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Climate change is shifting the distribution of fish stocks that straddle between exclusive economic zones (EEZ), challenging transboundary fisheries management. Here, we examine the projected sharing of jointly managed transboundary fish stocks between Canada and the United States. We hypothesize that ocean warming will alter the sharing of fish stocks between the two countries, and that such changes will intensify under a high carbon emission scenario. We look at the specific cases of the International Pacific Halibut Commission that manages Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) and a resource sharing arrangement in the Gulf of Maine for cod (Gadus morhua), haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), and yellowtail flounder (Limanda ferruginea) to discuss the management consequences of shifts in transboundary stocks. We rely on multiple Earth system models' simulations and species distribution models to estimate the change in catch potential and stock share ratio of each transboundary stock in the 21st century under two climate change scenarios. Results show that, even under a low emission scenario, most transboundary fish stocks sharing ratios, i.e., the proportion of the total catch of a fish stock taken by a given country, will change by 2050 relative to present. The overall reduction in catch potential, in addition to the changes in stock-share will further exacerbate trade-offs between changes in species catch potential. Such trade-offs in the Atlantic and Pacific regions will be amplified if a high emission scenario is followed, relative to a low carbon emission scenario. Based on the simulation results, we examine possible solution options to reduce climate risks on transboundary fish stocks and fisheries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We apply the concept of threat points in game theory to explore the stability of current joint management arrangements for shared transboundary fish stocks between Canada and the United States. We use three examples to explore the effects of projected impacts of climate change on the productivity and distribution of these stocks between the exclusive economic zones of the two countries. The three stocks that we study are: Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) and yellowtail flounder (Limanda ferruginea) within the Gulf of Maine, and Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) in the Pacific Coast. We define a threat point as the payoffs that the fisheries in Canada and the United States take home given the current management agreement between the two countries. This is an application of John Nash's threat point, defined as the minimum payoffs that each player in a game theoretic model must receive for the solution to a cooperative game to be stable, which is usually the outcome of a noncooperative game. First, we compute the threat points, that is, the current profits that Canada and the United States derive from the three shared stocks, respectively. Next, we build an ensemble of climate-marine ecosystem and economic models and use them to determine how climate change is likely to change current profits received by each country relative to the shifts in their threat points. We find that in some cases the profits obtained by fisheries in Canada and the United States would change under climate change both in absolute and relative terms resulting in relative changes in threat points. These relative changes in threat points serve as the basis for our discussion of the stability of current transboundary management agreements between Canada and the United States for these important shared stocks in the face of climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is causing fish stocks to shift, upending the social-ecological systems that rely on the historic distributions of these stocks and creating or exacerbating fisheries conflicts. The movements of internationally shared stocks between Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) or between EEZs and the high seas are especially concerning because they bring into play a variety of geopolitical factors and equity issues surrounding missing or conflicting regulations of jurisdictional boundary zones. Though many studies have explored the responses to and repercussions of shifting stocks on fisheries management, there is a dearth of interdisciplinary case studies that provide insight into the complexity of conflict formation in shifting transboundary fisheries, and that highlight the initial response stages where inclusion of proactive and cooperative measures can greatly improve a system's resilience to conflict. Our study helps to fill this gap by drawing on the knowledge of a diverse group of experts to analyze four case studies where transboundary stock shifts, geopolitical or governance tensions, and uncertainty regarding the future of the marine environment collide. Through synthesis of case study findings, we create a causal model of fishery conflict, within which we highlight factors that may heighten or mitigate the risk of conflict over shifting resources such as complex histories of power imbalance, unequal access to resources, or a lack of consistent and transparent data collection. Cooperation and equitable decision-making processes are recognized as vital components of internationally shared stock management which can promote lasting, effective, and conflict-resilient fisheries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effects of climate change on the ocean environment – especially ocean warming, acidification, and sea level rise – will impact fish stocks and fishers in important ways. Likely impacts include changes in fish stocks' productivity and distribution, human migration to and away from coastal areas, stresses on coastal fisheries infrastructure, and challenges to prevailing maritime boundaries. In this paper, we explore these and other related phenomena, in order to assess whether and how the impacts of climate change on fisheries will contribute to the risk of fisheries conflict. We argue that climate change will entail an increase in the conditions that may precipitate fisheries conflict, and thereby create new challenges for existing fisheries management institutions. Several potential changes in fisheries management policy are recommended to avert the growing risk of fisheries-related conflicts. Climate change is radically reshaping the maritime space – and fisheries in particular – in ways that challenge existing governance institutions and mechanisms, and increase the risk of fisheries conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]