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Researchers on inequalities in representation debate about whether governments represent the preferences of the rich better than those of less affluent citizens. We argue that problems of high‐ and low‐status citizens are treated differently already at the agenda‐setting stage. If affluent and less affluent citizens have different priorities about which issues should be tackled by government, then these divergent group priorities explain why government favors high‐ over low‐status citizens. Due to different levels of visibility, resources and social ties, governments pay more attention to what high‐status citizens consider important in their legislative agenda and pay less attention to the issues of low‐status citizens. We combined three types of data for our research design. First, we extracted the policy priorities (most important issues) for all status groups from Eurobarometer data between 2002 and 2016 for 10 European countries and match this information with data on policy outcomes from the Comparative Agendas Project. We then strengthen our results using a focused comparison of three single country studies over longer time series. We show that a priority gap exists and has representational consequences. Our analysis has important implications for the understanding of the unequal representation of status groups as it sheds light on an important, yet so far unexplored, aspect of the political process. Since the misrepresentation of political agendas occurs at the very beginning of the policy‐making process, the consequences are potentially even more severe than for the unequal treatment of preferences. published

Populist nationalism is on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa. Depending on the political orientation, it is both reinforced and confronted by social media and social movements. Nationalism also cements the longstanding rule of autocratic regimes in West Africa, particularly in Togo, Benin and Senegal. Supported by the commodification of the party system, autocrats set up a shadow state. They use populism to prop up their illegitimate rule and to destabilize the opposition. The internet and social media play a crucial role in the spread of fake news through the mostly state-controlled media. The Catholic Church also tried, with little success, to counteract the wave of nationalism. In Benin, for example, in 2019 the bishops of Cotonou called for a ‘fast on the lies that inundate and poison interpersonal and social relationships’. In Lomé, the bishops' conference condemned the systematic persecution of the opposition and the arrest of its leader, presidential candidate and former prime minister Agbeyome Kodjo. Senegal, like Benin, has long been marketed as a 'showcase of democracy' in Africa, including peaceful political transition. But things changed radically with the 2019 Senegalese presidential election, which brought new configurations. One of the main problems was political transhumance, which was elevated to the rank of religion with disregard for political morality. It threatened political stability and peace. In response, social networks of mostly young activists established in 2011 after the Arab Spring focused on campaigning for grassroots voters for good governance and democracy. They proposed a break with a political system they saw as neo-colonialist. Activists such as 'Y'en a marre' (literally 'I'm fed up') and other dissident social movements benefited from the country's particular social conditions, which favoured collective action. Should President Macky Sall opt for a third term in 2024, it would again pose a serious challenge to Senegalese democracy. Populistischer Nationalismus ist in Subsahara-Afrika auf dem Vormarsch. Er wird je nach politischer Ausrichtung durch soziale Medien und soziale Bewegungen sowohl verstärkt als auch konfrontiert. Der Nationalismus zementiert auch die langjährige Herrschaft autokratischer Regime in Westafrika, insbesondere in Togo, Benin und Senegal. Unterstützt durch die Kommodifizierung des Parteiensystems errichten Autokraten einen Schattenstaat. Sie nutzen den Populismus, um ihre illegitime Herrschaft zu stützen und die Opposition zu destabilisieren. Das Internet und soziale Medien spielen eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Verbreitung von Fake News durch die meist staatlich kontrollierten Medien. Auch die katholische Kirche versuchte mit wenig Erfolg, der Welle des Nationalismus entgegenzuwirken. In Benin beispielsweise riefen die Bischöfe von Cotonou 2019 zu einem "Fasten der Lügen auf, die zwischenmenschliche und soziale Beziehungen überschwemmen und vergiften". In Lomé verurteilte die Bischofskonferenz die systematische Verfolgung der Opposition und die Verhaftung ihres Anführers, Präsidentschaftskandidaten und ehemaligen Ministerpräsidenten Agbeyome Kodjo. Senegal wurde, ebenso wie Benin, lange Zeit als 'Schaufenster der Demokratie' in Afrika verkauft, einschließlich eines friedlichen politischen Wandels. Doch die Dinge änderten sich radikal mit der senegalesischen Präsidentschaftswahl von 2019, die neue Konfigurationen mit sich brachte. Eines der Hauptprobleme war die politische Transhumanz, die unter Missachtung der politischen Moral in den Rang einer Religion erhoben wurde. Sie bedrohte die politische Stabilität und den Frieden. Als Reaktion darauf konzentrierten sich soziale Netzwerke von meist jungen Aktivisten, die 2011 nach dem Arabischen Frühling gegründet wurden, darauf, Wähler an der Basis für gute Regierungsführung und Demokratie zu werben. Sie schlugen einen Bruch mit einem politischen System vor, das sie als neokolonialistisch ansahen. Aktivisten wie 'Y'en a marre' (wörtlich "Ich habe es satt") und andere soziale Dissidentenbewegungen profitierten von den besonderen sozialen Bedingungen im Land, die kollektives Handeln begünstigten. Sollte sich Präsident Macky Sall für eine dritte Amtszeit im Jahr 2024 entscheiden, würde dies die senegalesische Demokratie erneut vor eine ernsthafte Herausforderung stellen.

Colombia elected a new progressive government on 19 June. While the COVID-19 pandemic did not play a direct role in the campaign, it has deepened both structural problems as well as pre-pandemic trends such as high levels of social inequality, citizen distrust regarding state institutions, and increasing violence in certain regions of the country. While these social disparities led to a call for change by different groups, reducing violence will be a key policy test for the new government. COVID-19 hit Colombia at a delicate time. A comprehensive peace agreement had been signed in 2016, but the elections of 2018 brought the forces that had run on an anti-agreement platform into government. A half-hearted implementation of the accord resulted, which together with increasing citizen dissatisfaction led to mass protests at the end of 2019. In the wake of the pandemic's onset, around six million Colombians fell into poverty. Despite some social policies such as the solidarity income (ingreso solidario), in many fields the state retreated from the provision of public services - in contrast with an increase in repressive measures, as for instance in the pursuit of coca eradication. After a short decrease in collective forms of violence due to lockdown policies, pre-pandemic patterns resumed. In peripheral and border zones, armed actors strategically leveraged the pandemic to increase their control over illicit enterprises and local populations. The entanglement of deteriorating socio-economic conditions, increasing violence, and an extremely unpopular government opened the door to the election of the first left-leaning president in Colombia's history, Gustavo Petro. The new government offers the historic opportunity to save the peace agreement and initiate the profound changes Colombia desperately needs. External actors need to support the reform agenda. Particularly, the implementation of the structural changes established in the peace agreement as well as reform of the country's security institutions. While the latter are ignored in the peace accord, doing so is a necessary condition to promote trust in the state and to contain violence by means other than repression. In addition, new economic policies for greater social inclusion and the mitigation of climate change are urgent topics on the agenda too.

Populist nationalism is on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa. Depending on the political orientation, it is both reinforced and confronted by social media and social movements. Nationalism also cements the longstanding rule of autocratic regimes in West Africa, particularly in Togo, Benin and Senegal. Supported by the commodification of the party system, autocrats set up a shadow state. They use populism to prop up their illegitimate rule and to destabilize the opposition. The internet and social media play a crucial role in the spread of fake news through the mostly state-controlled media. The Catholic Church also tried, with little success, to counteract the wave of nationalism. In Benin, for example, in 2019 the bishops of Cotonou called for a 'fast on the lies that inundate and poison interpersonal and social relationships'. In Lomé, the bishops' conference condemned the systematic persecution of the opposition and the arrest of its leader, presidential candidate and former prime minister Agbeyome Kodjo. Senegal, like Benin, has long been marketed as a 'showcase of democracy' in Africa, including peaceful political transition. But things changed radically with the 2019 Senegalese presidential election, which brought new configurations. One of the main problems was political transhumance, which was elevated to the rank of religion with disregard for political morality. It threatened political stability and peace. In response, social networks of mostly young activists established in 2011 after the Arab Spring focused on campaigning for grassroots voters for good governance and democracy. They proposed a break with a political system they saw as neo-colonialist. Activists such as 'Y'en a marre' (literally 'I'm fed up') and other dissident social movements benefited from the country's particular social conditions, which favoured collective action. Should President Macky Sall opt for a third term in 2024, it would again pose a serious challenge to Senegalese democracy. Le nationalisme populiste est en hausse en Afrique subsaharienne. Selon l'orientation politique, elle est à la fois renforcée et confrontée par les réseaux sociaux et les mouvements sociaux. Le nationalisme cimente également la domination de longue date des régimes autocratiques en Afrique de l'Ouest, en particulier au Togo, au Bénin et au Sénégal. Soutenus par la marchandisation du système des partis, les autocrates ont mis en place un État fantôme. Ils utilisent le populisme pour étayer leur pouvoir illégitime et déstabiliser l'opposition. Internet et les médias sociaux jouent un rôle crucial dans la diffusion de fausses nouvelles par le biais de médias principalement contrôlés par l'État. L'Église catholique tenta aussi, sans grand succès, de contrer la vague de nationalisme. Au Bénin, par exemple, en 2019, les évêques de Cotonou ont appelé à "un jeûne sur les mensonges qui inondent et empoisonnent les relations interpersonnelles et sociales". À Lomé, la conférence des évêques a condamné la persécution systématique de l'opposition et l'arrestation de son leader, candidat à la présidence et ancien Premier ministre Agbeyome Kodjo. Le Sénégal, comme le Bénin, a longtemps été présenté comme une "vitrine de la démocratie" en Afrique, y compris la transition politique pacifique. Mais les choses ont radicalement changé avec l'élection présidentielle sénégalaise de 2019, qui a apporté de nouvelles configurations. L'un des principaux problèmes était la transhumance politique, élevée au rang de religion au mépris de la morale politique. Il menaçait la stabilité politique et la paix. En réponse, les réseaux sociaux de jeunes militants pour la plupart créés en 2011 après le printemps arabe se sont concentrés sur la campagne des électeurs de base pour la bonne gouvernance et la démocratie. Ils ont proposé de rompre avec un système politique qu'ils considéraient comme néo-colonialiste. Des militants comme "Y'en a marre" (littéralement "j'en ai marre") et d'autres mouvements sociaux dissidents profitent des conditions sociales particulières du pays, qui favorisent l'action collective. Si le président Macky Sall optait pour un troisième mandat en 2024, cela poserait à nouveau un sérieux défi à la démocratie sénégalaise.

Ergebnisse der wöchentlichen Umfragen, welches Thema aus Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft die Bundesbürger persönlich am meisten beschäftigt.

COVID-19, arguably the new millennium's most trying test of state capacity, caught the world off guard. In order to contain the spread of the virus, governments had to respond quickly and comprehensively: strict lockdowns, movement restrictions, masks, and social distancing - measures that draw not only on public resources but also on the buy-in and cooperation of civil society. Citizen compliance and cooperation are founded on trust in government institutions. As such, the pandemic has also been a stress test for trust in government. Trust in government is a crucial determinant of effective crisis management, and governments lacking such trust suffer a profound disadvantage. In many instances, strict lockdown measures were accompanied by an expansion of executive powers. This creates power imbalances, or aggravates existing ones, and poses a threat to trust in government. High levels of vaccine hesitancy, a looming recession, and expectations of government support require ongoing efforts to build and ensure trust in government. Even though many African countries seem to have gotten through the coronavirus crisis relatively well until now, vaccine hesitancy and looming recessions pose ongoing challenges for trust in government. Hence, governments must actively engage in building trust as they prepare for future crises. The Ebola epidemic has shown that a bottom-up approach entailing collaboration with pre-existing networks and institutions at the local level can facilitate this process. In contexts where executive powers have been expanded, the evolution of this process needs to be carefully monitored.

Dieser Bericht enthält zwölf mögliche Szenarien für die Welt im Jahr 2030. Er bietet Einblicke darin, wie die EU angesichts der großen disruptiven Veränderungen, die in diesem Jahrzehnt voraussichtlich aufkommen werden, ihre Handlungsfähigkeit erhalten und ausbauen kann. Die Publikation erschien im Vorfeld der Bundestagswahl im September 2021, die als Referendum über ein zehn Jahre andauerndes Krisenmanagement der Regierung gewertet werden kann.

Technocratic governments and similar systems that give more voice to experts in the decision-making process are one of the potential alternatives to traditional representative party government. These alternatives have become increasingly popular, especially in countries where strong political disaffection and previous favourable pro-expert attitudes exist simultaneously. The Spanish case is one of these settings, with the emergence of a political party, Ciudadanos (Citizens), that represents these ideas. This article contributes to the understanding of public opinion support for an expert government, its main motives, and social supports. We claim that experts are not so much a decision-making alternative as they are a desired piece of the decision-making process. Support for a more significant role for experts comes especially from those that credit them with ample technical capacities, but most citizens want them to work as a piece of representative government, not as an alternative to it. The article combines two types of evidence: A survey of a representative sample of the population, including innovative questions about support to expert governments, and 10 focus groups that allow a more in-depth comprehension of the support (and criticism) of an increased role for experts. The results provide a nuanced picture of the types of expert involvement sought and their respective social support.

During his election campaign, Jair Bolsonaro promised economic recovery, the fight against corruption, and an iron hand against violent crime - today, these tasks rep­resent the weak spots of the President: Brazil has become an epicentre of the Covid‑19 pandemic. Even though Bolsonaro downplays the situation and opposes containment measures, the virus and the chaotic crisis management are bringing about serious nega­tive health, social, and economic consequences for the citizens. Investigations, in­cluding those on corruption, and revelations about the Justice Minister who resigned are targeting the President and his family. While the homicide rate is on the rise again in 2020, Bolsonaro pleaded in a cabinet meeting for armed resistance from the population against the health protection policies in the federal states. Threatened by impeachment, the President is struggling for his political survival, challenging the rule of law and democratic principles. (author's abstract)

Hätte man einen Kenner der spanischen Politik bei der nationalen Parlamentswahl von 2008 nach den Veränderungen in den kommenden zwölf Jahren gefragt, hätte er wohl kaum vorhergesagt, dass bald über 30 Prozent der Stimmen auf Parteien entfallen würden, die es zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch gar nicht gab. Die rechtsradikale Partei Vox ("Stimme"), die bei der Parlamentswahl im November 2019 einen Stimmenanteil von etwa 15 Prozent erhielt, existiert erst seit Ende 2013. Unidos Podemos ("Gemeinsam schaffen wir das"), eine sich selbst als linkspopulistisch präsentierende Partei, die auf dem Höhepunkt ihres Erfolges 2016 etwas mehr als 21 Prozent der nationalen Stimmen erhielt, wurde erst wenige Wochen zuvor gegründet. Die Partei Ciudadanos ("Bürger"), auf die bei der Wahl im April 2019 fast 16 Prozent der abgegebenen Stimmen entfielen, war ursprünglich eine 2006 gegründete katalanische Regionalpartei, die erst seit 2015 an nationalen Wahlen teilnimmt. Demgegenüber sank der Stimmenanteil der zwei einstmals führenden sozialistischen und konservativen Altparteien - Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, "Spanische Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei") und Partido Popular (PP, "Volkspartei") - von gemeinsam fast 84 Prozent im Jahr 2008 auf knapp 49 Prozent bei der Wahl im November 2019.

Zusammenfassung Die Richtlinienkompetenz ist im Zuge der Auseinandersetzungen um die Asylpolitik die Diskussion geraten. Es zeigt sich, dass ihre Inanspruchnahme zur Konfliktlosung nicht nur ungeeignet war, sondern sich kontraproduktiv, namlich krisenverscharfend wirkte. Schlagworter: Bundeskanzler, Richtlinienkompetenz, Kanzler- und Ressortprinzip, Regierungspraxis ----- Bibliographie: Pehle, Heinrich: Die Richtlinienkompetenz der Bundeskanzlerin, und wie man mit ihr (nicht) umgehen sollte, GWP - Gesellschaft. Wirtschaft. Politik, 3-2018, S. 291-294. https://doi.org/10.3224/gwp.v67i3.01

Die Forderung nach buen vivir geht auf dekoloniale Kämpfe in Bolivien und Ecuador zurück. Gleichzeitig prägen transnationale Prozesse die Entwicklung des Konzepts und tragen zu seiner Wirkmächtigkeit bei. Im Kontext dieser vielschichtigen Wechselbeziehungen verfolgen die Protagonist_innen des buen vivir unterschiedliche skalare Strategien. Für die indigenen Organisationen steht buen vivir in einem engen Zusammenhang mit der Verteidigung ihres Territoriums und der Bewahrung der indigenen Kultur. Sie konzentrieren sich auf regionale und überregionale (bis hin zur kontinentalen) Vernetzungsarbeit und agieren zusätzlich auf zentralstaatlicher Ebene, um weitergehende Selbstbestimmungsrechte für die indigenen Gemeinden zu erwirken. Dagegen plädieren die in der Wissenschaft und in politischen Stiftungen tätigen lateinamerikanischen und europäischen Intellektuellen für eine diskursive Öffnung des Konzepts, um buen vivir auch in internationalen und transkontinentalen Arenen als Alternative zum wachstumsbasierten Entwicklungsmodell etablieren zu können. Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt sich die Frage, ob die diskursive Öffnung des buen vivir emanzipatorische Prozesse stärkt und deshalb forciert werden sollte oder ob die damit verbundene tendenzielle Entleerung des Begriffs im Gegenteil zu einer Schwächung der Mobilisierungsfähigkeit sozialer Bewegungen führt. Der Autor vertritt die These, dass die Debatten um die Vor- und Nachteile einer explizit indigenen vs. einer pluralistischen Ausrichtung des buen vivir nicht sehr virulent werden und auch nicht zu Brüchen innerhalb des Bewegungsspektrums führen werden, solange die Hauptkonfliktlinie zwischen Unterstützer_innen und Kritiker_innen der bolivianischen und ecuadorianischen Regierungen verläuft., While the claim for buen vivir goes back to de-colonial struggles in Bolivia and Ecuador, transnational processes have also influenced buen vivir’s development and contributed to its impact. In this context of complex correlations, the protagonists of buen vivir pursue diverse strategies on different scales. Indigenous organisations link the concept of buen vivir with the defence of their territory and the conservation of their culture. They focus on regional and trans-regional (up to continental) cooperation, as well as operate at the level of central government in order to achieve greater indigenous rights for self-determination. Conversely, Latin American and European intellectuals (working in science or for political foundations) advocate for a discursive opening of the concept. Their aim is to establish buen vivir in international and transcontinental arenas as an alternative to growth-based development models. Against this background the question arises as to whether a discursive opening of Buen Vivir strengthens emancipatory processes and therefore should be supported, or whether, on the contrary, the associated emptying of the signifier weakens the mobilisation capacities of social movements. The author argues that the debates regarding the advantages and disadvantages of an explicitly indigenous or pluralistic alignment of buen vivir will not escalate and cause splits within social movements so long as the main line of conflict runs between the supporters and the critics of the Bolivian and Ecuadorian governments.

This study focuses on government activity and social trust, and analyzes the effects of government effectiveness as well as the subjective recognition on the responsiveness, commitment, integrity, and democracy of government. It uses the data of 49,807 respondents from 34 countries (38 regions) in the 2014 Citizenship II survey of International Social Survey Programme, and the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank. Using hierarchical linear modeling, it shows the positive effects of government effectiveness, democracy, and GDP per capita at the national level on the respondents’ social trust. At the individual level, the corruption and democracy of government are significantly associated with social trust. Among the control variables, participation in a group (sports, leisure or cultural), a voluntary association or an interest group (trade union, business, or professional), and degree are positively related to social trust, but sex, age, and participation in political party, or religious organization are not significant. This result means that both the contextual factor on government activity at the national level and the subjective recognition at the individual level are related to social trust, and shows the possibility that the government may contribute to enhance the level of social trust when it conducts properly its own roles. Finally, it discusses the limitations of this study as well as its academic and practical implications.

On 5 August 2019, India's home minister Amit Shah made a shock announcement revoking India's constitutional guarantee of autonomy to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This article focuses on the wider ideological context of Hindu nationalism that has spurred this decision in order to assess the move's far-reaching implications for Indian democracy and peace in South Asia. In addition to the revocation of autonomy, a key condition of Kashmir's accession to India, India has further partitioned the state into two parts and downgraded its status to a centrally administered territory. This consolidation of the hard-line stance taken by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government in Kashmir since assuming power is bound to fuel further alienation and resentment. The unilateral decision calls into question India's other federal arrangements too - for instance, with states in India's north-east that also enjoy various degrees of autonomy, increasing the chance of disaffection and instability within the country. The decision also has the potential to spark tensions with Pakistan and China, both of which occupy portions of Kashmir's territory. Pakistan, which lays claim to the entire Muslim-majority province, has already downgraded its diplomatic relations with India. China, which claims rights to the north-eastern portion of Kashmir, has also issued a warning. Increased disaffection among the Kashmiri population is also likely to spur intervention by non-state Islamic groups, resulting in long-term strife. According to a Hindu Right dictum, only a display of might will get India its due in the world. This high-risk manoeuvre in Kashmir appears to be the Modi government's way of testing this axiom. The consolidation of Hindu nationalist politics in India suggests the government is likely to take a more belligerent stance in world politics, especially in issues concerning national security. EU decision-makers can expect to deal with a more uncompromising and hard-line India in their future engagements with the country.

Thanks to economic growth, Poland’s ruling PiS party has introduced social programs that have further bolstered its popularity. Unlike in recent European elections, the opposition is not running as a unified bloc in parliamentary elections on October 13, 2019. If PiS again wins a majority, it will take steps to cement its system of illiberal democracy. As long as he maintains good relations with Donald Trump, PiS’s leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski does not seem wary of reactions from Brussels and Berlin.

Boris Johnson geht auf Konfrontationskurs: Seit seiner Ernennung zum Premier­minister des Vereinigten Königreichs ordnet er die Agenda seiner Regierung dem Ziel unter, die EU um jeden Preis zum 31. Oktober 2019 zu verlassen - mit zunehmender Wahrscheinlichkeit ohne Abkommen. An seinen ersten Amtshandlungen wird deut­lich, dass der Wechsel mehr ist als eine Stabsübergabe, wie sie bei einem Führungswechsel inner­halb einer Partei üblich ist. Die Konservative Partei wandelt sich unter seiner Führung endgültig zur Partei des harten No-Deal Brexits, während die Opposition zerstritten bleibt. Ein Machtkampf mit dem Parlament ist in vollem Gange. Ange­sichts einer nur noch theoretisch denkbaren Parlamentsmehrheit sind vorgezogene Neu­wahlen unausweichlich. Entscheidend ist dabei ihr Zeitpunkt: ob vor oder nach dem EU-Austritt. In Anbetracht dessen muss auch die EU ihre Brexit-Strategie überdenken. (Autorenreferat)

The article mainly seeks to explain the legislature's preferences in social welfare before and after democratization using South Korea as a case study. Based on an original dataset that consists of all executive and of legislative branch-submitted bills between 1948 and 2016 - roughly 60,000- legislative priority on social welfare is compared over time, and tested using logistic regressions. The key focus of analysis is whether and how the level of democracy affected the degree and universality of social welfare priority. The findings show that the promotion of social welfare is positively related to higher levels of democracy in a continuous fashion, which clearly points to the need to avoid applying a simple regime dichotomy - authoritarian or democratic - when seeking to understand social welfare development. Going further, the article examines the legislature's priority in welfare issues within a presidential structure and under majoritarian electoral rule, at different levels of democracy. The result shows that the higher levels of democracy are, the more the legislative branch contributes to the overall salience of social welfare legislative initiatives as compared to the executive branch. Moreover, the legislative branch itself prioritizes a social welfare agenda - alongside democratic deepening - over other issues.

Sri Lanka emerges from this latest election with a hung Parliament in 2015. A coalition called the United National Front for Good Governance (UNFGG) won 106 seats and secured ten out of 22 electoral districts, including Colombo to obtain the largest block of seats at the parliamentary polls, though it couldn’t secure a simple majority in 225-member parliament. It also has the backing of smaller parties that support its agenda of electoral. In the August parliamentary election, the former president Rajapaksa forces upped the nationalist ante and campaigned to win a majority of parliamentary seats with the votes of the Sinhala Buddhists only, but extreme appeals to nationalism failed to get traction in the elections among the Sinhalese. It is fair to say that the double blow against nationalism in the south was occasioned by the politics of good governance promoted by the UNP and its alliance in the election. In Sri Lanka’s eighth General elections, none of the two major political alliances- the (UNF), nor the (UPFA)- gained a clear majority in the election. More important, for the fourth time the fragmentation of seats among the major parties and regional level party has inaugurated a period of unstable coalition governments, creating an air of political and economic ambiguity in the nation as it enters a post- Mahinda Rajapakse era. This study is based on an interpretive approach. The data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. The study examines distinguishes the 2015 election from previous ones and what extent? What are the major factors leads to defeat the ruling party? However, this study argues that the election results are indicative not only of the decline of Mahinda Rajapakse era but also of a gradual transition toward good governance.

South Korea under President Park Chung Hee underwent rapid industrialization and experienced phenomenal economic growth making the country one of the Asian Tigers alongside Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Had suffered by the long-standing Japanese colonialization, South Korea's development strategies in its incipient economic venture, interestingly, postulate unforeseen similarities with those imposed by Japan primarily during the phenomenal industrial revolution of the Meiji government (1868-1912). Exponential modernization in South Korea was substantially forged by the implementation of "developmental state" model. The term was initially coined by Johnson (1982) to explain the pacification of government policies -rather than market- to achieve successful economic rejuvenation of post-war Japan. In light to this historical paradox between South Korea and Japan, this article attempts to revisit the embarking point of South Korea's rapid economic development beginning in the 1960s by drawing attention to the importance of leadership as one of the major components of the developmental state model. It concludes that Park Chung Hee's strong Japanese linkage combined with his pretext for imposing "hard authoritarianism" is particularly influential in determining South Korea’s pragmatic development trajectory.

Eurosceptic rhetoric that PASOK had been expressing for years and had been constantly using for its confrontation with right-wing opponents (Nea Dimokratia). The fall of the junta and the return of Constantine Karamanlis is basically the starting point for PASOK's official expression of hard Euroscepticism. PASOK, as a genuine socialist party, rejected any form of participation in Western-style organizations and was therefore a major ardent against the European idea and European policy of Greece. Initially the party believed that European Integration could only harm the already fragile Greek economy and lead it to a further recession. PASOK took office for the first time in 1981 with the Greek economy presenting structural problems such as unemployment and stagnation. In addition to economic problems the government had to cope with the participation in the European institutions, which had emerged as a consequence of the proposed accession to the EEC by the previous government. Even before taking up duties, PASOK began to revise its political attitude towards the EEC, and it was not talking about leaving anymore. Yet, it opted for a special relationship. The prospect of taking power along with the tension that accompanied this prospect, transformed and evolved PASOK into a different party with genuine pro-European characteristics. The purpose of this paper is to indicate that as the probability for PASOK to take over the country's governance increased, a qualitative change of Euroscepticism from hard to moderate (1977-81) took place. In fact, friction with government power turned it into a pro-European party (1981-89). This analysis will examine specific events that played a role in shaping both governmental and party preferences during the period under consideration. Finally, an important point will be to draw critical conclusions about the reasons why PASOK revised its European ideas and transformed itself into a social-democratic party with a strong unifying factor up to date.

Am 19. Juli 2018 hat das israelische Parlament das sogenannte Nationalstaatsgesetz verabschiedet. Das Gesetz ist in Israel wie auch im internationalen Kontext stark umstritten, obwohl es strenggenommen nur wenige Neuerungen enthält. Seine Befürworter betonen, dass darin nur Realitäten zum Ausdruck kämen. Kritiker machen geltend, das Gesetz diskriminiere Minderheiten, richte sich gegen demo­kratische Werte und unterschlage insbesondere das Prinzip der Gleichheit. Dabei offenbart die Debatte in Israel das gesellschaftliche Spannungsverhältnis zwischen "jüdischer" und "demokratischer" Identität. Zudem zeigt sich, dass die maßgeblichen Unterstützer des Gesetzes auf Regierungsseite weiterreichende Absichten verfolgen, als dessen Wortlaut erkennen lässt. Ihnen geht es darum, jüdische Kollektivrechte über indivi­duelle Rechte und Freiheiten zu stellen. Das Gesetz ist daher auch eine Manifesta­tion derzeitiger Regierungspolitik, die darauf abzielt, Israel weg von einer eher libera­len und hin zu einer majoritären Demokratie zu führen. Insbesondere der Oberste Ge­richtshof als Verteidiger liberaler Prinzipien ist von dieser Politik betroffen. (Autorenreferat)

It really is quite amazing. In the few weeks since Abiy Ahmed was elected Prime Minister of Ethiopia, nearly all the established facts that underpin Ethiopian politics have started to unravel. The new Prime Minister has apologized to the population for the mistakes of the past, ended the border war with Eritrea without making any demands and dismissed key officials from the old regime. At the same time, he has lifted the state of emergency and liberalized the economy - all this was previously considered unthinkable in Ethiopia. Control, internal security and a close-knit collective of former liberation fighters were the defining elements of a style of politics that provided stability and economic growth for a long time, but neglected the country’s rapidly growing young population and its concerns. (Autorenreferat)

Das internationale Handelssystem wandelt sich rapide. Wer glaubte, das in der WTO kodifizierte Regelwerk würde Macht und Willkür einhegen und Handelskriege verhindern, sieht sich angesichts der drohenden Protektionismus-Spirale eines Besseren belehrt. Erstaunlich ist die Ursache: Die US-Regierung ist der Auffassung, von den bestehenden Regeln benachteiligt zu werden, die doch von den USA wesentlich mitbestimmt wurden. Darum arbeitet sie derzeit massiv an der Auflösung des Systems. (Autorenreferat)

Immer mehr Regierungen in Subsahara-Afrika kontrollieren zivilgesellschaftliche Gruppen, die sich für Menschenrechte einsetzen. Damit engen sie nicht nur den Raum für zivilgesellschaftliche Aktivitäten ein, sie zerstören auch das Rückgrat der Demokratie und Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten. Seit den frühen 2000er-Jahren schrumpfen zivilgesellschaftliche Freiräume in vielen Ländern Subsahara-Afrikas und in anderen Weltregionen. Unter anderem schüchtern Regierungen Aktivisten ein, erlassen restriktive Gesetze oder erschweren die offizielle Registrierung von zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen. Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen beobachten Menschenrechtsverletzungen und machen diese öffentlich. Wenn Regierungen schwere Verstöße gegen Menschenrechte begehen, ergibt sich daraus ein Anreiz, kritische Organisationen mundtot zu machen. Dieser Anreiz ist stärker und die Zivilgesellschaft ist in größerer Gefahr, wenn Regierungen internationalem Druck ausgesetzt sind, Menschenrechtsabkommen einzuhalten. Vereinzelte Restriktionen bringen die Zivilgesellschaft nicht zum Schweigen. Stattdessen protestieren Aktivisten gegen diese Restriktionen und finden kreative Wege, Menschenrechtsverletzungen bekannt zu machen, z.B. über soziale Medien. Es gibt jedoch einen besorgniserregenden Rückgang öffentlicher Kritik, wenn Regierungen systematisch durch verschiedene Restriktionen zivilgesellschaftliche Freiräume einschränken. Der schwindende Raum für zivilgesellschaftliche Aktivitäten macht auf unbeabsichtigte Folgen von internationalem Engagement für die Einhaltung der Menschenrechte aufmerksam. Dennoch sollten sich Europa und Deutschland nicht von den Verteidigern der Menschenrechte in Subsahara-Afrika abwenden - auch nicht im Zuge der politischen Förderungen von privatwirtschaftlichen Investitionen in afrikanischen Ländern im Rahmen des "Compact with Africa" der führenden Wirtschaftsnationen (G20). Nur eine unabhängige und aktive Zivilgesellschaft kann die Demokratie vertiefen und eine gerechte und nachhaltige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Subsahara-Afrika und anderswo gewährleisten.

Der Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas (KPCh) im Oktober 2017 und die Tagung des Nationalen Volkskongresses (NVK) im März 2018 haben eine neue Ära in der politischen Entwicklung der Volksrepublik eingeläutet. Beschlossen wurde eine Fülle ideologischer, konstitutioneller, organisatorischer und personeller Neuerungen. Zusammen markieren sie das Ende der von Deng Xiaoping im Jahr 1978 eingeleiteten Reformära. Die Kanonisierung der "Xi-Jinping-Ideen zum Sozialismus chinesischer Prägung für eine neue Ära" stellen diesen nach nur fünf Amtsjahren auf eine Stufe mit Mao Zedong und Deng Xiaoping. Programmatisch beinhalten die Xi-Jinping-Ideen nicht mehr nur ein Wohlstandsversprechen, sondern ein explizites internationales Statusstreben. Die jüngsten Verfassungsänderungen greifen tief in die konstitutionelle Architektur ein, indem die bisherige Fiktion einer Trennung zwischen Partei und Staat nun endgültig aufgegeben wird. Die Entfristung des Staatspräsidentenamtes und die Einrichtung einer Nationalen Aufsichtskommission als verlängerter Arm der Partei bestätigen dies. Ein massiver Umbau von Partei- und Regierungsorganen zielt auf eine effektivere Regierungsführung zur Bewältigung sozioökonomischer und finanzieller Risiken. Mit der Zentralisierung werden aber zugleich wichtige exekutive Aufgaben in die Hände der Partei verschoben. Die Führung hat darauf verzichtet, einen designierten Nachfolger für Xi Jinping zu bestimmen. Auch der Bruch mit informellen Altersgrenzen spricht für Vermutungen, wonach Xi die Spitzenämter in Partei, Staat und Militär über das Jahr 2023 hinaus behalten könnte. Die umfangreichen Neuerungen markieren den Aufbruch Chinas in eine neue Ära, die Reminiszenzen an die Herrschaft Mao Zedongs weckt. Angesichts des erreichten Entwicklungsstands des Landes verweisen sie zugleich aber auf ein neues Selbstverständnis im globalen Kontext. Die Führung will sich damit schlagkräftiger aufstellen, um sich künftig besser für internationale Konflikte zu wappnen. Europäische Entscheidungsträger sollten darauf gefasst sein, dass in Chinas Selbstwahrnehmung im wörtlichen Sinne "neue Zeiten" angebrochen sind, die auch auf internationalem Parkett neue Verhaltensweisen rechtfertigen.

A growing number of governments in sub-Saharan Africa are now cracking down on civil society organisations addressing human rights issues. Governments are not only shrinking the space for civic activism, but also des­troying the backbone of democracy and inclusive development. In many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, civic space has been shrinking since the early 2000s - mirroring a global trend of restrictions being imposed on civil society organisations. Governments intimidate and arrest activists, and publicly criticise their advocacy work. They also promulgate restrictive policies, such as laws that curtail the foreign funding of domestic civil society groups, and resort to subtle ways of restricting civil society's operating space - for instance, via cumbersome registration processes for civil society organisations. Civil society organisations monitor and publicly expose human rights abuses. If governments commit severe abuses, they therefore have an incentive to impose restrictions on civil society activists and to silence their criticism. This incentive is stronger and civil society in greater danger when governments face pressure to live up to international human rights norms - for instance, if they have previously committed to human rights treaties or fear investigation by the International Criminal Court. Isolated and sporadic government restrictions do not silence civil society. Instead, activists protest such restrictions and find creative ways of making human rights violations known - for example, via social media. However there has been a worrying decline in publicly voiced criticism recently as governments impose a large number of different restrictions, ones that render it difficult and indeed dangerous to expose government misbehaviour. The shrinking of civic space calls attention to the unintended consequences of promoting human rights abroad. International pressure to live up to human rights norms has led governments to impose restrictions on domestic civil society activists to silence their criticism. Nevertheless, the current policy shift towards mobilising private investment in selected African countries (per the G20 Compact with Africa) should not deflect international attention from the precarious situation of human rights defenders. Only an independent and active civil society can deepen democracy and guarantee equitable and sustainable economic development in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere.

How, if at all, does the Commission’s expertise inform intergovernmental decision-making within the EU? In this article, we aim to capture the relationship between the Commission’s expertise and its influence within intergovernmental policy-areas through a study of Commission influence in two least likely sectors: security and defence policies (military mission Atalanta and EU Maritime Security Strategy) and external migration (EU mobility partnerships with third countries). In these cases we observe that the Commission strongly informs policy developments even though it has only limited formal competences. To explore whether and, if so, how this influence is linked to its expertise, we develop and consider two hypotheses: The expert authority hypothesis and the expert arguments hypothesis. To identify possible additional channels of influence, we also consider the relevance of two alternative hypotheses: The strategic coalition hypothesis and the institutional circumvention hypothesis. We find that the Commission’s use of its expertise is indeed key to understanding its de facto influence within policy-areas where its formal competences remain limited. Our findings add to the existing literature by revealing how expertise matters. Specifically, our cases show that the Commission informs intergovernmental decision-making by successfully linking discussions to policy-areas where it holds expert authority. However, the Commission also informs EU policies by circumventing the formal lines of intergovernmental decision-making, and by cooperating with member states that share its preference for further integration.

This paper evaluates the impact of competing “democratic” discourses on human rights protection in Southeast Asia. The authors identify three key discourses emanating from a set of national governmental policies, advocacy positions promoted by both global and local civil society and international standards and procedures adopted by members of inter-governmental organisations. These discourses, the authors argue, are collectively shaping the emerging ASEAN inter-governmental human rights regime. The political impact of these competing “democratic” discourses and their complex interactions bring a cultural dimension to regional human rights. The authors argue that observers seeking to understand the emergence of norms, the establishment of institutions and their capacity to collectively protect regional human rights, need to understand these competing discourses. (author's abstract)

Armed rebellion has remained a constant decimal in the relation between the states and rebel groups in contemporary strategic discourse. The resolve by the Niger people of Nigeria to resort to arms and their agitations appear to have found deeper understanding within the context of history. This paper takes a historical look at the foundations of the agitations of the people of the Niger Delta and the ultimate decision to address their displeasure through the use terror or armed rebellion. It addresses the philosophy underpinning self-determination programmes of the Niger Delta militants and the responses of Nigerian state to the agitations of the Niger Delta militants. The paper therefore concludes that the use of arms as the ultimate ratio may remain the future of relationship in the Niger Delta because of the fundamental defects in the policies of the Nigerian state.

This paper endeavors to review the inter-state relation in Southeast Asia countries. Especially in government policy. The most significant problem in regional relationship is about the absence of political awareness. As a consequence, ASEAN only provides limited positive achievement in political performance regionally. This article provides an alternative explanation for the limited achievement in political performance of ASEAN by assessing the implication of using non-interference principe to the incidence of ignorance and disconnection between ASEAN countries that leads to lack of political awareness. In this paper, we try to propose a combination between formal diplomacy actions done by state institution and informal diplomacy actions done by non-government actors. We also points out an alternative strategy to promote political awareness on the future of SEA community. First, open policy to connecting diplomatic based community. Second, optimalize the regional cooperation with more concern with democracy and human rights issue. Third, building and institutionalizing political awareness through people participation.

One of President Trump's first actions upon assuming power was to come back to his campaign threats regarding trade with Mexico and against Mexican migrants, including the construction of an ominous wall. Meanwhile, the Mexican government has itself recently destroyed the only pillar on which a minimum level of public peace rested in the last decade and a half: economic stability.

The impeachment of President Park Gyeun-hye on 10 March 2017 saw South Korean politics enter a period of crisis. Her removal from office, the result of an unprecedented mass movement of citizen protests, provided a springboard for the subsequent success of the liberal candidate, Moon Jae-in, in the presidential election of 9 May 2017. This article suggests that political change in South Korea is only possible if actors move beyond the politics of personality, and tackle the structural reasons for the policy failures of recent times. Further, if democracy, a humane economic system and responsive political institutions are going to be developed and nourished, the country’s ‘imperial presidency’ needs to be reformed. In particular, the current ‘winner-takes-all’ politics, with the presidency as the main locus of power, needs to be reformed in ways that promote a more balanced political system, increasing the influence of other actors and institutions.

The recently established presidents in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru are seeking to implement governmental agendas that represent a policy shift with respect to previous administrations. However, in doing so, they face political and social constraints. Executive politics - that is, the presidential approach to the design of the highest executive agencies and appointment strategies - stands out as a tool to improve presidential leeway and coordination capacity. Since late 2015 the Latin American left has faced setbacks due to the election of President Mauricio Macri of Argentina and President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski of Peru, as well as former vice president Michel Temer's assumption of power in Brazil after the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. In Argentina and Peru these power shifts in the presidency were accompanied by minority support in Congress. In Brazil, in contrast, Temer built a large co­alition in Congress, albeit within a highly polarised political and social context that threatens its cohesiveness and survival. To face congressional oppositions, attentive publics, and organised social sectors that seek to hinder their policy goals, Latin American presidents need to use their important constitutional policymaking powers - as well as their prerogatives to appoint officials and to design the executive's upper-level structure - wisely and strategically. The three presidents have established smaller institutional presidencies than their predecessors - that is, they have reduced their core structure of close aids and supports. At the same time, they have given more power to the cabinet ministers, as well as to the cabinet coordination units, with the goal of aligning the executive with the president's policy preferences. The constitutional powers that presidents have to conduct the policymaking process, particularly in Congress, are important governing tools, but executive politics represents an equally crucial strategy. Presidents use changes to the executive's design and political appointments to influence the creation of policies and achieve their policy goals. These are important (although often neglected) presidential tools, particularly when presidents are dealing with reform ­agendas within constraining political environments.

This article argues that communitarianism, as the prevalent citizenship paradigm in the Philippines, observable also in modest expectations towards government services among Filipinos and a high emphasis on individual and community action, can be used to explain the lack of political change in the Philippines. In its first part, the article presents data on the sense of citizenship and concepts of social rights and obligations among Filipinos by combining findings from a series of problem-centered interviews with young urban professionals and quantitative data collected within annual surveys by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on government, social inequality, and citizenship. The second part of the article attributes these findings to everyday concepts of citizenship as ideal-typical state responsibility theories and modern citizenship paradigms. By including ethnographic data, it discovers significant traits of communitarianism in Philippine everyday life. This section goes on to present how communitarianism (with its inherent character of exclusivity) impedes a democratic culture and moreover, how it is unable to serve as a guiding social philosophy in unifying a large-scale society mainly consisting of citizens who are strangers (ibang tao) to each other. Nevertheless, in conclusion, the article suggests the possibility of deepening and broadening the sense of citizenship in the Philippine society and its respect for the stranger by drawing on elements of Filipino culture., Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, Vol 10 No 1 (2017): Gender, Ethnicity, and Environmental Transformations

US-Präsident Trumps Handeln wirkt auf viele Beobachter impulsiv und erratisch. Dennoch zeigt es in seiner vermeintlichen Inkohärenz eine klare Linie und ein klares Ziel: Es geht darum, die Rolle des Staates in den USA radikal zu beschneiden. Er könnte damit durchkommen - trotz der vehementen Kritik, die ihm insbesondere seit den Zwischenfällen in Charlotteville aus Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft entgegenschallt.

With US President Trump in office for half a year now, some people are still hoping that he will back away from his proclaimed protectionist policies. ­Given the current mood of populism in the United States, however, we cannot assume that Trump will yield to the pressure from domestic companies with a strong stake in China and return to some kind of "realpolitik." As a result, trade protectionism, investment barriers, and competition over global technological leadership will likely increase under the Trump administration, opening up new space for cooperation between the European Union and China. Populists in the United States are blaming globalisation for the loss of jobs and rising economic insecurity. They want to halt the shift of global economic power in favour of other countries. Trump is accusing China of profiting disproportionally from global free trade. China–US trade disputes within the World Trade Organization framework can be expected to intensify. Concurrently, bilateral trade agreements are preferred by the Trump administration, as it believes the United States can reap trade benefits more effectively this way. The United States will strengthen its request for better access to the Chinese market, while Chinese direct investment in the United States will come under more pressure. We can expect that China's acquisitions of US companies with sensitive technology will be further restricted. The US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is expected to lead to a decrease in US economic influence in Asia. The Trump administration seems to prioritise the short-term satisfaction of its populist clientele over the long-term impact on US competitiveness in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the Trump administration, we can expect that tension in US–China economic relations will increase. While the United States will remain an important economic partner of the European Union, the latter should use the window of opportunity to strengthen its trade and investment relations with China. Concluding the EU–China Investment Agreement will be an important step in this direction. In the light of Trump's "America First" policy, the Chinese side might be more willing to enter into this agreement, which will protect investments and facilitate greater market access for European companies.

Die Forschung zur digitalen Spaltung (Digital Divide) oder auch Beteiligungsspaltung (Participation Divide) hat diverse Voraussetzungen einer partizipativen Internetnutzung untersucht. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei eine immer größere Vielzahl förderlicher „Literacies“ oder Kompetenzen. Um einer zunehmenden Unübersichtlichkeit dieses Forschungsfelds entgegenzutreten, haben erste konzeptionelle Studien das umfassendere Konzept der „digitalen Mündigkeit“ vorgeschlagen. Basierend auf einer interdisziplinären Literaturanalyse erarbeitet der vorliegende Beitrag eine Definition der „digitalen Mündigkeit“, und führt das Konzept durch eine entsprechende Operationalisierung erstmals einer empirischen Analyse zu. Basierend auf einer Befragung von 1.044 deutschen Internetnutzenden wird der Einfluss der digitalen Mündigkeit – neben soziodemographischen Faktoren, politischer Orientierung und Regierungsvertrauen – auf die politische Online-Beteiligung untersucht., Politische Partizipation im Medienwandel (Digital Communication Research, Band 6)

Nach wie vor wird der Beschluss, bis zum Jahr 2022 ganz aus der Kernenergie auszusteigen und die Energieversorgung vor allem auf erneuerbare Energien umzustellen, von einer breiten Mehrheit der Bevölkerung unterstützt. Allerdings hat sich der Kreis der Unterstützer der Energiewende innerhalb des letzten Jahres verringert. Gleichzeitig hat sich der Anteil derer, die den Ausstiegsbeschluss kritisch sehen, leicht erhöht. Die Energiewende wird weiterhin von einer Mehrheit aller Bevölkerungsgruppen mitgetragen. Überdurchschnittlich ist die Unterstützung bei den Jüngeren und den politisch Interessierten, während sie von der ostdeutschen Bevölkerung etwas kritischer bewertet wird.

Main issues of complexity in a centralised system are explored, taking Austria as a case. The overall argument connects three interrelated topics of governing complexity in education: (1) an analysis of the sources of complexity in a centralised system, showing that centralisation-decentralisation is rather a continuum than a dichotomy; (2) an exploration of relations between structures in a centralised polity and policy and politics in education; (3) the production and use of knowledge and the knowledge flows as a key ingredient of governing complexity. The existing governance structures mediate between policy making and practice, and their shape depends more on the demands of power politics than on technical policy arguments of how to achieve efficacy and efficiency, at least in a centralised system. In such a system much part of its complexity is hidden behind existing formal regulations that superficially seem to ‘rationalise’ the practices of policy making. (author's abstract) Probleme von Komplexität in einem zentralistischen System werden untersucht. Die Argumentation verknüpft drei Aspekte der Governance von Komplexität: (1) die Quellen von Komplexität in einem zentralisierten System, wobei sich eher ein Kontinuum als eine Dichotomie zu dezentralen Strukturen zeigt; (2) Zusammenhänge zwischen den Strukturen einer zentralisierten Polity einerseits und Policy und Politics andererseits; (3) die Produktion und Nutzung von Wissen als Teil der Governance von Komplexität. Die Strukturen (Polity) vermitteln zwischen den politischen Prozessen und der Praxis im Bildungswesen, und diese sind in einem zentralisierten System stärker von der Machtpolitik als von der Sachpolitik bestimmt. Ein großer Teil der Komplexität wird durch die scheinbar ‚rationellen‘ formalen Strukturen versteckt. (Autorenreferat)

Der Aufsatz geht der Frage nach, wie in Deutschland - unter den derzeitigen politischen Bedingungen - gesellschaftliche Einheiten ihre Funktionen wahrnehmen und inwiefern einflussreiche Personen des öffentlichen Lebens nach einer bestimmten Ethik handeln. Max Webers Unterscheidung von Verantwortungs- und Gesinnungsethik gibt uns wichtige Anhaltspunkte für eine Untersuchung. Was tut die deutsche Regierung für die Durchsetzung des Rechtsstaates und die innere und äußere Sicherheit? Dies sind angrenzende Untersuchungsgegenstände. Merkels Regierung hat auf wirtschaftlichem Gebiet in den vergangenen zehn Jahren Wichtiges geleistet. Die Bundeswehr hat zwar nicht die internationale Sicherheit in nennenswerter Weise erhöht, hat aber dafür auch nicht an destruktiven Kriegen teilgenommen. Merkels Migrations-Politik, die sich nicht mit dem Konzept einer Verantwortungsethik erklären lässt, hat eher zu einer Schwächung des Rechtsstaates und der inneren Sicherheit beigetragen., The article addresses the question of how social units, namely the German state, are currently carrying out their functions and how people in general, and politically influential persons in particular, are acting according to certain ethics. Max Weber's distinction between an ethic of responsibility and an ethic of conviction gives us important clues for an examination of these questions. What does the German government do to fulfil its responsibilities and tasks; specifically, how does it enforce law, internal and external security? These are other relevant objects of investigation. In the past decade, Merkel's government has brought about some constructive results in the economic field. The German Federal Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr, have not increased international security in any significant way, but they also did not participate in destructive wars. Merkel's migration policy, which can not be explained with the concept of an ethics of responsibility, has instead contributed to weakening the rule of law and internal security.

Israel has been increasingly criticised for violating substantive democratic principles. The trigger was a series of decisions and initiatives. In July 2016, the Knesset adopted a stricter transparency law for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) financed from abroad, as well as a law empowering it to divest its members of their mandate. For weeks and months, government had made various suggestions for closer oversight of cultural and media institutions (for instance). There has also been repeated disapproval of Supreme Court judgements, which went hand in hand with calls for Parliament to be enabled to overrule its verdicts. These advances have had negative repercussions not just in Israel, but internationally as well. (author's abstract)

Bibliographie: Wanzek, Wanzek: Gleichstellung von Frauen und Mannern – Gedanken und Einschatzung zur Politik Sachsen-Anhalts, Femina Politica, 2-2016, S. 160-162. https://doi.org/10.3224/feminapolitica.v25i2.25363

Last month Saudi Arabia's 31-year-old deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) proposed a bold economic plan to end the kingdom's "addiction" to oil by 2030. MBS' "Vision 2030" would transform the Saudi economy by reforming the bureaucracy, bolstering the private sector, and building the world's largest public investment fund. Vision 2030 is also a promise to the kingdom's youth for greater opportunity and a more efficient and transparent government. With plunging oil prices and a budget deficit expected to reach 13.5 percent of GDP, Saudi Arabia clearly needs bold reforms.

Este artigo examina a política nuclear das administrações de Richard Nixon e Gerald Ford, por meio da análise de fontes primárias e secundárias sobre principais fatores internacionais e domésticos que as influenciaram. Argumenta-se que as diretrizes de longo prazo da política nuclear americana foram desenvolvidas nesse período, entre 1969 e 1977. Essas diretrizes podem ser divididas em três pontos principais. O primeiro é a plurilateralização do regime de não-proliferação nuclear e restrição do fornecimento de tecnologia de dual. Isso significou encontrar alternativas para instituições multilaterais existentes, por meio de negociações bilaterais de desarmamento com a URSS e por meio da criação de arranjos plurilaterais, como o GSN. O segundo ponto foi o compartilhamento da gestão da ordem internacional com poderes regionais, de modo a criar equilíbrio de poder favorável aos EUA. A última diretriz foi o aumento da competitividade das empresas americanas via privatização do setor nuclear. Este último ponto foi viabilizado na administração da Ford, dado o fracasso da iniciativa inicial de Nixon, e levou à consolidação de estrutura burocrática capaz de evitar mudanças drásticas na política de seguridade nuclear., This article addresses the nuclear policy of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations, through the analysis of secondary and primary documents on the major international and domestic factors that influenced it. It argues that the long-term guidelines of the American nuclear policy were, in fact, developed in this period, between 1969 and 1977. Those guidelines are divided into three main points. The first was plurilateralising the nuclear non-proliferation regime and restricting the supply of dual-use technology. This meant finding alternatives to multilateral institutions through bilateral disarmament negotiations with the URSS, and through the creation of plurilateral arrangements, such as the NSG. The second point was sharing the control over the world order with regional powers, to create a balance of power favourable to the US. The last guideline was increasing the competitiveness of American companies through the privatisation of the nuclear sector. This last point was made feasible by the Ford administration, after the failure of Nixon’s legislation, and led to the establishment of a strong bureaucratic structure, capable of blocking drastic shifts in nuclear safety policy.

Towards the end of 2008, as the world economy slowed and export-demand declined due to the global financial crisis, news reports began to appear detailing the return of rural migrants in China to their provincial homes. It was reported that 20 million rural migrant workers were laid off, and social instability rose due to both economic hardship and to the withholding of the payment of wages. Over time, these circumstances have changed, due to both the Chinese government's fiscal stimulus package and to those programmes that have been targeted specifically at assisting the country's rural migrants. As a result, the situation for rural migrants is no longer dire; circumstances have been greatly ameliorated by proactive government policies. To confirm these results, in this paper we look both at the situation across China and briefly at a study carried out in Sichuan province.

Regarding Southeast Asia as a multi-ethnics region, this paper attempts to examine about why Buddhist Community turns into religious violence against Rohingyas in the State of Rakhine (formerly known as Arakan). Through understanding the triggers of conflicts, this paper applies historical perspective to analyze why ethnic-religious conflict occur nowadays between Buddhist and Rohingya in Myanmar. This paper also discusses how the influence of history has constructed the government’s policy under military regime to exclude Rohingya. However, the ethno-religious conflict is either an indication of a weak state or failure state in managing diversity.Key words: Ethnic

Der Konflikt zwischen der argentinischen Regierung und der Justiz durchzieht die gesamte Präsidentschaft der beiden Kirchners, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner und ihres Vorgängers und verstorbenen Ehemanns Néstor Kirchner. Beide waren immer bestrebt, die Macht in der Exekutive zu konzentrieren. Die Auseinandersetzungen nach dem Tod des Staatsanwalts Alberto Nisman im Januar 2015 sind nur der jüngste Ausdruck dieses Konflikts. Staatsanwalt Nisman hatte die Präsidentin Cristina Fernández und ihren Außenminister heftig angegriffen. Unmittelbar nach seinem Tod hatte Cristina Fernández sehr ungeschickt agiert. Es gelang ihr jedoch bald, die politische Initiative zurückzugewinnen. Sie inszenierte einen Konflikt mit dem Obersten Gerichtshof und konnte so ihre Anhänger mobilisieren. Fragen zum Tod des Staatsanwalts gerieten in den Hintergrund. Angesichts der Zersplitterung der Opposition scheint ihre Rechnung im Wahljahr 2015 aufzugehen. Auch nach über zwanzig Jahren bleibt der Anschlag auf das jüdische Gemeindezentrum AMIA straflos. Die Hintergründe der Tat standen im Mittelpunkt eines Ermittlungsverfahrens des Staatsanwalts Alberto Nisman. Nisman hatte der Präsidentin vorgeworfen, die Strafverfolgung der Verdächtigen den bestehenden guten Beziehungen zu Iran unterzuordnen. Vor seinem bislang ungeklärten Tod hatte er eine formale Anklage gegen Cristina Fernández vorbereitet. Die Regierung reagierte zunächst ungeschickt und inszenierte dann als Ablenkungsmanöver erneut einen Konflikt mit der Judikative. Durch offene Drohungen, die Zusammensetzung des Obersten Gerichtshofs zu ändern, und mehr oder minder geheime Absprachen mit einzelnen Richtern bekam sie das Heft des Handels zurück. Die realen Hintergründe des Todes von Alberto Nisman und des Attentats von 1994 werden bei realistischer Betrachtung wohl nie aufgedeckt. Die Wahrheit bleibt auf der Strecke. Obwohl die Opposition mit dem Thema "Unabhängigkeit der Justiz" gerade im Wahljahr eine gute Möglichkeit zur Profilierung gehabt hätte, griff sie es nicht auf und demonstrierte damit ihre eigene Schwäche.

This article provides a commentary on growing awareness of human trafficking to and within the United Kingdom and government responses to it.