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Frequent and open interaction between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs is necessary for venture capital investments to occur. Increasingly, these investments are made across jurisdictions. The vast majority of these cross-border investments are carried out in a syndicate of two or more VCs, indicating the effects of intra-industry networks needing further analysis. Using China as a model, we provide a novel multidimensional framework to explain cross-border investments in innovative ventures across developed and emerging economies. By analyzing a unique international dataset, we examine worldwide venture capital investment flows from 2000-2012 and consider the effects of geographical, cultural, and institutional proximity as well as institutional and relational trust. We find trust to mitigate the negative effects of geographical and cultural distance, where institutional trust is more relevant for investments in emerging economies, and relational trust is more relevant for investments in developed economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and India are touted as new entrepreneurship powerhouses. The two countries' different institutional history and characteristics have led to differences in environments related to entrepreneurship. There are some well-founded rationales as well as a number of misinformed and ill-guided viewpoints about the friendliness of the environment to support entrepreneurship in each country as well as the China-India differences concerning entrepreneurial environment. This article contributes to this debate by offering theoretical and empirical evidence regarding the differences in regulative institutions in the two economies. Specifically, we compare the state's regulative, participative, and supportive roles from the standpoint of entrepreneurship in the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based upon a county level analysis, this article explores the complex processes of poverty mis-targeting in China and supplements the pre-existing literature with a bottom-up analysis. It argues that the rational calculations of key county leaders, shaped by a combination of formal and informal institutions, determine whether a county, irrespective of poverty level, competes for the title of “state-designated poorest county (SDPC).” This article also demonstrates that the interaction between formal and informal institutions is dynamic and subject to change. For future relevant research, this article suggests to analyze the practice of poverty reduction in a disaggregated manner by examining the interplay within and among different levels of government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]