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This paper examines the influence of coalition governance on public service delivery in the local government sphere. Literature search shows that the inception of coalition governments in the local government sphere was a moment when the political landscape of South Africa changed radically. To examine the impact of coalition governments in local government service delivery, the paper employed the Rational Choice Theory (RTC). This paper used secondary data sources, through a literature review to gather relevant information. It was revealed that amidst the political transformation and change from mostly one-party rule to coalition governments in local governments, service delivery in South Africa particularly in disadvantaged communities and rural areas has remained problematic, fragile, and unstable. Further, whilst it is believed that coalitions in the local government sphere can be used as a governance model to greatly improve leadership, share governance practices, and ultimately improve service delivery. South Africa has seen a rise in service delivery protests since its commencement. The paper concluded by arguing that coalition agreements must be strengthened with policies that seek to support service delivery for communities of the country and be made public to foster accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores some of the conversations currently taking place within Asian Canadian studies as they relate to coalitional spaces and community building. Specifically, I look at a co-op radio program from Vancouver called Pender Guy which aired in the 1970s. The members of Pender Guy were comprised of artists and activists from the Asian Canadian community attempting to establish and solidify their own collective identity during a time when minority communities and people of color were often sidelined or else considered as "surplus" to a national narrative that privileged Anglo- and Franco-Canadian identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coalition government is an old phenomenon that has got its roots in Western European countries. It has since spread all over the world including in South Africa. Coalitions in the local sphere of government have existed predominantly in KwaZulu Natal and Western Cape, but it has since spread over to other provinces in South Africa. The outcome of the 2016 local government elections brought about dramatic results which saw the governments of three metropolitan municipalities change hands to coalitions of political parties. The Democratic Alliance (DA) and other small parties with the assistance of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) constituted coalition governments in Nelson Mandela Bay (in Eastern Cape), City of Tshwane, and Johannesburg in Gauteng province. However, the DA mayor and his executive in Nelson Mandela Bay have since been removed with the one from the United Democratic Movement (UDM) as a mayor and the executives from the African National Congress (ANC) and other smaller parties. The EFF announced in July 2019 that it will not vote with the DAor ANC in all municipalities where coalition councils must be formed. This paper seeks to identify challenges associated with coalition governments in the local sphere of government and propose possible solutions for curtailing such challenges. The paper does so by way of reviewing existing literature related to coalitions and alliances of municipal governments in South Africa. One of the challenges is the differing policy positions of the political parties in the coalition. This paper proposes that the needs and service delivery demands of the local communities must be given more preference over the political ideologies of the political parties concerned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emergencies intensify existing vulnerabilities and create new ones for people in their impact areas. In the case of transportation, for example, disasters have the capacity to isolate individuals from the services on which they rely not for only their health and wellbeing, but for their very lives. This paper discusses the Regional Alliance for Resilient and Equitable Transportation (RARET) — a coalition-based model created to address non-life-saving transportation coordination needs during emergencies. RARET focuses on the provision of lifesustaining transportation, serving vulnerable individuals who may require first-responder assistance if their unaddressed needs remain unmet. Using examples from the COVID-19 pandemic as well as seasonal and regional disasters, the paper highlights how leveraging a coalition built to break down the sector and geographical silos leads to better outcomes for the public and bolsters regional resiliency. The paper underlines how the novel nature of RARET delivers ongoing process improvements via a new emergency transportation provider network. Lastly, the paper suggests methods to adapt this model to other jurisdictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As awareness of climate change increases, diverse initiatives such as subsidies for remanufactured products and take-back programs for end-of-life products have been taken to conserve energies and materials. This paper explores how the subsidy program affects manufacturer's take-back activity in a closed-loop supply chain and also analyzes how a coalition between a retailer and a remanufacturer affects the equilibrium decisions. Major findings of this paper reveal that (i) when a take-back program is implemented, the government imposes a high penalty on products that are not collected, thereby encouraging manufacturers to collect more used products, (ii) implementing a take-back program in conjunction with a subsidy program results in a greater reduction in environmentally negative impacts and an enhanced social welfare compared to implementing them separately, and (iii) a coalition between a retailer and a remanufacturer results in lowering the penalty imposed to a manufacturer, which leads to lowering the quantity of the collected and remanufactured products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Arts for Linguistic & Literary Studies is the property of Thamar University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper deals with alliances and coalitions that can be formed by agents or entities. It is assumed that alliance agents cooperate and form coalitions for performing the tasks or missions. It is considered that alliance agents are unselfish. That is, they are more interested in achieving the common goal(s) than in getting personal benefits. In the paper, the concept of fuzzy alliance was introduced. A fuzzy alliance is considered as generalization of traditional alliance allowing agents to decide on the capabilities that their agents can and wanted deliver to coalition. Coalitions that can be formed by fuzzy alliance agents were considered. The definition of the "best" coalition was explained. The method of how to find the "best" coalition among all possible coalitions was suggested and verified by computer simulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The coalition in a graph G consists of two disjoint sets of vertices V1 and V2, neither of which is a dominating set but whose union V1 ∪ V2, is a dominating set. A coalition partition in a graph G is a vertex partition π = {V1, V2, . . ., Vk} such that every set Vi ∈ π is not a dominating set but forms a coalition with another set Vj ∈ π which is not a dominating set. The coalition number C(G) equals the maximum k of a coalition partition of G. In this paper, we compute the coalition numbers of all cubic graphs of order at most 10. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractWe define a total coalition in a graph G as a pair of disjoint subsets A1,A2 ⊆ A that satisfy the following conditions: (a) neither A1 nor A2 constitutes a total dominating set of G, and (b) A1 ∪ A2 constitutes a total dominating set of G. A total coalition partition of a graph G is a partition ϒ = {A1,A2, . . . ,Ak} of its vertex set such that no subset of ϒ acts as a total dominating set of G, but for every set Ai ∈ ϒ, there exists a set Aj ∈ ϒ such that Ai and Aj combine to form a total coalition. We define the total coalition number of G as the maximum cardinality of a total coalition partition of G, and we denote it by Ct(G). The purpose of this paper is to begin an investigation into the characteristics of total coalition in graphs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutionalism gives priority to structure over agency. Yet institutions have never developed and operated without the intervention of interested groups. This paper develops a conceptual framework for the role of agency in historical institutionalism. Based on recent contributions following the coalitional turn and drawing on insights from sociological institutionalism, it argues that agency plays a key role in the creation and maintenance of social coalitions that stabilize but also challenge institutions. Without such agency, no coalition can be created, maintained, or changed. Similarly, without a supporting coalition, no contested institution can survive. Yet, due to collective action problems, such coalitional work is challenging. This coalitional perspective offers a robust role for agency in historical institutionalism, but it also explains why institutions remain stable despite agency. In addition, this paper forwards several portable propositions that allow for the identification of who is likely to develop agency and what these actors do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with a theoretical study of the coordination of actions of members of a self-managed team using the Stackelberg strategy aimed at increasing their individual gains. It is assumed that the team creates a total income that increases with the growth of efforts made by each agent and obeys the diminishing return law. The unique Nash equilibrium that exists under the conditions of complete autonomy of all agents is Pareto inefficient. It is shown that for the transition to a Pareto-preferential outcome it suffices to form a small group (coalition) in the team whose members trust each other and are not prone to opportunistic behavior. Following a coalition strategy aimed at achieving the maximum coalition gain, the coalition members increase their efforts; this leads to an increase in the total income. Conditions are found under which the coalition can use the Stackelberg leadership strategy. It is shown that the Stackelberg equilibrium outcome dominates in the sense of Pareto over Nash equilibrium outcomes both in noncooperative and coalitional games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to rationalise the continued conceptual utility of social exclusion, and in so doing addresses the prevailing question of what to do with it. This is relevant from social exclusion’s declining relevance in contemporary UK social policy and academia, where its consideration as a concept to explain disadvantage is being usurped by other concepts, both old and new. Design/methodology/approach – The paper analyses criticisms of limitations of social exclusion which have typically centred on the operationalisation of the concept, but the author will argue that there are distinctive operationalisation and conceptual strengths within social exclusion which make it value-added as a concept to explain disadvantage. Specifically, there will be an analysis of both New Labour’s and the present Coalition government’s conceptualisation of the term in policy in relation to work. Findings – The analysis highlights the significant difference that a focus on processes rather than outcomes of social exclusion can make to our understanding of inequality and social injustice, and locates this difference within an argument that social exclusion’s true applied capabilities for social justice requires a shift to a conceptualisation built on the processes that cause it in the first place. Originality/value – The paper acts as a rejoinder to prevailing theoretical and political thinking of the limited and diminishing value of social exclusion for tackling disadvantage. In particular, the paper shows how social exclusion can be conceptualised to provide a critical approach to tackling inequality and social injustice, and in doing so foregrounds the truly applied capabilities of social exclusion for transforming social justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While community psychologists often work with coalitions, these entities engage in a wide range of activities and structures that are not well defined within the field. In this paper, we explore the following questions: (a) What are the characteristics of coalitions community psychologists study? (b) What are the themes in the way authors define coalitions in their work? To address these questions, we conducted a systematic review of articles about coalitions in journals serving community psychologists. Findings suggest coalitions in community psychology can be characterised by a focus on a wide variety of local level community issues and include a diverse group of stakeholders. Coalitions are defined by a focus on three types of coordination: knowledge coordination, negotiated coordination, and action coordination. These types of coordination are used to address specific problems coalitions encounter and define the goals and techniques appropriate for resolving them. Please refer to the Supplementary Material section to find this article's Community and Social Impact Statement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The hesitant fuzzy set (HFS) is a very fruitful mathematical approach to deal with uncertain or imprecise information. In this work, we consider a multi-objective linear production planning (MOLPP) problem in which multiple decision makers pool resources to make various products and analyze them with the help of cooperative game theory. It can be formulated as a mathematical programming problem with triangular hesitant fuzzy (THF) parameters. The main aim of this paper is to analyze the MOLPP problem in THF environment. In view of realistic sense we choose the coefficients of multi-objective linear production planning game (MOLPPG) as triangular hesitant fuzzy numbers (THFNs), and hereby it is referred to as THF-MOLPPG. The THF-MOLPPG is converted to fuzzy MOLPPG by taking an average aggregation operator (AAO) of the THFNs. Thereafter we consider α -cut of a fuzzy number to obtain MOLPPG with interval parameters. Two approaches, namely weighted sum method (WSM) and extended technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS), are chosen to obtain the optimal strategy and payoff vectors of the players to the MOLPPG. For solving MOLPPG, we apply WSM and extended TOPSIS by considering the various values of α for finding the value of the game in such a way that the total income is maximized. A comparison is drawn among the payoff vectors, which are determined from the approaches. Finally, the applicability and feasibility of the proposed methods are illustrated by a numerical example. WSM and extended TOPSIS provide better results at the values α = 0.3 and α = 0.9 , respectively, for the proposed problem. From the results, we infer that TOPSIS is far better than WSM of the proposed problem. Also, the conclusions and outlooks of the paper are delineated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of East China University of Science & Technology is the property of Journal of East China University of Science & Technology Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper proposes an optimal power scheduling strategy for cooperative operation of multiple-coupled microgrids, where the microgrid coalition makes day-ahead energy exchange commitments with the grid. Deviations from their commitments are limited by penalizing the microgrids. Various system intermittencies are captured via scenarios. The framework aims at maximizing the expected profit of each microgrid, while mitigating the distribution power losses by enabling local power trades between all microgrids within a coalition. The scheduling problem only utilizes the power exchange requests as the control signals between participating microgrids. Extensive numerical results are presented to corroborate the efficacy of the proposed approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Pravnik is the property of Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of State & Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the US–Mexico borderlands, coalitions have formed to successfully thwart attempted amplification of militarisation in the region. However, in the borderlands, where migrants are criminalised and the colonisation of Indigenous lands and life is ongoing, coalition building is complicated due to the distinct positionalities of anti‐militarisation activists. This paper analyses solidarity from the perspective of anti‐militarisation organisations and activists in Southern Arizona/on occupied O'odham lands. I contend that desires for solidarity built around the worker, despite the recognition of unique struggles, reveal certain tendencies in activism remain bound to settler colonial ways of relating and understanding. Nonetheless, I argue that ongoing resistance to settler colonial terms of condition may motivate moves to refuse colonial forms of solidarity by reimagining coalition building as transpiring through reciprocal exchange of (hi)stories between differently positioned activists, rather than seeking a struggle that is common to all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with alliances and coalitions that can be formed by agents or entities. It is assumed that alliance agents cooperate and form coalitions for performing the tasks or missions. It is considered that alliance agents are unselfish. That is, they are more interested in achieving the common goal(s) than in getting personal benefits. In the paper, the concept of fuzzy alliance was introduced. A fuzzy alliance is considered as generalization of traditional alliance allowing agents to decide on the capabilities that their agents can and wanted deliver to coalition. Coalitions that can be formed by fuzzy alliance agents were considered. The definition of the “best” coalition was explained. The method of how to find the “best” coalition among all possible coalitions was suggested and verified by computer simulation.

In a previous paper, 'The Playing a Blinder Myth and why we must not forget shortcomings in unprecedented times', it was argued that acting Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar's response to the pandemic was one of opportunism rather than one of competency. By adopting a similar method to the previous article, this piece will provide an updated discussion and commentary, based on newspaper articles covering the newly formed Irish (Republic of Ireland) government's response to the pandemic to date. This paper discusses the governance of the coalition of Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil and The Green Party to examine whether the context of the pandemic deflected the Irish public's attention from what was simply a continuation of the Government's normal approach to welfare, housing and healthcare. Therefore, this paper will focus on the coalition's decision to screen and tax recipients of the Pandemic Unemployment Payment, the enactment of housing strategies that have not met the existing issues within the housing market and how previous measures have not provided adequate protection for the healthcare system during the pandemic. In this short article, the Republic of Ireland's government response to the pandemic is revisited after a year of living with coronavirus within the context of welfare, housing and healthcare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a detailed and systemic representation of the process of organizational identification in social enterprises, and a better understanding of how individuals position themselves in these organizations. We highlight that identification in social enterprises is the result of the interplay between the multiple identities of the individuals who take part in coalitions defending different institutional logics. Identification will depend on whether or not it is easy for the individual to find a coalition that corresponds to him or her, and on whether or not the ideas of this coalition are dominant. The relative size of the various coalitions among the staff and the way they evolve will have a clear impact on what the dominant logic of the social enterprise will be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A coalition in a graph G = (V;E) consists of two disjoint sets of vertices V1 and V2, neither of which is a dominating set of G but whose union V1 ∪ V2 is a dominating set of G. A coalition partition in a graph G of order n = |V | is a vertex partition π = {V1; V2, . . ., Vkg of V such that every set Vi either is a dominating set consisting of a single vertex of degree n - 1, or is not a dominating set but forms a coalition with another set Vj which is not a dominating set. Associated with every coalition partition &#960, of a graph G is a graph called the coalition graph of G with respect to &#960, denoted CG(G, &#960,), the vertices of which correspond one-to-one with the sets V1, V2, . . ., Vk of &#960, and two vertices are adjacent in CG(G, &#960,) if and only if their corresponding sets in &#960, form a coalition. In this paper we study coalition graphs, focusing on the coalition graphs of paths, cycles, and trees. We show that there are only finitely many coalition graphs of paths and finitely many coalition graphs of cycles and we identify precisely what they are. On the other hand, we show that there are infinitely many coalition graphs of trees and characterize this family of graphs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studies in Politics & Society / Polityka & Społeczeństwo is the property of University of Rzeszow and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

When and why do countries in a wartime coalition engage in diplomacy during hostilities? This paper establishes a theoretical framework of coalitional diplomacy that highlights each member's private costs and benefits to fighting or seeking a negotiated exit. I argue that the propensity for coalition members to engage in negotiations is a function of the coalition's balance of military contributions, as well as the coalition's battlefield successes and failures. Evidence supporting these claims stem from a large-scale quantitative analysis of two centuries of interstate wars, as well as a close study of the Allies in the Crimean War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper introduces coalition structures to study belief-free full implementation. When the mechanism designer does not know which coalitions are admissible, we provide necessary and almost sufficient conditions on when a social choice function is robustly coalitionally implementable, i.e., implementable regardless of the coalition pattern and the belief structure. Robust coalitional implementation is a strong requirement that imposes stringent conditions on implementable social choice functions. However, when the mechanism designer has additional information on which coalitions are admissible, we show that coalitional manipulations may help a mechanism designer to implement social choice functions that are not robustly implementable in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2009, 2011). As different social choice functions are implementable under different coalition patterns, the paper provides insights on when agents should be allowed to play cooperatively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 (3/11), Japan has witnessed a nationwide upsurge of antinuclear demonstrations as well as protests against diverse concerns. Why did this upsurge of protests occur beyond the antinuclear concerns? The exact mechanism that caused this general upsurge of protests has not been explored in detail. Given the limited number of first-time participants, this phenomenon can be fully explained only through an analysis of network-building processes among social movement organizations (SMOs). Based on the first nationwide survey of SMOs conducted in Japan by our team in February 2018, covering 308 groups, we analyzed the constellation of the SMOs' networks after 3/11, their logic of coalition building, and their network effects on mobilization. We observed that the new characteristics of the constellation of the SMOs' networks are twofold. The first feature is that the networks of various SMOs were bridged by antinuclear groups. Antinuclear organizations served as the hub of SMOs' networks, enabling the mobilization to cross different concerns. The second feature is the connections between the citizen groups and labor unions. Labor unions increase the participation during events by mobilizing their partner unions. Both new connections contributed to the general upsurge in large-scale demonstrations for various concerns after 3/11. Our paper contributes to the general discussion on the relation between coalition of SMOs and mobilization by focusing on the dyadic level of networks, and analyzing its effect for mobilization through egocentric network analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using crip theory, specifically Barounis' formulation of antiprophylactic citizenship, Piepzna-Samarasinha's conceptualisation of care work, and Shotwell's calls against purity, this paper analyses the making of the film HIV in the Rust Belt during the COVID-19 crisis. HIV in the Rust Belt (directed by Holly Hey) documents some of the experiences of local HIV survivors. During the course of filming, however, a story emerged about the importance of an AIDS facility, David's House Compassion, which had served as a hospice and a resource centre between 1988 to 2003. When COVID-19 arrived in the USA, we were mid-way through filming. Doing this work during the COVID-19 pandemic opened up a host of questions about the porousness of bodies as well as the slippage of time and stigma between the two pandemics. As we continued filming, we were made more aware that the story of David's House Compassion could be just as much as story of COVID-19, representative of antiprophylactic citizenship, an idea of belonging that comes from an openness and vulnerability that only sickness can offer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A coalition in a graph G=(V,E) consists of two disjoint sets V1 and V2 of vertices, such that neither V1 nor V2 is a dominating set, but the union V1∪V2 is a dominating set of G. A coalition partition in a graph G of order n=|V| is a vertex partition π=V1,V2,...,Vk such that every set Vi either is a dominating set consisting of a single vertex of degree n-1, or is not a dominating set but forms a coalition with another set Vj. Associated with every coalition partition π of a graph G is a graph called the coalition graph of G with respect to π, denoted CG(G,π), the vertices of which correspond one-to-one with the sets V1,V2,...,Vk of π and two vertices are adjacent in CG(G,π) if and only if their corresponding sets in π form a coalition. In this paper, we initiate the study of coalition graphs and we show that every graph is a coalition graph. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The scale of the cuts to local government finance, coupled with increasing demand for services, has led to unprecedented ‘budget gaps’ in council budgets. Arguably, two competing narratives of the trajectory of local government have emerged in which contrasting futures are imagined for the sector – a positive story of adaptation and survival and more negative one of residualisation and marginalisation. Drawing on case study evidence from three English local authorities, the paper distinguishes and provides examples of three strategic approaches to managing austerity – efficiency, retrenchment and investment. It demonstrates how and why the balance of these strategies has shifted between the early and later phases of austerity and considers the extent to which the evidence of the case studies provide support for either the survival or marginalisation narrative. The paper concludes by arguing that a third narrative – responsibilisation – captures more fully the trajectory of local government in England. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper, we develop a non-cooperative game theoretic model for our problem context in which the competing producers adopt one of the two alternate production and marketing technologies - efficient and inefficient. We examine stability related implications of the producers' decisions regarding the choices of (i) technologies, (ii) coalition formation, (iii) coalition form, (iv) intensity of collusion. The coalitions can adopt either complete collusion or partial collusion by determining intensity of collusion using endogenously determined sharing rules. The motivation for our study comes from the Costa Rican coffee industry and interesting findings presented in the existing literature focusing on a variety of competing-coalitions settings. Our results can be categorized as: (i) Nash equilibrium of the endogenously determined sharing rules, (ii) the equilibrium coalition forms, and (iii) stability of coalitions. They highlight the dynamics between the number of coalition producers and the cost of inefficiency. We show that the equilibrium sharing rules may have interior solutions and they are not necessarily (a)symmetric. We also show that both coalitions forming complete collusion of the respective producers in not always a Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium coalition forms need not be (a)symmetric. Our main contribution to existing literature rests in determining the situations in which (i) competing players form coalitions, and (ii) they adopt the coalition form of either complete or partial collusion. Moreover, we provide an alternate explanation to why competing producers horizontally merge in the presence of a competing coalition adopting partial collusion in spite of the merger paradox. We also show that none of the two types of producers considered in this paper have any incentives in not making the information on their coalition form public. Moreover, we establish that situations yielding stable coalitions always exist. Our results demonstrate that the cost advantage to the efficient producers decreases in the number of producers adopting the efficient technology, and the coalition stability related conditions need not imply better profitability for one type of producer vis-à-vis the other. Our model essentially provides a platform for future research in a variety of competing-coalitions settings adopting endogenously determined sharing rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the representativeness and inclusiveness of neighbourhood forums (NFs) in London. A descriptive profile of NF areas at the London-wide level is developed through examining and analysing demographic indicators, location characteristics and key planning information. Interviews with key informants then provide an exploration of the lived reality of the process that NFs undergo in defining themselves. How NFs operationalise the process of self-definition is used to evaluate representativeness and inclusiveness internally. Four case studies are subsequently presented. Considering all data, types of representation, participatory/representative democracy and inclusivity/exclusivity are used as criteria in evaluating the overall representativeness and inclusiveness of NFs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper the author focuses on the first part of the methodological problems of modelling situations in the game theory, which contain the non antagonistic conflict. It is a situation, in which the players ' interests are not in direct contradiction. The victory of one participant does not imply the loss of the other participant of the game. In cooperative conflict, it is assumed that the players have the opportunity to conclude a binding agreement and can cooperate with each other. Having introduced the general conditions and axioms of rationality, which describe the features that the coalition structure should meet and their corresponding distributions of payments, in the second part of the paper, the author refers to the application of Shapley's value and methods of C-core in dealing with conflict situations in the context of cooperative games in telecommunications companies in Slovakia. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate the possibilities of the methodology of cooperative games analysis and those of their application for modelling and solving conflict decision-making situations and the formation of coalitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the advanced capabilities of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) components such as vehicles, Roadside Units (RSUs) and smart devices as well as the increasing amount of data generated, Federated Learning (FL) becomes a promising tool given that it enables privacy-preserving machine learning that can be implemented in the IoV. However, the performance of the FL suffers from the failure of communication links and missing nodes, especially when continuous exchanges of model parameters are required. Therefore, we propose the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as wireless relays to facilitate the communications between the IoV components and the FL server and thus improving the accuracy of the FL. However, a single UAV may not have sufficient resources to provide services for all iterations of the FL process. In this paper, we present a joint auction-coalition formation framework to solve the allocation of UAV coalitions to groups of IoV components. Specifically, the coalition formation game is formulated to maximize the sum of individual profits of the UAVs. The joint auction-coalition formation algorithm is proposed to achieve a stable partition of UAV coalitions in which an auction scheme is applied to solve the allocation of UAV coalitions. The auction scheme is designed to take into account the preferences of IoV components over heterogeneous UAVs. The simulation results show that the grand coalition, where all UAVs join a single coalition, is not always stable due to the profit-maximizing behavior of the UAVs. In addition, we show that as the cooperation cost of the UAVs increases, the UAVs prefer to support the IoV components independently and not to form any coalition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, a new class of games with fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy payoff value is proposed. This class of fuzzy games is based on the generalized integral form, which contains several kinds of other fuzzy games, such as fuzzy cooperative game with fuzzy payoff value, the multilinear extension game introduced by Owen, the game with proportional value proposed by Butnariu and the game with Choquet integral form given by Tsurumi et al. Also, the proposed fuzzy game is also further extension of the fuzzy game in Choquet integral form proposed by Yu et al., which is also is a kind of fuzzy games in the condition that coalition and fuzzy payoff value are both fuzzy information. The fuzzy Shapley value for this kind of fuzzy games is represented by Shapley value of corresponding fuzzy cooperative game with fuzzy payoff value. Based on Hukuhara-difference, we give the explicit Shapley value for the proposed fuzzy game. It has been seen that most of properties hold well in the proposed fuzzy game, which are processed by cooperation game with fuzzy payoff value, and fuzzy coalition game, respectively. Finally, a practical application of the proposed model is also provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the fuzzy bargaining set of cooperative game with fuzzy coalition is proposed, which can be regarded as the generalization of crisp bargaining set. The fuzzy bargaining set is based on the assumption that the total worth of a fuzzy coalition will be allocated to the players whose participation rate is larger than zero. Because fuzzy core had been proposed as a kind of solution for the fuzzy games, the relationship between fuzzy bargaining set and fuzzy core is also showed. Surprisingly, the relationship between fuzzy bargaining set and fuzzy core does coincide as in the classical case. The property of fuzzy bargaining set is also analyzed, such as the existence condition of counter-objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper considers the two main game-theoretic models, such as coalition and cooperative. The authors are of the opinion that definitions and notions of cooperative games and coalition games are different, but both games are coopetitive games. Transitivity and superadditivity are presented as the main characteristic functions of coopetitive games. The individual and collective rationality were identified as unconditional requirements for the optimal distribution between players. Furthermore, the additional income added to the guaranteed amount occurs in the event of coopetition. Any substantial coopetitive game has an infinite number of transactions. The authors highlighted that the dominant transaction is the transaction that is better for all coalition numbers without exceptions and it can be reached by the coalition. In addition, the authors propose using Shapley system of axioms to identify coopetitive game results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extending services and operations of organizations in the field of e-business or e-government sometimes requires the integration of business applications. However, sometimes due to challenges and risks, such as complex business processes reengineering, upstream organizations are reluctant to integrate their applications. This paper focuses on two critical questions; (1) How can organizations be encouraged to participate in integrating their business applications? (2) What is the amount of incentives required? In this study, cooperative game theory and the externalities of these systems have been considered to form a stable coalition between organizations for integrating their business applications. We provided an algorithm for determining the incentives to integrate the business applications with other organizations in this coalition. These incentives can be extended to various management issues for better decision-making such as economic aspects, public subsidies, and public participation. The results of experiments have shown that creating a coalition based on this strategy is always possible, and the benefits of organizations in the coalition rise with increasing service delivery in business applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil society is generally seen as the safeguard of Tunisian democratization, but how do networks in Tunisian civil society manifest? Which are the important actors and how do they interact? The paper takes a network perspective as used in social movement studies to analyze the networks and their influence on the Tunisian political landscape by comparing four 'old' civil society organizations. In taking the network perspective, a coalition can be observed and the positions within the coalition are unevenly distributed among actors. What is particularly striking is the minimal interaction with newer civil society organizations mainly due to a lack of confidence. A generational divide is found in Tunisian civil society, which not only concerns personal age, but also organizational age that often equates to reputation and resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Collected Papers of the Faculty of Law in Split / Zbornik Radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Splitu is the property of Split Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper proposes an adjustment of the formalization of a fuzzy cooperative game for choosing an action strategy during hospitalization by a genetic algorithm. Adjustment expands the number of possible strategies for the player, additionally introducing the requirement for coordination of actions between the players. Since this increases the number of possible combinations of actions and increases the complexity of the calculation, a genetic algorithm is used in the paper to select an effective strategy for the actions of coalition members in the hospitalization process. As a fitness function, the characteristic function of estimating the gain of the coalition is used. The simulation results on the data obtained during the analysis of the hospitalization process in Russia showed that for small numbers of participants it is more efficient to search for a solution to the game by comparing all possible options, while with an increase in the number of participants, starting from 200 participants, the genetic algorithm starts to win in terms of performance.

The growing emphasis on ensuring the sustainability of animal agriculture is providing an impetus for the adoption of new approaches to structuring and conducting research. Sustainability is a complex topic involving many considerations related to the economic, social, and environmental impacts of production systems. Successfully addressing this topic requires multidisciplinary research as well as a high degree of communication with food system stakeholders to ensure that the research results contribute to informed decision making. In this paper, we provide an overview of a public–private partnership, the Coalition for Sustainable Egg Supply (CSES), which was formed to support research evaluating the sustainability of laying hen housing systems. Because of increasing public concerns about the behavioral restriction imposed on laying hens housed in conventional cages, the U.S. egg industry is faced with a need to transition to alternative systems. However, before the CSES project, there was limited information available about how this transition might affect trade-offs related to the sustainability of egg production. The goal of the CSES project was to provide this information by conducting holistic research on a commercial farm that had 3 different hen housing systems. The CSES members represented a variety of stakeholders, including food retailers and distributors, egg producers, universities, and governmental (USDA ARS) and nongovernmental organizations. The CSES was facilitated by a not-for-profit intermediary, the Center for Food Integrity, which was also responsible for communicating the research results to food system stakeholders, including via quantitative and qualitative consumer research. In this paper, we describe the structural aspects of the CSES that were responsible for the successful completion and dissemination of the research as well as the insights that were gained regarding multidisciplinary and multi-institutional collaboration, conducting commercial-scale research, fostering and maintaining stakeholder interaction, and communicating research results. Although not without limitations, this project demonstrates that public–private partnerships can be effective strategies for addressing sustainability questions related to animal agriculture and, thus, serves as a useful model for the other animal industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The widespread adoption of science-based prevention requires local infrastructures for prevention service delivery. Communities That Care (CTC) is a tested prevention service delivery system that enables a local coalition of community stakeholders to use a science-based approach to prevention and improve the behavioral health of young people. This paper uses data from the Community Youth Development Study (CYDS), a community-randomized trial of CTC, to examine the extent to which better internal team functioning of CTC coalitions increases the community-wide adoption of science-based prevention within 12 communities, relative to 12 matched comparison communities. Specifically, this paper examines the potential of both a direct relationship between coalition functioning and the community-wide adoption of science-based prevention and a direct relationship between functioning and the coalition capacities that ultimately enable the adoption of science-based prevention. Findings indicate no evidence of a direct relationship between four dimensions of coalition functioning and the community-wide adoption of a science-based approach to prevention, but suggest a relationship between coalition functioning and coalition capacities (building new member skills and establishing external linkages with existing community organizations) that enable science-based prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2023 Spanish general election was a snap election called unexpectedly by the PM Pedro Sánchez the day after the local and regional elections in May 2023. Turnout was higher than expected (66.6%) and the result confirmed the high degree of multi-dimensional polarisation in Spanish society. Right-wing parties improved their position: the mainstream conservative PP increased its support mainly at the expense of Ciudadanos and the far-right VOX. Yet, parties on the left, especially the incumbent PSOE, performed better than predicted by polls and, together with the seats won by regional parties, were able to keep a dominant position in Congress. A left-wing minority coalition cabinet was ultimately formed with two parties in government (PSOE and Sumar) and the parliamentary support of several regional parties. Parliamentary support was reached after an agreement that includes decentralisation measures and an amnesty to repair the judiciary consequences of the 2017 independence referendum in Catalonia, which showcases the multilevel and multidimensional complexity of Spanish politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We know little about how coalitional strategy affects the electoral fates of political parties in presidential democracy. The literature on coalitions in parliamentary systems shows a negative impact of entering government, while the coattail effects literature on presidential systems suggests some benefits. Combining elements from both approaches, we argue that there is a conditional electoral effect of joining the cabinet under coalitional presidentialism. Even considering presidentialism's heightened attribution of responsibility to a unipersonal executive, we find that coalition parties do indeed place a meaningful electoral wager whenever they choose to enter the president's cabinet as identifiable allies. Leveraging data on Brazilian elections held at national and local levels over 24 years and employing an innovative measure of portfolio salience, we show that the payoff of this wager is contingent on control of the most highly-valued cabinet positions and on the popular approval of the president. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperative UAV swarms typically adopt coalition-based network structures for executing tasks more efficiently. Coalition heads in such networks need to do both intra- and inter-coalition communication and may operate on different channels. While being equipped with multiple transceivers or switching among channels are alternative methods, this option would result in larger payload or incur delays. Fortunately, partially overlapping channels (POCs) can be used to forward messages on different channels since communication can be made on adjacent overlapped channels. This can help realize both intra- and inter-coalition communication with heads being equipped with only one transceiver and no switching. Therefore, this paper proposes a POC-based communication method where each coalition selects one of the POCs and UAVs in the same coalition operate on the same channel. While POCs enable information exchange among coalitions, they also incur inter-coalition interference and therefore the POC access problem is investigated. Owing to the coupled relationships among the strategies of coalitions, the problem is a combinatorial optimization one and an online learning algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is distributed and reduces the computation complexity to a great extent. Based on the knowledge of the potential game theory, the algorithm is proved to converge to the optimal solution of each stage asymptotically. Under three representative settings, simulations are made to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the rapid growth of mobile and wireless technologies, mobile collaborative activities have become important in group learning. However, the problem of establishing optimal groups of members located in various locations occurs if distances between each member and the group itself are concerned. Furthermore, the challenge becomes increasingly complex and time consuming as the number of people required for location-based group formation rises. As a result, the main contribution of this paper is to propose a greedy approach for generating optimal groups of members with the shortest traveling distances between members. We also want to demonstrate that the algorithm can be utilized on mobile devices. A prototype of a mobile -based graphical user interface is presented. In addition, a questionnaire is conducted in order to obtain user feedback that will help us shape the development of the future mobile application in an appropriate manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the world economy with interdependent markets for fossil fuel deposits and extracted fossil fuel, a coalition of countries may fight climate change by purchasing fossil fuel deposits for preservation. Harstad (J Polit Econ 120:77–115, 2012) has shown that the coalition's supply-side climate policy implements the first-best. The present paper focuses on the role exploration and asymmetric information with respect to climate damage plays for the efficiency of unilateral supply-side climate policy. Under the assumption of non-strategic exploration and truthful reporting of climate damage, the deposit policy turns out to be efficient. If exploration is used strategically or the coalition misreports its climate damage, however, the deposit policy becomes inefficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a cooperative game in which the distance (or similarity) between some objects (players) can be measured numerically. For this game, a characteristic function is defined so that it takes high values for the coalitions consisting of most close (similar) players in comparison with the players from the other coalitions. Such a function does not satisfy superadditivity, and hence it seems reasonable to introduce the model with coalition structure. Therefore, this game can be treated as a clustering procedure for objects (players). Finally, the existence conditions of a stable coalition structure are established, which allow to perform efficient (crisp) clustering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]