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The main objective of this paper is to overview the developments of Japan's ODA and assess, in a quantitative manner, their economic impacts on Asian countries. The benefits of two alternative measures—one from capital formation by Japan's ODA loans and the other from import liberalization in the Japanese market—are compared. Those economy-wide impacts of aid and trade on six Asian countries—China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam—are estimated by a CGE model of global trade, incorporating a certain mechanism of dynamic capital formation. Japan's ODA loans are effective for economic growth in the countries. Real GDP gains range from 0.1 to 1.6% annually. Trade liberalization is efficient to improve economic welfare. Utility gains range from 0.2 to 1.9%, which exceed those on account of Japan's ODA. Variations in those economic impacts are much more significantly observed when examined by sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to explore the manner in which Australian policy in matters of international trade is set. The author finds a number of puzzling features. First is the lack of detailed scrutiny given to the policy mechanisms employed by the countries of North-East Asia which have recently been so outstandingly successful in furthering their international trade and economic interests. There can be no valid reason for failing to give close attention to the means whereby others have succeeded. Second is the apparent separation in Australia, unlike Japan, between international trade policy and other, broader economic objectives such as the identification and support of new high value industries with global export potential. If we lack national objectives of this latter kind it is legitimate to ask whether this lack is for the best. Third is the extent to which policy appears to assume, without more ado, that through the liberation of market forces we shall largely resolve our international competitive and trade problems. This is a truly heroic assumption which should be clearly recognised for what it is. Fourth and perhaps most puzzling of all is the extraordinarily low level of community debate, even of interest group debate, over precisely where our 1990s international trade and economic development interests lie. If the current GATT round should largely fail, which is quite likely, clear thinking about where our best interests lie will suddenly become urgent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The demographic structure of Asia is expected to change rapidly from around 2020 up to around 2050. Following Japan, which is already at an advanced stage of aging and birthrate decline, China, South Korea, Thailand, and Singapore will also witness a further decline in their birthrates and an aging of their populations. Next in line will be the remaining countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations as well as India. Such changes, accompanied by a decline in the labor force, will not only adversely affect economic growth, but also have a major impact on voting structures, savings rates, and social security systems. Moreover, the process of demographic aging in Asia will be faster than in Japan, and its extent will be substantial, both of which exacerbates the negative effects. On positive side, these trends will give rise to the emergence of new markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]