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Studies of micro-level violence make various claims to universality: namely, that there are patterns of violence in civil wars that are observable across time and space. The analysis of rebel violence against civilians constitutes one of the enduring themes of these studies. By evaluating the actions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) during the latter half of the Colombian civil war, this paper demonstrates that the claims of micro-level studies are unable to account for FARC's violence against civilians. In response, this study provides an alternative framework for understanding FARC's violence. Informed by the theories of Carl von Clausewitz it is possible to comprehend the logic of FARC's violence against civilians within a strategic framework that aimed to advance the movement's political goals. However, it also illustrates that FARC was influenced heavily by its involvement in the drugs trade. The main findings are a) that whilst FARC's acts of violence may have contained similarities to that of other drugs cartels FARC did not become a narco-guerrilla organization, b) the case of FARC demonstrates that ultimately there are no reproducible patterns in war, micro-level or otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After more than 50 years of war, in 2016, the Colombian government signed a historic peace accord with the country's largest rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Although the cessation of hostilities between the rebel group and the government is a monumental step, violence remains rife in the country. By drawing attention to the correlation between neoliberal economic development in the country and militarism, this paper sheds light on several structural issues that have been left potentially unresolved by the peace negotiations, each with the potential to ignite further violence. We introduce the concept of militaristic neoliberalism to argue that there is a fundamental link between Colombia's neoliberal development and a culture of militarism, which relies on gendered and racialized constructions of 'self' and 'other', that exacerbate structural inequalities and severely hampers prospects for achieving peace for many of Colombia's citizens post-conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The starting point for this paper is the Colombian 'success story'. That is, the claim that a transition has taken place from a problematic conflict situation to a successful postconflict one. As the debates about the Colombian success story revolve around the presence or absence of violence, a proposal is made here to think of the postconflict period in terms of the transformation of the rules on the use of violence. The main aspects of the professionalisation programme accelerated and deepened via the Plan Colombia are analysed in an attempt to grasp the terms under which the Colombian military's expertise is understood. Finally, the reorganisation of violence in the postconflict period is discussed by mapping out the main features of military training programmes in the context of peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I analyze how the strategies of counterinsurgency warfare undertaken in Colombia during the sixties and seventies recreate an immunity politics device. I argue that this device is based on a notion where the nation is under - stood as a social body threatened and infected by communist ideologies and where the idea of safety and protection involving the administration of violence. I argue that this immunity politics device operates under a self-destructive logic and a notion of delocalized threat that encouraged the militarization of society, the management of fear and the maintenance of State in a permanent emergency. These facts, in turn, enabled to the appeal to the constitutional exceptionalism as a form of standardized government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this paper is to analyze the transformation process of the Colombian Army between 1960 and 1965, which was driven by the political decisions of the rulers, the intervention of the Armed Forces, and by factual gambles made by the military to eliminate the first revolutionary guerillas. Through this, we expect to argue two hypotheses: first that the relationship between the Army and the civilian government was ambiguous during a period of institutional transition; and, second, that political subordination and military autonomy were breached by the intromission of military players in the political scene, and by rulers in the military scene. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]