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We focus on a key IR Theory article by Alexander Wendt (1992) and two Jackson Pollock paintings. Our aim is to identify meanings Pollock’s art communicates and reveals for Wendt (1992). It derives from an appeal to visual imagination and a desire for semiotic interpretation of Constructivist view of anarchy. The visual sign is an association such that there is Wendt’s theoretical claim on the one hand and an abstract painting on the other. We do not gaze at Wendt’s claim, we read it. We do not read a painting, look at it. This remark does not imply a one-way relationship. We can argue that a specific painting comes to life in our mind where colored movements are inextricably mixed up when we read the constructivist claim. Both Pollock paintings selected for our sign-making effort confirm the dynamic character of Constructivism and reveal not only three but countlessly many anarchies in international relations. They foment our assessments of abrupt changes of intersubjectivity among states. Cyclicality of dripped paints provides an anchor to fix Wendt’s anarchy conceptualization in these structural-abstract paintings. As to Wendt’s concept of anarchy, it acts as a helper, as a standard, against which interpretations of Pollock’s artwork construct meanings.

Semiotics constitutes an untapped and interdisciplinary source of enrichment for the discipline of International Relations (IR) theory. We propose two visual metaphors to that effect to interpret the figure depicting the central claim of structural realism (SR) offered by late Kenneth Waltz who is one of the most disputed, read, and inspiring IR theorists. The figure is the tenor of both metaphors. The vehicles are two paintings by Mark Rothko, namely, “Green and Tangerine on Red” and the “Number 14.” The metaphors generate innumerable meanings for the tenor and eliminate the criticism that SR is a static and an ahistorical theory. Thus, they benefit the Discipline characterised by academic cleavages on the meaning of theory, science, and production of knowledge.

This article proposes three evolutionary games to study secularization. The games assume that there is a severe competition for a resource defined as the material wealth a society produces. Successful strategies emerge out of the process, become the authority, capture and allocate the resource. Individuals who prefer a heavier or lighter weight of religion within the organization of the polity respectively named as religious and secular types can become wealthier and be emulated in the population depending on their initial proportions in the population. The society can evolve into a stable division of secular and religious types or can evolve opposite directions toward secularization. Impostors who misrepresent their religious preferences can invade a population that is equally halved into religious and secular types. No evolutionary stability is reached if impostors make no mistake in misrepresenting their beliefs; otherwise secular or religious strategies become evolutionarily stable.

Guner, Serdar S . (2011) Religion and Preferences: A Decision-theoretic Explanation of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00152.x Religious beliefs can affect preferences of decision makers who formulate and guide foreign policy. This article investigates the relationship between preferences affected by Islamic worldview of Turkey’s new leadership and foreign policy the new elite conduct through two simple models. The models are games against nature; thus, Turkey is the only decision maker facing no strategic uncertainty. It is found that the subjective estimates of achieving gains under the new foreign policy (NWP) and the old foreign policy (SQP) are critical and distinct from gains and costs of both policies. The new Turkish foreign policy (NWP) is a reversible move, even though Turkish decision makers evaluate it as generating a higher gain and a lower cost compared with the preservation of the status quo (SQP). The implementation of the NWP does not only depend on its gain but also on how attractive is the SQP.

This article presents four analyses of an interaction between the middle-Bronze Age Pharaoh Nibmuarea and the Babylonian king Kadashman-Enlil as described in the Amarna letters (Moran [1992] The Amarna Letters, The Johns Hopkins Universiy Press, Baltimore, Maryland). Intent on denying the Pharaoh his daughter in marriage, the Babylonian king was faced with the choice of sending messengers who could (''dignitaries'') or could not identify (''non-dignitaries'') his missing sister in the Pharaoh's court. Intent on marrying the king's daughter, the Pharaoh was faced with the choice of showing the sister or showing someone else. Based on the assumption of complete information (game 1), the analysis revealed a dominant-strategy equilibrium: Nibmuarea shows the sister and Kadashman-Enlil sends non-dignitaries. Based on the assumption of one-sided incomplete information (Pharaoh's misperception; game 2), the analysis revealed that the Pharaoh had a dominant strategy of showing the sister irrespective of whether the king is keen or reluctant to learn about his sister's fate. Based on the assumption of one-sided incomplete information (Kadashman-Enlil's misperception; game 3), the analysis revealed that if non-dignitaries are sent, the Pharaoh prefers showing someone other than his sister. Based on the assumption of two-sided incomplete information (game 4), the Pharaoh finds it more beneficial to present the sister irrespective of whether his intentions are genuine or feigned. With incomplete information, it is difficult to judge the other's intentions; the cost of being caught cheating by not showing the sister to knowledgeable messengers was quite high. These analyses highlight the strategic uncertainty that characterized this Bronze-Age interaction.

This paper proposes a simple two-person game of one-sided incomplete information in extensive form to understand strategic choices made in the Turkish-Syrian linkage between water and terrorism. Turkish intelligence established Syrian support of a terrorist group that aims at an independent Kurdish state in eastern Anatolia. Yet, Turkey frequently stipulates the cessation of this support for negotiating with Syria a water agreement over the Euphrates. The game presents Turkey as a player having superior information. Syria is assumed to be uncertain about Turkish preferences with respect to the mutual conflict. This analysis identifies three pooling equilibria indicating that Syrian beliefs do not matter.

Unlike the previous contributions to this section on Models of International Negotiations this chapter deals with a concrete and as yet unsolved international conflict, namely, that between Greece and Turkey over the breadth of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea. Greece claims that it has the freedom to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles, whereas Turkey has indicated that a Greek extension of territorial waters constitutes a casus belli. Currently, both countries apply the six-mile limit; several crises have occurred over this issue in the past, but the status quo has remained unchanged. © 2007 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.

Conflicts over the delimitation of territorial waters are abundant around the globe. Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies, are no exceptions. The delimitation of territorial waters and continental shelf, the status of islands, islets, and flight control zones and corridors in the Aegean Sea constitute constant sources of friction between them. We offer an evolutionary game model to explore for directions their relations can take including chances of new crises and the revision of the status quo. We find that crises constitute a norm in bilateral relations of the two littoral states. The crisis equilibrium indicates routinized practices involving first displaying then falling back. Hence aggressive behavior can be periodically observed but the current status quo will persist. A revised status quo becomes a likely prospect only if both countries were posited as single unitary actors maximizing their expected utilities.

This chapter investigates possible alliances between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq in their dispute over water in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. A noncooperative game in extensive form models Turkish-Syrian interactions related to water and terrorism. Iraq is modeled as a dummy player having no choice in the game but benefiting from Turkish-Syrian concessions. A Turkish-Syrian alliance cannot target Iraq, as the latter has no means of reducing the water volume upstream. The equilibria of the game explain the current state of the conflict by providing two different rationales. A unique equilibrium stipulates the conditions for a Turkish- Syrian cooperation. Turkish-Iraqi and Syrian-Iraqi alliances are found to be formed to balance threats in the basin.