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Purpose: In the process of school-to-work transition, the role of general education and vocational education and training (VET) remains quite central. Based on the human capital theory, we estimate whether investment in VET brings additional returns for workers across the age cohorts. Design/methodology/approach: The focus of our study being the labour market in India, the data from the Periodic Labour Force Survey 2018–19, conducted by the National Statistical Office, has been used for analysis. We have applied the ordinary least square method with sample selection correction, the quasi-experimental technique of propensity score matching and heteroskedasticity based instrumental variable approach to estimate the returns with respect to no VET, formal VET and informal VET. Findings: Our study shows that workers with formal VET earn higher wages than workers with no VET or informal VET. The study finds that workers with informal VET do not earn higher wages than workers with no VET. Moreover, from the age cohort analysis, we have deduced that wage advantage of workers with formal VET persists across all age cohorts and, in fact, accentuates with an increase in age. Originality/value: We have estimated that VET being complemented with basic general education fetches higher returns in the labour market, especially when provided through formal channels. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, in the case of developing countries where informal VET is widely provided, this is one of the first studies that captures the return to informal VET. Lastly, complementing the existing studies on the developed countries, we have estimated the returns to VET over the life cycle of the workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The nationwide lockdown (March 25 to June 8, 2020) to curb the spread of coronavirus infection had significant health and economic impacts on the Indian economy. There is limited empirical evidence on how COVID-19 restrictive measures may impact the economic welfare of specific groups of patients, e.g., tuberculosis patients. We provide the first such evidence for India.Methods: A total of 291 tuberculosis patients from the general population and from a high-risk group, patients from tea garden areas, were interviewed at different time points to understand household income loss during the complete lockdown, three and eight months after the complete lockdown was lifted. Income loss was estimated by comparing net monthly household income during and after lockdown with prelockdown income. Tuberculosis service utilization patterns before and during the lockdown period also were examined. Household income loss, travel and other expenses related to tuberculosis drug pickup were presented in 2020 US dollars (1 US$ = INR 74.132).Results: 26% of households with tuberculosis patients in tea garden areas and 51% of households in the general population had zero monthly income during the complete lockdown months (April-May 2020). Overall income loss slowly recovered during July-August compared to April-May 2020. Approximately 7% of patients in the general population and 4% in tea garden areas discontinued their tuberculosis medicines because of the complete lockdown.Conclusion: Discontinuation of medicine will have an additional burden on the tuberculosis elimination program in terms of additional cases, including multidrug resistant tuberculosis cases. Income loss for households and poor restoration of income after the lockdown will likely have an impact on the nutrition of tuberculosis patients and families. Tuberculosis patients working in the informal sector were the worst affected group during the nationwide lockdown. This emphasizes that a policy priority must continue to protect those working in informal sectors from the economic consequences of such restrictive measures, including paid sick leave, additional food support, and direct benefit transfers. Alongside ensuring widespread access to COVID-19 vaccines, these policy actions remain pivotal in ensuring the well-being of those who are unfortunate enough to be living with tuberculosis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In developing economies like India, 'informal' sector occupies a large portion of GDP and employment. In the wake of slowdown in investments across countries and ensuing fall in the GDP growth rates, the question that arises is the following. If an economy suffers from growth slowdown, and since investment is often believed to be a driver of growth, should more investments go to the formal sector or to the informal sector? In what ways outcomes are different in terms of composition of output, employment, and wages? The issue may be a particular interest to India where slowdown in investments is believed to be the primary reason behind the recent sluggish growth of the economy. This paper theoretically evaluates the effects of investments on sectoral wage rates, output and employment composition, and growth in a developing economy consisting of a vast informal sector in a general equilibrium framework with endogenous demand and sector specific capital. The model traces, beginning with capital market disequilibrium and labour market distortion, whether investments into the sectors lead to equilibrium in capital and labour markets over time. This approach is distinctly different from the existing literature that is primarily engaged with finding out comparative statics results of a change in policy variables such as tariff rate and subsidy/tax. This paper also brings in endogenous demand that is mostly missing thus far. The model highlights the following results. Investments in the formal sector increase the size of the sector and cause the informal sector to shrink. The labour market distortion goes away as wages are eventually equalized across the sectors, after which the capital market equilibrium is achieved. Equalisation of wages is similar to the 'turning point' of the Lewis model of development. On the other hand, investments in the informal sector increase its own size but do not alter the size of the formal sector. Much contrary to the previous case, capital market equilibrium is achieved first, so the labour market distortion stays, leading to the existence of a persistent wage gap in the long run. One way of avoiding the possibility of the informal sector becoming large in size would be to subsidize the short-run capital return in the formal sector. This of course is a 'second-best' policy to counteracting the distortion in the labour market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The predominant type of firms in developing countries is small family firms and the self-employed in the informal sector. Very few family firms make the transition to larger firms employing non-family labour. In this paper, we examine the reasons for the low presence of firms employing non-family labour in the informal sector, using a firm-level data set drawn from nationally representative repeated cross-sectional surveys of the Indian informal manufacturing sector. We find that the key constraint to firm transition is firm capabilities, followed by the level of urbanisation, access to electricity and roads, and human capital, with financial constraints playing a lesser role. JEL codes: O17, L25, D22 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India responded to the COVID-19 measures abruptly and in a tough manner during the early stages of the pandemic. Its response did not take into consideration the socio-economic life of the majority of people in India who work in the informal sector and the sheer diversity of the country. The imposition of a nationwide lockdown using the Disaster Management Act 2005 enabled the Union Government to impose its will on the whole country. India has a federal system, and health is a state subject. Such an overbearing role on the part of the Central Government did not, however, lead to coordinated action. Some states expressed their differences, but eventually all complied with the central guidelines. The COVID-19 pandemic struck at a time when an agitation was going on in the country, especially in New Delhi, against the Citizen Amendment Act. The lockdown was imposed all of a sudden and was extended until 31 May. This led to a humanitarian crisis involving a large number of domestic migrant workers, who were left stranded with no income for survival and no means of transport to go home. Indians abroad who were intending to return also found themselves trapped. Dissenting voices were silenced through arrests and detentions during this period, and the victims included rights activists, students, lawyers, and even some academics. Power tussles and elections continued as usual and the social distancing norms were often compromised. Since COVID-19 containment measures were carried out primarily at the state level, this paper will also selectively draw on their experiences. India also used the opportunity to burnish its credentials as the 'pharmacy of the world' by sending medical supplies to over a hundred countries. In the second wave, there were many deaths, but the government was accused of undercounting them and of not doing enough to deliver vaccines to Indians. This paper will deal with the conflicts, contestations and the foreign policy fallout following the onset of the pandemic and the measures adopted by the union government to cope with them, with less focus on the economic and epidemiological aspects of pandemic management. This paper looks at previous studies, press reports, and press releases by government agencies to collect the needed data. A descriptive and analytical approach is followed in the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]