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We know that women politicians are harassed by constituents to a greater extent than men, but we know less about why this difference exists. This study tests potential drivers of hostility against women politicans using an original survey experiment with 7,500 respondents in the United States and Sweden. First, I test whether constituents hold more lenient attitudes toward hostility directed at women than men, which would make hostility in messages targeting women representatives more likely. Second, I test whether constituents prefer to direct their complaints to women, which would increase the risk of hostility by generating a higher number of angry contacts. Results from both countries show a preference for directing complaints to women representatives over men, but no evidence of more leniency toward hostility directed at women.

The Paris Agreement places states' nationally determined contributions (NDCs) at the center of global climate politics. While previous research on the NDC has provided important suggestions for enhanced legitimacy and effectiveness of global climate governance, I examine the NDC not in terms of its content, but as an instrument for governing climate conduct in the post-Paris regime. By analyzing state submissions to post-Paris NDC negotiations, I identify five functions of the NDC: Progress Tracker, Trust-Builder, Influencer, Differentiator, and Gatekeeper. While the first three functions are informed by a techno-managerial rationality that posits effective climate action as a project of increased information-sharing, the last two highlight underlying political struggles of responsibility and fairness which are not necessearily solvable through intensified collaboration. I argue that these diverging views on the function of the NDC will become increasingly prominent as we move toward the first round of the global stocktake in 2023.

This article is concerned with the psychological dimensions of deglobalization and white supremacy as related to fantasies of “whiteness.” The (re)construction of narratives and myths are contested processes, concerning both the struggle for control over historical and cultural space as well as the articulation of particular needs for individuals and groups in the present. We explore the stories and myths created around globalization, (in)security, and the nation. Of importance is how deglobalization and emerging ontological insecurities relate to various fantasy narratives and how these can be understood in psychological terms of dislocation, hybridity, and impermanence in conjunction with a search for security and stability. The implications of these processes on contemporary political identities are of crucial importance as they are able to speak to some of the most contested issues of our times: the threat of extremist and white supremacist groups and discourses to democracy and democratic institutions.

Providers’ tendency to cream skim clients according to certain sociodemographic traits is widely believed to increase under marketization, and therefore also discrimination. However, due to a lack of experimental research, little is known about the presence of discrimination in marketized welfare services and of the potential drivers of such biased treatment. The lack of research is particularly evident in regard to socioeconomic status (SES) discrimination and publicly financed for-profit providers. Moreover, competition, an important aspect of marketization, has not been investigated. Focusing on the interesting case of the Swedish school sector, we aim to improve knowledge on these matters. In a field experiment, 3,430 elementary school principals were randomly contacted though e-mail by parents with Arabic- or Swedish-sounding names and in low- or high-socioeconomic professions. The fictional parents were interested in placing their children at the school. The Swedish school sector resembles marketized public services in several Western countries. The results show clear signs of ethnic as well as SES discrimination, particularly in regard to more qualitative aspects of the replies. However, we find no significant differences in discrimination between public and private/for-profit schools and depending on the degree of competition in the school market.

Focusing on the debates on ‘due impartiality’ provided to far-right leaders in Swedish media, this article uses a Lacanian approach to address the relationship between the practices of normalisation of far-right discourses and fantasies, and the evolution of emotional governance at the interstice of old (i.e. traditional) and new (e.g. social media) media. Emotional governance refers to the everyday emotionally charged utterances and statements made by political leaders. However, this phenomenon can also be read in a larger Foucauldian sense as techniques of surveillance, control and manipulation and as related to narrative representational fantasies. Studies dealing with the normalisation of far-right discourse from a media perspective tend to focus on framing, journalistic norms, market structures and business incentives. We aim to expand these perspectives by opening a discussion on the interplay between the ontological (in)securities attached to the emotional governance of far-right leaders, and the techno-social affordances and roles provided to (and by) ‘old’ and ’new’ actors in the hybrid media ecosystem. We further analyse this interplay by looking at the particular fantasies embedded in it and the consequences of the enactment of ‘due impartiality' and equal footing’ norms and practices in the Swedish media landscape.

Swedish compulsory schools are committed to work for equality and social cohesion. Increasing school segregation, however, challenges this commitment. Based on survey data from Swedish municipalities, this article maps and analyses local initiatives that counteract school segregation. We identify three main types of initiatives-reinforcement, dispersal, and merging-and the exogenous (school external) and endogenous (school internal) drivers involved in each of them. The analysis reveals several gaps between the national level, the municipal level and local schools that hamper local efforts to counter school segregation. This article contributes to increased knowledge on how local initiatives of counteracting segregation are constrained by national policies about school choice and independent versus municipal schools, but also how local initiatives tend to focus on organizational dynamics rather than on social and pedagogical processes., Att bryta segregation genom utbildning - en jämförande studie av lokala initiativ för att bryta skolsegregation.

This study highlights the distinct nature of EU business lobbying. Studying such an immense and fast-evolving relationship between business and the EU is a never-ending story. We point to future directions that we believe offer fruitful and constructive ways forward. As mentioned above and by contributors in this symposium, multi-disciplinary approaches can, under specific conditions, provide a set of valuable complementary tools that address multi-layered and complex subjects. In our book, we find that work from political science, and business and management studies is a fertile space, however, it is by no means the only productive combination.

Public organisations are starting to show an interest in automated decision-making (ADM). So far, existing research focuses on the governmental perspective on this phenomenon. Less attention is paid to citizens’ views on ADM. The aim of this study is to provide empirical insights into citizen awareness of and beliefs about ADM in public-sector services. To this end, we participated in an annual national survey in Sweden carried out by the SOM Institute at Gothenburg University concluding that a minority of the citizens know about the use of ADM in public-sector services. Furthermore, when computers instead of civil servants make decisions in the public-sector, citizens expect decisions by computers to become less legally secure but more impartial. They also expect ADM to take personal circumstances into account to a lesser degree and become less transparent. Finally, we found that citizens with that awareness expect decisions by computers to become more reliable and impartial. Based on our empirical findings in relation to previous research, we suggest four hypotheses on citizen’s awareness and beliefs about public-sector ADM.

PurposeTechnology access, digital skills, and digital services are increasingly prerequisites for public life and accessing public services. The digital divide in contemporary societies matters for efforts to digitalize the welfare state. Research has already mapped individual determinants of digital exclusion and the existence of an age-related digital divide. However, far less attention has been paid to variations in digital inclusion between countries and to their potential explanations related to political systems. This study explores the influence of variations in welfare regimes on the digital divide among seniors (aged 65+) in Europe.Design/methodology/approachThis article presents time-series cross-sectional analyses of the relationship between welfare state regimes and digital inclusion among seniors in European countries. The analyses are based on data from Eurostat, the World Bank, and the UN E-Government Survey.FindingsThe authors find extensive variation in the digital inclusion of citizens between welfare regimes and argue that considering regime differences improves the understanding of these variations. The findings indicate that the age-related digital divide seems to be least evident in countries with more universalistic welfare regimes and most evident in countries where seniors rely more on their families.Originality/valueThis is the first comparative study of the association between welfare state regimes and digital inclusion among seniors.

This article advances an interdisciplinary and multifactorial socio-cultural approach to the fascistization of the Ustaša in interwar Yugoslavia, leading to terrorism and racial cleansing. It concentrates on the life-trajectories of Mijo Babić and Zvonimir Pospišil, two nationalist activists notoriously known as the first Ustaša terrorists. Drawing on the previously unknown political memoirs of Pospišil and Babić, the article argues that the two activists bridged several phases of cumulative radicalization in the Ustaša organization, from the adop- tion of political violence at the grass-root level in the 1920s to international terrorism in the 1930s and then state-sponsored genocide in the first half of the 1940s. The article points out that Ustaša underwent most forms of political radicalization to terrorism identified by McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), but it also adds to their typology a case of radicalization to mass violence in the regime phase. Ustaša’s trajectory thus illustrates a rare process of transition from the radicalization of an oppositional, non-state group to mass radicaliza- tion leading to racial genocidal policies under a fascist-totalitarian regime. It is hoped that the biographical approach to radicalization advanced by the article contributes to a better understanding of politically motivated terrorism and mass violence in post-1918 Europe

This report outlines the results from the research project Food for Urban Life and Localities (FULL) funded by Formas (2020-02864). The research set out to learn how COVID-19 response strategies in six cities (Stockholm, London, Wuhan, Singapore, Sydney, and Seoul) have facilitated access to food for vulnerable groups and how new food supply solutions have emerged through social and technological innovations. This report presents the case of each city in turn and pauses on the role of community-based organisations, ad- hoc community initiatives and municipalities during the COVID-19 pandemic. The report provides a detailed discussion of local or community-level responses in cities that aim to provide access to food through social and/or technological innovations. The lessons learned are important for the Swedish context in the case of similar events that challenge local access to food. The research collected data through qualitative and quantitative methods, and also made use of the breadth of online data sources in response to COVID-19 restrictions on free movement and travelling. The overall finding is that in situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic, local access to food is extremely challenging and cannot be addressed by existing welfare or state arrangements only;civil society organisations and voluntary community organizations (VCOs) step in to fill the gap in public provision; and the stricter the lockdown, the more dependent on civil society response urban areas and communities were. 2023-03-27 First published online.2023-05-17 New version published with a minor correction in the abstract including funding information. To this date, the report has been downloaded 188 times.

Reflective of a wider, global trend of changing civil society space and anti-gender backlash against womenʼs rights, research is increasingly interested in exploring the dynamics and implications of hybrid and authoritarian regimes strategies toward civil society, and womenʼs organizations in particular. Nevertheless, few have focused on studying the role of governmental womenʼs organizations – so-called women-GONGOs - as mechanisms of regime strategies, such as in the case of competitive-authoritarian Turkey where women-GONGOs aim to constrain civil society space and feminist, gender equality-oriented discourse and practice. In this study, the aim is to explore how feminist, oppositional womenʼs organizations, despite their “outsider” positions in Turkeyʼs civil society, use and reshape feminist strategies to adapt, renegotiate or resist women-GONGOs as mechanisms of control, co-optation and regime interference.Based on in-depth interviews with 21 womenʼs organizations in Turkey, the study finds that “outsider”, feminist womenʼs organizations in competitive-authoritarian Turkey perceive the influence of women-GONGOs as central to possibilities and limitations in civil society and womenʼs organizing. Consequently, interviews show that “outsiders” employ a variety of feminist strategies, mostly in combination, to create or maintain their activism and operations within the Turkish de-democratization context, for example turning to grassroots in combination with finding new alliances, or connected to sustaining activities within broader democratization movements. However, the study suggests that the changing space of civil society in Turkey affects these “outsiders” in different ways; for example service-oriented womenʼs organizations are less constrained in their feminist strategies compared to claims-making “outsiders”. Lastly, the study illustrates how the dominant role of women-GONGOs in Turkey impacts feminist discourse and practice of “outsiders”, thereby providing empirical insights and theoretical contributions to better understanding transformations of feminist engagement in Turkey and similar gendered de-democratization contexts across the Mediterranean and beyond.

The absence of a gendered analysis of the effect of marriage on voting is surprising, given researchers’ cognizance of the heterogeneous effects of marriage on a range of other social outcomes. In this paper, we shed new light on spousal dependency by studying the gendered impact of marital disruption, in the form of divorce, on voter turnout. First, drawing on Swedish population-wide registry data, we use the differential timing of divorces in relation to general elections to generate more credible estimates of the causal effect of divorce on turnout. Second, although we find that both sexes are strongly and adversely affected by divorce, we show that the effect is much more pronounced for men. Specifically, the long-term effect is almost twice as large for men. Finally, we use these, as well as a variety of additional data, to show that the gendered effect of divorce is mainly driven by asymmetrical spousal mobilization due to higher levels of voter turnout among women.

In list proportional representation (PR) systems, parties shape political selection. We propose a theory of party list choice and elections in list PR systems. Our results describe how a party allocates candidates of heterogenoeus quality across list ranks depending on (1) its electoral goals and (2) its competitive environment. We test our predictions on the universe of Swedish local politicians from 1991 to 2014. While parties assign better candidates to higher ranks at all ballot levels, the pattern is most pronounced among electorally advantaged parties, i.e., those with the strongest prospect of controlling the executive. These results contrast with existing accounts of candidate selection, which emphasize that parties prioritize candidate quality in their nomination strategies only when constrained by electoral incentives. Our results, instead, suggest that the principal demand for high-quality politicians derives from parties, rather than voters.

This article engages with emerging debates about feminist peace and uses this concept to assess the ability of the Women, Peace and Security agenda to achieve gender-just change. We advance a conception of feminist peace as political conditions that allow women affected by conflict to articulate their visions of change and influence the construction of post-war order. Applying this to a case study of Women, Peace and Security practice in Myanmar, we demonstrate that features of how international aid is organised, combined with the Myanmar government’s interest in excluding critical voices, limit the ability of Women, Peace and Security practices to contribute to feminist peace. This highlights the potential for illiberal post-war states to obstruct and co-opt the Women, Peace and Security agenda, and shows how the women most directly affected by armed conflict are often the least able to participate in, benefit from and inform Women, Peace and Security practices.

This study seeks to advance the scholarship on trade union heterogeneity. Expanding on previous research, we develop a theoretical framework that distinguishes unions along two dimensions—members’ labor market risk exposure and the predominance of white-collar workers—that help shape their labor market policy preferences and advocacy. The framework is then assessed in a within-country mixed-methods analysis. We first document how members in 35 Swedish unions map onto the two dimensions, using fine-grained survey data, and then qualitatively analyze the advocacy of seven unions with different membership characteristics. Our results confirm the relevance of isolating the two dimensions in analyses of both membership preferences and elite advocacy. These findings contrast with existing accounts of the contemporary Swedish union movement and carry implications for many other countries with fragmented union landscapes. They particularly demonstrate the importance of disaggregating union membership in micro- and macro-level research involving unions and their power resources.

Putin’s fourth term as president (2018–2024) has involved new challenges for Russia’s hybrid regime. COVID-19 hit the Kremlin at a sensitive time, when the old institutional forces had been demounted and new arrangements, including extensive constitutional changes, had yet to become cemented. There is an emerging gulf between state rhetoric, PR events, and patriotic performances, on the one hand, and economic chaos, social disorder and dysfunctional state capacity, on the other, which is likely to reduce system legitimacy and cause increased reliance on repressive methods. This article examines Kremlin legitimation efforts across Beetham’s three dimensions: rules, beliefs, and actions. We argue that the regime’s legitimation efforts in 2020–21 have failed to reverse emerging cleavages in public opinion since 2018. Increased reliance on repression and manipulation in this period, combined with the contrast between regime promises and observable realities on the ground, speak not of strength, but of the Kremlin’s increased weakness and embattlement.

What explains affective polarization among voters and societal groups? Much of the existing literature focusing on mass political polarization in modern democracies originates in the US, where studies have shown that, while ideological separation has grown, political conflict increasingly reflects social identity divisions rather than policy disagreements, resulting in affective polarization. We focus on explaining such polarization in a multi-party context. Drawing on social identity theory and intergroup threat theory, we hypothesize that individuals who perceive an intergroup threat show stronger intergroup differentiation and increased affective polarization. We analyze the influence of perceived threat on affective polarization drawing on two large-scale representative surveys in Sweden (N = 1429 and 1343). We show that individual-level affective polarization is related to perceived intergroup threats among the voters in both studies, measuring affective polarization using social distance, negative trait attribution, and party like-dislike ratings.

This book provides a general theory of democratic inclusion for the present world. It presents an original contribution to our understanding of the democratic ideal by explaining how democratic inclusion can apply to individuals in a variety of contexts: the workplace, social clubs, religious institutions, the family, and, of course, the state. The book explores the problem of democratic inclusion, what it means to be subject to de facto authority, how this conception translates into legal systems, and the relationship between territorial claims by the state, and law’s claim to legitimate authority. The volume will be of interest to scholars and researchers of politics, especially political theory and democracy.

As a way to manage political disagreements over public policies, political representatives might be tempted to avoid open discussions by depoliticising political issues—hoping that the conflict may eventually disappear. When decision-makers employ such strategies, it is up to the administration to make political priorities and manage unresolved policy conflicts. Earlier studies indicate that there are at least two strategies that administrators can employ to manage such ambiguities: (re)framing and technical depoliticisation. This article reveals that public administrators also employ a third framing strategy: repoliticisation, where administrators seek to endow their policy areas with political power by connecting politicians to the work and implementation of policies. The study is based on 38 interviews from 11 municipalities in Sweden.

In the recent past, European states have adopted mandatory due diligence (MDD) laws for holding companies accountable for the environmental and human rights impacts of their supply chains. The institutionalization of the international due diligence norm into domestic legislation has, however, been highly contested. Our contribution analyzes the discursive struggles about the meaning of due diligence that have accompanied the institutionalization of MDD in Germany and France. Based on document analysis and legal analysis of laws and law proposals, we identify a state-centric, a market-based, and a polycentric-governance discourse. These discourses are based on fundamentally different understandings of how the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights should be translated into hard law. By outlining these discourses and comparing the related policy preferences, we contribute with a better understanding of different ways in which MDD is institutionalized, with important consequences for the possibilities to enhance corporate accountability in global supply chains.

This paper compares how forest ecosystem service–related policies are integrated in different national European forest governance contexts. Efforts to achieve policy integration at the EU and national levels are often described in terms of limited success. Our analysis of forest, energy/bioeconomy, climate, and conservation policies suggests that notions of progress or failure merit careful assessment. Combining theories of policy integration (PI), environmental policy integration (EPI), and policy coherence, we argue that integration outcomes depend on the combined effects of the degree and nature of PI, EPI, and multilevel coherence in the context of the prevailing forest governance system. The nature of the interdependencies, specifically anticipated synergies, and the scope of FES-related climate objectives, are crucial. Realizing the range of FES-related objectives entails safeguarding objectives not synergistically aligned with economic aims. Failures to safeguard biodiversity and regulating and cultural ecosystem services in the process of integration may have far-reaching consequences. Funding: This work was conducted as part of the ERA-Net Sumforest Project “POLYFORES” (Grant Agreement 606803). The related research was funded by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism (BMNT) [grant 101201/1], the Ministry of Economy and Business of the Spanish Government (project code PCIN- 2017-050), German Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL) via the Federal Office for Agriculture and Food (BLE) [grant number 2816ERA03S], the Swedish Research Council for Sustainable Development (FORMAS, Dnr. 2016-02111). The Russian study was carried out within the framework of CEPF RAS’ state assignment (No. 121121600118-8).

This article deals with the 2009 user choice reform in Swedish elderly care. It analyses how the tension between choice and older citizens’ equal access to good quality care was dealt with by the policymakers who introduced it. Three overarching research questions are addressed in the analysis: (i) what role and responsibilities did the Swedish user choice reform assign to the users and how did the policymakers view users’ ability to make an informed choice? (ii) How did the policymakers view the role and responsibilities of the local authorities and what tools were the local authorities given to ensure access to good quality elderly care for all citizens? (iii) Can the new user choice reform be said to contain a new notion of social citizenship for older people in Sweden? The findings suggest that while the user choice reform encouraged users to allocate resources and make free choices between providers, it also required users to become more responsible to ensure service quality. The reform also advocated that the local authorities should steer their elderly care sectors through partly new governance tools and secure quality foremost through the entering of contracts with authorized providers. The paper argues that, because of these required new roles and responsibilities, the Swedish user choice reform entails a more libertarian notion of social citizenship, requiring users to take on greater responsibility for their own well-being and protection against risks.

The rise of authoritarian populism has forced many democracies to consider how best to defend democracy against its inner enemies. In the literature on democratic self-defense, one often distinguishes between three models: a legal (militant), political (procedural) and social (integrational). If much scholarly attention is on the merits and limits of the first two models, the social model has fallen behind. This is surprising given its success in the interwar years in many Scandinavian countries, and the empirical correlation between high levels of social equality and high levels of political tolerance. This article examines the merits and limits of the social model. More specifically, it makes two contributions. First, it introduces ‘the social security’ approach proposed by early Swedish social democratic thinkers as an alternative to ‘the social homogeneity’ approach proposed by Hermann Heller. The aim is to show that they provide different solutions to the loser's dilemma: the fact that losers in a democratic election must be ready to support the winners, whose decisions are at odds with their own convictions. Second, the article examines a common objection against the social security approach, namely, that it politicizes democracy, and thereby undermines the distinction between procedure and substance in the defense of democracy

We still know remarkably little about the voting behavior of immigrant populations, and in particular, the children of immigrants – who grow up in the same society as their contemporaries, but may be subject to different patterns of socialization. This article uses verified voting behavior in Swedish municipal elections to offer at least two new perspectives on these questions. First, we are able to separate out the impacts of family socialization, general societal socialization, and citizenship acquisition on electoral participation. Second, we are also able to add to our knowledge of the differences in political participation levels between different groups of foreign-background voters.

Extreme right-wing violence has resulted in an intense academic debate on how democratic actors can respond to movement on the extreme right. This article explores how various types of CSOs perceive their role, interest, and willingness when it comes to counteracting right-wing extremism. Building on a theoretical framework that makes visible a variety of CSO responses and differences between types of CSOs, the results show that CSOs view themselves as having a watchdog role in relation to right-wing extremism. However, CSOs place the principal responsibility of response to right-wing extremism outside organized civil society in the hands of politicians, citizens, and the media. In addition, not all CSOs are willing to respond in the same way or to the same extent. Humanitarian and social service organizations are more inclined to engage in dialogue and protest compared with sports and recreation organizations and culture organizations. The article concludes by discussing the notion that bridging organizations may be more willing to respond to right-wing extremism and to use dialogue and deliberation compared to bonding organizations.

Conventional assumptions locating peacebuilding temporally after violence have largely prevented exploration of how peacebuilding is practiced amidst conditions of ongoing violence. This article addresses this gap by analysing how Myanmar women's activists have devised strategies in pursuit of peace, amidst ongoing armed conflict, from the 1990s and onwards. The findings demonstrate that women's inter-ethnic cooperation contributed to transform conflict divides long before the initiation of formal national peace negotiations in 2011. Further, theorizing these peacebuilding practices, the article provides new insights into the dynamics of women's peace activism of relevance beyond the case of Myanmar.

Governance and complexity have increasingly become subjects of interest within research on sustainable tourism. Governance has been marked by a turn to more corporatist and networked policymaking structures. At the same time, the use of the concept of complexity in research on tourism destinations and governance is gaining momentum in an effort to address the links in increasingly networked systems as well as the interrelatedness of the multiple features of a tourist destination. Meanwhile, resilience has emerged as a new buzzword in research on sustainable development and governance which denotes the ability of a destination to cope with and adapt to change. This article reviews the literature on destination governance to identify critical issues and trends and discusses the relevance of complexity approaches. Evolutionary studies and research on resilience in a sustainability context are becoming part of this discussion. The review sheds light on the limitations and merits of each of these concepts, as well as on their nexus. The article concludes with some key areas for future research on destination governance. The aim of the review is to contribute to conceptual clarity and to advance the application of complexity approaches in research on destination governance.

Sweden's 2017 Climate Act is part of a climate policy framework aiming for net zero domestic greenhouse gas emissions by 2045. The framework was based on a proposal from the All Party Committee on Environmental Objectives (the Committee), in which members from all participating parliamentary parties agreed unanimously. This was despite a contested climate debate running in parallel, notwithstanding strong criticism from business confederations and trade unions. Aiming to draw lessons of value for climate policy-making, this study explores the main factors that influenced the work and outcomes of the Committee, based on a series of in-depth interviews and document review. The research design is linked to policy process theories. The interviews mainly concern underlying motives, the role of knowledge, the influence of impact assessments, and international influence. It is shown that a continuous and comprehensive learning process in the Committee was instrumental for achieving consensus, including addressing concerns among some members regarding policy costs and constitutionality. The Committee was also influenced by policy developments elsewhere, referred to as policy diffusion, notably from the U.K. Climate Change Act and the UNFCCC COP 21 policy process. Over time, a cross-party consensus among Committee members emerged and led to the invention of an original policy proposal. The consensus was instrumental for generating support for the proposal in an otherwise conflictual political landscape. As a result, a governmental bill based on the proposal was eventually enacted into law, renewing Sweden's climate policy with a climate change act coupled to ambitious climate objectives. Key policy insights Joint learning on factually complex and normatively contested climate issues requires time and comprehensive processes but can lead to policy inventions and ambitious outcomes. Policy diffusion between countries may be important for raising ambitions and shaping innovative, new elements of national climate policy. Framework climate change acts and specific climate laws can be mutually supportive, i.e. frameworks foster more ambitious sectoral laws and the more precise sectoral laws, the easier it is to agree on stricter overall ambitions. Adoption of more stringent climate policies may require precise dismantling of arguments working against action, in particular on policy costs.

European Defence is in a new and formative phase in which the European Union’s long list of defence acronyms has steadily grown. One of the most noticeable new policy initiatives is the European Commission’s European Defence Fund (EDF). This article consequently investigates and outlines the establishment of the European Defence Fund and the European Commission’s new role within the field of security and defence through the lens of revised neofunctionalism. This article thus asks how and through what steps did the EDF come about; and secondly how can neofunctionalism explain the dynamics involved in the establishment of the European Defence Fund. The analysis uses a process-tracing method and draws on interviews with relevant policymakers and officials in Brussels as well as official EU documents. The conclusions argue that the ever-increasing involvement of the European Commission in a policy field close to national sovereignty is starting to blur the traditional dichotomy between intergovernmental and supranational decision-making. In this way, this study contributes to the growing literature on the weakening of intergovernmentalism within the EU security and defence policy field.

Research on invalid voting has expanded over the past few years. Scholars largely agree on the most important determinants of invalid voting, foremost compulsory voting, quality of democracy, and ballot structure. However, disagreement prevails concerning several factors; more exactly, whether the effect is positive or negative. We examine determinants of invalid voting in the four most recent local elections in a single country, Sweden, all municipalities included. Applying a subnational research design allows us to control for several determinants that have been reported to be of significance in explaining varying levels of invalid voting, and, consequently, to examine factors with theoretically contradictory directions of effects. Two theoretical models of invalid voting are tested, an institutional and a societal model, each consisting of four variables. The latter explains considerably more of the variation in the dependent variable than the former. The most important determinant is education: higher levels of education among the population decrease the share of invalid votes. Concerning the institutional model, only district magnitude significantly affects the dependent variable, indicating that larger district magnitude depresses invalid voting. However, the effect disappears when societal variables are included, due to higher levels of education among the population in municipalities with high district magnitudes. Proportion of the electorate born abroad also significantly affects levels of invalid voting; higher proportions decrease invalid voting. We suggest that this is a consequence of political sophistication, interest, and being politically informed combined with who decides to vote and who decides to abstain amongst immigrants.

While studies show a consistent negative relationship between the level of corruption and range indicators of national-level economic performance, including sovereign credit ratings, we know less about the relationship between corruption and subnational credit ratings. This study suggests that federal transfers allow states with higher levels of corruption to retain good credit ratings, despite the negative economic implications of corruption more broadly, which also allows them to continue to borrow at low costs. Using data on corruption conviction in US states and credit ratings between 2001 and 2015, we show that corruption does not directly reduce credit ratings on average. We find, however, heterogeneous effects, in that there is a negative effect of corruption on credit ratings only in states that have a comparatively low level of fiscal dependence on federal transfers. This suggest that while less dependent states are punished by international assessors when seen as more corrupt, corruption does not affect the ratings of states with higher levels of fiscal dependence on federal revenue.

How, and under what conditions, does electoral violence influence voter turnout? Existing research often presumes that electoral violence demobilizes voters, but we lack knowledge of the conditions under which violence depresses turnout. This study takes a subnational approach to probe the moderating effect of local incumbent strength on the association between electoral violence and turnout. Based on existing work, I argue that electoral violence can reduce voter turnout by heightening threat perceptions among voters and eroding public trust in the electoral system, thereby raising the expected costs of voting and undermining the belief that one’s vote matters. Moreover, I propose that in elections contested across multiple local rather than a single national voting district, the negative effect of electoral violence on turnout should be greater in districts where the incumbent is stronger. This is because when the incumbent is stronger, voters have lesser strategic and purposive incentives to vote than voters in localities where the opposition is stronger. I test the argument by combining original subnational event data on electoral violence before Côte d’Ivoire’s 2021 legislative elections with electoral records. The results support the main hypothesis and indicate that electoral violence was associated with significantly lower voter turnout in voting districts where the incumbent was stronger, but not where the opposition was stronger. The study contributes new knowledge on the conditions under which electoral violence depresses voter turnout, and suggests that voters in opposition strongholds can be more resilient to electoral violence than often assumed.

This article focuses on how party identity can shape policy support or opposition to the controversial issue of legalizing cannabis in Sweden, which is strongly opposed by the public. In a survey experiment (N = 3612), we manipulated if a message that supported or opposed a policy proposal to legalize cannabis was presented by a representative of the own party or an outgroup party. Results showed increased opposition to the proposal when the ingroup party opposed the policy and when the outgroup party endorsed the policy. When the ingroup party endorsed the policy and when the outgroup party opposed the policy, attitudes to the policy were not influenced. We argue that prior attitudes moderate how ingroup- and outgroup party messages are processed and that voters do not blindly follow the party line. Only when the own party presents a position that coincides with the individual’s prior position, are attitudes strengthened and voters follow the party line. Attitudes are also strengthened as a way to increase distance to a disliked outgroup party. When the party cue contradicts prior beliefs (ingroup-endorse; outgroup-oppose), the information is ignored, which allows individuals to retain their view of the party, be it positive or negative.

Why do self-representations of weakness pervade public discourse in self-identified great powers? Moreover, why do they intersect with self-representations of greatness? Do such narrative instability, inconsistency, and incoherence simply indicate that great powers are ontologically insecure? This article advances a theoretical explanation that is both embedded in and contributes to scholarship that theorizes ontological (in)security from a Lacanian perspective. The gist, ironically, is that great powers’ quest for greatness is co-constituted with the narrative construction of weakness. The article then challenges the assumption in existing ontological security scholarship that states are generally self-reflexive and experience pride when ontologically secure but shame when ontologically insecure. Since great power narratives reflect persistent, exaggerated, and simultaneous feelings of shame and pride, it argues that narcissism helps better account for great power self-identification and ontological security-seeking. Drawing on psychological research on narcissism, the article develops four narrative forms—shame, pride, denial, and insult—through which self-representations of weakness and greatness, and feelings of shame and pride, can be mediated. Finally, using empirical illustrations from the United States and China, the article analyzes how and with what implications political leaders have narrated about each respective great power's weakness and greatness, with a focus on the period 2006–2020.¿Por qué las autorrepresentaciones de debilidad se extienden en los discursos públicos en las grandes potencias autoidentificadas? Asimismo, ¿por qué se entrecruzan con las autorrepresentaciones de grandeza? ¿La inestabilidad, la incongruencia y la incoherencia narrativa simplemente indican que las grandes potencias son inseguras en términos ontológicos? Este artículo propone una explicación teórica que está incorporada a una erudición, y que contribuye con ella, que teoriza la (in)seguridad desde una perspectiva lacaniana. Irónicamente, la idea es que la búsqueda de grandeza de las grandes potencias está coconstituida con la construcción narrativa de debilidad. Por lo tanto, el artículo desafía el supuesto de la erudición existente de seguridad ontológica que establece que, por lo general, los estados son autorreflexivos y experimentan orgullo cuando están ontológicamente seguros, pero experimentan vergüenza cuando están inseguros en términos ontológicos. Puesto que las narraciones de las grandes potencias reflejan sentimientos persistentes, exagerados y simultáneos de vergüenza y orgullo, se sostiene que el narcisismo ayuda mejor a dar cuenta de la autoidentificación y de la búsqueda de seguridad ontológica de las grandes potencias. Al recurrir a la investigación psicológica sobre el narcisismo, el artículo desarrolla cuatro formas de narraciones: vergüenza, orgullo, negación e insulto, a través de las cuales se pueden mediar las autorrepresentaciones de debilidad y grandeza, así como los sentimientos de vergüenza y orgullo. Por último, usando ejemplos empíricos de los Estados Unidos y de China, el artículo analiza cómo y con qué consecuencias los líderes políticos han narrado sobre la debilidad y la grandeza de cada gran potencia, y se centra en el período que va de 2006 a 2020.Pourquoi les auto-représentations de faiblesse imprègnent-elles le discours public des grandes puissances autoproclamées ? De plus, pourquoi ces auto-représentations de faiblesse s'entrecroisent-elles avec des auto-représentations de grandeur ? De telles instabilités, inconstances et incohérences narratives indiquent-elles simplement que les grandes puissances sont ontologiquement insécurisées ? Cet article avance une explication théorique qui est à la fois intégrée et contributrice aux recherches qui théorisent l’(in)sécurité ontologique d'un point de vue lacanien. Ironiquement, l'idée générale est que la quête de grandeur des grandes puissances se constitue conjointement avec la construction narrative de la faiblesse. Cet article remet ensuite en question l'hypothèse des recherches existantes sur la sécurité ontologique, qui est que les États sont généralement auto-réflexifs et qu'ils ressentent de la fierté lorsqu'ils sont ontologiquement sécurisés mais de la honte lorsqu'ils sont ontologiquement insécurisés. Étant donné que les discours des grandes puissances reflètent des sentiments persistants, exagérés et simultanés de honte et de fierté, cet article soutient que le narcissisme aide à mieux prendre en compte l'autoproclamation des grandes puissances et leur quête de sécurité ontologique. Cet article s'appuie sur une recherche psychologique sur le narcissisme pour présenter quatre formes narratives—de la honte, de la fierté, du déni et de l'insulte—par le biais desquelles les auto-représentations de faiblesse et de grandeur, et les sentiments de honte et de fierté, peuvent être communiqués. Enfin, cet article utilise des illustrations empiriques des États-Unis et de Chine pour analyser la manière dont et les implications avec lesquelles les dirigeants politiques ont discouru sur les faiblesses et grandeurs respectives de chacune des grandes puissances en se concentrant sur la période 2006–2020.

How can institutional corruption be combatted? While recent years have seen a growth in anti-corruption literature, examples of countries rooting out systemic corruption remain few. The lack of success stories has sparked an academic debate about the theoretical foundations of anti-corruption frameworks: primarily between proponents of the principal-agent framework and those seeing systemic corruption as the result of collective-action problems. Through an analysis of current principal-agent and collective action anti-corruption literature, this article adds two additional arguments to the debate: (a) the need to specify what one talks about when talking about systemic corruption and (b) the necessity to move beyond the principal-agent versus collective action frameworks dichotomy towards a policy-centered approach for how to combat institutional corruption. Having outlined how institutional corruption can be seen as one type of systemic corruption, this article shows how a policy-centered approach such as strengthening the appearance standard through an independent public commission can address theoretical mechanisms emphasized in each anti-corruption framework–thus arguing that the frameworks complement rather than rival each other. The article ends by arguing for an anti-corruption discourse acknowledging that a multifaceted problem such as corruption requires multiple frameworks rather than attempts for silver-bullet explanations.

Active labour market policy (ALMP) has emerged as a major topic of inquiry among comparative scholars in recent decades, alongside other social investments. However, few conclusive results have been produced regarding the political explanations of these policies, and not least the role of partisan politics. To help remedy this problem, this article proposes a new understanding of ALMP as a profoundly versatile set of ‘multi-purpose tools’ that policymakers across the political spectrum can use as a means to very different distributional ends. Specifically, it highlights how ALMP programmes vary in terms of 1) their target groups, 2) their intended labour market outcomes, and 3) their modes of production in politically salient ways. Informed by the new framework and by recent research, the article then develops a refined theory about how governments with different left–right placement, operating under economic and institutional constraints, affect ALMP development in different directions.

This introduction to the Special Section ‘Parliaments as workplaces: gendered approaches to the study of legislatures’ makes the case for revisiting the conditions under which male and female Members of Parliament (MPs) and staff carry out their parliamentary duties, thereby furthering the understanding of parliaments’ inner workings. It shows that adopting a workplace perspective grounded on feminist institutionalist analyses and gender organisational studies opens up new avenues for studying parliaments and the outcomes of political representation. The article then outlines how contributors to this Special Section deal with various aspects of the parliamentary workplace and concludes by highlighting the wider implications of this perspective for examining crucial questions of the parliamentary studies research agenda.

The global spread of electoral gender quotas has been characterized as one of the most significant institutional developments of the last 30 years. Many of the countries that have adopted these laws designed to increase women's political representation are electoral autocracies that have otherwise-stark gender inequalities. Some scholars argue that electoral authoritarian states have adopted quotas as a strategy for improving their international reputations for democracy. This article represents the first exploration of whether quotas really generate reputational boosts. Using large-scale survey experiments in Sweden and the United States concerning hypothetical developing countries, we find that they do. In particular, audiences perceived electoral autocracies as more democratic and were more likely to support giving them foreign aid when women's descriptive representation was greater. Beyond its contribution to our understanding of gender quotas and women's representation, this article contributes to broader debates about international reputation, human rights, and foreign aid attitudes.

The evolution of public social expenditures displays divergent patterns across non-western countries. This exploratory article argues that in order to understand the domestic sources of this divergence, institutional and structural explanations should be complemented with an actor-oriented perspective. Analyses of the role of party politics in non-OECD democracies, through multivariate fixed-effect regressions using data from 46 countries between 1995 and 2015, reveals a robust positive association between shifts towards Left party government and increases in total public social expenditures, also when controlling for structural and institutional factors. This association however seems potentially conditional on sufficient levels of economic growth. While indicating an impact of partisanship, further research is arguably needed regarding the origins, organization and policy outputs of parties in more recently democratized countries, as well as regarding the conditions under which the ideological orientation of parties in government are actually consequential.

Louise Olsson and Angela Muvumba Sellstrom Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and Uppsala University Since the adoption of UNSCR 1820 in 2008, United Nations peacekeeping operations have come und...

The term ‘think tank’ represents a heterogeneous concept and is used to characterise a diverse group of organisations. This diversity also characterises the Swedish organisations and institutions that currently fall under the think tank umbrella. In the Swedish political context, most organisations known by the public and news media as think tanks are advocacy organisations with an unambiguous ideological and political profile. Further, during the last decade, we have seen a proliferation of independent, self‐declared think tanks with more specific policy agendas, such as the environment and health care. However, according to the broader understanding used in global rankings, the Swedish think tank landscape includes a range of research institutions in different policy areas. Some receive funding from the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, corporations and private donors; others are government‐funded, with Stockholm's International Peace Research Institute as a prominent example. The aim of this article is to map the Swedish think tank landscape and its borders and analyse the roles of different types of think tanks in consensual or confrontational policymaking. Strategic differences among these types are related to historical background and funding. While government‐funded and some policy‐sector think tanks typically represent a tradition of consensual policymaking, those funded by the Corporation of Swedish Enterprise and other business interests represent a post‐corporatist development advocating neoliberal ideas and assuming a confrontational role in the expansion of private ownership and market solutions.

Previous research shows that public perceptions of climate change risk are strongly related to the individual willingness to support climate mitigation and adaptation policy. In this article, I investigate how public perceptions of climate change risk are affected by communications from political parties and the degree of polarization among them. Specifically, using survey data from Sweden, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand, I study the relationship between party source cues, perceived polarization, and public perceptions of climate change risk. The results reveal a positive relationship between party cues and perceptions of climate change risk, indicating that individuals adjust their risk perceptions to align with their party preference. Furthermore, a negative relationship between perceived polarization and individual risk perceptions is also discovered, showing that individuals tend to be less concerned with climate change the more polarization they perceive. However, the effect of perceived polarization is found to be limited to more abstract perceptions of risk, while being unrelated to perceptions of concrete risks. Even with some contextual variance, the results generally hold up well across the four countries.

Objectives Preelectoral party coalitions are common in multiparty systems. We examine the proposition that individuals who choose between parties from competing coalitions think and behave differently compared to those who only consider voting for parties of the same coalition. Part of the reason, we suggest, is that coalition‐straddling voters play a key role in deciding who forms government. Methods We rely on data from a multiwave panel with thousands of participants collected during two election campaigns in Sweden. Statistical regression techniques are used to analyze the data. Results We find that citizens who straddle opposing coalitions think that the vote decision is harder and rely more on voting advice applications. Moreover, the evidence suggests that their ultimate vote choice is more consequential in how they view parties. Conclusion Coalition‐straddling influences political behavior. The evidence is largely in line with the notion that coalition‐straddling individuals are aware of their importance.

This article investigates the extent of and characteristics of localised voting in a Swedish context. Localised voting is defined as an independent act of choice in relation to local elections. Contrary to most previous research, this article suggests that localised voting should also include those who are well informed about each election but vote for the same party in the different elections and not only those that split their tickets. A citizen survey conducted in the four northernmost counties indicates that two-thirds of the voters are local; 38 percent are informed same-party voters and 28 percent split their tickets. To a large extent, the two types of localised voting are explained by different factors. The informed same-party voters tend be older and are critical of the state of democracy in their municipality whereas the split-ticket voters have weak party allegiance and generally support a small party.

This article applies Hirschman’s model of exit, voice and loyalty to a Swedish case of housing renovation in a building with comparatively well-off tenants. Hirschman’s framework is particularly well suited for understanding the housing market with its heterogeneity and high transaction and attachment costs, and accordingly strong loyalty and voice. Our study indicates that the exit-voice-loyalty framework is a useful tool for analysing renovation processes, since these trigger both voice and exit behaviour. We argue that renovations can be considered as critical junctures to an existing tenant–landlord relation, thereby exposing power relations on the housing market. In the case studied, tenants were not able to affect the scope of the renovation directly, but tenant voice did affect the process as well as the outcome in other respects. The capable tenant group makes this a ”most likely case” for testing the limits of tenant influence in housing renovation processes.

In the policy sciences, the intractability of disputes in natural resource governance is commonly explained in terms of a “devil shift” between rival policy coalitions. In a devil shift, policy actors overestimate the power of their opponents and exaggerate the differences between their own and their opponents’ policy beliefs. While the devil shift is widely recognized in policy research, knowledge of its causes and solutions remains limited. Drawing insights from the advocacy coalition framework and social identity theory, we empirically explore beliefs and social identity as two potential drivers of the devil shift. Next, we investigate the potential of collaborative venues to decrease the devil shift over time. These assumptions are tested through statistical analyses of longitudinal survey data targeting actors involved in three policy subsystems within Swedish large carnivore management. Our evidence shows, first, that the devil shift is more pronounced if coalitions are defined by shared beliefs rather than by shared identity. Second, our study shows that participation in collaborative venues does not reduce the devil shift over time. We end by proposing methodological and theoretical steps to advance knowledge of the devil shift in contested policy subsystems.

The COVID-19 crisis is a stark reminder that modern society is vulnerable to a special species of trouble: the creeping crisis. The creeping crisis poses a deep challenge to both academics and practitioners. In the crisis literature, it remains ill-defined and understudied. It is even harder to manage. As a threat, it carries a potential for societal disruption-but that potential is not fully understood. An accumulation of these creeping crises can erode public trust in institutions. This paper proposes a definition of a creeping crisis, formulates research questions, and identifies the most relevant theoretical approaches. It provides the building blocks for the systematic study of creeping crises.2019新型冠状病毒(La crisis de COVID‐19 es un claro recordatorio de que la sociedad moderna es vulnerable a una especie especial de problemas: la crisis progresiva. La progresiva crisis plantea un profundo desafío tanto para los académicos como para los profesionales. En la literatura, permanece mal definida y poco estudiada. Es aún más difícil de manejar. Como amenaza, conlleva un potencial de disrupción social, pero ese potencial no se comprende completamente. La acumulación de estas crisis progresivas puede erosionar la confianza pública en las instituciones. Este artículo propone una definición de crisis progresiva, formula preguntas de investigación e identifica los enfoques teóricos más relevantes. Proporciona los componentes básicos para el estudio sistemático de las crisis progresivas.

Established in 2009, Swedish Higher Vocational Education (HVE) gives employers an opportunity to initiate state-funded but locally conceptualised and managed training programmes. This article investigates the system, the ideas used in policy to mandate this arrangement of vocational education and training (VET) and the institutional relations of power and control between stakeholders that it represents. Fourteen Swedish educational policy documents relating to post-secondary VET and the establishment of HVE were analysed. The findings show that policy has placed much of the power and control over HVE with employers and that both public and private education providers are dependent on employers. The system does not create any institutional relations between trade unions and HVE. Nor does it encourage employers to collaborate more comprehensively than locally regarding single programmes, to conceptualise them and their curricula. Hence, the qualifications and positions of HVE graduates in enterprises, unlike those of graduates from initial VET in upper secondary education, are not negotiated by the stakeholders in the conventional Swedish model, where national employers’ organisations and trade unions are central actors. The findings also reveal that the HVE students, in policy documents, are construed as input material that, through training, are turned into products with exchange value–into commodities.