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In this paper I examined the relationship between class, religion and political ideology. I proposed to show that religious beliefs and values incorporate elements of class based ideology which then serve to legitimate a militant or submissive world view. Class, in this paper, is defined as a collectivity of individuals who are conscious of their socio-economic status and interests. I distinguish between ascending, retrenching, bourgeois, and the alienated classes. Corresponding to these classes are four types of religions: inclusive and exclusive militant and submissive religions. The religious values which assume theology-like status are as follows. The religions of the ascending classes are primarily inclusive militants emphasizing the values of collectivity, equality and justice. The religions of the retrenching classes are exclusive militants which stress individualism, freedom, and Christian love. Bourgeois religions are inclusive submissive and while they incorporate the values of the above two, they also add the values of charity and decorum. The religions of the alienated classes are exclusive submissive and anti-class although they do manifest a caste-like system with an elitist self concept and a total commitment to the group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper extends Sigelman's (1977) analyses of cross-national patterns in reported levels of church attendance and subscription to selected religious beliefs. The analyses are extended in these ways: More countries are included in the comparisons; more measures of religious involvement are employed; and the data are for about 15 years later, from the same period in the 1980s, for each country. Also, we present multivariate controlled comparisons across nations, which were not provided in Sigelman's analyses. Among the results is evidence that Americans are comparably high, but not always first, in involvement levels, both before and after controls for six sociodemographic status measures. Nation of residence is considerably stronger than each control variable (educational attainment, employment status, age, marital status, community size, and broad categories of religious affiliation) as a predictor, for all of the measures of religious involvement. The different profiles of the nations on the social status controls, and their effects upon involvement, do not explain the cross-national patterns in involvement. Alternative interpretations of the comparative results are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This manuscript examines the structural causes of the gender gap in political interest. In many countries, men are more interested in politics than women. Yet, in others, men and women prove equally interested. We explain this crossnational variation by focusing on the effects of societal religiosity. Since religion sustains the traditional gender order, contexts where societal religiosity is low undermine the taken-for-grantedness of this order, subjecting it to debate. Men then become especially interested in politics to try to reassert their traditional gender dominance, or to compensate for their increasingly uncertain social status. A secular environment thus increases political interest more among men than among women, expanding this gender gap. Using the World and European Values Survey, we estimate three-level regression models and test our religiosity-based approach in 96 countries. The results are consistent with our hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using worldwide data from the World Values Survey (WVS) gathered in 2010–2014, we examine two distinct ways in which Islam may be associated with women's employment. We show that, within their countries, Muslim women are less likely to be employed than women of other religions. We also examine between‐country differences and find that, net of education and family statuses, the employment levels of women living in countries that are 90–100 per cent Muslim are not significantly different than those living in countries that are only 0–20 per cent Muslim. Then we test a prevailing view: that Islam discourages gender egalitarian values, and that these values – held by women themselves or people around them – explain why Muslim women are less likely to be employed than women of other religions within their own countries. Despite the rich measures of values in the WVS and a large sample, we find no evidence that values explain any of the lower employment of Muslim women, mainly because values have little or no effect on women's employment. Thus, we conclude that most of the world's gap in employment between Muslim women and other women is within‐country and is not explained by gender ideology. Future research should examine alternative hypotheses, including ethno‐religious discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present the first nationally representative evidence on the relationship between religion and subjective well-being for the case of China. Research on Western societies tends to find a positive association between being religious and level of well-being. China provides an interesting critical case as the religious population is growing rapidly and the religious and socioeconomic environments are profoundly different from Western societies, implying different mechanisms might be at work. We hypothesize to find a positive association between religion and well-being in China too, but argue social capital, for which strong evidence is often found in Western societies, is unlikely to be an important mechanism because religion in China is generally non-congregational. Instead, we argue that the private and subjective dimension of religion matters for well-being in China by helping adherents have an improved sense of social status relative to the non-religious in the context of rapid social change and growing inequality. Our results generally support these predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on Muslim fertility in Europe. Evidence from 25 countries suggests that the Muslim total fertility rate is on average 47% higher than the national level. However, we find a significant difference in the level of fertility of native-born Muslims and immigrant Muslims. The native-born have a 19% higher total fertility rate, while immigrants have 62% higher fertility. Our main research question is whether religion is an important determinant of fertility outcome, or whether the other characteristics that are specific for Muslims in Europe (e.g. socio-economics, migrant status, and religiosity) determine the observed difference in fertility. To answer this question, we focus on three case studies: Spain, where most Muslims are immigrants; Bulgaria, where most Muslims are native; and Greece, which has significant shares of both recent migrants and native Muslims. Our findings suggest that the immigrant status of Muslims and their socio-economic status are more important than religion in terms of explaining their high fertility. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors respond to commentary regarding their research on marriage and a woman's transition to motherhood. The authors highlight comments made on certain areas of their research including psychological outcomes associated with the transition to motherhood, the methods used to assess marital quality, and the lack of consideration given to race, ethnicity, and nativity in the analysis. In response to comments regarding the absence of consideration given to religion and socioeconomic status, the authors present results from additional review of the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) database.

This study examines race and socioeconomic status (SES) differences in levels of the sense of divine control and its association with psychological distress. Using data from adults aged 65 and older in the District of Columbia and two adjoining counties in Maryland, we document that levels of the sense of divine control are highest among African Americans and individuals of low SES. Although the association between SES and perceived divine control is more negative among whites net of statistical adjustments for other indicators of religiosity and stressors, these conditions contribute modestly to the race × SES interaction effect. In addition, the sense of divine control is associated negatively with distress among low-SES African Americans and positively with distress among low-SES white elders. These patterns remain stable net of other forms of religiosity, an array of stressors, and the personal resources of the sense of mastery and self-esteem. Our findings elaborate on social stratification differences in religiosity and their different associations with well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This note replicates a previous study to determine the extent religion influences voting behavior. It focuses on ballot measures that involve moral issues and considers other factors as well. A multiple regression uses the percentage of voters favoring five ballot proposals as the dependent variable, with socioeconomic status, rural isolation, liquor consumption, and three categories of religion as independent variables. The analysis revealed that the religion variables were significant and negatively associated with voting for most proposals that liberalized drinking and betting. Socioeconomic status and liquor consumption were significant in most cases and were positively linked to votes cast for the proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process of religious affiliation is mediated by institutions such as the family, which provide a network of ties to the public sphere. Variations in the likelihood of those with no religious affiliation in high school (N=900) becoming church members by the time they reach 30 are explained in terms of a combination of individual attributes, such as educational and spatial mobility, and changes in structural location, such as the transition to marital and parental status. Panel data from the Career Development Study show that women's chances of affiliation are more affected than are men's by parents' religious homogamy, getting married, and having children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effects of current occupational status and intergenerational differences in occupational status upon individual beliefs in doctrinal orthodoxy are examined in light of three hypotheses. A dissociative hypothesis would predict excessively high levels of orthodoxy for mobile persons, suggesting that the consequences of social mobility would work to counteract processes of secularization. An acculturation hypothesis would predict that mobile persons will be intermediate in degree of orthodoxy to persons at their strata of origin and destination, suggesting that in the societal context of an excess of upward over downward mobility, social mobility would generate a net increase in secularization. A cognitive dissonance hypothesis would predict excessively low levels of orthodoxy among mobile persons, suggesting that social mobility reinforces processes of secularization. The data generally best fit a model consistent with the acculturation hypothesis, though sufficient deviations occur to warrant a discussion of the conditions which foster dissociative and dissonance effects as manifested in orthodox religious beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]