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The use of flipped learning as a pedagogical approach has increased in the 21st century. While there is an existing survey of literature regarding the development in American educational institutions--and fewer in an Asian context--there are some unique cultural considerations that may need to be examined regarding flipped learning's adoption and adaptation in Asia. This paper serves as a literature review focusing on several Asian nations with respect to three major considerations in comparison to the United States: geographical, educational, and cultural. After the comprehensive review, which comments on the number of relevant publications available per nation, this paper concludes that there is no significant barrier to the implementation of flipped learning in Asia beyond the existing considerations apparent in the United States (access, time, and institutional support). Additionally, the prevalence of flipped learning in Asia, and the purposes of various studies surveyed, indicate that cultural barriers, at least in this area, are becoming less notable or authoritative as national or historical distinctions are diminishing through Millennials' tendencies toward globalization.

How much is hegemony and how much is self-determination in the higher education systems in Southeast Asia? This paper argues that while the question of centre and periphery is still relevant to the analysis of international university systems, the analytical frameworks from which it has arisen may lose viability in the long term. Southeast Asian states are making use of higher education to act in ways that will contribute to the altering of their peripheral position in the global economic and political system. While changes in Southeast Asian higher education are closely tied to global markets and follow what sometimes appears to be a dependent pattern of adaptations driven by Western developed economies, the paper argues that there is also a significant amount of resistance. As Southeast Asian countries adapt in ways that help embed economic globalisation within their national landscape, the manner in which the adaptation occurs is more selective, open, and democratic than before. Moreover, while global communication with core (centre) university systems has been more open and transparent, the system is closed to direct intervention from the outside, making hegemony a less plausible explanation for the manner in which the system is reacting within the new global environment of financial interdependency.

Purpose: This paper aims to explore the holistic picture of sustainability curricula in Asian higher education. Design/methodology/approach: Content analysis was conducted based on Asian management education for sustainability in higher education. Online courses arrangement, teaching methods, instructors' educational background and cross-referencing data between triple bottom line and sustainability courses have been investigated. Findings: The paper provides empirical insights about the current state of sustainability education in Asia. The results show that there is an opportunity for interdisciplinary integration, as there are imbalanced sustainability courses offered by business, science and engineering schools. It also suggests that Asian universities should add an international connection and active promotion of sustainability education on their Web sites. Research limitations/implications: Findings are based on web-based sustainability-related courses. Future research could apply method of case study to do a deeper study. Practical implications: The paper provides an overview of Asian management education for sustainability and curricula analysis through our research, and that this will further assist in the development of interdisciplinary integration in Asian management education for sustainability. Originality/value: This paper is the first attempt to gain better understanding of sustainability-related courses offered in leading business/management colleges in Asia.

In recent years, local and global for-profit e-learning providers have expanded in Asia. A combination of factors has encouraged such development: The accelerating roll-out of technology, the availability of sophisticated learning management systems, and the high growth rates of Internet usage by the 510 million or so Asians who now represent 39% of the world's users (Internet usage in Asia, 2007) is leading to the belief that there is a huge un- or under-exploited market for e-learning. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a treaty of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that entered into force in 1995, has created increasing pressure for augmented efforts in opening up the existing education market (Jung, 2005a). Many Asian governments are eager to introduce market principles, constrain expenditures, widen access to higher education and professional development, and improve quality via competition. It is recognized that for-profit providers may better meet rapidly changing educational needs. This paper examines the emergence of new for-profit e-learning providers in Asia. (Contains 28 endnotes.)

This paper examines defense industrialization in three leading arms-producing states in Asia - India, Japan, and South Korea - and how their experiences compare to China's recent defense industrial developments. It argues that despite decades of considerable effort and investments in pursuit of a techno-nationalist self-arming strategy, these countries have experienced only modest success when it comes to achieving such self-reliance. Most regional defense industrial bases lack the necessary design skills and technological expertise in order to truly innovate, and at best these countries act as 'late innovators' when it comes to armaments production. The experiences of these countries have lessons for China as it attempts to move into the first tier of arms-producing states. China has over the past 15 years made significant progress in modernizing its defense technological and industrial base. At the same time, China faces the same long-term challenges that currently confront other regional arms industries - that is, making techno-nationalism work at the later stages of innovation. This is particularly critical as China's defense industry strives to move from a basically platform-centric to an increasingly network-centric technological-industrial process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]