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Resumo As grandes mutações sociais, políticas e econômicas que perfazem a conjuntura da atual quadra histórica brasileira evidenciam a ruptura com a ordem democrática instaurada a partir da Constituição Federal de 1988. É neste sentido que as características desenvolvidas neste ensaio permitem indicar a possível ruptura do modelo Democrático de Estado, dando-se abertura para o avanço do Estado Pós-Democrático. Neste cenário, o presente trabalho apresenta a Emenda Constitucional nº 95/2016 como a legitimação jurídica necessária para a instauração da ordem Pós-Democrática no Brasil, tendo fixado novos paradigmas para a gestão orçamentária e a política fiscal, especialmente com reflexos no campo dos direitos sociais e políticas públicas, notadamente em seu núcleo essencial, que são direitos à educação e à saúde. A partir dessa afirmação, teceram-se considerações na busca de responder a problemática proposta: quais as principais características que permitem afirmar que a Emenda Constitucional n° 95/2016 constituiu uma espécie de “legitimação jurídica” ao avanço do Estado Pós-Democrático no Brasil? O resultado previamente encontrado é de que a Emenda Constitucional nº 95/2016 configura-se como a legitimação jurídica ao avanço do Estado Pós-Democrático, inviabilizando o incremento no campo das políticas públicas e o consequente fomento ao controle social, fatores essenciais para a construção de uma política emancipatória para o exercício da cidadania, projetada pela Constituição Federal de 1988. O método de abordagem é dedutivo, procedimento analítico, utilizando-se da técnica de documentação direta através de pesquisa bibliográfica. Abstract The great social, political and economic changes that make up the current situation of the current Brazilian historical period show the rupture with the democratic order established since the Federal Constitution of 1988. In this sense, the characteristics developed in this essay allow to indicate the possible rupture of the Democratic State model, opening up for the advancement of the Post-Democratic State. In this scenario, the present work presents Constitutional Amendment nº 95/2016 as the necessary legal legitimation for the establishment of the Post-Democratic order in Brazil, having set new paradigms for budget management and fiscal policy, especially with repercussions in the field of social rights and public policies, notably in their essential nucleus, which are rights to education and health. From this statement, considerations were made in the search to answer the problematic proposal: what are the main characteristics that allow us to affirm that Constitutional Amendment No. 95/2016 constituted a kind of “legal legitimation” to the advancement of the Post-Democratic State in Brazil? The result previously found is that Constitutional Amendment nº 95/2016 is configured as the legal legitimation for the advancement of the Post-Democratic State, preventing the increase in the field of public policies and the consequent promotion of social control, essential factors for the construction of an emancipatory policy for the exercise of citizenship, designed by the Federal Constitution of 1988. The method of approach is deductive, an analytical procedure, using the technique of direct documentation through bibliographic research.

This article reviews the central problematique of citizenship, arguing that the challenges imposed by neoliberal globalisation involve the loss of political, social and civil rights. By negating the mediations performed by citizenship between the people and the state, post-democracy renders citizenship meaningless. The article traces two main responses to this, a reactionary and a progressive one, none of which can address the problems of citizenship. The grains of a new response are found in three developments: a new ontology of the citizen, brought into being through digital acts; the existence of dual power, creating new forms of governance and social reproduction from below; and between these, the development of new procedures that directly engage with state power. Taken together, these considerations indicate a new possibility for the radicalisation of citizenship rather than a return to the former state of affairs.

As more and more political systems acquire signs of hybridity, and as the cycle of accountability and decision making for society becomes narrower, processes of de-democratisation emerge in democracies. Also, the result of the connection between processes of democratisation and de-democratisation becomes even more unclear. The analytical construction of post-democracy has appeared in the scientific discourse. In this article, the connection between democratisation and de-democratisation in a post-democratic environment is analysed through the concept of C. Tilly’s methodologically presumed analysis of democracy. For the purpose of theoretical statement operationalisation, an analysis of the Ukrainian practice is used. Methods: scientific literature and publication analysis, statistical analysis, case study. Research results: The theorisation of the connection between processes of democratisation and dedemocratisation which was highlighted and updated in C. Tilly’s democracy research is an effective analytical tool for the development of democracy. The famous analytical triad formulated by C. Tilly (an increase or decrease in integration between interpersonal networks of trust and public politics; an increase or decrease in the insulation from public politics of the main categorical inequalities; an increase or decrease in the autonomy of major power centres) allows us to reveal the many nuances of democracy. Despite this, Tilly stresses the processes of democratisation and de-democratisation as negating each other, and multiple political hybrids unfold under post-democratic conditions. We respond to Tilly’s call for those who want the worldwide establishment of democracy not to waste their time preaching about the benefits of democracy, creating constitutions and NGOs, or even expressing sympathy for undemocratic countries; but instead, to make a significant effort at integrating politics into networks of trust, insulating the main categorical inequalities from public politics, and fighting against autonomous power centres. In a world full of processes of democratisation and de-democratisation, the number of undemocratic political regimes and undemocratic tendencies does not decrease, even in old democracies. Different cases of trust network insulation from politics or the relationship between politics and categorical inequalities, power centres autonomous from the state, still exist. The inclusion of trust networks in public hearings and other public processes is a welcome and necessary ingredient for sustaining democracy, or at least for the beginning of its consolidation. Despite this, the process still does not guarantee democratisation, because fundamental democratic principles, such as government control, equivalence of representation and participation, are not guaranteed by formally democratic institutions themselves. This is partly because democracies cannot significantly reduce social and economic inequality. The inability to limit the growth of social inequality has evolved into mass protest movements. They do not necessarily propose violent conflict, but rather raise doubts about the potential of democracy to solve current problems in people’s daily lives. Moreover, it means that the configuration of processes of democratisation and dedemoratisation remains a complex issue. The latter significantly complements autonomous power centres, which occurs both in a globalised, post-democratic world and in free and partly free countries. They have the potential to continue to get stronger and limit state power and authority even more. A partial analysis of recent processes in Ukraine using C. Tilly’s concept of the connection between democratisation and de-democratisation showed that democratisation and de-democratisation in this country take place in parallel, they coexist, and do not contradict each other in principle. More detailed research and comparative studies are needed in order to find out whether it is a random situation, or a universal current situation. The study conducted of processes of democratisation and de-democratisation shows that it is meaningful to continue research not only into the radical opposition of these processes, but also their parallel opposition, when they do not contradict each other, but rather hybridise; and also to test the assumption of simultaneous, one-directional processes of democratisation and de-democratisation.

The crisis in Greece in the last decade has led to a wide economic transition, raising the question of whether Greece can be understood as a kind of a ‘post-growth’ society. The article has two aims. First, it examines how the Greek crisis has been discussed within the post-growth debate and focuses on three views: Greece as a post-growth anti-paradigm, Greece as an opportunity for democratic post-growth and austerity in Greece as a path for anti-Keynesian degrowth. Second, the article examines how ideas and projects with a post-growth orientation have influenced specific social initiatives born out of the crisis period in Greece. Some of these initiatives are reviewed (self-organized social and economic collectives, grassroots initiatives for solidarity, solidarity economy actions, etc.). As further discussed in the article, these initiatives were part of a broader ‘countermovement’ (Polanyi), and they faded together with other forms of labour and social protest, in accordance with events at the central political scene, and especially SYRIZA’s adoption of Memoranda politics. It is observed that in the post-Memoranda era in Greece, although past strategies of social reproduction are either unavailable (the pre-crisis finance-led growth model) or no longer equally effective (the familistic social model) and fiscal discipline remains, the search for other alternatives, including social initiatives with a post-growth orientation, did not actually extend as was expected, due to some new growth opportunities, e.g. in the field of tourism. It is finally concluded that, although they constituted an important part of the Greek countermovement, born as responses to the crisis, these social initiatives did not manage to consolidate more permanent structures of social action that could successfully challenge the neoliberal agenda.

Zusammenfassung Extremistische Einstellungen sind kein gesellschaftliches Randphanomen, sondern konnen in samtlichen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen auftreten. Die klassische Links-/Rechtszuordnung erweist sich nicht nur fur eine moderne Extremismusforschung als ungeeignet. Dennoch scheinen einige politische, gesellschaftliche Akteur*innen an diesem alten Konzept, dem Hufeisenmodell, festzuhangen. Moderne, sozialwissenschaftliche Extremismusforschung beruht auf dem Konzept gesellschaftlicher Desintegration. In diesem Artikel wird das Konzept der Desintegration sowie die damit verknupfte gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit (GMF) diskutiert. Es wird auf das Phanomen des marktformigen Extremismus der GMF eingegangen, welches Abwertungskonstruktionen auf okonomischer Basis beschreibt. Diese Form des Extremismus, kann als Erklarungsansatz fur die politische Entwicklung der letzten Jahre sowie fur die Regierungskrise in Thuringen 2020 angewendet werden. In diesem Artikel wird argumentiert, dass mit einem Erstarken postdemokratischer Dynamiken die gesellschaftlichen Desintegrationsprozesse eines marktformigen Extremismus steigen. Schlagworter: Extremismus; Marktformiger Extremismus; Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit ----- Bibliographie : Mach, Leonard: Paradigmenwechsel im Extremismus, Soziologiemagazin, 1-2020, S. 41-63. https://doi.org/10.3224/soz.v13i1.04

The analysis starts from a key question: how many transformations did post-communism, which came as a promise and project for one transformation, actually carry out? This article is a conceptual, not an event narrative about the transformations of democratization. Its theoretical ambition is threefold. The first aim is to develop a new analytical model for the study of transformations based on the concept of ‘symbolic-ideological hegemony’ and a matrix of two pairs of indicators. The first pair reflects the intentionality of the change and examines the (non-)existence of an explicitly formulated political project as well as its (self-)designation by elites and citizens. The second pair of indicators concerns agency and covers the supply side and the demand side, the perspective and role of elites, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the perspective and role of citizens. The other ambitions of the study are to identify the key transformations in Bulgaria’s three-decade-long post-communist development – a democratic, a (national) populist, and a post-democratic one, and to analyze them in a comparative perspective.

The project of liberal democracy is inherently marked by tensions between its liberal and democratic pillar. This means that liberal democracy needs to constantly strive for a balance between conflicting principles. If it does not contain these centrifugal forces, liberal democracies risk becoming subverted from within due to one principle clearly dominating the other. In this article, we start from the idea of liberal democracy depending on balance to systematically assess multiple endogenous challenges to democracy. We identify four types of deformations and show how they are qualitatively distinct phenomena, yet systematically relate to each other. We furthermore discuss what the co-existence of several such deformations means for the notion of liberal democracy understood as a state of balance. In sum, the proposed framework adds to existing research by providing a systematizing and theoretically grounded assessment of ongoing subversive tendencies in liberal democracy.

In an era of apparent “post-democracy”, political participation is challenged on multiple levels. On the one hand, traditional understandings of democratic participation appear to be out of sync wi...

Die normative Assoziierung von Technikfolgenabschätzung (TA) mit der Habermas‘schen deliberativen Demokratietheorie ist weit verbreitet; eine tiefere Auseinandersetzung mit alternativen Demokratieverständnissen bleibt allerdings weitestgehend aus. Daher regt dieser Beitrag eine grundsätzliche Debatte über die demokratietheoretische Einbettung der TA und ihr Verhältnis zum Politischen an. Aufbauend auf der u. a. in dieser Zeitschrift geführten Diskussion über die (Un)Möglichkeit normativer Neutralität in der TA wird eine weiterführende Kritik am Anspruch der TA auf normative Fundierung hergeleitet. Mit der pluralen und radikalen Demokratietheorie von Laclau und Mouffe werden gesellschaftstheoretische Annahmen der an deliberativer Demokratie orientierten TA hinterfragt, und es wird für eine Politisierung und Pluralisierung der TA argumentiert The political in TA Reflections based on Laclau and Mouffe’s plural and radical democracy theory The normative association of technology assessment (TA) with Habermas’s deliberative democracy theory is widespread. However, there is hardly any debate on alternative concepts of democracy. This contribution, therefore, aims to stimulate debate on TA’s relation to democracy theory and to the political. Building on the discussion about the (im) possibility of normative neutrality in TA – published, among others, in this journal –, a more fundamental critique of TA’s normative foundation will be put forward. Based on Laclau and Mouffe’s plural and radical democracy theory, this contribution questions the social theoretical assumptions of a TA oriented toward deliberation and argues for a politicization and pluralization of TA.

The author conducts a comparative analysis of authoritarian liberalism’s concepts in contemporary political theory. The paper deals with the main directions of interpretation of authoritarian liberalism in the framework of methodological approaches and conceptual models of neoliberalism, ordoliberalism, political liberalism, J.-W. Mueller’s ‘restrained democracy’, J. Habermas’ ‘legitimation crisis’, C. Crouch’s ‘post-democracy’, C. Macpherson’s ‘participatory democracy’, M. Wilkinson’s ‘dedemocratisation and delegalisation’, W. Streeck’s ‘democratic capitalism crisis’ and G. Majone’s ‘crypto-federalism’. The basic analytical concept is the idea of authoritarian economic liberalism, first proposed by H. Heller and K. Polanyi. This paper will sub-stantiate that in crisis and transformational periods the actualisation of authoritarian liberalism corresponds to the fundamental tension between market capitalism and representative democracy. The author conceptualises authoritarian liberalism as the practice of dedemocratisation and restrained democracy, which results in the regionalisation of radical protest against the supranational regime of political integration in Europe. Latent political authoritarianism strengthens economic liberalism, which, in turn, reinforces the further EU’s ‘liberal authoritarian transformation’. Authoritarian liberalism restricts traditional forms of representative democracy, contributing to the reanimation of populism and political radicalism. The authoritarian restriction of representative democracy can lead not only to the strengthening of market capitalism, but also to the revival of reactionary forms of ‘new nationalism’ and illiberalism. Today, the EU’s regime is transformed from a nominally rule-based structure supported by market discipline into a ‘discretionary order’ reinforced by bureaucratic power. The EU’s transnational solidarity can become a democratically legitimate tool for a de-escalation of tensions between market capitalism and representative democracy.

Leseprobe ----- Zusammenfassung Der autoritar gesonnene Antifeminismus hat in der neoliberalen Postdemokratie Konjunktur und fuhrt zu einer antiutopisch ausgerichteten Passivierung politischer Subjektivitat, jener Subjektivitat, die gerade in der Vielzahl feministischer Auseinandersetzungen hart erkampft wurde und wird. Doch warum ist der Rechtspopulismus mit dieser Strategie – die einem Frontalangriff auf demokratische Geschlechterverhaltnisse und damit auf die Demokratie insgesamt gleicht – so erfolgreich? Die Beantwortung der Frage soll zunachst im Rekurs auf psychoanalytische Uberlegungen beantwortet werden. Dabei wird in ideologiekritischer Absicht insbesondere die Rolle des gesellschaftlichen Unbewussten und der symbolischen Kastration hervorgehoben. Die These ist, dass wir es in der neoliberalen Postdemokratie mit ideologischen Anrufungen zu tun haben, die auf phantasmatische Weise Anerkennung suggerieren, zugleich aber feministische Anerkennungskampfe mit konkret-utopischer Ausrichtung desavouieren. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser These sollen theoretische Uberlegungen angestellt werden, unter welchen Voraussetzungen das Unbewusste und die Utopie als Kategorien der feministischen Ideologiekritik verstanden werden konnen, die gleichsam zur Erneuerung der in die autoritare Krise geratenen, neoliberalen Postdemokratie beitragen konnte. ----- Against the Death of Feminist Utopia – Reflections on the Utopian Potential of Feminist Approaches in Times of an Authoritarian Backlash in the context of Neoliberalism Abstract Nowadays, we are confronted with an authoritarian and anti-feminist backlash implying a de-politicization of subjectivity, a concept that has been essential in the context of feminist struggles for recognition. But why are we facing such success of antifeminist right-wing populism which is at the same time a direct attack on democracy? In answering this question, I argue that neoliberalism goes hand in hand with repressive ideological interpellations effecting the tabooing of concrete utopian thinking by making the causes of societal suffering unconscious. To this end, I outline the psychoanalytical meaning of the unconsciousness and of symbolic castration as an approach for analyzing ideology, that is, to theorize the (ideological fabrication of the) unconsciousness as a category of feminist critique and to combine these thoughts with theoretical reflections on the concept of utopia. Moreover, I argue that these theoretical considerations might also contribute to rethinking democracy radically and to reforming neoliberal (post)democracies that have fallen into an authoritarian crisis. ----- Bibliographie: Meisterhans, Nadja: Wider dem Tod der feministischen Utopie – Zum utopischen Potential feministischer Ansatze in Zeiten des autoritaren Backlash im Kontext des Neoliberalismus, Femina Politica - Zeitschrift fur feministische Politikwissenschaft, 1-2019, S. 72-84. https://doi.org/10.3224/feminapolitica.v28i1.06

This article assesses the referendums in Hungary in 2004, 2008, and 2016 diachronically. The review is framed by two competing liberal parliamentary approaches to direct democracy: A useful democratic corrective to the distortions of particracy, or a risky option leading to tyranny of the majority? Rather than choosing sides, this article shows how the conundrum conceals another, more interesting question: Which are the constraints under which the liberal parliamentary viewpoint shifts from the one to the other? Theorizing on post-democracy and populism provides a provisional answer: A consensualized, “post-political” parliament is key, as this, in combination with widening social-economic disparities, incentivizes illiberal populist parties to harness referendums, which prompts liberal parliamentarianists to change their minds. The referendums in 2004, 2008, and 2016 in Hungary substantiate this suspicion. Taken together, they offer a step-by-step blueprint for how, in a thoroughly postpolitical situation, a referendum evolves into a perfect catalyst for populists on their road to power, enabling them with (a) agenda-setting; (b) an explosive emphasis on popular legitimacy; (c) arousing voluntarism, while luring opponents into campaigning for boycott and political apathy; (d) combining social equalitarianism with identarian protectionism, and most importantly; (e) bypassing parliament itself. This article is part of the special cluster titled Political Parties and Direct Democracy in Eastern Europe, guest-edited by Sergiu Gherghina.

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This chapter discusses two emerging patterns of political behaviour in Western democracies, namely non-voting and voting for right-wing populist parties. Both are considered as a reaction to the post-democratic turn in general, and the changing meaning of political participation in special. Against the widespread notion that they should be considered as irrational, it is argued that at least for some parts of the citizenry both forms of political behaviour make sense. It is stated that at least for those parts of the citizenry which can be described as ‘left-authoritarian’, voting for right-wing populist parties seems to be even more rational than refusing to vote.

Political correctness, which is manifested in relation to the behaviours and attitudes of citizens but above all with their linguistic uses, is considered to be the "postmodern censorship" exercised in principle from various instances but always linked to civil society. But the application of some of its principles by the public authorities, especially the executive and the legislative authorities, is being detected, which could represent, in the context of the already called post-democracy, the reinvention of the usual censorship, exercised from the Power. La corrección política, que se manifiesta en relación con los comportamientos y actitudes de los ciudadanos pero sobre todo con sus usos lingüísticos, es considerada como la «censura posmoderna» ejercida en principio desde instancias diversas, pero siempre vinculadas a la sociedad civil. Mas se está detectando la aplicación de algunos de sus principios por parte de los poderes públicos, especialmente el ejecutivo y el legislativo, lo que podría representar, en el contexto de la ya denominada posdemocracia, la reinvención de la censura de siempre, ejercida desde el Poder.

This chapter observes that the current political situation is shaped by politicisation processes (e.g. populist protests) that, contrary to the 1970s (e.g. civil rights movements), deteriorate rather than enhance representative democracy. It thus analyses the reasons for this cleavage and argues that civil rights movements brought the political to the fore while current protest suppresses it. Bringing the political to the fore means to allow the coexistence of more than one representation of one and the same object, highlighting the incommensurability between the people’s sovereign and the actual people. It thus prevents the possibility of a fully fledged representation and allows further contesting in the future. Populist mobilisations, instead, restrict political conflict to the borderline between the people and their ‘enemies’ (immigrants, the elite etc.), politicising without democratising.

This concluding chapter describes how the Europe of the 1990s was for the first time in its history both united and democratic. But the sudden turning point of 1989 lacked something of the global significance of the other European post-war moments of the twentieth century in 1918 and 1945. Europe no longer stood at the centre of its own history, as demonstrated by the ineffective response of the European Union to the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia during the 1990s, and by the divisions that emerged among European states during the American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In economic terms, too, the ascendancy of a new global capitalism obliged Europe to accept the economic weather generated by more distant or universal forces. In addition, however, Europe had lost confidence in the democratic model that it had developed and, to a large degree, patented. The more fractured and fluid politics that had emerged in Europe by the end of the twentieth century might be more appropriately described as post-democracy: a politics still conducted through the language and institutional structures of democracy, but which lacked much of the former substance of democratic politics.

Viele Wahlberechtigte wählen inzwischen per Brief. Corona befeuert die Diskussion um das Für und Wider dieser Option. Führt Briefwahl zu einer höheren und sozial ausgewogeneren Wahlbeteiligung? Welche Parteien profitieren?

According to the mainstream literature, the concept of democracy coincides with the historical configuration of the liberal-democratic regimes, producing a static image that rests on a minimal, procedural meaning. We instead support the idea of process-oriented democracy, which occurs in the conflicting relationship between citizens and the state. Every process of democratisation is exposed to the risks of a de-democratisation featuring the regression of democratic conditions. We also integrate the concept of democracy of liberal derivation with other meanings that are gaining ground in the face of a crisis of legitimisation of Western liberal regimes. Democracy is also linked to political participation, connected to the two interrelated concepts of citizenship and democratisation; citizens to whom the rights of belonging to a political community are guaranteed, take part in the public life of that community, trying to influence its course. They may only be interested in public affairs, developing mass political attitudes not necessarily translated into direct engagement, or may also actively participate in the political process in the conventional forms of voting or, otherwise, using non-conventional, protest-oriented repertoires of action. The three main actors of collective political participation are “political parties”, “interest groups” and “social movements”. In this chapter, we will dedicate a specific section to interest groups, which are now central in the dynamics of decision-making in contemporary democracies. Every democratisation process always starts from a non-democratic condition. We will observe the main forms of non-democratic state organisation, from traditionalism to totalitarianism, and the various types of authoritarianism and then dedicate the last section to transition regimes, the so-called pseudo-democracies, and post-democracies.

Die Konflikte um das Großprojekt "Stuttgart 21" verdeutlichen exemplarisch, wie Protestbewegungen das postdemokratische Zusammenspiel von Staat und Wirtschaft herausfordern. Bürgerbeteiligung und Kostentransparenz sind seither nahezu obligatorisch, dabei hat die Bewegung gegen "S21" ihr eigentliches Ziel, das Bahn- und Immobilienprojekt zu stoppen, verfehlt, trotz scheinbar positiver Ausgangslage. Anhand von Schlüsselereignissen im Konflikt um das Großprojekt rekonstruiert die Autorin die Dynamiken und Diskurse dieser sozialen Bewegung. Diese Untersuchung stellt in ihrer Art eine Neuheit in der Protest- und Bewegungsforschung dar und ist gleichzeitig ein Lehrstück für andere soziale Bewegungen. A teaching play for protest research: key events and dynamics of the social movement against "S21".

Scientific, political and bureaucratic elites use epistemic practices like “big data analysis” and “web scraping” to create representations of the citizenry and to legitimize policymaking. I develop the concept of “demos scraping” for these practices of gaining information about citizens (the “demos”) through automated analysis of digital trace data which are re-purposed for political means. This article critically engages with the discourse advocating demos scraping and provides a conceptual analysis of its democratic implications. It engages with the promise of demos scraping advocates to reduce the gap between political elites and citizens and highlights how demos scraping is presented as a superior form of accessing the “will of the people” and to increase democratic legitimacy. This leads me to critically discuss the implications of demos scraping for political representation and participation. In its current form, demos scraping is technocratic and de-politicizing; and the larger political and economic context in which it takes place makes it unlikely that it will reduce the gap between elites and citizens. From the analytic perspective of a post-democratic turn, demos scraping is an attempt of late modern and digitalized societies to address the democratic paradox of increasing citizen expectations coupled with a deep legitimation crisis.

Review of Erik Swyngedouw’s Promises of the Political: Insurgent Cities in a Post-Political Environment. 2018. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 222 pp. ISBN: 978-0-262-03822.

Formal modes of political incorporation in South Korea rest on a foundation of limited pluralism. The notion that the state should impose rigid boundaries on political representation pervades the country’s democracy. This notion is enshrined in law – in particular in the constitution’s Article 8 and in the Political Parties Act – and is upheld and perpetuated by the judiciary, the election commission, and the parties that dominate representative institutions. Labour is particularly disadvantaged by the limited pluralism contained in party laws. The role of party law in shaping modes of political incorporation is frequently overlooked. This account of party law in South Korea echoes this issue’s attention to the quiet ways that the state in Asia has silenced or ignored particular groups while maintaining the formal institutions of electoral democracy. In this case, the effect is to facilitate a rightward drift by the state as left-leaning actors face greater challenges in contesting elections.

This paper applies the concept of post-democracy coined by Crouch to shed light on the emerging political dynamics of macroeconomic policy coordination in the Eurozone as they applied to France during Hollande’s presidency. Firstly, the paper explains the nature of EMU reform, characterized here as post-democratic by institutional design, before analysing its impact on France’s budgetary politics. Finally, the French case involving Hollande’s balancing act between supranational rules and domestic spending preferences is used as a way to reflect on the stability of this post-democratic arrangement for rescuing the Euro. The 2017 presidential election pitting Macron against Le Pen showed that post-democracy by design is sustainable only if the supply side of politics remains supportive of EMU—a condition undermined by the institutionalization of austerity, at least in France.

Across Asia there has been a shift to the right in important democratic polities. This article argues that this conservative or authoritarian shift reflects the emergence of a new form of political regime that Nicos Poulantzas characterised as authoritarian statism. This article presents a theoretical framework – with illustrative case studies of Japan and Korea – to understand the emergence of a distinctive brand of Asian authoritarian statism. These new trajectories of political regimes reflect interconnected political and economic crises of conservative capitalist democracies. These crises are the result of the fracturing of modes and mechanisms of political incorporation due to the transnationalisation of capital. It is argued that the inability of current modes of state intervention or political incorporation to manage these economic and political crises or secure political legitimacy for political projects to deepen market reform has led to a “crisis of crisis management” and the further weakening of the Japanese and Korean states.

The article is focused on the problems for political management in the modern "digital age". New technical tools provided to citizens increasing opportunity for civil participation in governance. It is also increased transparency as an instrument of control over the activities of politicians and officials. According to the research these possibilities gave new chances for direct democracy ("one-click democracy") and could reload the representative one. Author proved complementarity of those two types of democracy in the framework of the "advisory democracy" model. It was considered the successful experience of interaction of grass-roots forms of direct democracy with central government in a number of countries (Austria, Iceland, Ireland, etc.)

The dawn of 21st century has witnessed some new features of democratic politics that seem to be shifting away from what we call democratic. The impact of globalisation has created such a nexus among elites of politics–corporates–media that has made political regimes to ignore the democratic norms and well-being of common masses and overemphasise economic growth and corporate-friendly policy priorities. Besides, the approach of the political actors (parties and politicians), in the process of power-seeking, has shown unconventional trends. These features do not resemble either dictatorship or totalitarianism; rather they depict trends of aristocratic mode of decision-making by using democratic framework and institutions. Such trends have been termed as ‘post-democracy’ by recent Western scholarship. Indian politics is not an exception. These trends have created an imbalance between interest of social classes and corporative interests which has prompted political regimes to take tough decisions, in despotic ways. Though the present article does not posit that Indian democracy is on the brink, it attempts to underline the post-democratic features visible in Indian politics through examination of (a) party politics in terms of democratic framework, ideology, policy initiations and reforms, electioneering, etc.; (b) politicians–corporates–media nexus; and (c) modes and trends of politicians in communicating and relating with the electorate.

This paper presents the case of the post-crisis discursive defence of shadow banking in the Netherlands to argue, first, that there is a need to dust off older elite theories and adapt them to post-democratic conditions where there are no widely shared ‘political formulas’ to secure mass support for elite projects. Second, that temporality should be taken more seriously; it is when stories fail that elite storytelling can be observed in practice. As new ‘political formulas’ are minted and become established, elites can again hope to withdraw from the political scene and leave policy-making to the self-evidence of output legitimacy and/or the perpetuum mobile of There-Is-No-Alternative (TINA). This suggests that elite theory should replace an epochal reading of post-democracy with a more conjunctural one.

The dominant theory of elite power, grounded in Weberian bureaucracy, has analyzed elites in terms of stable positions at the top of enduring institutions. Today, many conditions that spawned these stable ‘command posts’ no longer prevail, and elite power thus warrants rethinking. This article advances an argument about contemporary ‘influence elites’. The way they are organized and the modus operandi they employ to wield influence enable them to evade public accountability, a hallmark of a democratic society. Three cases are presented, first to investigate changes in how elites operate and, second, to examine varying configurations in which the new elites are organized. The cases demonstrate that influence elites intermesh hierarchies and networks, serve as connectors, and coordinate influence from multiple, moving perches, inside and outside official structures. Their flexible and multi-positioned organizing modes call for reconsidering elite theory and grappling with the implications of these elites for democratic society.

Transitions towards renewable energy sources are changing landscapes in many respects and causing controversies over legitimate landscape governance. The paper investigates these trends by examining the production of energy landscapes as multifaceted processes of ‘cosmopolitics’, which inevitably generate landscape controversies. It sketches such co-constructive processes under various governance constellations. In case studies from Bavaria (Germany), the controversies could be traced back to conflicting patterns of justification beyond industrial certainties of ‘first modernity’. These controversies cannot be fully understood if we see them as conflicts about siting decisions; instead, we need in-depth inquiry into socio-eco-technical co-constructions and ways of reshaping them. The paper looks at whether such controversies can be considered as typical elements of reflexive governance in ‘second modernity’, or whether they point to a post-political production of energy landscapes on the way towar...

The “post-democracy” concept appeared in critical literature at the beginning of the twentieth century. Its initial purpose was to consider what could come after democracy in the context of a paradigmatic change of superstructure: if modern democracy was born with the nation state in a governmental logic, how could one imagine its evolution in an unsettled and globalized governance? Post-democracy offers both a normative and an analytical answer: only a subtle understanding of the destabilization mechanisms of the democratic order will allow an efficient fight for the safeguarding of our political and social assets. Yet there is no uniform theory concerning post-democracy at the present time; as for its line of analysis it sometimes covers contradictory fields of law, political science and philosophy. Taking this into consideration, we have chosen to confront the principles of post-democracy with their own ambivalences in order to attest to the quality of their diagnosis and conceptual soundness.

Populism has often been described as a great challenge and threat to Western democracies. Not surprisingly, at a time in which we are witnessing a significant rise in populist actors in Europe and the US, scientific analyses and commentary regarding populism have become particularly popular and, indeed, necessary. My aim in this article is to offer a brief yet comprehensive overview of the ongoing debates in a bid to problematise the supposed ‘imminent threat’ of populism in light of recent developments within the political systems and societies of established democracies, especially under conditions of crisis. I understand populism as a specific type of discourse, and thus as a way—among others—of doing politics and appealing to groups of people. Thus, I highlight the varying orientations that populist movements might take, depending on the ideological traditions with which they are closely articulated and the sociopolitical environment in which they manifest. Last, I relate the ‘populist surge’ to discussions regarding post-democracy.

The paper aims to highlight the ordoliberal discourse that permeates the public choice in the new European governance. The social market economy remains the key-doctrine of any further strengthening of the EMU, even though the shift towards an institutionalised differentiated integration will bring to a progressive depoliticisation of the public authority and will give rise to disruptive forces. Furthermore, the article will focus on the “multiple Union” (Monetary, Financial, Fiscal, and Political Union) combined with the concept of “resilient economies” as a turning point in conceiving the relationship between capitalism and democracy in Europe. A relationship that subordinates the Keynesian “full employment” objective to the “benchmarking” competitiveness models, export led and deflationary policies. From another angle, this encounters a serious gap of legitimacy and a progressive EU popular disaffection that deal, in a broader sense, with deconsolidation of the classical liberal and representative democratic framework.

In Germany, the electoral success of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is one of the most obvious signs of the rise of the far right. In public debates this tends to be associated with Eastern Germany and rural regions. What is neglected is the fact that the party was also remarkably successful in less privileged urban districts across Germany. In this paper I focus on the urban conditions for the rise of the far right. I do so by presenting first results of ethnographic research in two neighbourhoods of Frankfurt am Main. Both – Riederwald and Nied – are marginalised and the AfD gained considerable support there in the 2017 general elections. In the accounts given in 14 expert interviews I identify three crucial urban processes: austerity urbanism, post-democracy and gentrification. Relating them to findings of long-term studies on right-wing attitudes as well as to the concept of ‘downward mobility’, I argue that these processes increase the competition for resources and strengthen feelings of being left behind as well as experiences of being abandoned by political representatives – which are driving forces for the rise of the far right. And yet these experiences alone do not provide sufficient reason to explain the rise of the far right. They are general processes in the neighbourhoods. However, it seems that intersections with existing group-focused enmities drive a shift from social to regressive collectivity, which raises the potential for far-right political subjectification.

At the beginning of the 21st century, many South American countries witnessed the ascension of progressive governments supported by a range of social and popular actors. The democratic ascension of leftist and/or populist political leaderships through direct elections reinforced the consolidation of competitive and inclusive regimes inaugurated in the nineties. The so-called Left Turns in Latin America inaugurated the Post-neoliberal cycle, referred to the capacity to “bring in” the Latin American state again to the center of the public policies. Currently, the coincidence between the global ascension of authoritarianism and the regional return of the right wing can indicate the transition to a “Post-democratic” cycle in Latin America. The Brazilian case is the best example to illustrate such dynamic, synthesizing some global tendencies of the new democracies without demos.

Since Japan’s imposition of export controls against Korea in July 2019 and its following countermoves, including the termination of the General Security of Military Information Agreement, the governments of both countries have presented their own narratives of the origin of this trade war, both of which mirror theories of international politics. Nonetheless, these narratives mask several domestic origins. Most importantly, this paper demonstrates that behind the trade war, there has been a preoccupation of the two governments with mutually irreconcilable version forms of historicism. One is Korea’s pro-naturalist historicism, seeing Korean history as being preordained by the universal laws of human progress and defining Japan as a historical reactionary. The other is Japan’s anti-naturalist historicism, upholding internationalism as a new driving force of history that will transform Japan from a war criminal state into a proper subject in international society while criticizing Korea as being a drag on this transformation. This paper argues that, resulting from decades-long neoliberal politics that have disturbed the state-society balance, the national structure of post-democracy has encouraged each government to push historicism to its limit as an alternative source of political legitimacy in lieu of democratic accountability. Concretely, it shows that post-democracy has determined (1) the historicist framing of emerging conflicts, (2) the government’s legislative struggles to realize historicist policies, and (3) the incontestability of historicist hostility by other ideas in each country.

The European Project is currently experiencing the most serious crisis in its sixty year existence. Past crises have produced transformational leaders who used them to build more Europe. Today transformational leadership at the European level has been replaced with transactional and laissez faire leaders and is being challenged by charismatic populist ‘strong men’ who oppose more Europe. The structure of the EU, the rise of new media, the large flows of immigrants and refugees combined with economic stagnation and the decline of traditional ideologies have undermined the ability of leaders to shape effective policies. Emerging leaders will be grounded in the nation state and in a more Gaullist Europe.

Inspired by the Arab Spring, massive social movements have erupted since 2011 in many places around the world. Despite their differences, these movements have had at least two remarkable common features: all of them struggled for ‘real democracy’ and occupied prominent urban public spaces to erect temporary tent encampments. By focusing on the case study of the 2011 Israeli tent protests, this paper argues that the production of such places of resistance works as a crucial, albeit ambivalent, strategy to confront hegemonic power relations. On the basis of the literature on the spatialities of contentious politics, the article demonstrates that the establishment of more than 70 tent camps in public spaces all across Israel was of vital importance not only to challenging the post-democratic political system but also to overcoming an internal crisis of representation within the Israeli protest movement. However, the case of the Israeli J14 tent protests also underlines that while the production of pl...

This article challenges the narrowly founded but untroubled consensus about the alleged benefits of the Conservative government's devolution programme. It suggests that too much attention has been paid to purported benefits and too little regard to the potential risks, and draws attention to international evidence that suggests that the distribution of the benefits of devolution is crucially dependent on its design. It critically examines the case for the currently offered model of devolution and finds the underpinning economic model and limited forms of democratic accountability are likely to produce regressive social outcomes and the reinforcement of existing local elites. It calls for a wider public debate and fuller democratic scrutiny of the model of devolution on offer.