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Pride and PrejudiceandWuthering Heightsare regarded as seminal works from the Victorian era, having received extensive scholarly interest. Written by Jane Austen, who is widely recognized as one of the greatest English writers,Pride and Prejudicehas remained popular among readers since its first publication. Scholars have analyzed the novel from multiple angles, including feminist, Marxist, and psychological perspectives, further cementing its status as a significant work of literature. On the contrary, Emily Bronte’sWuthering Heightsdid not enjoy the same level of recognition during its initial release and only gained widespread acclaim until the 20th century. As time passed, the novel’s reputation has grown to be on par with that ofPride and Prejudice. However, the comparison between the two novels is neglected by scholars. This essay aims to fill that gap by examining the two heroines, Elizabeth and Catherine, using Sigmund Freud’s id, ego, and superego framework.

Masochism is central to all pathologies and its relevance in clinical practise cannot be underestimated. The initial connection made by Freud was that masochism was a component or partial instinct, still operating within the pleasure principle. The relationship between masochism and the theory of drives marks a main theoretical difference in the different authors' explorations of this subject. The understanding of what is meant by 'masochism' gained complexity following Freud's postulation of a life and death drive (which is more or less contemporary with his 1924 paper on masochism) and the differences made by him between 'primary' and 'secondary' masochism. This introduction to the papers presented in this section will address some of these differences, as well as exploring the notions of primary erotogenic masochism, feminine and moral masochism. It will also look at the notion of binding /unbinding of the life/death drives, and the role of the superego. It will introduce the different papers by Novick and Novick, Bourdin, Frank and Persano on developmental perspectives, primary masochism, views on French analysts such as Benno Rosenberg and on Kleinian ideas on the subject as well as on the role of the body, pain and self harm.

Masochistic elements are puzzling entanglements for most of us in the beginning. Taking Melanie Klein's attempts to think about them thus show one way how to make sense of them. Starting from her struggles with masochistic symptoms in child analyses in the early 1920ies Melanie Klein tried to conceptualize those experiences in a way that could help to fact them in the analytic process. In this article the development is outlined, the move from thinking about them in libidinal terms to gradually grasping in greater depth their destructive quality. She speaks of an "evil principle" and then finds a conclusive solution in conceptualizing masochism as a representation of the death drive. In the next decades her followers would further work on the complexities of the countertransference issues and superego organizations in masochism in more detail as will be shown. Finally, a look in a piece of present analytic work will exemplify the clinical usefulness of the Kleinian conceptualization.

It is suggested in this paper that in the Shoah one is confronted with the abolition of the Law of the Dead Father and the re-establishing of the tyranny of the narcissistic father. In the extermination of the Jews of Europe in the Shoah, the aim was the destruction of the rules of genealogy and filiation to both mother and father that establish the social and give rise to personhood and are at the core of the oedipal structure. The rule of absolute power - the destruction of any sense of maternal care and paternal rules - leads ultimately to the creation of the abject.Freud distinguished between two different types of obstacles to psychoanalytic treatment that are expressions of the death drive. The first is bound and is related to the superego; it is connected to the negative therapeutic reaction, masochism, and the unconscious sense of guilt. The other manifestation of the death drive is unbound and diffuse. If the first is understandable, the second, he suggests, escapes any understanding. The paper makes use of this distinction to examine Hannah Arendt's notion of the banality of evil.

Benno Rosenberg's work has been little translated into English. Yet, his work on masochism is a landmark in France. He set himself the goal of deploying all the richness and implications of the second Freudian drive theory and the introduction of the death drive. He therefore returns to "the Economic Problem of Masochism" to give all its value to the drive fusion that it achieves internally and which is therefore for it "guardian of life", even if it is can also be fatal. He draws consequences on the psychic construction of the ego, the superego and on that of temporality. He also describes a "work of melancholy" which is different from mourning. Thinking it necessary to push the consequences of the new theorizing further than Freud was able to do, he revisits "Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety" to articulate the triggering of anxiety by a libidinal demand and the threat to the unity of the ego who comes from the death drive due to conflict. Starting from the psychosomatic descriptions of Pierre Marty, whose options are specified, he also proposed a metapsychology of somatization during the overflow of the psyche by the destructiveness which will then threaten the body.

Modern ve postmodern toplumların en yaygın sorunlarından biri olarak kabul edilen intihar, her toplumda veya kültürde var olan sosyo-psikiyatrik bir olgudur. Geçmişte intihar çalışması başlıca psikiyatri alanına girerken; intiharın altında yatan bazı sosyal faktörlerin farkındalığıyla birlikte, artık sosyolojik bir perspektiften de ele alınmaya başlanmıştır. Yirminci yüzyılın ikinci yarısı ile birlikte modern toplum ilişkilerinde ve yaşam tarzlarında meydana gelen değişiklikler postmodern kültürde daha belirgin hale gelmişti. Geleceğe yönelik beklentiler bu dönemde önemli ölçüde azalır. Mutlak hiçlik kavramı artık insan yaşamının her alanında açıkça görülmektedir. Tüm bu unsurlar insanın iç huzurunu etkileyerek fiziksel, zihinsel ve psikolojik bozulmalara neden olur. 1998 yılında Paulo Coelho tarafından yazılan Veronika Ölmek İstiyor adlı roman, yaşam motivasyonunu kaybeden ve intihara teşebbüs eden genç bir kadının psikolojik yolculuğunu konu alıyor. Coelho, kendi yaşam deneyimlerinden yola çıkarak intihar girişimi başarısız olan ana karakter Veronika'nın akıl hastanesinde geçirdiği psikolojik dönüşümleri gözler önüne seriyor. Bu sebeple, hem yaşam ve ölüm arasındaki çatışma hem de benlik ve toplum arasındaki çatışma, Veronika'nın intihar davranışlarının bazı olası nedenlerini analiz etmek için oldukça önemlidir. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma, romanı psikanalizin kurucusu Sigmund Freud’un psikanalitik bakış açısıyla incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. İntihar girişiminin arkasındaki psikolojik ve dış kaynaklı motivasyon, yaşam (Eros) ve ölüm (Thanatos) içgüdüsü teorisi ve bunun id, ego ve süperego ile ilişkisi ile açıklığa kavuşturulacaktır., Suicide, one of the most common problems in modern and postmodern societies, is a socio-psychiatric phenomenon existing in every society or culture. In the past, the study of suicide was mainly included in psychiatry; however, with an increasing awareness of some social factors behind suicide, it has now been tackled from a sociological perspective. In the second half of the twentieth century, changes in relationships and lifestyles of modern society began to be more apparent in postmodern culture. Expectations for the future dramatically decline in this period. The notion of absolute nothingness is now clearly seen in every aspect of human life. All these elements affect humans' inner peace and cause physical, mental, and psychological deterioration. Veronika Decides to Die, written by Paulo Coelho in 1998, deals with the psychological journey of a young woman who loses her motivation to live and attempts suicide. Basing on his own life experiences, Coelho, reveals the psychological transformations of the main character Veronika, whose suicide attempt fails. Therefore, both the conflict between life and death and the conflict between self and society are highly significant to analyze some possible reasons for the suicidal behaviors of Veronika. In this respect, this paper intends to analyze the novel from the psychoanalytic perspective of Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis. The psychological and external motivation behind the suicide attempt will be clarified with theory of life (Eros) and death (Thanatos) instincts, and their relation to id, ego, and superego.

RESUMO: Com base na premissa de que o supereu corresponde a um mandamento que ordena um gozo impossível, o presente trabalho investiga o destino que a psicanálise é suscetível de conferir ao imperativo superegoico. Sua problemática consiste na coalescência entre comando e obediência, bem como na abertura, a ser sustentada pelo discurso analítico, de uma hiância entre ambos. O desenvolvimento parte do emparelhamento entre ouvir e obedecer, servindo-se da hipnose, de Pascal Quignard, La Boétie e Herman 1853. A variedade vocal do objeto constitui o eixo que conduz, em uma análise, à fenda do desejo e ao sintoma que remaneja o gozo. ABSTRACT: Based on the premise that the superego is a command that demands an impossible jouissance, this article studies the possible destiny psychoanalysis can give to the superegoic imperative. The issue raised is the coalescence between commanding and obeying, as well as the opening of a gap, as supported by the discourse of the analyst, between the both of them. The development of the study establishes a pairing between listening and obeying, recurring to the hypnosis technique, to Pascal Quignard, to La Boétie and also Herman Melville. The object’s vocal variety constitutes an axis which conducts, in an analysis, to the desire gap and to the symptom that relocates jouissance.

This paper examines the repetition compulsion as a composite structure and explores the elements that are involved in it. After examining the difference between playful repetition, which promotes psychic development, and the repetition compulsion, which obstructs psychic change, the author discusses Freud's models of the repetition compulsion (as the return of the repressed vs an expression of the death drive). Further elements that contribute to the repetition compulsion include the role of a primitive, punitive superego, the persistence of raw, unsymbolized elements, obsessional doubt, the retreat into timeless states of mind as well as a re-entry mechanism in certain psychotic patients. Finally, the failure of reparative processes seems to be a central mechanism in sustaining the repetition compulsion. Brief clinical vignettes illustrate the author's arguments.

This paper attempts to understand further the working of values in ethics and religion. Its premise is that the psyche is organized by its internal objects, and that understanding the effective working of values therefore requires understanding the relevant internal objects. It begins with a brief outline of the history of internal objects in the thought of Freud, Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott and Loewald, and suggests that they are best thought of as "phenomenological" in nature, meaning that, whether conscious or unconscious, they appear in the mind without an enduring substrate. Using the thought of Loewald and of the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas in particular, it suggests that the functioning of "allegory" offers an important avenue to understanding how certain internal objects act to organize the psyche hierarchically on a basis of values including ethical ones. "Religious objects" may then be understood as a subclass of "allegorical objects", acting analogously to Levinas's "face of the other" and experienced as giving access to "transcendent" (commanding) values. Such values are not adequately described by traditional accounts of a superego and require a deepening of the psychoanalytic dialogue with philosophy.

This paper provides a historical overview of the reception of the superego concept in sociology and psychoanalytic social psychology. Central to the discussion are the ways in which classical and contemporary approaches (e.g. Parsons, Elias, Bourdieu) have responded to Freud's theories concerning the genesis of the superego and its changes in the course of psychic development, to his suppositions concerning anthropology and psychopathology, and to later psychoanalytic extensions of the concept (e.g. Klein, Erikson and Loewald). With reference to Freud's works of cultural critique, special emphasis is given to conceptions of the superego in studies on authoritarianism, adaptation and morality, notably by the Frankfurt School (Fromm, Horkheimer, Adorno). The authors also discuss the historical changes undergone by the superego concept and examine by way of examples the benefits of concept for achieving a clearer understanding of recent societal trends associated with contemporary phenomena such as digitization and optimization.

This paper presents an overview of the main issues that underlie the outbreak of a psychosis in adolescence. The author addresses significant questions that arise in connection with the use of the terms psychosis, psychotic functioning, and adolescent breakdown, examining different theoretical and clinical approaches to psychosis in adolescence. One of the main areas to be explored is the use of the specific diagnosis of psychosis in adolescence when we witness fluctuating mental states, variability, and changeable behaviour.A central point in the development of a psychotic process is the relationship to external reality. This break with reality was characterized by M. and M.E. Laufer as specifically lived out in relation to the reality of the adolescent's changing body. This paper will look at these authors' understanding of psychotic episodes, psychotic functioning, and psychosis, as well as other theoretical perspectives. The paper will address the economic aspects linked to drive increase, the complex interplay of early anxieties, unconscious phantasies and internal object relations, along with the role of identity, the superego and trauma. The paper also discusses different modalities of treatment and stresses the benefit of psychoanalytic treatment for disturbed adolescents.

Authority and freedom are connected, and both have external and internal forms. External authority, political or institutional, can impinge on internal freedom in ways that matter to psychoanalysts. Internal freedom requires an internal authority that can be trusted. The superego is an external authority masquerading as an internal one. The ego, with its compliance toward the id, the superego, and external reality, operates like a false self in the psyche. In Lacanian terms, it is of necessity alienated from itself. By contrast, the true self as described by Winnicott, and the “subject” as theorized especially in French psychoanalysis, represent an authentic conscience that allows us to become the authors of our at one’s authority. This implies two sorts of freedom: freedom from narcissistic self-investment, and the forward-looking freedom of psychic growth. The latter occurs only in a context of relatedness to others, and it entails caring for the interests of others—if necessary at one’s own expense. This vision of human beings as having an innate impetus toward psychic growth makes psychoanalysis a fundamentally optimistic endeavor. Clinical and nonclinical examples show, however, that it demands a perpetual readiness to let go of apparent certainties.

This text explores the evolution of the notion of trauma in Freud's work and of its decisive import for the organization of psychic functioning through a two-stage process called the

Na história da psicanálise, o conceito de supereu é objeto de inúmeros estudos por introduzir questões teóricas que exigem precisões sempre maiores. Uma delas diz respeito à articulação com alguns aspectos do conceito de Outro, em Lacan. Pretendemos contribuir ao debate, com a clínica da melancolia, seguindo à risca as orientações de Freud, inclusive em nossa leitura de Lacan, para o que nos servimos também de alguns outros autores. Chamamos a atenção para a tradução do verbo eintauchen, com o qual Freud identifica o mecanismo que relaciona o supereu com o isso. Um caso clínico ilustra de que modo o supereu imerge no isso para então, servindo-nos dos desenvolvimentos topológicos de Lacan, verificarmos de que maneira o toro do Outro pode imergir no interior do envelope das demandas, imergindo no isso, como dizia Freud, reservatório da pulsão que é, fundamentalmente, pulsão de morte. In the history of psychoanalysis, the concept of superego is the object of countless studies for introducing theoretical questions that require increasingly greater precisions. One of them concerns the articulation with some aspects of the concept of the Other in Lacan. We intend to contribute to the debate, with the clinic of melancholy, following the guidelines of Freud, even in our reading of Lacan, to which we also make use of some contributions from other authors. We call the attention to the translation of the verb eintauchen, with which Freud identifies the mechanism that relates the superego to the it (id). A clinical case illustrates how the superego immerses in the it, and then, using the topological developments of Lacan, we try to see how the torus of the Other can immerse itself within the envelope of demands, immersing in the it, as Freud used to say, the reservoir of the drive that is fundamentally the death drive. Dans l’histoire de la psychanalyse, le concept du surmoi fait l’objet d’innombrables études car il introduit des questions théoriques nécessitant des précisions toujours plus grandes. L’une d’elles concerne l’articulation avec certains aspects du concept de l’Autre de la théorie de Lacan. Nous essayons de contribuer au débat, à la clinique de la mélancolie, en suivant rigoureusement les directives de Freud, y compris dans notre lecture de Lacan, et également d’autres auteurs. Nous attirons l’attention sur la traduction du verbe « eintauchen », par lequel Freud identifie le mécanisme reliant le surmoi et la « chose ». Un cas clinique illustre la manière dont le surmoi s’immerge dans la chose. En utilisant les développements topologiques de Lacan, nous vérifions comment le tore de l’Autre peut s’immerger dans l’enveloppe des demandes en s’immergeant, comme disait Freud, dans le réservoir de la pulsion qui est, fondamentalement, pulsion de mort. En la historia del psicoanálisis, el concepto del superyó ha sido objeto de innumerables estudios, ya que introduce cuestiones teóricas que siempre requieren mayores precisiones. Una de ellas se refiere a la articulación con algunos aspectos del concepto de Otro, en Lacan. Se pretende contribuir al debate con la clínica de la melancolía, siguiendo al pie de la letra las orientaciones de Freud, incluso en nuestra lectura de Lacan, para lo cual también consultamos a otros autores. Llamamos la atención sobre la traducción del verbo eintauchen, con el que Freud identifica el mecanismo que relaciona al superyó con el ello. Un caso clínico ilustra de qué manera el superyó se sumerge en el ello para entonces, sirviéndonos de los desarrollos topológicos de Lacan, verificar de qué manera el toro del Otro puede sumergirse en el interior del sobre de las demandas, sumergiéndose en el ello, como decía Freud, reservorio de la pulsión que es fundamentalmente pulsión de muerte. In der Geschichte der Psychoanalyse ist das Konzept des Über-Ichs bis heute Gegenstand zahlloser Studien, da es theoretische Fragen aufwirft, die zunehmend präzisere Antworten erfordern. Eine dieser Fragen betrifft den Zusammenhang mit einigen Aspekten des Konzepts des Anderen von Lacan. Dieser Artikel untersucht die Klinik der Melancholie gemäß Freuds Richtlinien, sogar in unserer Lektüre von Lacan, zu der wir auch einige Beiträge anderer Autoren zu Hilfe nehmen. Wir weisen auf die Übersetzung des Verbes eintauchen hin, mit dem Freud den Mechanismus identifiziert, der das Über-Ich mit dem Es in Beziehung setzt. Anhand eines klinischen Falles zeigen wir auf, wie das Über-Ich in das Es eintaucht und untersuchen dann - anhand der topologischen Entwicklungen von Lacan - wie der Torus des Anderen in die Hülle der Forderungen eintauchen kann, eintauchend, wie Freud sagte, in das Reservoir des Triebes, der im Grunde der Todesantrieb ist.

Freud’s ideas on the development and psychological characteristics of girls and women, though laden with rich clinical and theoretical discoveries and achievements, appear to have been significantly flawed by the influence of traditional patriarchal and evolutionary values. This influence is evident in certain questionable presuppositions, logical errors and inconsistencies, suspensions of intensive inquiry, underemphasis on certain developmental variables, and confusions between observations, definitions, and value preferences. Under three headings—The Problem of Women’s Morality and Objectivity, The Problem of Neglected Prephallic Development, and The Problem of Naming—I discuss Freud’s generalizations concerning ego and superego development in boys and girls, penis envy, biologically predestined procreativity, the role of the mother, the fateful linkages male-masculine-active-aggressive-dominant and female-feminine-passive-masochistic-submissive, and other topics as well. In general, it is argued that Freud’s generalizations concerning girls and women do injustice to both his psychoanalytic method and his clinical findings.

In this contribution I will sustain that, given its origin, meaning and function, the superego is readily susceptible to the pathological distortions observed in clinical psychoanalytic work. After all, while we as psychoanalysts are unacquainted with the "normal" superego, we are accustomed to seeing patients with either an abnormal sense of guilt or a seeming absence of guilt. However, a distinction must first be drawn between the primitive superego and its pathological counterpart. Whereas some clinical situations involve a superego whose primitive aspects feature prominently in the foreground, in other cases one encounters psychopathological structures that do not stem from the primitive superego, even if they share the latter's seductive, dominant or intimidatory aspects.

In Bion's work, we find both continuity with and a breakthrough from the ideas developed by Freud and Melanie Klein on the concept of superego. After relying on Klein's views, Bion presented two fresh perspectives on this topic. In the first, in his theory of thinking we find a shift from an instinctive perspective to a psychological approach to morality. In the second we find conjectures (both imaginative and rational) about a primitive conscience, a form of morality prior to the mental functioning described as the superego by Freud and even the archaic superego described by Klein. This primordial psychic condition refers to a hazy dimension in which phylogenesis merges with fetal experiences. As described by Bion, the manifestations of this primitive conscience emerge as states of intense terror and guilt underneath a symbolic mind. They inhibit the development of the mind, are felt as harsh and authoritarian, always present as prohibitive, can potentially drive the individual to suicide, and are frequently found in the psychoanalytic practice.

Translation of psychoanalytic texts is notoriously complex, amplified by differences between Western languages/cultures and China. Freud labelled translation "traitorous". A current challenge is the trend among some professional translators to diminish or eliminate hierarchies of accurate and inaccurate translations. We argue for accurate translation to transmit psychoanalytic concepts in Mandarin Chinese. The English Standard Edition involved unfortunate choices to "Latinize" key Freudian terms; for example, Es, Ich and Uberich were rendered as Id, Ego and Supergo, instead of more experience-near common language equivalents in English, "it, I and over I." Similarly, some recent translations of German and English psychoanalytic terms into Mandarin Chinese have also tended to perpetuate intellectualized distancing from Freud's original vivid words. Here, we focus on seven critical terms for core psychoanalytic concepts: Ich/I, Es/it, Uberich/superego, Transference (Ubertragung), Countertransference (Gegenubertragung), Psyche/Soul (Psyche/Seele), psychoanalysis and (surprisingly) schizophrenia. We suggest that the currently popular oral-aural translations from English into Mandarin perpetuate distancing and lead to mis-translations that obscure our foundational concepts. We propose alternative Mandarin translations for some terms and discuss the broader cultural challenges involved in transmitting the heart (and soul) of psychoanalysis with Chinese colleagues.

La “muerte de Dios” apenas si ha sido considerada en términos psicoanalíticos. A partir de algunos planteamientos lacanianos, este artículo intenta aclarar si tal fenómeno debe entenderse como el fin de toda divinidad o más bien como una transformación radical en la relación con ella. Asimismo, el artículo busca determinar las raíces históricas de esta “muerte” y sus efectos sobre la vida anímica de los pueblos occidentales. Como se verá, con esa expresión se enuncia el declive —en nuestra época— de la capacidad inventiva vinculada con el deseo. The “death of God” has hardly been considered in psychoanalytical terms. On the basis of some Lacanian proposals, the article attempts to clarify whether the expression refers to the end of everything divine or rather as a radical transformation of the relationship to the divine. Likewise, the article seeks to identify the historical roots of this "death" and its effects on the spiritual life of Western peoples. As we shall see, the expression denotes the decline—in our time— of the inventive capacity linked to desire. La “mort de Dieu” n’a été que très peu considérée en termes psychanalytiques. Cet article se demande, à partir de quelques formulations lacaniennes, s’il s’agit là de la fin de toute divinité ou plutôt d’une transformation radicale dans son rapport à elle. L’article cherche aussi à déterminer les racines historiques de cette “mort” et ses effets sur la vie psychique des peuples occidentaux. On y verra que cette expression énonce le déclin en notre époque de l’inventivité liée au désir.

El Ideal de la Revolución, como función simbólica, deviene el significante central en la subjetividad de sus militantes, produciendo sus propios Nombres del Padre, sus propios significantes amo que alienan a los combatientes y generan efectos del orden de “lo sagrado” en los registros simbólico, imaginario y real, en la escena pública del colectivo y en la escena privada del sujeto. En este artículo se propone comprender el despliegue del ideal que jalona la causa revolucionaria, las formas como opera en la escena colectiva y singular, y los efectos que genera en la subjetividad. Finalmente se observa el proceso de la caída del ideal y sus algunas de sus encrucijadas como preámbulo a la salida del sujeto de la guerra. As a symbolic function, the Ideal of the Revolution becomes the central signifier in the subjectivity of its militants, and creates its own Names of the Father, its own master signifiers that alienate the combatants and generate effects at the level of "the sacred" in the symbolic, imaginary, and real registers, in both the public setting of the collective and the private one of the subject. The objective of the article is to understand the deployment of the ideal that drives the revolutionary cause, the ways it operates in the collective and singular setting, and the effects it causes on subjectivity. Finally, it examines the process of downfall of the ideal and some of its dilemmas as a preamble of the subject's exit from war. L’idéal révolutionnaire en tant que fonction symbolique devient le signifiant au cœur de la subjectivité de ses militants, ce qui produit ses propres Noms du père, se propres signifiants maître où les combattants s’aliènent et qui engendrent des effets de l’ordre du “sacré” dans le symbolique, l’imaginaire et le réel, sur la scène publique du collectif et sur la scène privé du sujet. L’article cherche à comprendre le déploiement de l’idéal qui jalonne la cause révolutionnaire, comment elle fonctionne sur la scène collective et singulière, et les effets qu’elle a sur la subjectivité. Finalement, le processus de chute de l’idéal et ses enjeux semblent être aux annonces de la sortie du sujet de la guerre.

The paper discusses Freud's view of the law as the implementation of collective violence on the individual violator. I focus on the implications of the link between the superego (as the source of moral judgment) and the aggressive drive and suggest that we need to be ever vigilant regarding the danger of employing the law as a disguised means of taking pleasure in collective violence. The paper also discusses Freud's conception of personal responsibility, according to which we are responsible for all our behavior, including unconsciously motivated behavior (such as slips and dreams). However, the kind of responsibility Freud has in mind is not the moral responsibility of blameworthiness or praiseworthiness, but rather responsibility in the sense that, whether or not acknowledged, all our behavior reflects our personal desires and motives.

Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is characterized by intrusive images or impulses and/or ritualistic and rigid behaviors. Symptoms of OCD have different contents including contamination, harming and symmetry. Religion is one of the themes that has been observed in the context of OCD frequently. The aim of the present study was to examine the power of superego and ego characteristics in predicting scrupulosity and non-religious obsessions and compulsions, as well as comparing the two sets of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Sixty six Iranian (19 men, 47 women) participated in the study. All participants were asked to complete Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory, Penn Inventory of Scrupulosity, Perfectionism Cognitions Inventory, the Multidimensional Anger Inventory, and Ego Strength Scale. Results showed that perfectionism and anger were positively correlated with scrupulosity and non-religious obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Ego control was negatively correlated with scrupulosity, while ego resiliency was not correlated with any of these two sets of symptoms. Regression analysis indicated that among these variables, anger was the best predictor of non-religious obsessive-compulsive symptoms, while perfectionism and ego control were the best predictors of scrupulosity.

With the transition from a one-person psychology of instinctual needs to a two-person psychology of relational needs, the metapsychological focus tends to shift from instinct theory to emotion motivation and systems theory, and, accordingly, familiar concepts have to be rethought. In this article, the superego is reconceptualized as a psychic regulation system for self-evaluation, comprising the capacity for empathy, the proneness to experience self-conscious emotions, such as shame, pride, and guilt, and the capacity for moral reasoning. This new conceptualization provides useful tools for addressing the actual functioning of the conscience in clinical psychoanalysis. Affective neuropsychoanalysis can make important contributions to this rethinking of the superego. It also brings clinical practice and psychoanalytic metapsychology closer to empirical research beyond the scope of clinical psychoanalysis. The new model offers ample opportunities for integrating affective neuroscience into the functioning of the conscience.

Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-23T22:00:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_8960_Estudo sobre a motivação para o tratamento em DQ.pdf: 8293313 bytes, checksum: 4fe7109f02776d7a0202c8944f0ce483 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-06-08 Esta tese teve como objetivo investigar os aspectos afetivos envolvidos tanto na motivação para buscar espontaneamente o tratamento para a dependência química quanto na motivação para manter o tratamento. A pesquisa empírica, de natureza qualitativa e exploratória, foi realizada por meio de cinco estudos de caso. Para a coleta de dados, foi utilizada uma série de quatro entrevistas semiestruturadas com cada um dos participantes. Participaram da pesquisa cinco homens que encontravam-se internados em uma clínica de amparo e recuperação de dependentes químicos, localizada na região metropolitana de Vitória. Para tratamento e análise de dados, utilizamos a Análise de Conteúdo. Para investigar a participação da afetividade na mudança da conduta, por conseguinte, na decisão de romper a relação com a droga, buscando o tratamento, adotamos abordagem sobre motivação apresentada por Jean Piaget (1954/2014a), segundo a qual a afetividade atua como móbile das ações. Os principais resultados apontam que, no momento de tomar a decisão de buscar pelo tratamento, os participantes passavam por um intenso sofrimento; ao longo do tratamento, o sentimento de culpa predominou, mobilizando a ação de mantê-lo. O rompimento da relação com a droga envolveu alguns outros sentimentos além da culpa, tais como vontade, tristeza, vergonha e medo, que tanto podem motivar o rompimento quanto a manutenção do consumo de drogas. A partir desses dados, por meio do referencial psicanalítico (Lacan, 1975/2016), compreendeu-se que a dependência química se trata de uma relação de gozo entre um sujeito e o objeto droga, na qual, por vezes, o sujeito se reduz a própria droga. Assim, na perspectiva da psicanálise, foi examinada a função do supereu, e de seu imperativo de gozo, na dependência; e, além disso, a participação do sentimento de culpa na motivação para o tratamento. Os principais resultados apontaram que, na prática clínica, é delicado fortalecer o supereu por meio da culpa; quanto ao rompimento da relação com a droga, ela ocorreu sempre de maneira imprevisível.

En distintas situaciones vivimos un desgarro entre lo que nos sale de dentro y la norma experimentada como exterior. Este desgarro es analizado a partir del concepto de deseo, que desplegamos en categorías psicológicas. Postulamos la reconciliación de este deseo como actitud que evita represiones o adicciones; y presentamos procesos concretos de reconciliación a partir del juego, la interpretación y el ritual. Procesos en que —por medio de un tipo particular de repetición— el yo se abre a otros sujetos, siendo testigo de la irrupción del Misterio.

El presente artículo está asociado a la investigación "Del exceso y su regulación. Reflexiones desde el psicoanálisis y la filosofía", realizada por el grupo de investigación Psicoanálisis, Sujeto y Sociedad de la Universidad de Antioquia. En él se compara la teoría sobre el deseo en Kant, nombrada por él como "facultad de desear", y la "vivencia de satisfacción" descritapor Sigmund Freud. Son dos enfoques sobre el deseo, proviniendo uno de la filosofía y otro de la clínica. En relación al lenguaje, se presenta la lógica del significante formulada por Jaques Lacan y la consecuencia del surgimiento de un sujeto inconsciente. Sujeto considerado por Lacan como una respuesta de lo Real. En relación a la moral, se presenta la teoría del superyó y la culpa como una génesis de la moral en Freud.

O objetivo deste artigo é investigar uma das vertentes mais relevantes da neurose obsessiva, a problemática moral. Isso se deve à importância que o sentimento de culpa adquire nessa patologia, expresso por meio de autoacusações. Nossa investigação centrar-se-á principalmente na questão do sentimento de culpa a partir da relação entre as instâncias do ego e do superego. Realizaremos uma elaboração teórica desta questão por meio de uma análise crítica da bibliografia consultada, segundo um modelo metodológico de tipo qualitativo. Procuraremos mostrar que a violência do superego, característica da neurose obsessiva, não está atrelada, de forma prioritária, à questão da lei, no sentido da moralidade. Examinaremos os aspectos essenciais que embasam a instauração do sentimento de culpa nessa modalidade de neurose, levando em conta a dinâmica pulsional subjacente. Visando demonstrar a ação de uma dimensão de violência psíquica na neurose obsessiva, analisaremos as determinações da violência do sentimento de culpa, considerando os aspectos tópicos, dinâmicos e econômicos envolvidos. O superego ataca o ego de maneira implacável, colocando-o em uma posição de passividade. Na tentativa de superá-la, o ego responde a esse ataque pela convocação de uma moral categórica.

Though commonly seen as a member of the so-called "culturistic" school of psychoanalysis that rejected Freudian drive theory and embraced an "oversocialized" conception of human nature, Fromm's qualified essentialism and neo-Marxist existentialism significantly transcend both biological and social determinism (although he succumbs to the latter in regard to his theory of the Oedipus complex). His existential Freudo-Marxism contributes to the integration of psychoanalysis and social science. In place of the authoritarian superego and the pseudo-objective stance of the classical Freudians, Fromm offers conscientious, egalitarian, personalistic, and humane values.

In this paper we follow the development and transmission of moral learning from Adam Smith's impartial spectator to Sigmund Freud's superego and then to contemporary psychoanalysis. We argue that defenses are an integral component in the acquisition of any moral system. Elaborating on this argument, we assert that there is a progression from defensive systems that are "closed" to defensive systems that are "open," as defined in a recent work by Novick and Novick. The former system is "static, avoids reality, and is characterized by power dynamics, sadomasochism, and omnipotent defense." The latter, on the other hand, is a system that allows for "joy, creativity, spontaneity, love and it is attuned to reality." Furthermore, while Smith and Freud's systems are more one-person systems of defense, contemporary psychoanalysis has moved to more of a two-person system.

Psychoanalytic literature has often overlooked the child's participation in organized sports, which often can facilitate or impede not only expression of aggression and narcissism, but enhance or skew the growth of the child's superego and ego ideal. Specific outcomes are largely determined by the experience and knowledge of the parents, the coaches, and sports organizations for latency-aged youth. Sports participation facilitates a major step forward in psychic development, that is, an agreed-upon adherence to a set of rules and regulations, monitored by an official embodying the final word regarding rules and their infractions. This paper is an attempt to delineate the role of sports in the life of the latency child, the parents who become involved, the coaches who teach and supervise, and the social and individual milieu within which sports take place. All these contribute to common goals: the engendering of good sportsmanship and the encouragement of psychic growth, particularly regarding how aggression and narcissism contribute to the development of superego and ego ideals. The fate of aggression and narcissism in superego and ego ideal development is influenced to a large degree by the nature, orientation, and motivations of all involved in sports for the latency-aged.

The Comprehensive System (CS; Exner, 2003) has specific procedures to address brief Rorschach protocols when the first administration yields fewer than 14 responses. These procedures involve the assessor's asking the client to retake the test by providing more responses on the second administration than the first administration. The request carries with it an implicit criticism of the client's initial effort and a mandate to improve performance on retake. The retake request, with its ambiguously worded demand for improved performance, engages the client's superego (i.e., the client feels judged) and makes it possible to study superego manifestations (e.g., guilt, shame) on the Rorschach test, using a model of (a) brief first record, (b) retake directive, and (c) second administration. We present a case that illustrates a clinical strategy, modeled on a psychoanalytic understanding of the CS retake procedure, for studying the client's superego functioning under retest conditions.

This article presents a guide for conceptualizing psychological difficulties across the broad spectrum of personality and symptom disorders. A psychodynamic model is used to organize these disorders along a structural continuum of severity. The authors propose that seven key indices of personality functioning be evaluated: cognition, affect, self-object relations, interpersonal relations, defenses, superego functioning, and primary dynamics. The results are then employed to determine where the patient should be placed along a continuum of nine diagnostic categories of ego development and their associated disorders. These include "normal," neurotic trait, and neurotic symptom organization; high-, mid-, and low-level borderline organization; and affective, cognitive-affective, and cognitive psychotic organization. An accurate evaluation of the seven variables will permit a more precise formulation of the nature and severity of the patient's difficulties, which will hopefully result in more accurate and appropriate treatment planning. Examples of the application of this model to a common symptom complaint are provided.

In this paper fascination phenomenologically is described as a state of radically being captured by an imposing object. What is left of the impoverished and paralysed subject clings to the exclusive fascinating object. Fascination is the eye of the storm of extreme ambivalence towards an exclusive object: being the only remaining object it is necessary for living in an object world, but at the same time it is threatening to life by absorbing the subject totally. So the subject is sucked in by a yet frightening object. From a metapsychological point of view fascination is understood as the congealed result of excessive projective identification and a strong confusional state connected with it: the subject empties itself so much in the object that it comes to stand for the subject. The fascinating object embodies in a condensed way - as a special form of a bizarre object - split off unconscious threatening material. So fascination is linked to the Kleinian theory of anxiety. Two clinical vignettes illustrate how states of fascination can be understood as an ultimate defence against unconscious menacing material welling up. The hypothesis is developed that fascination points to a revelation of fundamental psychic truth that promptly cramps the subject because the reintegration of it is felt as annihilating. In the vignettes this takes the form of a 'transformation in hallucinosis'. Fascination is at the same time 'the moment of truth' and possibly a serious obstruction of the analytic process. This unconscious truth seems to concern primitive 'superego violence'. The challenge consists in thawing the frozen fascinating object by linking it to other material.

The first section of the paper explores a number of differing views regarding the concept of the superego, essentially in terms of its formation and its functions. Two broad theories of superego development, both of which were introduced by Freud, are described. The first takes the superego to be principally oedipal in origin; the second traces the superego to an earlier period. The controversy about the usefulness of the concept of the death instinct is also implicated in the different views. It is then suggested that it is worthwhile to distinguish between a normal superego and a pathological superego and that these two distinct models of the superego are implicit in the work of both Freud and Klein. Strachey's (1934) views on the nature of the mutative effect of psychoanalytic treatment are briefly reviewed in the light of this distinction. It is suggested that Strachey was hesitant in clarifying the full implications of his views, particularly regarding the reasons for the difficulty the psychoanalyst will experience in making a transference interpretation. It is argued that the difficulty will relate to the psychoanalyst's anxiety about having sufficiently worked through the countertransference, particularly in relation to superego functioning. Two brief clinical vignettes are considered in support of this view. The last section of the paper offers some comments on the emotional development of the psychoanalyst and the ways that maturing as a psychoanalyst will involve a certain mellowing of the analyst's stance and a greater tolerance of the patient's prerogative to bring the full range of his or her personality into the treatment.

The erotic transference can be seen as the Janus face of clinical work in psychoanalysis: it may either arise out of the positive emotions necessary for the building of new shared realities, or be fueled by falsified and distorted constructions. In the former case, the erotic transference expresses the capacity to anticipate, or “dream,” the emotional relationship with the object—which is why Freud valued its transformative aspect as one of the “forces impelling [the patient] to . . . make changes”—whereas in the latter it is equivalent to a flight from psychic reality and may be imperceptibly transformed into an actual delusion.

With the help of attachment theory and research, the paper attempts to broaden and build on classical and current views on the superego. Attachment theory's epigenetic approach and the concept of the subliminal superego are described. The superego, it is argued, is as much concerned with safety as sex. The superego is 'heir', not just to the Oedipus complex or Klein's pre-oedipal constellation, but also to the attachment relationship. Under favourable developmental conditions a 'mature superego' emerges, facilitating, in the presence of an internal secure base, maturational boundary crossings towards adult sexuality. In the light of the above, the paper reviews Lear's updating of Strachey's model of psychic change and explores the concept of transgression in relation to the 'professional superego', its development and maturation. Theoretical arguments are illustrated with clinical examples.

I will suggest that the phantasy of 'a father is being beaten' and its transformations emerges for certain male patients as a result of the work of analysis and becomes a potential appropriation of the (symbolic) father. The symbolic beating of the father takes place at the threshold between an anal-sadistic organization and the oedipal situation. The phantasy of the 'father being beaten' does not necessarily mean that it is the father who is explicitly being beaten. It is a construction derived from the free associations and dreams, in the analytic encounter, reached through the work of interpretation. Detailed material of sessions of the five times a week analysis of one of my patients will be presented. This will be contrasted with material from four other analyses of male patients where the 'father being beaten' phantasy was not achieved. The common feature in all these other configurations is a foreclosure in the relationship to the father and a lack of an internalization of the paternal function as a symbolic capacity. It is my suggestion that this absence of the father in its symbolic function is then sexualized in a fusion between life and death drives. A final contrasting example is derived from Karl Abraham's classic paper detailing the analysis of a patient where one can interpret a dream as expressing 'a father is being beaten' phantasy; however the dream's repetitive nature and its links with a current dream in the analysis points out to a lack of differentiation between the sexes and an anal-sadistic organization.

The main proposal of this paper is that normal mourning is not completed after six months to a year or two as suggested in earlier literature, but may bring about a permanent alteration of psychological structures that affect various aspects of the mourning persons' lives. These structural consequences of mourning consist in the setting up of a persistent internalized object relationship with the lost object that affects ego and superego functions. The persistent internalized object relationship develops in parallel to the identification with the lost object, and the superego modification includes the internalization of the value systems and life project of the lost object. A new dimension of spiritual orientation, the search for transcendental value systems, is one consequence of this superego modification.

The authors describe an interruption in communication in the analyses of two patients, which gradually brings the analytic process to a halt/standstill. They propose several hypotheses for understanding this situation. One explanation is mutual identification of primitive superegos in the analytic couple which generates a moralizing effect thereby hindering investigation and discovery. They emphasize the importance of countertransference involvement which partly provokes this particular type of impasse. They also suggest the idea of shared acting out, with complementary participations of analyst and patient. In this way the analytic couple supports a 'bastion' which protects against the risk of breaking the omnipotence of patient and analyst or contributes to this omnipotence. Their shared unconscious phantasy feeds collusion linked to unconscious persecutory guilt. The authors also describe movements to break free from this impasse. The enclave created by the analytic couple is detected and subsequently worked through by way of the patient's contribution of dream material and the analyst's work with her countertransference.

The repetition compulsion-the propensity to repeat formative early life experiences, for good or ill-is one of psychoanalysis's most important contributions to the understanding of human nature. However, its broader applications to psychodynamic psychiatry and psychotherapy have received little attention. In fact, it is a concept widely applicable to the understanding and treatment of psychiatric disorders, since maladaptive or self-defeating repetitions are the stuff of psychopathology. This article will discuss the repetition compulsion as a core concept of psychodynamic psychiatry. Principles of the compulsion to repeat will be applied to the dynamics of personality disorders, and will be illustrated by discussion of its usefulness in understanding and treating several common and representative psychiatric conditions: reactive depression, punitive superego function, and traumatic neurosis. These conditions illustrate the reparative, retributive, and restorative functions of the compulsion to repeat.

Erik H. Erikson wrote three articles when he was in his late-twenties and an up-and-coming member of the psychoanalytic community in Vienna. At the time he wrote these articles, he was in a training psychoanalysis with Anna Freud, teaching at the Heitzing School in Vienna, and learning the Montessori method of teaching. These articles focus on the loss of primary narcissism and the development of the superego (or punitive conscience) in early childhood, especially through the child's conflict with maternal authority. They support the idea that melancholia, with its internalized rage against the mother, is the inevitable outcome of the loss of primary narcissism. I note, however, that the third of these articles makes a case for the restorative role of humor, especially when Freud's view that humor is a function of the superego is taken into account.

Developing from the author's prior work in which the patient's superego is conceived as more accessible to consciousness than generally believed, this article undertakes greater illumination of technical matters arising in the clinical circumstance. Directly and firmly addressing the superego of the psychotic patient is regarded as having immediate therapeutic benefit, rendering the ego stronger and leading to increased rationality and firmer sense of identity.

In his wonderfully written and documented article, Richard Brockman puts forth a Darwinian perspective on the psychology of the neonate. As a new organizing principle for psychoanalysis, it opens the door to a new understanding of infant development. He departs from Freud’s conclusion that what was in an infant’s mind is impossible to ascertain, that the contents of the infant mind could be “constructed” using the data of the analysis of the adult psychoneurotic. Instead he turns to John Bowlby’s (1969) monumental work on attachment. Rather than the analytic couch, the source of Bowlby’s data was his observation of young animals and infants. Brockman quotes him as saying that “One of the first behaviors that are seen in man and animals are behaviors directed toward attaching to an object, towards a mother or mother figure” (Bowlby, p. 155). Brockman unites Bowlby with Darwin whose observations led to the understanding that an innate mammalian ability to communicate had survival value for the individual and thus this characteristic evolved. The author writes further that “Mammals in Darwin’s view were social by virtue of evolution. And thus mammals because of evolution are born with an innate biology of attachment.” He concludes that psychoanalysis must begin with data that is scientific, that it must go back to attachment which is where interpersonal behavior begins. “[I]n the beginning, there is no evidence of fantasy. In the beginning, there is attachment. In the beginning there is holding.” He concludes, “We do not begin life focused on internal fantasy. We begin with an orientation to the world, to . . . a holding environment. It is not a metaphor. It is a foundation. It is an evolutionary fact.” With this new organizing principle for understanding human psychology, old psychoanalytic concepts can now be reconsidered. One of these is the origins of the superego, of a sense of right and wrong, of what is good and what is bad. A friend sent me the following story

A cental thesis of Paul Gray's work is that a “developmental lag” pervades modern psychoanalysis in its failure to assimilate and apply knowledge gained about the role of the unconscious ego in intrapsychic life. But Gray himself, it is proposed, has become a victim of a new “developmental lag,” of his own construction. As he somewhat single-mindedly pursued the ramifications of his “developmental lag” concept, Gray may have foreclosed on some noteworthy ideas developing around him. The most important example is his claim—herein refuted—that proper interpretive technique can avoid being infused with transference. He also seems to have rejected the theoretical importance of the internalization of the analyst and the clinical usefulness of countertransference. While emphasizing defense analysis, he ignores defenses such as splitting, denial, and disavowal as substantive problems for his technique of close-process attention. Gray's “undoing” of the rapprochement between “ego analysis” and “id analysis” by viewing the matter as an either-or proposition undermines the very real value of his contribution to the field.

The author uses the life and personal history of the poet Edna St. Vincent Millay, as revealed through her diaries and letters and in biographies, to illustrate a particular type of psychoanalytic patient. Such patients are resistant to change, particularly when it involves letting go of the internalization of early parental figures. Although some of these patients fail to achieve successful analytic outcomes, Millay is an example of someone with similar circumstances who nevertheless made significant creative contributions.