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11 results on '"Thai Ha-Huy"'

1. A tale of two Rawlsian criteria

Author

Thai Ha-Huy, Université Paris-Saclay, Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques (EPEE), and Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne (UEVE)-Université Paris-Saclay

Subjects
Rawls criterion, maximin principle, multiple discount rates, Sociology and Political Science, General Social Sciences, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Rawls criterion maximin principle multiple discount rates. JEL classification numbers: C61 D11 D90, General Psychology, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences
Abstract

This article considers optimization problems under two Rawls criteria. The first one is the classical Rawls criterion in literature and the second one as a result of the maximin criteria with multiple discount factors presented in Chambers and Echenique [8]. Though these criteria are different, they have the same optimal value and solution.

Published
2022
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2. Ascendant altruism and asset price bubbles

Author

Stefano Bosi, Thai Ha‐Huy, Cao‐Tung Pham, and Ngoc‐Sang Pham

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, 0502 economics and business, 05 social sciences, 8. Economic growth, 050207 economics, 050205 econometrics
Published
2021
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3. Wheels and cycles: Suboptimality and volatility of corrupted economies

Author

Thai Ha-Huy, Stefano Bosi, David Desmarchelier, Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques (EPEE), Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne (UEVE)-Université Paris-Saclay, Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), AgroParisTech-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar (Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA))-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), TIMAS, Thang Long University, and ANR-11-LABX-0023,MME-DII,Modèles Mathématiques et Economiques de la Dynamique, de l'Incertitude et des Interactions(2011)

Subjects
Corruption, Economics and Econometrics, media_common.quotation_subject, Optimal cycles, Ramsey model, Economics, Monetary economics, Volatility (finance), [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, media_common
Abstract

International audience; We consider a simple economy where production depends on labor supply and social capital. Networking increases the social capital (“greases the wheel”) but also the corruption level (“sands the wheel”). Corruption is a negative productive externality. We compare the market economy, where the negative externality is not taken into account by individuals, with a centralized economy, where the planner internalizes the negative effect. We highlight the possible existence of cycles in the market economy and optimal cycles in the planned economy. We compare the centralized and the decentralized solutions in the short and long run.

Published
2021
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6. Arbitrage and equilibrium in economies with short-selling and ambiguity

Author

Thai Ha-Huy, Cuong Le Van, Cuong Tran-Viet, Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques (EPEE), Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne (UEVE), IPAG Business School, Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Institute of Mathematics and Applied Science (TIMAS), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1), ANR-11-LABX-0023,MME-DII,Modèles Mathématiques et Economiques de la Dynamique, de l'Incertitude et des Interactions(2011), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), and Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)

Subjects
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory, Economics and Econometrics, media_common.quotation_subject, Mathematics::Optimization and Control, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium, Mathematics::Probability, Computer Science::Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science, 0502 economics and business, Economics, JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets, 050207 economics, Maximin expected utility, Finite set, Expected utility hypothesis, 050205 econometrics, media_common, Individually rational attainable allocations, [QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin], Applied Mathematics, 05 social sciences, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty, No-arbitrage prices, Ambiguity, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Minimax, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D84 - Expectations • Speculations, Asset market equilibrium, Individually rational utility set, 8. Economic growth, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D50 - General, No-arbitrage condition, Arbitrage, Mathematical economics
Abstract

International audience; We consider a model with a finite number of states of nature where short sells are allowed. We present a notion of no-arbitrage price weaker than the one of Werner (1987) that we call weak no-arbitrage price. We prove that in the case of maximin expected utility functions, the existence of one common weak no-arbitrage price is equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium. © 2018 Elsevier B.V.

Published
2018
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10. No arbitrage condition and existence of equilibrium in infinite or finite dimension with expected risk averse utilities

Author

Thai Ha Huy, Cuong Le Van, and Manh Hung NGUYEN

Subjects
jel:D81, jel:D84, jel:G1, jel:C62, jel:D50, No-arbitrage Conditions, the two-period wealth model, No Unbouded Arbitrage, Weak No Market Arbitrage
Abstract

We consider a general equilibrium model in asset markets with a countable set of states and expected risk averse utilities. The agents do not have the same beliefs. We use the methods in Le Van - Truong Xuan (JME, 2001) but one of their assumption which is crucial for obtaining their result cannot be accepted in our model when the number of states is countable. We give a proof of existence of equilibrium when the number of states is inï¬ nite or ï¬ nite.

Published
2008

11. No unbounded arbitrage, weak no market arbitrage and no arbitrage price system conditions: The circular results

Author

Manh-Hung Nguyen and Thai Ha-Huy

Subjects
jel:C62, jel:D50, Arbitrage, Competitive equilibrium, Arbitrage, Equilibrium, Recession cone
Abstract

Page and Wooders (1996) prove that the no-unbounded-arbitrage (NUBA) condition introduced by Page (1987) is equivalent to the existence of a no arbitrage price (NAPS) when no agent has non-null useless vectors. Al- louch, Le Van and Page (2002) show that their generalized NAPS condition is actually equivalent to the weak-no-market-arbitrage (WNMA) condition introduced by Hart (1974). They mention that this result implies the one given by Page andWooders (1996). In this note, we show that these results are actually circular.

Published
2008

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