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Neoklasik realizm, ortaya ciktigi 1990'lardan gunumuze gerek realist uluslararasi iliskiler gelenegi icerisinde gerekse uluslararasi iliskiler disiplini capinda pek cok hararetli ve bereketli tartismaya kaynaklik etti. Baslarda, yalnizca yapisal realist (ya [...]

Why do some near crises tip over into full-blown crisis and others do not? This paper considers existing scholarship and identifies four key barriers to using quantitative analysis for tipping-point analyses: strategic indeterminacy; the incentives for conflict parties to avoid inefficiencies; the paucity of cases; and the availability of quality data. Due to these challenges, many do not perform well as immediate causes for crisis escalation. We also argue and demonstrate through two quantitative models of crisis escalation that some variables, particularly related to domestic politics, can do well in explaining why some disputes tip into crisis and others do not. As we illustrate with reference to the 1995–1996 Third Taiwan Straits Crisis, qualitative approaches that analyze the processes by which leaders and foreign policy institutions make decisions add needed explanatory power to purely quantitative models of the potential for near crises to tip into crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Norrin M. Ripsman and T.V. Paul Globalization and the National Security State New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 296 pp. $ 29.95 (paper) ISBN 978-0-19-539391-0 Globalization is a defining factor [...]

Commercial liberalism would suggest that whereas globalization was conducive to great power cooperation—or at least moderated competition—deglobalization is likely to ignite greater competition amongst the Great Powers. In reality, however, the picture is much more complex. To begin with, the intense globalization of the 1990s and 2000s is not responsible for moderating Great Power tensions; instead, it is itself a product of the security situation resulting from the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, while globalization did serve to reinforce cooperation between the United States and rising challengers, such as China, which sought to harness the economic gains of globalization to accelerate their rise, it also created or intensified fault-lines that have led to heightening tensions between the Great Powers. Finally, while we are currently witnessing increasing tensions between the US and both China and Russia, deglobalization does not appear to be the primary cause. Thus, geoeconomic conditions do not drive security relations; instead, the geoeconomic environment, which is itself influenced by Great Power politics, is better understood as a medium of Great Power competition, which may affect the character of Great Power competition and its intensity, but does not determine it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article connects neorealist and feminist approaches to International Relations. I claim that neorealism's main assumption, anarchy, and its main variable, the distribution of power, can offer insights into women's and gender-related problems. First, I argue that neorealism's core concepts and theories (anarchy and the balance of power) can help explain how culture forms, how international politics impact women's lives, and even have predictive power concerning the feminist movement itself. Second, I theorize how and when balance-of-power politics may influence women's societal position and introduce a few examples to support my case. Hence, this paper proposes a neorealist feminist synthesis and is an attempt at inter-paradigm dialogue that could prove fruitful for International Relations theory at large [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy & Peace is the property of Ihsan Dogramaci Peace Foundation, Center for Foreign Policy & Peace Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper introduces some of the major themes of An Unwritten Future: Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics, and provides a short illustration of how the analytical apparatus elaborated there can offer fruitful insights into understanding enduring puzzles in international relations. An Unwritten Future explores, illuminates and interrogates Classical Realism, an approach to the study of world politics that is contrasted with Structural Realism and with the 'hyper-rationalist' perspective associated with the 'Rationalist Explanations for War' school of thought. It elucidates the fundamental flaws of those two highly influential paradigms, and explains why Classical Realism, with its emphasis on what Structural Realism and Hyper-rationalism forbid—content, purpose, history, and irreducible uncertainty—provides a more promising and productive point of departure for students of international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, China and Russia decades have adopted accommodation, normalisation and convergence strategies that transformed their cooperation into a comprehensive strategic partnership. Despite having this strategic alignment, several issues still constrain their long-term relations, such as divergent views and assessment of the world order, imbalance in bilateral trade and investment, competition in their respective spheres of influence, Russians' fear of a Chinese immigrant onslaught, ideological cleavages, and asymmetrical power distribution between the two. This study explains the factors behind their convergence and divergences of interests and its implications for their future relations. While utilising content analysis as the research methodology this study hypothesizes that though the two are engaged in strategic and other partnerships, yet the structural differences will inhibit their long-term cordiality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Varia História is the property of Varia Historia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A number of studies on sanction effectiveness have highlighted the importance of regime type and how it affects the sensitivity of sanctioned states (target) to the economic costs of sanctions. The scholarly consensus holds that mainly because of their responsiveness to domestic audiences, democratic regimes are most likely to give in to the demands of the sanctioning state (sender). I argue that regime type is important not only in influencing leaders' sensitivity to economic costs—which create incentives to back down—but also to the audience costs—which create incentives to stand firm. I argue that taking the audience cost into account would lead to different predictions about the effect of democracy. Particularly, I argue that the effect of democracy is inverted- U shaped, where full democracies have no higher likelihood of meeting the demands of the sender than mixed (hybrid) regimes. Using a newly released dataset on economic sanctions between 1950-2020, I find robust support for my argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Diversitas Journal is the property of Diversitas Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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Copyright of Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen (ZIB) is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In 1981, Israel launched a preventive military strike against a nuclear reactor that Iraq was constructing at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center. The low fungibility of Iraq's power resources, and especially its nuclear weapons program, shaped Israel's decision-making process. First, it motivated Israel's executives to disaggregate Iraq's capabilities. Though they identified Baghdad's emerging nuclear weapons program as a threat, there was little pressure to act more broadly. Second, it pushed Israel's leaders to favour delaying strategies to stall Iraq's program. Third, it motivated Israel's leaders to favour a preventive military strike to delay Iraq's nuclear program from becoming more fungible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of POSTData: Revista de Reflexión y Análisis Político is the property of Grupo Interuniversitario Postdata and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Rwanda Defence Force recently staged military operations against insurgents in Mozambique and the Central African Republic. Both actions were performed outside regional or multinational efforts. This makes the contemporary actions of Rwanda outliers in the international relations of Sub-Saharan Africa and heralds shifts in conflict management on the continent. An explanation is found in the application of neoclassical realist theory to the case of Rwanda – a first – as the country's leaders have taken advantage of a permissive strategic environment, high clarity, leaders' beliefs and a strategic culture to produce the output of extra-regional military deployments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does the United States either continue to support or turn its back on a friendly dictator once that dictator is faced with internal uprisings? This study argues that a US president's decision to either remain loyal to or abandon dictators when they are in trouble ultimately depends on the preservation of acquired influence (PAI). This argument is tested by considering three crises in which the White House was faced with a choice between prolonging support or abandoning established alliances with Batista in Cuba (1956–1959), Mobutu in Zaire (1990–1991), and Mubarak in Egypt (2011). In all three case studies, the PAI argument is found to account for observed variations in US foreign policy toward friendly dictators in trouble. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies / Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi is the property of Sakarya University, Middle East Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article aims at clearing up a widespread misunderstanding in previous research that the classical strategic perspective, based on the writings of Carl von Clausewitz and his contemporary followers, shares ontological assumptions with realism. Although both perspectives perceive a constant state of disharmony in international politics, they differ substantially in their assumptions about state-centrism, actor behaviour, and the role of unpredictability. As the relationship between the perspectives is ambiguous, the article argues that scholars should treat them as two separate theoretical entities. The greater scholarly relevance of the article lies in its contribution to conceptual clarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Security Strategies Journal / Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi is the property of Strategic Research Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the wake of the Arab uprisings, Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen experienced military interventions following popular protests absent civil strife where citizens coalesced around common grievances. Why did external actors pursue military interventions during the Arab uprisings? What prompted such interventions? This article explicates the structural conditions underpinning external interventions during the MENA region's largest pro-democracy wave. I posit the simultaneity of the protests within a given temporal setting produced a permissive strategic environment that created a window of opportunity for external actors to alter the balance of power to maintain competing spheres of influence. The cross-national comparison contributes novel case studies to the extant literature on foreign military interventions to illustrate how and why regional shocks structure interest and opportunity for states seeking to leverage geostrategic interests through military interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When great powers such as the United States and China grow especially hawkish with more uncertainties, how does a smaller state react to such a complex and dangerous territorial conflict? Given the competing frames of influence between China and the United States, what are the underlying reasons for the shift in the Philippines' foreign policy? This paper focuses on the Philippines' changing foreign policy on the South China Sea dispute and examines the main rationale for its shift in strategy towards China. We use the perspective of neoclassical realism to unpack the constraining factors that underlie the Philippines' domestic politics and ongoing global exigencies. With changes in its domestic politics and the security challenges posed by the evolving geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region, the Philippines is in a difficult situation, having to choose between a territorially hostile trading partner and its historical security guarantor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes contemporary Turkey-European Union (EU) relations through the lenses of international relations (IR) theory. After providing a brief overview of the history of Turkey-EU relations, it focuses on the underlying dynamics of Turkey-EU relations in the post-2016 period. It makes a case that realism is better suited to explain the latest episodes in Turkey-EU relations. It specifically argues that balancing and neoclassical realism provide a more nuanced explanatory value as to why Turkey and the EU are going through a particularly tense period in their relationship. It also outlines global/regional factors as well as intervening national/domestic factors behind the rising tensions in Turkey's relations with the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent years have witnessed a significant change in China–EUrope relations, with the EU's strategic positioning of China undergoing a fundamental shift from a "partner" to a "systemic rival." By applying a theoretical framework based on neoclassical realism, the present paper examines the determinant factors leading to such a shift. This study highlights three factors: first, a change in the US's strategy and governance capability; second, the power symmetries between China and EUrope, including salient changes in material strength and marked differences in norms; third, an emergent change in strategic culture, encompassing a striving China vis-à-vis a strategically autonomous EUrope. By following Götz's (2021) insights on neoclassical realist approaches that employ intervening variables as complementary factors, we identify the US factor as the most important international factor in structural terms, while the power symmetries and strategic culture act as complementary factors. The paper concludes that while maintaining engagement, China–EUrope relations will only see further intensified rivalry and contradictions in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analysis of the Chinese military-civil fusion strategy through a neoclassical realist and state action theory perspective highlights that the advent of emerging technologies has opened up an unprecedented opportunity for states to amplify the extraction and mobilisation of resources, conducive to maintaining and increasing their military and economic power in global politics. Underpinned by increasing cooperation between the People's Liberation Army and private companies as well as state-owned enterprises, the Chinese military-civil fusion strategy can be viewed as a comprehensive strategy of mobilisation and extraction (actively relying on state-driven technology advancement) that has especially drawn upon technology transfer and talent recruitment from abroad. In this regard, China has acted in line with the premises of state action theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Mecmua is the property of MECMUA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Actual Problems of Jurisprudence / Habaršy. Zan̦ Seriâsy is the property of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Colombia Internacional is the property of Universidad de los Andes and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Smithsonian magazine (Jan-Feb) 2019 edition published facts about U.S. military intrusion in 14 countries including Afghanistan, as a consequence of the 9/11, 2001 attacks on its soil. U.S. invasion and its following bleak strategy raise questions on the rationale of this decision because Afghanistan had never been that powerful and capable of posing a security threat to U.S. Foreign invasion and following withdrawal that is pledged to be completed 9/11, 2021 have its specific reasons as well as implications in the region that need to be explored. Hence, the pretext of military invasion on the territory of Afghanistan and maintaining it for two decades is not very strong. However, after this long military presence the U.S. finally decided to withdraw from the state that could be strategically important. Little scholarly work has been done to explain the reasons of withdrawal of superpower from a small country after a long-time presence. South Asia is one of the important regions to study for several reasons firstly considerable size of the region's population, strategic location, contribution to the productive capacity of the world, and variations in political systems. The theory of neoclassical realism better explains the role of a domestic political system to distort the pursuit of security. It focuses on the behaviour of the United States in deciding on withdrawal. This study addresses a key research question that is, why the United States, being a superpower willingly withdraws its military presence from a much smaller country, Afghanistan that could have a strategic value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on one of the most fascinating features of contemporary Chinese foreign policy, namely the use of economics as a tool of national power. This article seeks to provide a foundational context for the study of China's economic statecraft. The first portion of this article builds upon existing work to frame the phenomenon of China's post-Cold War economic statecraft. I then offer a rough periodization of this post-Cold War era highlighting key events and strategic turning points for China. I distinguish three major periods: integration into the global economic system following the post-Tiananmen isolation (1989–1997), a decade of win-win diplomacy (1998–2008), and emerging great power economic statecraft (2008–2017). The piece concludes with a proposition that we may be witnessing the early stages of a fourth phase as well as some considerations for the future study of Chinese economic statecraft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study adopts an institutional approach in the case analysis of China's economic statecraft towards Brazil. In light of institutionalisation theory, it examines the institutional arrangements between Beijing and Brasilia for the purpose of facilitating bilateral economic cooperation and advancing strategic partnership. As a descriptive effort, it yields some preliminary findings: first, the institutionalisation of China's economic statecraft towards Brazil is incremental, driven largely by the desire for and belief in long-term planning; second, a set of norms, values, and principles is instituted alongside designated agencies, point persons, operational protocols, and exchange mechanisms, creating a form of institutional governance based on a multi-actor, multilevel, and network-based steering mode; third, governance remains so centralised that it falls short in empowering strategic participation; and, fourth and finally, Beijing's institution-building proves useful in the management of relations with Brazil, suggesting that economic statecraft may benefit from institutionalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that efforts to strengthen the theoretical foundations for foreign policy analysis (FPA) should take as a vantage point the smallest social unit—the human being. It advocates far-reaching engagement with psychology and the life sciences for insights on the individual in the social context. Research on emotion, as a general human phenomenon and one that has been extensively researched across disciplines, is thought to offer a particularly promising conceptual lens on foreign policy. For cues on how to incorporate scientific findings with historical analysis and situate resulting hypotheses in relation to prevailing theoretical paradigms, the article draws on classical realism. Especially mid-twentieth century realists such as Hans Morgenthau expressed a nuanced conception of human agency and the interplay between emotion and cognition. Substantial aspects of their theories, based largely on experience and intuition, have been corroborated by recent scientific research. This review is structured around four central issues. These have been both the loci of much criticism levelled at classical realism and remain a challenge to IR as a whole: the levels of analysis problem, the "scaling up" of emotion, the classification and choice of emotion(s), and the accessibility of the political world to scientific method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As one component of its mission to reduce trade barriers and encourage the liberalization of international commerce, the World Trade Organization provides states with a forum in which they can raise and resolve complaints about partners' unfair trading practices. This mechanism streamlines the process of identifying non-compliant behavior, and provides real incentives for the removal of such policies. By furnishing a form of dispute resolution, the institution should be both trade-inducing and peace-enhancing for member states. However, this very mechanism also has the potential to aggravate existing dispute for two reasons. First, it removes the opportunity for states to use economic policies as instruments of structural linkage in resolving disputes. Second, it deprives its members of powerful economic tools that could be used in lieu of militarized responses. Using the implementation of the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism, as well as the subsequent expiration of Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (the so-called 'peace clause'), we examine whether the opportunity to resolve trade disputes through the organization affects the likelihood that member states engage in militarized conflict with one another. We find that membership in a trade institution facilitates peaceful interaction, but that judicialization erases these benefits. We conclude that institution building requires caution and attention to the possibility of unintended consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Norway is widely accepted as a global leader in peacemaking, due to its lengthy track record of involvement in complex peace processes. Its predilection for peacemaking is usually interpreted as a form of 'status-seeking' by a smaller state, aimed at enhancing Norway's influence and reputation in the international system. However, this perception offers a limited view and obscures other motivations that drive Norway to peacemaking. Aimed at addressing this gap, this paper dissects Norwegian peacemaking efforts in Myanmar between 2011 and 2019. The paper utilises a critical political economy lens to uncover the deeper motivations underpinning Norwegian peacemaking, drawing on new interview fieldwork with diverse stakeholders in Myanmar's peace process. The paper finds that material interests, including the desire to access new markets in the Global South, have played a significant role in influencing Norwegian peacemaking, highlighting the instrumental potential of 'status-seeking' in foreign policy. Concerningly, this strategy has served the interests of dominant power groups in Myanmar, contributing to the subordination of minority actors, thus compromising their engagement and revealing an image of Norway that belies constructivist perceptions of its status as a moral or humanitarian 'great power'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to growing public attention to geoeconomics as the new mode of conducting great power competition, the IR discipline has not actively engaged in conceptual and theoretical analysis from the geoeconomic viewpoint. This article examines issues that geoeconomics needs to solve to become a new theoretical framework in the positivist "American" IR scholarship that dominates research on great power competition. On the one hand, the concept of geoeconomics needs to be redefined and account for a phenomenon that is not already covered in extant IR scholarship. Thus, geoeconomics should be considered as a form of grand strategy and defined as the use of economic instruments to advance mid- to long-term strategic interests in a geographical region of the world. On the other hand, geoeconomics in positivist IR should take into account international economic structure and domestic politics in developing a parsimonious explanation for the conditions to employ geoeconomic grand strategy. In this process, the theorist needs to make an analytical choice to concentrate on certain factors and mechanisms to assure theoretical parsimony. This article concludes that addressing the issues of conceptual clarity and parsimonious theorization would potentially allow geoeconomics to become a new research program in positivist IR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study deals with Turkey's Iraq War Decision that led up to the March 1 Parliamentary Motion Crisis in 2003 from the perspective of neoclassical realism, which analyzes the interaction between systemic and unit-level variables. The United States requested Turkey's collaboration in the war against Iraq. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government initially sought a peaceful settlement but eventually decided to align with the United States. Systemic and structural factors made cooperation with the United States an imperative for Turkey, which may be classified as a secondary state in the regional context. While the domestic political environment was favorable for the Turkish government to reach such a decision, it was hindered by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT). In this framework, the study has two primary purposes. The first is to prove that in restrictive international environments where opportunities and threats are clear and the decision-making process is constrained by time, domestic divisions may matter in foreign policy and prevail over the systemic imperative, contrary to conventional expectations. The second is to demonstrate that in a restrictive international milieu, strong leadership, a factor underappreciated by neoclassical realists, is essential even for single-party governments, which are normally expected to have greater autonomy in democratic parliamentary systems, to formulate foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carl Schmitt (1888-1885) is one of the great absentees from the university in Portugal. We can even say that Portugal is one of the most arid landscapes existing in European lands regarding Schmittian studies (although a reference is due, among others, to Professor Alexandre Franco de Sá, the main disseminator and translator of his work in our country). Author of a multifaceted oeuvre, he influenced several disciplines - constitutional and international law, political science, history of ideas, political philosophy, and political theology - as well as international relations and its history, geopolitics and polemology. Breaking paradigms, he left us a "heterodox" work (Odisseos and Petito, 2007: 11), where his intuition about the concept of the political stands out naturally; but he was also a man who lived in a dangerous moment, in an almost permanent state of exception, who suffered temptations and disillusions, who was judged by the authorities and, more severely, by the people. Especially by his peers. Momentary adhesion to the Third Reich was at the basis of his demonization and exclusion from the university (Balakrishnan, 2006: 27), he who was a Catholic conservative and one of the central figures of the "Conservative Revolution" movement (Mohler, 1993: 661) and even, during the Weimar Republic, tried to prevent Hitler from coming to power. In this article we will focus on Carl Schmitt's contribution to international relations. But why talk about him now? Because we cannot fail to highlight - whether we agree with him or not - his concept of the political; because we believe that some of his theorizations -- the case of the partisan or the great space - are important for the understanding of the moment we live in, namely regarding the changing international system, helping us to understand the emergence of the new civilization states and the concept of illiberal democracy; finally, because works such as "The Nomos of the Earth" should be part of the canon of mandatory readings of the discipline of International Relations. His trajectory is well known, especially in its more controversial aspects. By way of introduction, we will make a quick tour through his life, framing his personal evolution in the great trends of the century. Then, we will try to analyze some central aspects of his work, which constitute relevant contributions to the study of international relations. We will analyze the timeliness of his thought, seeking to prove - this is our ambition - that he is a "modern" and important author for understanding current events, and that he should be an obligatory reference in the discipline of international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leon Trotsky's notion of 'uneven and combined development' (UCD) has been gaining traction as an explanatory theory of international relations over the past decade, notably in work by Justin Rosenberg and Alexander Anievas. The idea that the uneven sequencing of economic development between countries affects both their relative power relationships and domestic political stability, in particular, carries prima-facie intuitive plausibility. The potential consequences for international stability of such relative power shifts and domestic upheavals suggest, furthermore, that there may be significant explanatory payoffs from this line of investigation. At the same time, however, the UCD intuition raises other questions about causal foundations and theoretical affiliations. What accounts for the sequencing of uneven development, for example? And how exactly do both relative power shifts and domestic political instability elevate war risks? This paper will address these lacunae, by demonstrating that – at the level of its underlying micro-foundations – UCD can be understood as a compound of catch-up convergence growth theory and security-dilemma realism. Such a recognition paves the way, in turn, for a fruitful application of UCD to contemporary questions in international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This forum presents a snapshot of the current state of neoclassical realist theorizing. Its contributors are self-identified neoclassical realists who delineate their version of neoclassical realism (NCR), its scope, object of analysis, and theoretical contribution. From the standpoint of NCR, they contribute to and reflect on the "end of IR theory" debate. NCR has come under criticism for its supposed lack of theoretical structure and alleged disregard for paradigmatic boundaries. This raises questions as to the nature of this (theoretical) beast. Is NCR a midrange, progressive research program? Can it formulate a grand theory informed by metatheoretical assumptions? Is it a reformulation of neorealism or classical realism or an eclectic mix of different paradigms? The forum contributors argue that NCR, in different variants, holds considerable promise to investigate foreign policy, grand strategy and international politics. They interrogate the interaction of international and domestic politics and consider normative implications as well as the sources and cases of NCR beyond the West. In so doing, they speak to theorizing and the utility of the theoretical enterprise in IR more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Historica. Historia Contemporánea is the property of Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Management of the South China Sea disputes must consider the "hedging" behavior of the claimant and non-claimant countries. This behavior is characterized by an insistence on not aligning with any of the competing powers, through intentionally contradictory actions to offset multiple risks, or through a continuous effort to maintain a fallback position. Indeed, in the face of China's increasingly assertive actions and U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, nearly all the states in the region have avoided "balancing" (fully aligning with the U.S. to check China) and none of them have adopted "bandwagoning" (fully aligning with China for economic reasons but at the expense of autonomy and other national interests). Instead the Southeast Asian states have insisted on hedging. This paper argues that this proclivity to hedge is a result of both structural and domestic factors. Structurally, the high uncertainties surrounding China's intentions, U.S. commitment, and future U.S.-China ties have compelled the smaller states to avoid putting all their eggs in either power's basket. Domestically, for their political legitimation, the ruling elites in the states hedge to offset multiple risks and pursue mixed policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After WWII, Japan established a unique system of civil–military relations and civilian control of its Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), characterised by bureaucratic rather than political control. For more than half a century, military influence on defence policymaking had been comparably low, depriving political leaders of a critical source of knowledge on national security. Yet, the latter half of the 2000s saw several institutional changes which resulted in the wide-reaching inclusion of military officials in national security policymaking. Why did a democratic Japan, shaped by WWII experiences, see the need for more military influence? The cause for this development ultimately lies within a changing security environment which lends credit to the broader argument that Japan has embraced a 'realpolitik' approach to national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions about migration and security are often characterized by emotions and symbolic images, for example of capsizing, overcrowded boats with desperate people or of seemingly unmanageable queues of migrants in front of border crossings. State and non-state actors confront these uncertainties through maritime migration with different missions. This article provides an overview of these missions over time and in the context of refugee routes used. Different understandings and a lack of regulations have their core, among others, in the fact that classical sea rescue of shipwrecked seafarers differs from the phenomenon of induced distress situations for unauthorized border crossing. Reception seems morally imperative, but political consensus is lacking. The obligation to rescue endangered persons at sea as well as to examine asylum claims after border crossings are being circumvented partially. In governing the migration issue, the EU and its member states face several dilemmas. The article highlights selected dilemmas of European migration policies and addresses the question of whether we are witnessing a failure of sea rescue in the Mediterranean or a successful externalization of borders. In the outlook, policy options are outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Israeli army's policing since 1967 has raised public awareness of the suffering of the Palestinian population, thereby implicating it as a key player in the Israeli political debate. This article discusses how policing has been presented in the leading military journals Ma'arakhot and Bein HaKtavim from 1967 to 2018. It argues that this coverage has served to mitigate the controversy by avoiding the explicit term 'policing' and replacing it with euphemisms that construct it differently in three distinct periods. In particular, since early in the twenty-first century, these journals have suggested alternative terms, which provide policing with hybrid military connotations that respond to pressure from both nationalist and liberal groups. New terms such as 'the war between the wars' promote broad public acceptance of the intractable nature of the conflict and legitimize the need to use violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's strategy in the South China Sea has gone through considerable changes over the last decades. While multiple oscillations have occurred over short periods of time, the three‐decade‐long "trend line" has been characterized by two major inflection points. China's provocations in the mid‐1990s were followed by a transition to cooperation at the turn of the millennium, itself followed by a shift toward heavy‐handed methods since the turn of the 2010s. While each of these two "transitions" has been studied in great detail, few studies have tried to apply explanatory models to both of the transitions to assess their strength. This article fills this void in the existing literature by examining how major explanatory frameworks are distributed into two main categories – domestic and systemic – and perform in explaining China's changing strategy in the two transitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]