior to the Russian invasion of 2022, our research finds that while the mission's observational power was expanded, remote sensing technologies ultimately had little effect on modifying conflict party behavior or compliance. While in this case remote sensing technology minimally increased compliance, the study contributes to debates on the use of technology as a conflict management tool, and provides an assessment framework for scholars and for policymakers considering adopting technology in other monitoring contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Departing from Russia's full-scale invasion in Ukraine in 2022, this article analyses the OSCE-based security order that prevailed since the Cold War and that later was formalised in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The first conclusion is that the OSCE-based European security order was successively weakened, and at the longest can be said to have functioned until 2014. The second conclusion is that this security order will not reappear even if the OSCE survives the consequences of the war. The article then analyses the partially parallel development of the EU as a security actor in Europe, and the potential of the EU to become a node in a new European security order. The third and fourth conclusions are that the EU has the potential of being a node in a new European security order, but that it will also need to become a node in a larger global order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution enquires into the relevance of the human security perspective in the analysis of the humanitarian situation created by the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. For this purpose, it will first characterize the war in Ukraine from an international legal perspective, and then introduce the main elements of the human security approach in order to apply it in a third step to the war in Ukraine. In this context the relevance of fact-finding on violations of International Humanitarian Law and human rights will be highlighted. The focus on vulnerabilities and a victim-oriented approach allows to better identify the threats to the security of people, in particular of vulnerable groups. The use of multilateral tools and the empowerment of civil society can help to provide assistance against the suffering and prepare for accountability for war crimes and human rights violations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Maidan protests in late 2013, women have played crucial roles in all sectors in the conflict in Ukraine: politics, civil society, reconciliation efforts, and armed fighting. The conflict has offered new challenges and opportunities for their emancipation, influence, and empowerment, but also for growing violations of their human rights. Despite their activism, women and gender issues remain underrepresented in the Minsk process for the resolution of the conflict, despite ongoing efforts by international organizations and pressure from civil society. International and national support for women's participation in dialogue and cooperation has increased, but needs to be sustained and expanded to new grassroots groups and women leaders for more visible impact. The article reflects the author's personal observations on how women's roles have evolved in the Ukrainian crisis by drawing on her field experience, meetings, interviews, and reports by international and national organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has a vital interest in the restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty and the resolution of its conflict with Russia, which are key to de-escalating growing tension across the wider European and Euro-Atlantic space. Yet the conflict in Ukraine's East has settled into a largely recognisable pattern: a new and very large "frozen conflict," increasingly reminiscent of that in Moldova, Georgia and Armenia/Azerbaijan, where intense fighting at the time of the Soviet Union's collapse was reduced by de facto cease-fires, but no effective long-term conflict-settlement mechanism was found. Washington should seek agreement from all parties to engage more directly in an OSCE-mediated process to stem the ongoing damage to European security, the deepening human and economic costs, and the threat to Ukraine's sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Of Ukraine's six presidential transitions, only those in 2010 and 2019 proceeded entirely as envisioned in the constitution. In several cases, elections and transitions resulted from ad hoc arrangements made to address political crises. In one case, street protests forced the rerunning of elections seen as rigged, and in another street protests led to the departure of a president whose election had been seen as free and fair. In some cases, procedures that were entirely improvised were widely seen as legitimate, while in other cases established formal procedures were insufficient to legitimize a leader's rule. This raises the question of how elections and legitimacy interact. Under what conditions are elections sufficient to legitimate rule, and in what cases are they insufficient? Under what circumstances do non-legal means of changing rulers gain popular legitimacy? By reviewing Ukraine's seven presidential elections and six transitions of power, this article explores variation in the power of elections as a legitimating force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws on the experiences of two previously unacquainted researchers working at distance who collaboratively used online platforms to co-interview respondents across a dozen countries in 2021–22. Rather than our research plans being disrupted by the constraints of COVID-19, we planned from the outset to conduct our research entirely online. Given our geographic separation, personal circumstances, and globally dispersed respondents, online methods were imperative to our research collaboration. At the same time, conducting co-interviews online introduced the challenge of structuring both effective interviewer-to-interviewer and interviewer-to-interviewee interactions in a virtual environment, where conventional methods might not suffice to create productive engagements, and where non-verbal communications are both more difficult to convey and interpret. In this article, we explore and reflect on our strategies and tactics for co-interviewing in contexts where online methods are a deliberate, welcome choice, rather than the fallback option. We focus on the nuances of interviewing elites, offering insights to help researchers prepare for the process, rather than only the content, of such interview encounters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the international institutions in which negotiations have often taken place have been challenged by increased conflict among member states in the early 21st century. Multilateral international institutions function best when common interests are viewed as paramount by the state parties, because they allow the state parties to negotiate structures and processes that serve their shared interests and values. The paper analyzes the difficulties in managing international conflicts in the UN, osce, nato, and EU since 2000 due in part to the inability to achieve consensus within fractured and stalemated institutions. These problems have increasingly limited the role of these institutions in managing some of the most dangerous global conflicts, including on arms control and disarmament and managing the Russian war in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The anthology describes the ongoing decentralization reform in Ukraine involved with the conflict "in and around Ukraine" (as described by OSCE). It is recommended to those who what to know what the decentralization reform in Ukraine is about, as well as to those who want to go deeper into problems and risks of decentralization in general. The case of Ukraine: edited by Hanna Shelest and Maryna Rabinovych, Cham, Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan Federalism and Internal Conflicts series, 2020, 373 pp., €131.99 (hardback), ISBN 978-3-030-41764-2; €96.29 (eBook), ISBN 9778-3-030-41765-9. [Extracted from the article]

The article reports on the appointment of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) by the government of Ukrain as the OSCE external auditor for 2009. The appointment is the first time for the organization to assume the position. Meanwhile, the OSCE will be entrusted with several auditing responsibilities including administrative and financial system, as well as to make recommendations for improvement.

International election observation has become a standard practice in democratizing countries. Doubts have been cast on the ability of electoral observers to accurately judge the freedom and fairness of an electoral process, and the scholarly literature has still not reached a consensus on the unintended consequences of election observation. This article empirically tests the hypothesis that observers can deter election-day fraud through a natural experiment on polling-station-level election results. Using data from the Ukraine 2004 presidential election, it will show that OSCE/ODIHR observation has both immediate and lasting effect on domestic political actors' behavior. Results do support the usefulness of election observation in reducing election-day fraud. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war is ready to emerge in Ukraine. We have the full information coming from the Western offi cials, specially the American ones, pronounced by State Secretary Anthony Blinken in the Security Council1 or by the President in front of the European leaders. America has chosen to use all the instruments for deterring Russia to move to war and has even sacrifi ce valuable intelligence in order to show that every move is well known. So that it wasn’t a surprise that Friday, on 18 February, we had the announcement that Putin decided the invasion and Sunday evening that orders of action have been delivered to the Russian units, once the BelarusRussia huge snap exercise has been prolonged due to evolutions in Donbas2 . It is interesting to see that the information war has begun as well as the war for narratives, credibility, legitimacy, hearts and minds of the worldʼs citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a process of continuously adjusting to and counteracting the circumstances of conflict since 2014, the Ukrainian media community has become polarized (Budivska & Orlova, 2017). Nygren et al. (2018) observe a confrontation between the ideal of neutrality in coverage and favoring "patriotic journalism" in practice among Ukrainian journalists. Th is article takes this discussion further and highlights the role of professional journalism associations and international organizations in the struggles within the journalism culture in the situation of conflict. The article uses Ginosar's (2015) interpretation of Hanitzsch's (2007) model of journalism culture and Mouff e's (2013) conceptualization of agonistic vs. antagonistic struggle to discuss the project Two Countries -- One Profession is initiated and supported by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. Finally, it draws on the reactions by the Ukrainian media community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines four of Europe's more marginal military institutions that receive less attention: the Franco-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF); the French led European Intervention Initiative (EI2); the British led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF); and the Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian joint brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG). These are described here as "interstitial" because they exist in the niches between both the main multilateral security forums (NATO, EU, UN, OSCE) and the national level. They are intermediaries, working like bridges to cover political obstacles, while often borrowing resources from established actors (notably NATO). It is argued here that such institutions are a form of national hedging against institutional blockages within NATO/EU while providing a platform for national defence policy entrepreneurship. In the context of Cold War 2.0 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, such institutional practices should not be dismissed as marginal. They offer a means to deploy European military forces outside formal NATO or EU decision-making structures, a feature which confers a useful flexibility. (161) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The end of the twentieth century was marked by dramatic changes on the geopolitical ground, which was generated, first of all, by the USSR collapse. Political confrontations that accompanied the process of USSR collapse caused in the early 90's violent conflicts at the periphery of the former Soviet empire (in the Republic of Moldova, for example). The path pursued by the Republic of Moldova from 1992-2003 to settle its conflict was reduced to negotiations with the Transdniestrian separatist administration and to signing of a great number of documents with the participation of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). After some events (for example, refusal of signing the "Kozak Memorandum") the negotiation format was changed. Two new negotiator representatives of USA and European Union were involved in the process; they expressed their own positions and interests, provided new visions. The Transdniestrian conflict reached an international level and actually is has been discussed within the Council of Europe, European Commission and other international bodies, which is significantly important in the politics of conflict resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past five years, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission has been implementing its mandate, partially in an environment of ongoing violence. This article describes ways in which the conflict continues to impact the lives of civilians and describes the humanitarian-security nexus in the Ukrainian conflict. As well, the article draws conclusions, which contributions an international monitoring mission can make to mitigate the human cost of the conflict and pursue a comprehensive concept of security and to prevention, even while operating under the conditions of an ongoing conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since independence and up until now Ukraine has tried to shape its security priorities and to define and implement key policies into its main security-related documents: laws, strategies, and defense policy ("military doctrine"). Ukraine also invested its hopes into the development of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), planned to enhance its participation in the activities of North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), and the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), expecting that the activities of these institutions would contribute to shaping the new architecture of pan-European security and assuming that belonging to the latter would be crucial for Ukraine's national security. First, in 2010 the pro-presidential majority in the Parliament of Ukraine passed the Law No 2411-VI "On the Basics of Internal and External Policy."[12] The document stated that Ukraine, as a European country that did not belong to any military block, had an open foreign policy, and sought co-operation with any interested partners, whilst avoiding dependence on any country, groups of counties, or international organisations. Ukraine was the first non-allied country to contribute military capabilities to the NATO Response Force.[26]Under OSCE umbrella Ukraine has taken part in OSCE missions in Kosovo, Georgia, Macedonia, and Kyrgyzstan. [Extracted from the article]

Die Welt steht vor einer unvorhergesehenen Krise mit dem Auftreten mehrerer regionaler Konflikte und dem Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine. Vor diesem Hintergrund erörtert dieser Artikel, wie Europas Sicherheit sich nach dieser Krise entfalten könnte. Er unterstreicht hierbei, dass die gegenwärtigen Herausforderungen für den europäischen Sicherheitsdialog die europäischen Staaten dazu auffordern, gemeinsam mit der OSZE die diplomatischen Beziehungen und die Zusammenarbeit zu stärken. Die Situation in Europa und dessen enge zwischenstaatliche Verflechtung betont zudem die Notwendigkeit und den Bedarf an Reformen, besonders im Sicherheitsbereich. Ferner ist es von entscheidender Bedeutung, sich in den Friedensbemühungen auf historische Entwicklungen zu stützen. In Anbetracht der aktuellen Situation werden die Lehren aus den Helsinki-Vereinbarungen und die Stärkung bestehender Rahmenwerke sich als entscheidend erweisen bei der Förderung von Frieden sowie von regionaler und internationaler Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit. Die Rolle der zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen ist hierbei von zentraler Bedeutung, da sie eine Fülle wertvoller Informationen und Forschungsanalysen bereitstellen, die einen entscheidenden Beitrag dazu leisten, Anliegen von Konflikten betroffener Regionen und der internationalen Gemeinschaft als Ganzes zu enthüllen und zu berücksichtigen. The world is facing an unprecedented crisis with several regional conflicts and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Against this background, this article looks at how Europe's security could unfold after this crisis. In doing so, it underlines the current challenges to the European security dialogue and calls on European states and the OSCE to jointly strengthen diplomatic ties and cooperation. The situation in Europe and its states' interdependencies also underscore the need for reform, particularly in the security domain. Furthermore, it is paramount to draw on historical developments in peace efforts. Given the current situation, borrowing lessons from and strengthening existing frameworks such as the Helsinki Accords will prove decisive in promoting regional and international peace, security, and cooperation. The role of civil society organizations is crucial in this regard, given their importance in providing a plethora of valuable information and research analysis that is instrumental in addressing concerns of conflict-affected regions and the international community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The military invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation since February 2022 has led to widespread international condemnation and close scrutiny. Among the various key aspects of this phase of the conflict, one of the most pressing legal issues is the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. These acts represent not only egregious violations of international law but also pose significant threats to peace, security, and the sovereignty of Ukraine, a recognized subject of international law. The need to address and delineate the legal responsibility of those guilty of committing these violations is both urgent and critical. This scholarly article aims to analyze the individual criminal responsibility of Russian state representatives for their involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine. By looking at specific cases and the framework of international criminal law, the article seeks to propose realistic avenues for bringing perpetrators to justice, thereby contributing to the broader discourse on accountability and the enforcement of international legal standards. The research methodology adopted in this article is characterized by a relevant analysis of international legal instruments, jurisprudence, and some international cases. Through a brief examination of the criminal acts committed by Russian troops in Ukraine, the article leverages both qualitative and quantitative data to categorize and assess the nature of these crimes within the ambit of modern international criminal law. The article's research elucidates the categorization of war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined by international law, providing their clear differentiation from one another. By systematically reviewing incidents since the military invasion of Ukraine, the article qualifies multiple acts by Russian forces as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, the article provides a brief review of the individual criminal responsibility for the commission of core crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity and look at how it should apply to the Russian perpetrators. It concludes with a strong advocacy for the expedited identification and utilization of an appropriate judicial mechanism to address the criminal responsibility of Russian state representatives. It highlights the imperative need for swift action to prevent further impunity and ensure justice for the victims of these heinous crimes. Additionally, the article warns of the risks associated with delays in the judicial process, emphasizing the potential for prolonged suffering and instability in the region. Ultimately, it calls for a concerted international effort to uphold the principles of international law and human rights, thereby safeguarding the sovereignty and dignity of Ukraine and its people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International election observation has been scrutinized over the past two decades by scholars trying to explain its aim, scope, and consequences. As it is now a standard practice in democratizing countries, scholarly literature has almost reached a consensus on the ability of observers to deter election-day fraud, one of the most positive unintended consequences of election observation. Using data from the 2004 Ukraine presidential election, this article extends our knowledge through a natural experiment on polling station-level election results. I will show that observation during counting does not have a stronger effect than observation during opening and/or polling. Results support previous studies showing the usefulness of election observation in reducing election-day fraud but add an important finding that deserves further scholarly attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]