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Out of a concern with the often implicit western‐centricity of theories of nationalism which are currently dominant, the article proposes to shift the focus of analysis onto the working of human agency in our understanding of nations and nationalism. Drawing from insights from the history of ideas, it argues that, contrary to the modernist account, the rise of nationalism of Japan can be traced back to the rise of Kokugaku in the eighteenth century when westernisation/modernisation had not yet reached Japan. Kokugaku scholars were engaged with intense collective self‐reflection and proposed answers to the question who the Japanese were and what Japan should be without adopting the formula of national imagination generated in the West. The article suggests that a focus on human agency has the potential to free inquires into non‐western parts of the world from the deeply embedded western‐centricity of conventional social theories, thus enriching our understanding of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is generally accepted that the "invention of tradition" is the product of two combined phenomena : on the one hand, government intervention in the economy resulting from the establishment of contemporary nation-states, and on the other hand, the process of "commodification". In Japan, the "commodification of traditions" is being carried out at a tremendous pace in the run-up to the Tokyo Olympics. The short-term objective is to attract foreign tourists to Japan in order to stimulate the country's economy, and at present, the search for a "Profitable Cultural Heritage" has become the driving force of the Japanese nation's cultural and economic policies. The Edo period, during which a traditional culture created by the people was born, is at the heart of this process of commodification. The "commodification of Edo", which appears through clothing trends, historical fictions and movies, and also video games, tends to present a one-sided vision of this period, a vision of a society devoid of any contradiction, which is at the origin of what we will call "representations of the Good Old Edo." Moreover, the construction of these "representations" also constitutes a means for the nation-state to encourage the integration of a national consciousness among Japanese people, leading them to turn away from current problems to contemplate with nostalgia the traditions of a happy society. After first analyzing the constitution and evolution of "representations of the Good Old Edo", we will examine in detail the creation of the "Tokyo cultural resources district," which is at the heart of a series of political measures aimed at transforming cultural heritage assets into tourist resources, and at the center of the cultural program of the Tokyo Olympics. Finally, we will highlight in a concrete way the various problems related to this project. Beyond the matter of the Tokyo Olympics, it seems important to us that historians get to work in order to counter the wave of cultural nationalism caused by the spread of these "representations of the Good Old Edo". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1970s, many critical Japanese Studies scholars have problematized nihonjinron discourses, which overemphasize Japanese uniqueness and its exclusive nature, as a manifestation of cultural nationalism for establishing ethnonational identity. Similarly, Japanese journalists and online writers have also begun to criticize the recent rampant praise of Japan in mass media as cultural nationalism. The present study explores this issue through a close analysis of a television variety show entitled Bukkomi Japanīzu 3 [Sneaking in a Japanese Expert 3] aired in 2014. Recent years have witnessed increasing nationalistic tendencies in Japan, expressed in both overt hate speech and political activities and in covert cultural nationalism. This article focuses on the latter, offering a textual and discursive analysis of a television show that features non-Japanese people engaging in Japanese cultural practices outside of Japan. It examines the structure, narrations, and interactions of one episode of the show as an ‘encoding’ process, which is followed by a ‘decoding’ of the show through the analysis of online viewer comments. Thus, the present study discusses how the show constructs the essentialist view that Japanese culture belongs exclusively to Japanese people and how audience members respond in diverse ways in online commentary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kosaku Yoshino is one of the few Japanese sociologists who bravely pioneered to tackle the thorny issue of nationalism in postwar Japan I from a sociological perspective i . Kosaku's contributions to the study of nationalism in general, and Japanese nationalism in particular, have been noteworthy and well recognized, particularly in those positive reviews of his celebrated book I Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan i ([4]). Kosaku perceptively points to the call for a "wholesome" ( I kenzen na i ) nationalism in postwar Japan, and he distinguished between two types: the resurgent cultural nationalism and the prudent revivalist nationalism. [Extracted from the article]

In the 1950s and 1960s, the modern Japanese state employed overseas cultural promotion as a way to maximise its interests and image not only in international contexts but also at home. By juxtaposing the Takarazuka Revue’s performances in the United States and Japan during the postwar period, this paper argues that the overseas promotion of this Japanese theatre troupe both depended upon and reinforced the Japanese populace’s nationalistic pride in its culture. The paper also addresses the ways in which the Japanese government used Takarazuka’s theatrical presentations as a means of pursuing its domestic and diplomatic agendas: improving Japan’s international position by proposing shared aspects of popular culture with the US and increasing its sense of nationalism by propagating cultural pride. In doing so, the paper explicates the ways in which Japanese popular cultural considerations interfaced with political concerns in the shaping of postwar Japan’s national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Professionally trained teachers shifted an ideological debate to a discussion of how to increase their students' potential to navigate within new power structures of the Japanese nation and empire. While other scholars have described how many teachers opposed the idea of kokugo not least on the periphery of nation and empire, this essay analyzes concrete recommendations made by classroom teachers. I argue that teachers trained at the new normal schools authored articles for journals of the Teikoku Kyoiku Kai (Imperial Education Society) that fundamentally changed the central discourse on kokugo by introducing theoretical and pedagogical considerations tested and inspired by classroom experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores the connection between the economy and cultural identity in Japanese nationalism and the intellectual discourses that have historically defined it. Nationalism in the pre-war period was closely associated with the anxiety that Japanese modernity was deformed. After World War II Japan was part of the global trend towards developmental nationalism, including a transformation of its economy into both a wealthy and a highly egalitarian one. In the 1970s and 1980s ethnic nationalism re-emerged, this time arguing that economic success was the product of Japanese cultural uniqueness rather than of the developmental nationalist policies of the previous quarter-century. The economic downturn of the 1990s thus challenged Japan both economically and culturally, and reawakened anxieties about Japanese deformity. At first, this crisis led to a critical re-evaluation of national culture, manifested as serious attempts to both resolve tensions with Asia dating from World War II and to dismantle domestic social hierarchies. By the mid-1990s, however, this moment had passed and government and business leaders adopted fully fledged neoliberal policies, reversing the long postwar trend towards income equality, also expressing a more strident and militarist cultural nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the historical changes in the national identity of the Korean minority in China from the period of Japanese colonial invasion through to the present. Existing studies have taken an ethno-cultural approach to the Korean minority's dual identity, but they have ignored the importance of political identity-formation which creates, re-creates, and transforms national identity. The Korean minority's national identity has been determined by political and economic factors rather than ethnic and cultural backgrounds. In this regard, the Korean minority's double-minded self-understanding of its own nationhood has shifted from an ethnicity-centred dual identity to a nationality-centred dual identity. This article notes that the Korean minority's national identity has been created and re-created by political identity-formation, and its imagination of ethnicity has been transformed through this political process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose — Despite contrary evidence, much management research treats Asians as culturally homogeneous. This study seeks to explore how managers from four Asian nations differ in conflict management and whether observed differences are linked to cultural attitudes. Design/methodology/approach — A questionnaire assessed conflict management practices and cultural attitudes of managers from four nations with considerable historical, geographical, and economic differences. ANOVA and ANCOVA were used to test hypotheses about groups differences in preference for three conflict management styles — competing integrating, and avoiding — controlling for differences in demographics and cultural attitudes. Findings — Statistically significant differences were found on all three of the conflict management styles, although the hypotheses were only partly supported. Controlling for differences in demographics and cultural attitudes had little impact on the main findings. Some similarities among the nationalities were found: "integrating" was the most preferred style, and showed the least variation, among the groups. However, there was less similarity among the nationalities regarding "competing" and "avoiding". Research limitations/implications — Since the hypotheses — based largely on national culture differences among the nationalities — were only partly supported, future research should attempt to identify variables that better explain differences among nationalities in conflict management style. Practical implications — The information on conflict management style preferences in these four nations will be valuable to those wishing to do business there. Further, refuting the common assumption of cultural homogeneity among Asians will better prepare Westerners for doing business elsewhere in Asia. Originality/value — This paper demonstrates that national differences in conflict management style were not based on demographic differences in the sample or differences in cultural attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As some of the contributors to the symposium point out below, for the past few years, Kosaku often mentioned his plan to tackle the very contemporary phase of Japanese nationalism from a different angle that he pursued in I Cultural Nationalism of Contemporary Japan i ([3]). Indeed, Yoshino is first and foremost known for I Cultural Nationalism of Contemporary Japan i ([3]), a ground-breaking piece of work on contemporary Japanese nationalism. Yoshino's approach to cultural nationalism not only enables cross-national comparison of matured and maturing consumer society/nation in the world but also can be applied to a study of other topic than nationalism. [Extracted from the article]