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This analysis considers the impact of the demonstrations that occurred in Kosovo in spring 1981. They shocked Federal Yugoslavia and re-opened the Kosovo question as an issue in European and international diplomacy. They simultaneously intensified and consolidated the Albanian national movement in Kosovo, although activists held differing views as to the best solution to the problem. Another result of the demonstrations was a deterioration in Albano–Yugoslav relations over territorial and nationalist issues. The “Kosovo Spring” placed Albania in conflict with Yugoslavia, which declared a state of emergency in Kosovo on 2 April 1981 and suppressed the demonstrations by force. The events in Kosovo had the effect of redefining the whole Albanian question. The maturity of the Albanian response led international opinion to take Albania more seriously. For its part, Albania was impelled to evaluate more highly the response of Western countries to events in Kosovo and initiate a more realistic approach to the West—albeit tentatively—despite the persistence of deep ideological differences. The demonstrations of 1981 had a substantial effect on Albanian state policy regarding Kosovo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theoretical debates about multilateralism positively juxtapose it to unilateralism or bilateralism, because it is seen as a natural ideational fit with the growth of global governance. The major schism on the concept is between normativists who emphasise shared values and the realists' concerns with strategic interactions and power asymmetries. The Kosovo crisis beginning in 1999 could be seen as the first major crisis of multilateralism in the international system after the end of the Cold War. It was a crisis about the role and interests of a hegemonic USA and a weakened Russia. As a case, Kosovo demonstrates the paradoxes and limitations of multilateralism in the field of international security, when there are different types and levels of multilateralism interacting. The US and EU leaderships saw Kosovo as essentially a regional problem which could be manipulated to rejuvenate and enhance Western multilateral cooperation in NATO. This view found support among an upper echelon of officials in the UN, surrounding Secretary-General Kofi Annan, which favoured a multilateral intervention in Kosovo as proof of commitment to the developing norm of ‘right to protect’. Russia, however, saw its multilateral engagement over Kosovo as a strategic interaction to counterbalance and compensate for its weakness vis-à-vis NATO. The multilateral interactions by these three parties appear to have deepened mistrust as the process failed to resolve the final status of Kosovo, leading to its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. The case demonstrates the importance of shared interests for successful multilateral interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the period after 1999, the international community abrogated Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo. It took responsibility for governing Kosovo and actively supported the development of autonomous Kosovar government institutions. Simultaneously, the Serbian authorities immediately started to rebuild Serbian government institutions in the parts of Kosovo that hosted a Serbian majority population. This article analyzes how this situation of parallel governance affects ethnic boundary strategies in the village of Gracanica, the largest Serbian village in central Kosovo. The article is based on evidence collected during fieldwork in Gracanica one year after Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008. In this period, the Kosovar government implemented a decentralization program, which would transform Gracanica into a Serb majority municipality. Using Andreas Wimmer's multilevel process theory on boundary making, the article argues that in the period studied, “the scripts of action” concerning how to deal with the Kosovar government do slowly change, but this is largely a pragmatic response and Kosovo Serbs still identify themselves with Serbia. Important explanatory factors for these changing local dynamics are the changes in institutional structures (less Belgrade, more Pristina), the changes in (the balance of) resources offered by either government at the local level, the characteristics of the local political networks, and the weakness of local leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

I explore the nexus between genocide and secession. I argue, first, that legal ambiguity creates space for overlap, with genocide claims frequently proving to be the weapon of choice for relatively weak secessionist entities struggling to enhance their bargaining position and achieve international legal status. Using new data, I find that nearly three-quarters of pro-autonomy entities belonging to the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) have made genocide allegations an important part of their struggle. Next, I use the three secessionist cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia) and Kosovo (Yugoslavia) to analyze how genocide allegations alter local and international stances and significantly complicate the nature of conflict resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The determination of the political status of Kosovo is presented a case of path dependency. The article identifies a number critical junctures since summer 1999, arguing that there were a variety of options that would have led toward a settlement other than independence. These critical junctures included the October 2000 overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic; the March 2003 assassination of Zoran Đinđdic; the March 2005 indictment of Ramush Haradinaj; and the January 2007 Serbian parliamentary elections. Because of choices made primarily in Belgrade and Prishtina the process was driven toward a path that favoured independence. The article stresses the indeterminacy of the process at its start, as well as the importance of local agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the successes and failures of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Specifically, the article examines the question of whether the use of military force to accomplish human good was successful, noting the history of Kosovo between 1999 and 2008.