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The paper focuses on Schopenhauer’s idealism and investigates how its elaboration was related not only to Kant but also to Berkeley – a theme generally overlooked by scholars. Schopenhauer viewed B...

Berkeley’s likeness principle states that only an idea can be like an idea. In this paper, I argue that the principle should be read as a premise only in a metaphysical argument showing that matter cannot instantiate anything like the sensory properties we perceive. It goes against those interpretations that take it to serve also, if not primarily, an epistemological purpose, featuring in Berkeley’s alleged Representation Argument to the effect that we cannot reach beyond the veil of our ideas. First, in section 1, I raise some concerns about the traditional narrative concerning the likeness principle’s role in Berkeley’s argumentation. In section 2, I delineate an alternative narrative, arguing that there is no ‘missing premise’ in his alleged Representation Argument we need to explain simply because he advances no argument like that in the first place. In section 3–4, I provide a close reading of the relevant passages—first from the 'Principles', then the 'Dialogues'—and their contexts, supporting textually a purely metaphysical interpretation of the likeness principle arguments. In section 5, I address some possible objections, based on the phrasing of the likeness principle passages and some related texts.

In 1966, British artist, designer and educator Simon Nicholson (1934–1990) offered a lower division course, Design 12, at the College of Environmental Design, UC Berkeley. Controversially, Nicholson promoted play as the principal method of design and invited children to assess students’ projects on the Berkeley campus and in local schools, parks, playgrounds and hospitals. This article presents Design 12 as an important example of environmental design pedagogy in the USA, which uniquely attempted to synthesize British post-war constructivism with ‘design science’ and adventure play. The result was a course that placed play at the centre of design pedagogy, where it could combine intuition with systems building to promote ‘involved science’ and co-construction.

Berkeley, arguing against Barrow, claims that the infinite divisibility of finite lines is neither an axiom nor a theorem in Euclid The Thirteen Books of The Elements. Instead, he suggests that it is rooted in ancient prejudice. In this paper, I attempt to substantiate Berkeley’s claims by looking carefully at the history and practice of ancient geometry as a first step towards understanding Berkeley’s mathematical atomism.

Berkeley’s appeal to a posteriori arguments for God’s existence supports belief only in a God who is finite. But by appealing to an a priori argument for God’s existence, Berkeley emphasizes God’s infinity. In this latter argument, God is not the efficient cause of particular finite things in the world, for such an explanation does not provide a justification or rationale for why the totality of finite things would exist in the first place. Instead, God is understood as the creator of the total unity of all there is, the whole of creation. In this a priori argument, we should not focus on the specific objects that God creates, for that requires that we think that God knows each finite thing as distinct from every other. Rather, we should recognize how God creates all things in creating the complex, infinite totality of finite perceivings, each of which exists in virtue of the distinctions and relations it expresses.

In this paper, I compare Margaret Cavendish’s argument for the view that colours of objects are inseparable from their ‘physical’ qualities (such as size and shape) with George Berkeley’s argument for the view that secondary qualities of objects (such as colours, tastes, and sounds) are inseparable from their primary qualities (such as size and shape). By reconstructing their respective arguments, I show that both thinkers rely on the ‘inconceivability principle’: the claim that inconceivability entails impossibility. That is, both premise their arguments on the claim that it is impossible to conceive of an object that has size and shape but (e.g.) no colour. I argue that Cavendish, like Berkeley, accepts the inconceivability principle on the grounds that it is impossible to conceive of something that could not, in principle, be perceived and, in turn, that something imperceptible could not possibly exist. As such, I argue that both Cavendish and Berkeley are committed to an ‘empiricist’ modal epistemology: one wherein our knowledge of what it is possible to perceive informs us about what could possibly exist. For this reason, I conclude that there is more empiricism (albeit of the Berkeleian rather than, say, the Baconian variety) in Cavendish’s epistemology than secondary literature to date suggests.

The world has always been, and will always be a fascinating enigma to man. Generations of thinkers have struggled to fathom the world and explain it in an intelligible formation. Till date, a thoroughly satisfactory explanation of the cosmos has not been finagled. The search for a comprehensive explanation of the world continues. Dominating the interpretations of the world are the materialistic and idealistic schools of thought. These are diametrically opposed cosmological systems without a middle ground. The materialists see the world as essentially material, devoid of any god or maker. The idealists see the world as a product of a spirit or mind. They believe the world to be fundamentally non-material in nature. Nkrumah, a thorough going materialist, believes the world to be fundamentally material in nature, Berkeley who was the most radical advocate of idealism, however, believes the world to be fundamentally spiritual. But the cosmos is, irrespective of man’s interpretation of it. It is fundamentally one in our experience. The problem lies with our conception of some phenomena as material; and some others as spiritual. How can the material and non-material interact? If the world is material, it is definitely not spiritual. If it is made of ideas only, it is definitely not material. But supposing the world is neither material nor spiritual? It could as well be that our definition of matter does not encompass some of the properties inherent in the phenomena we regard as ‘matter”. It could as well be that what we refer as “spiritual” are properties inherent in but not encompassed by the definition of what we call matter. We could as well be living in a “matserial” cosmos, a world that is fundamentally made up of substances whose properties include those we conceive as “material” and some of those we consider as “spiritual”. Perhaps it is time to re-examine our concept of matter and our concept of spirit. Perhaps, we should be talking of “matser” rather than matter and spirit. This work is a product of library research, philosophical analysis and systematic philosophical speculation. It addresses the problem of the interpretation of the world which encompasses the problem of language and the mind/matter dichotomy. It is the finding of this work that the cosmos is neither made up solely of matter or spirit. Phenomena exhibit characteristics which we traditionally describe as spiritual and material. Our conceptualizations of mind and spirit logically leads to a dual cosmos of mind and spirit, which obviously is fallacious. We are in one cosmos. The cosmos is only doubled in our language, not in our experience. Our experience of the cosmos remains one. It is the recommendation of this work that “matser” rather than mind and spirit should be used to characterize phenomena. Ours is a matserial cosmos.

Partnerships between universities and K-12 schools [from kindergarten (=K) for 4- to 6-year-olds through twelfth grade (12) for 17- to 19-year-olds] have a long history in the United States. The early partnerships typically involved elite or selective schools that catered to children from affluent households or children of academics. In the past few decades, a third wave of university schools has opened. These schools have a social justice and equity focus and are intended to provide quality educational experiences to children from low-income backgrounds and children from groups underrepresented in tertiary education. The California College Preparatory Academy (CAL Prep) is a member of this third wave and one of several school-university partnerships involving University of California campuses. CAL Prep opened in 2005 and is an ongoing partnership involving Aspire Pubic Schools and the University of California, Berkeley. This article provides a description of CAL Prep, and an overview of the circumstances that led to CAL Prep's formation. The partnership structures, which contributed to the longevity of the partnership, are also described. (DIPF/Orig.), Partnerschaften zwischen Universitäten und K-12-Schulen [Schulen, die vom Kindergarten bis zur zwölften Klasse führen] haben in den USA eine lange Geschichte. Die ersten Partnerschaften bestanden meist mit Eliteschulen, die entweder von Kindern aus wohlhabendem Elternhaus oder von Akademikerkindern besucht wurden. In den letzten Jahrzehnten kam es zur Gründung einer dritten Form von Universitätsschulen. Diesen Schulen geht es vor allem um soziale Gerechtigkeit und Chancengleichheit; sie sollen Kindern aus einkommensschwachen Elternhäusern und Kindern mit bildungsferner Herkunft eine qualifizierte Bildung bieten. Die California College Preparatory Academy (CAL Prep) gehört zu dieser dritten Gruppe; es handelt sich bei ihr um eine von mehreren Partnerschaften zwischen Universitäten und Schulen in Kalifornien. Die CAL Prep wurde im Jahre 2005 gegründet und beruht auf der Partnerschaft zwischen Aspire Public Schools und der University of California, Berkeley. Dieser Beitrag stellt die CAL Prep vor und erläutert die Umstände, die zu ihrer Gründung geführt haben. Außerdem werden die Strukturen beschrieben, die die Nachhaltigkeit dieser Partnerschaft gesichert haben. (DIPF/Orig.)

Milakis et al. (2015b) explored the acceptable travel time concept as a possible factor in the travel and destination decision-making process. These researchers employed both theory and methods triangulation to assess the validity of this concept. Results from interviews with 20 subjects in Berkeley, CA supported the acceptable travel time concept. In this paper, the US study is replicated in Europe (Delft, The Netherlands) to further explore the validity of the acceptable travel time concept, compare results between Delft and Berkeley, and to identify possible factors influencing the acceptable travel time. Results of this study offer support for the validity of the acceptable travel time concept. The subjects in Delft appeared to be less satisfied with longer commute times than the subjects in Berkeley. Urban, transport as well as sociocultural factors might explain this variation in acceptable travel times.

Author(s): Taylor, RLC; Kaplan, S; Villas-Boas, SB; Jung, K | Abstract: © 2019 Western Economic Association International We examine how soda sales changed due to the campaign attention and election outcome of a local excise tax on sugar-sweetened beverages. Using panel data of beverage sales from university retailers in Berkeley, California, we estimate that soda purchases relative to control beverages significantly dropped immediately after the election, months before the tax was implemented in the city of Berkeley or on campus. Supplemental scanner data from off-campus retailers reveal this result is not unique to the university setting. Our findings suggest soda tax media coverage and election outcomes can have larger effects on purchasing behavior than the tax itself. (JEL D12, H20, C23, I38, Q18).

This paper gives a critical account of the precise character of Berkeley's fictionalism and instrumentalism in his philosophy of science. Two replies are given to the objections typically raised against his vision of science and its incompatibility with the scientific practice. The first objection claims that his immaterialism is incompatible with the natural causation, and the second that it is not able to give an explanation for the complex structure of issues raised by natural sciences. The replies rely on Berkeley's thesis concerning the language of God, claiming that there are no causal but only semantic relations between the signs and the signified in the world. The system of nature constitutes a language which God uses to communicate with the finite creatures.

Ao defender, nos Princípios matemáticos de filosofia natural, a existência de uma força de gravitação universal, Newton desencadeou uma onda de dúvidas e objeções filosóficas. Suas próprias declarações sobre a natureza da gravitação não são facilmente interpretáveis como formando um conjunto consistente de opiniões. Por um lado, logo após fornecer as três definições de "quantidades de forças centrípetas" (Defs. 6-8), Newton observa que está tratando tais forças "matematicamente", sem se pronunciar sobre sua realidade física. Mas, por outro lado, no Escólio Geral inserido no final da segunda edição do livro, Newton diz que foi capaz de "explicar" vários fenômenos de movimento por meio da força de gravidade - que ele mostrou ser um tipo de força centrípeta -, embora não tivesse ainda conseguido explicar a causa dessa força. Uma interpretação plausível dessas últimas afirmações é que Newton acreditava que pôde inferir, a partir dos fenômenos, a existência da força de gravidade, enquanto agente causal real de certos movimentos, mas que ainda não havia tido sucesso em descobrir a causa dessa causa. O objetivo principal do presente artigo não é aprofundar a análise histórica das declarações de Newton, mas examinar como essa questão se insere no debate mais geral sobre o estatuto epistemológico das hipóteses científicas que transcendem a experiência imediata. Segundo a posição defendida, entre muitos outros, por John Locke, tais hipóteses devem ser interpretadas como tentativas legítimas de descrever aspectos inobserváveis da realidade. Em contraste com isso, no caso específico das hipóteses sobre forças - de gravitação ou quaisquer outras -, George Berkeley argumentou vigorosamente a favor de sua interpretação como meros artifícios teóricos úteis às "demonstrações matemáticas" na ciência da mecânica. Ao longo da análise das vantagens e desvantagens filosóficas dessas posições opostas, indica-se aqui que, embora a interpretação realista pareça fazer mais justiça ao desenvolvimento real da física após os Princípios matemáticos, a interpretação instrumentalista de Berkeley tem o mérito filosófico inegável de representar uma adesão mais firme ao empirismo, que é, de um modo ou de outro, valorizado por ambas as partes envolvidas na disputa sobre a natureza da gravitação.

In 1920s and 1930s California, a new architectural style emerged with exaggerated, whimsical, or theatrical qualities, evocative of medieval Europe. It appeared most often in houses or bungalow courts. Historians in the 1970s described this architecture as “dollhouse” or “Hansel and Gretel.” More recently, authors use the term Storybook Style, likely because writers often used storybook and fairytale references to explain the architecture. In the midst of California bungalows and Spanish Colonial Revival buildings this is an odd occurrence. This thesis is an examination of the two decades of architectural production in California during which this previously understudied architectural phenomenon emerged. Two million Americans migrated to California in the decade of the 1920s. As a result of new money and new opportunity, the state rapidly developed. Concurrently, with the rise of the film industry, there was increasing creativity in design through the intermingling of set designers and architects, and greater exposure to other countries, cultures, and worlds through films. There was also increased and improved production of children’s books, especially fairy tales, featuring highly imaginative designs. The architecture suggested a desire to return to the world of the child and created a romantic atmosphere. This thesis will argue that this so-called storybook architecture materialized as a specific product of the California context, though the particular attributes of the style do not readily indicate California. Chapter One examines California in the 1920s and proposes that storybook architecture offered a third alternative to the prevailing trends of Spanish Colonial Revival and Modernism. Chapter Two investigates the advent of the film industry in Los Angeles and its impact on the development of this architectural tradition. Chapter Three explores the simultaneous development of storybook architecture in San Francisco, the impact of children’s book illustrations on the architecture of Carmel, and the other key designers in the area. Chapter Four will address the perpetuation of storybook elements through Dixon plans and advertisements. Thus, it was the confluence of events and ideas in California that gave this type of revival architecture a strong footing, resulting in the largest collection of storybook architecture in this state alone.

This report is the culmination of more than three years of work in Richmond in partnership with local community leaders and organizations. It outlines strategies that can facilitate more engaged partnerships between UC Berkeley and surrounding Richmond community in order to realize transformational food system change. With the announcements of the Berkeley Global Campus (BGC) in Richmond and Global Food Initiative (GFI) from the UC Office of the President, there is great promise to align those initiatives’ values of sustainability, equity, and global inclusion with the aspirations of local community in Richmond. The report, authored by Nadia Barhoum, provides a general overview of food systems and community health, followed by a description of the current landscape of existing food challenges and food equity efforts in Richmond and food-related work at UC Berkeley and within the Global Food Initiative.

Berkeley’s general tenet about immaterialism is presented and discussed. I examined apart the several theses that concur to the immaterialist theory. After that, the general argument is presented and discussed. In particular, I stress Berkeley’s assumption that a world without matter and a world with matter would be indistinguishable from the point of view of (i) the content of perceptions, (ii) natural science (viz. Newtonian mechanics). I stress that this assumption depends on a relative account of circular motion, generating the centrifugal forces, as Newton shows in his bucket experiment. In spite of the efforts by Leibniz and Huygens, such a relative account of rotational motion was never presented. So the thesis about the scientific and perceptual identity between worlds with and without matter remains a simple case of wishful thinking in need for a justification.

Ovaj rad pokazuje u čemu se tačno sastoji fikcionalistički i instrumentalistički karakter Barklijeve filozofije nauke, o kojem se mnogo govori u novijoj literaturi o Barkliju. To je učinjeno kroz odgovore na dve vrste prigovora koji se obično postavljaju barklijevskoj slici nauke: da je njegov imaterijalizam neuskladiv sa prirodnom uzročnošću i da ne može da objasni zbog čega objekti koje proučava prirodna nauka imaju složenu strukturu. Ti odgovori leže u Barklijevoj tezi da između događaja u prirodi nema kauzalne veze, već da između njih vladaju semantičke relacije znaka i označenog. Sistem prirode konstituiše jezik kojim Bog komunicira sa konačnim bićima. This paper gives a critical account of the precise character of Berkeley's fictionalism and instrumentalism in his philosophy of science. Two replies are given to the objections typically raised against his vision of science and its incompatibility with the scientific practice. The first objection claims that his immaterialism is incompatible with the natural causation, and the second that it is not able to give an explanation for the complex structure of issues raised by natural sciences. The replies rely on Berkeley's thesis concerning the language of God, claiming that there are no causal but only semantic relations between the signs and the signified in the world. The system of nature constitutes a language which God uses to communicate with the finite creatures.

The influence of different edible coatings on total phenolic content, total anthocyanin and antioxidant capacity in highbush blueberry (Vaccinium corymbosum L. cv Berkeley and O'Neal) was investigated, mainly for industrial applications. Also titratable acidity, soluble solids content, firmness and weight loss of berries were determined at harvest and at 15-day intervals during 45 storage days at 0 °C, in order to optimize coating composition. Application of chitosan coating delayed the decrease in anthocyanin content, phenolic content and antioxidant capacity. Coating samples showed no significant reduction in the weight loss during storage period. In cv Berkeley, the use of alginate coating showed a positive effect on firmness, titratable acidity and maintained surface lightness of treated berries. In cv O'Neal, no significant differences in total soluble solids content were found, and the chitosan-coated berries showed the minimum firmness losses. In both cultivars, the addition of chitosan to coatings decreases the microbial growth rate.

Se investiga en este trabajo la única visita que Hans Kelsen hizo a España a lo largo de su vida. Esta visita fue a Granada, en 1956, para asistir a una reunión del Institut de Droit International. La Universidad de Salamanca había nombrado a Kelsen doctor honoris causa, junto con otros juristas, en 1954, con ocasión de su VII Centenario. En ese acto se había otorgado también la misma distinción a Francisco Franco, Jefe del Estado español. Kelsen no acudió al acto de investidura. Cuando dos años después visita Granada se interesa, sin embargo, por obtener el diploma acreditativo dirigiéndose por carta a la Universidad de Salamanca. Esta carta se publica al final del presente trabajo. El objeto del mismo es averiguar la conexión que existió entre estos acontecimientos: por qué Kelsen no acudió a Salamanca para ser investido como doctor honoris causa en 1954 y por qué reivindicó este título en 1956 en su visita a Granada. Para ello, el trabajo considera tanto el contexto histórico-político de las relaciones España-Estados Unidos en ese momento, como también el contexto biográfico de Kelsen. This paper investigates the only visit to Spain Hans Kelsen made throughout his life. This was to Granada in 1956, to attend a meeting of the Institut de Droit International. The University of Salamanca had appointed Kelsen honorary doctor Kelsen, along with other jurists in 1954, celebrating its seventh centenary. On the event was also awarded the same distinction to Francisco Franco, Head of the Spanish State. Kelsen excused attendance at the investiture ceremony. Two years later, during his visit to Granada, he was interested nevertheless in obtaining the diploma and addressed a letter to the University of Salamanca to that effect. This letter is published at the end of this paper. The purpose of the latter is to find out the connection that existed between these events: why Kelsen did not go to Salamanca to collect his honorary doctorate in 1954 and why he claimed it in 1956 during his visit to Granada. For that purpose, the paper takes into consideration both the historical-polítical context of the Spain-EEUU relations and the biographical context of Kelsen. Este trabajo se enmarca en el Proyecto de Investigación Desarrollo de una concepción argumentativa del Derecho (DER2013-42472-P), financiado por el Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad.

In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas developed two models for how humans may speak of God - either by the analogy of proportion or by the analogy of proportionality. Aquinas's doctrines initiated a theological debate concerning analogy that spanned several centuries. In the 18th century, there appeared two closely related arguments for atheism which both utilized analogy for their own purposes. In this thesis, I show that one argument, articulated by the French materialist Paul-Henri Thiry Baron d'Holbach, is successful in showing that God-talk, as conceived of using the analogy of proportion, is unintelligible non-sense. In addition, I show that another argument, articulated by Anthony Collins (Vindication of Divine Attributes), George Berkeley (chapter IV of Alciphron), and David Hume (chapter XII of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion) can be restructured into an argument for the position that the analogy of proportionality makes the distinction between atheism and theism merely verbal. Since both of these are undesirable consequences for the theist, I conclude that Aquinas's doctrine of analogy does not withstand the assault of 18th century atheists. Master of Arts

Author(s): Bintliff, Jacob | Abstract: The University of California, Berkeley, became a site of the Occupy Movement in fall 2011. On November 9, the university found itself in the company of financial hubs, civic centers, and parks and plazas the world over when Sproul Plaza was re-appropriated by the sleeping bags and “mic checks” that came to symbolize the disenfranchised majority, "the 99%." Occupy Cal was immediately subject to a brutal suppression of student protest by the police, as both students and the university administration struggled to impose their respective meanings upon the university's "Main Street," Sproul Plaza. Like other Occupy encampments, controlling public space on the university campus became a way of projecting meanings of the "public": how the public is constructed and represented, and what types of voice and access it would have in determining the future of public education and social justice.

Russia's defeat in the Crimean War cast new doubt upon the fundamental political traditions, social structures, national myths of the Nikolaevan era. It precipitated wide-ranging reforms, including military reforms, which were predicated on a shift in mentality. This essay examines the new notions of heroism that circulated among Russia's emerging public sphere during and after the war. It analyzes the types of heroes that were celebrated as reflections of critical changes in attitude and mindset, which prefigured the liberalizing era of Alexander II.

Se investiga en este trabajo la única visita que Hans Kelsen hizo a España a lo largo de su vida. Esta visita fue a Granada, en 1956, para asistir a una reunión del Institut de Droit International. La Universidad de Salamanca había nombrado a Kelsen doctor honoris causa, junto con otros juristas, en 1954, con ocasión de su VII Centenario. En ese acto se había otorgado también la misma distinción a Francisco Franco, Jefe del Estado español. Kelsen no acudió al acto de investidura. Cuando dos años después visita Granada se interesa, sin embargo, por obtener el diploma acreditativo dirigiéndose por carta a la Universidad de Salamanca. Esta carta se publica al final del presente trabajo. El objeto del mismo es averiguar la conexión que existió entre estos acontecimientos: por qué Kelsen no acudió a Salamanca para ser investido como doctor honoris causa en 1954 y por qué reivindicó este título en 1956 en su visita a Granada. Para ello, el trabajo considera tanto el contexto histórico-político de las relaciones España-Estados Unidos en ese momento, como también el contexto biográfico de Kelsen. This paper investigates the only visit to Spain Hans Kelsen made throughout his life. This was to Granada in 1956, to attend a meeting of the Institut de Droit International. The University of Salamanca had appointed Kelsen honorary doctor Kelsen, along with other jurists in 1954, celebrating its seventh centenary. On the event was also awarded the same distinction to Francisco Franco, Head of the Spanish State. Kelsen excused attendance at the investiture ceremony. Two years later, during his visit to Granada, he was interested nevertheless in obtaining the diploma and addressed a letter to the University of Salamanca to that effect. This letter is published at the end of this paper. The purpose of the latter is to find out the connection that existed between these events: why Kelsen did not go to Salamanca to collect his honorary doctorate in 1954 and why he claimed it in 1956 during his visit to Granada. For that purpose, the paper takes into consideration both the historical-polítical context of the Spain-EEUU relations and the biographical context of Kelsen. Este trabajo se enmarca en el Proyecto de Investigación Desarrollo de una concepción argumentativa del Derecho (DER2013-42472-P), financiado por el Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad.

Berkeley desarrolla su teoría de la visión en la obra de juventud Ensayo para una nueva teoría de la visión, que por lo general ha sido leída atendiendo sólo a sus aspectos científicos o perceptuales. En este artículo propongo una lectura distinta, que busca mostrar que el Ensayo no sólo atiende aspectos científicos sino, por el contrario, anticipa el inmaterialismo de obras posteriores. Esto lo hace porque Dios cumple un importante papel en él, lo cual se debe, entre otras cosas, a que la teoría de la visión es desarrollada en función de Dios, pues de Él depende tanto la vista y los objetos visibles como el argumento del lenguaje visual.

A acusação de entusiasmo é um dos temas mais paradoxais da polêmica entabulada por Berkeley no Alciphron contra o livre-pensamento. Com efeito, o entusiasmo designa tradicionalmente uma forma de iluminação religiosa aparentemente incompatível com as pretensões do livre-pensamento à racionalidade crítica. Ora, essa acusação não se dirige aos principais deistas como Toland e Collins (antes qualificados como racionalistas obstinados) mas principalmente a Shaftesbury, cuja análise inovadora do entusiasmo como paixão universal, criativa ou destrutiva segundo o temperamento do indivíduo, é recusada por Berkeley. Este artigo quer mostrar que a recusa de Berkeley traz subentendida uma concepção da razão como disciplina educativa heterônoma e que ela reenvia a uma imagem tradicional do homem, cuja natureza só é bestial antes ou sem a educação religiosa, contra a reavaliação do papel epistemológico e moral conferido pela análise shaftesburiana do entusiasmo ao desejo e ao sentimento individuais. Freethinking: an Enthusiasm of Reason? Abstract In the polemic raised by Berkeleys Alciphron against Freethinking, one of the most paradoxical topics is the accusation of enthusiasm. For enthusiasm traditionnally means a kind of religious illumination seemingly incompatible with the critical rationalism the freethinkers pretend to assume. Now this accusation is not raised against the foremost british deists like Toland and Collins (rather dismissed as rationalistic bigots), but against Shaftesbury, whose new analysis of enthusiasm as a universal passion, creative or destructive following only the temper of the individual, is strongly rejected by Berkeley. This papers aim is to show that Berkeleys rejection of this modern sense of enthusiasm involves a traditional and conservative conception of reason as an heteronomous, educational discipline of man, whose nature would only be bestial before -or withoutreligious education, against the new epistemological and moral role given to desire and sentiment by Shaftesburys analysis of enthusiasm.

Letters concerning a position in the history department at Utah Agricultural College.

List of headquarters hotels and convention rates for the National Educational Association.

List of hotels in the vicinity of Copley Square.