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Starting from the analysis of a cycle of sonnets neglected by criticism (Rime 126-130), this paper aims to demonstrate the meaning of the private themes in Bembo's lyrics with regard to the historical context of the first thirty years of the XVI century, in connection with the uncertainty generated by the Italian Wars as well as with the role of intellectuals and writers in Renaissance society. All of the texts are tied to a precise moment, the year 1526: the extremes of the sequence are two civic-political sonnets, addressed to Clemente VII and his datary Giberti, while the central texts are dedicated to the theme of friendship and to la Morosina's illness. The series appears particularly uneven, even more so because of its position just behind the ending of the amorous canzoniere and before the spiritual texts; however, the sonnets are bound together by the theme of fortune and history, in which is rooted Bembo's idea of the love lyric. The paper proves that this thematic thread hints at an articulated discourse about poetic autonomy, grounded in the Latin classics, which represent the true substrate of Bembo's poetry. The study of the sources and of the macrotext confirms the importance of Propertius and Horace in the Rime: specifically, in the Venusian poet Bembo identified a point of reference for the definition of the writers' position vis-à-vis power and for the idea of constructing a monumental work, capable of making eternal not only the memory of its author but also that of his friends, lovers, and lords who are involved in the verses; in Propertius, instead, he saw an example for the treatment of the amorous theme in poetic discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to examine Margaret Atwood's blurring of the boundary between fiction and fact as a key mechanism underpinning the literary construction of The Handmaid's Tale (1985). By drawing on Atwood's statements concerning the documentary imprint of her dystopianspeculative novel, this discussion sheds light on the disguised references to historical figures, momentous events and phenomena which can be discerned throughout The Handmaid's Tale. From Nazi Germany to Nicolae Ceauşescu's Romania, passing through Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's Iran or 1980s' America, Atwood has hugely drawn inspiration from historical events and transfigured them in order to offer a memorable depiction of the futuristic state of Gilead. Reading The Handmaid's Tale from this perspective will provide evidence of the novel's capability to negotiate with the extratextual domain and deliver a powerful cautionary message. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Roversi's theory of law as an artifact raises some interesting questions, some of them concerning what kind of analysis follows from the characterization of law as a socio-ontological entity, if any. In this paper, I will present some remarks regarding the different ways to understand the artifactuality of law, and how they may affect our theories to explain legal phenomena and legal institutions. Against the scepticism about legal phenomena founded in its artifactual character, I will argue that this premise, as it is defended by Roversi, actually takes us closer to a non-sceptic kind of analysis. Then, I will defend the idea that a conceptual analysis of law as an artifact needs to provide an explanation of the changeability of law and legal institutions and I will present different candidates to that purpose. Finally, I will consider whether the relation between structure and function - present in every artifact - can affect the unity of Roversi's theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Roversi's theory of law as an artifact raises some interesting questions, some of them concerning what kind of analysis follows from the characterization of law as a socio-ontological entity, if any. In this paper, I will present some remarks regarding the different ways to understand the artifactuality of law, and how they may affect our theories to explain legal phenomena and legal institutions. Against the scepticism about legal phenomena founded in its artifactual character, I will argue that this premise, as it is defended by Roversi, actually takes us closer to a non-sceptic kind of analysis. Then, I will defend the idea that a conceptual analysis of law as an artifact needs to provide an explanation of the changeability of law and legal institutions and I will present different candidates to that purpose. Finally, I will consider whether the relation between structure and function - present in every artifact - can affect the unity of Roversi's theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]