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This article focuses on the impact of press on British diplomacy. Never does diplomats scoff too long at the latent mischievousness of the press, nor can they always be free from the atmosphere created by newspaper polemics; but their professionalism is something of a shield. British diplomatic mind when dealing with European politics, has no love for the press and very little respect. A distinction is made between the press and public opinion, and without denying the mischief of the former, does not identify it with the latter. The press may influence people, but it does not generally influence governments or officials. The press will usually follow the governments. Constant effort must be expended to ascertain which papers have an official "taint." So many apparent trivialities are reported that one feels diplomats watch the foreign press more than their domestic papers, which generally do not move them. But they must remember foreign diplomats may be angered by them. Cosmic forces, not the press, must be the main factor.`

It is widely recognized that leaks can hamper international negotiations, but the ability of publicity to promote agreement among nations has received less attention. This article argues that the press contributes to international agreement insofar as it illuminates the issues under negotiation, helps to ensure intra-governmental coordination, links governments with interested publics, and provides supplementary communication channels for diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a discussion related to studies in international relations in reference to a paper titled "Mexican Legislation in the Light of International Law" published in September 1928 issue of the "Social Science Quarterly," by David Y. Thomas. The Thomas article has been chosen by the author because, the author believes that it is an excellent illustration of its own kind of scholarship in its own time and it is curiously modern, or even "post-modern" in flavor. Its own kind of scholarship is more or less diplomatic history. It is an up-to-the-minute, argumentative interpretation which the historians might reject as premature and the political scientists might refuse to claim as inadequately "scientific." Call it academic journalism if one wishes, but it is very good academic journalism. Thomas documents impressively from a wide variety of sources, official, scholarly, journalistic and even inventively personal. Thomas prepares his "brief" carefully and persuades with the weight of evidence. If one wishes to emulate the scholar engaged he could find few better models than Thomas.

The article presents information on a meeting of the American Antiquarian Society (AAS) which was held in Boston, Massachusetts on April 26, 1899. AAS president Stephen Salisbury proposed a resolution offering the society's gratitude to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences for hosting AAS meetings. A paper on U.S. diplomacy was presented. AAS vice-president George F. Hoar presented a sermon from minister Aaron Bancroft.

The article presents the author's perception of misunderstandings in international relations. The author agrees that the disentanglement of nationalistic ideologies and non-nationalistic factors in ideologies is important for a comprehensive understanding of certain basic issues. The author states that there are two dynamic systems that are causing misunderstandings-first is related to interdependence between culture, emotions and perceptions and second is the limits of insight.

The article discusses the conduct of Locarno Diplomacy. The author notes that the Locarno Conference of October 1925 ended the conflict between Germany and the Western powers during World War I and II, and its aftermath. Locarno and its aftermath have acquired a reputation for consensus due to the record of agreements compiled at that time. It also brought settlement to the Franco-German differences; however it does not overcome fundamental rivalries and antagonisms.

The article examines the application of the bargaining technique of "divide and choose" to international disarmament negotiations. It cites the failure of the present political strategies and counterstrategies to reach a solution to the disarmament problem. It claims that the conventional types of verbal bargaining have been inadequate in dealing with the difficulties involved in negotiating thousands of different classes of weapons. It explains the concept of "divide and choose" bargaining and its potential use in disarmament negotiations. It also attempts to provide a reasonably acceptable disarmament model.

The Big-Three wartime conferences at Casablanca, Moscow, Tehran, Yalta and also the Potsdam conference of August 1945 each produced substantial results by means of compromise. The compromises were made in private discussions and reported only in official communiques approved by all three powers. Neither the Summit meeting of July 1945 nor the Post-Summit meeting of October 1955 produced any substantial compromise, a fact perhaps partly explained by the glare of publicity to which both Geneva conferences were exposed. The evidence suggests that the success of any high-level international conference is inversely proportional to the publicity the conference receives, that publicity compels the participants to address themselves to the galleries—to the "home," "directly-concerned," allied and other world audiences—instead of to those across the table. To the degree that unrestricted communication of the conference proceedings with the world audiences has this effect upon the participant, publicity blocks effective compromise in international conferences.

The article cogitates on the influence of diplomats on world politics and international relations. In the modern society, diplomat appears to be the miscreant of the human family. This is supported by the theory which states that man is naturally inclined to live at peace with his neighbor, and that the wars and quarrels which disfigure the world are the result of the lusts and wickedness and appetite of particular tyrants. According to this theory, the job of the statesman and the diplomat is not to smooth the way of progress, but to try to alleviate patiently and probably quietly fears and suspicions between nations.