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Creating autonomous robots that can actively explore the environment, acquire knowledge and learn skills continuously is the ultimate achievement envisioned in cognitive and developmental robotics. Their learning processes should be based on interactions with their physical and social world in the manner of human learning and cognitive development. Based on this context, in this paper, we focus on the two concepts of world models and predictive coding. Recently, world models have attracted renewed attention as a topic of considerable interest in artificial intelligence. Cognitive systems learn world models to better predict future sensory observations and optimize their policies, i.e., controllers. Alternatively, in neuroscience, predictive coding proposes that the brain continuously predicts its inputs and adapts to model its own dynamics and control behavior in its environment. Both ideas may be considered as underpinning the cognitive development of robots and humans capable of continual or lifelong learning. Although many studies have been conducted on predictive coding in cognitive robotics and neurorobotics, the relationship between world model-based approaches in AI and predictive coding in robotics has rarely been discussed. Therefore, in this paper, we clarify the definitions, relationships, and status of current research on these topics, as well as missing pieces of world models and predictive coding in conjunction with crucially related concepts such as the free-energy principle and active inference in the context of cognitive and developmental robotics. Furthermore, we outline the frontiers and challenges involved in world models and predictive coding toward the further integration of AI and robotics, as well as the creation of robots with real cognitive and developmental capabilities in the future., Comment: 28 pages, 3 figures

Emotional concepts and their mental representations have been extensively studied. Yet, some ecologically relevant aspects, such as how they are processed in ambiguous contexts (e.g., in relation to other emotional stimuli that share similar characteristics), are incompletely known. We employed a similarity judgement of emotional concepts and manipulated the contextual congruency of the responses along the two main affective dimensions of hedonic valence and physiological activation, respectively. Behavioural and kinematics (mouse-tracking) measures were combined to gather a novel ‘similarity index’ between emotional concepts, to derive topographical maps of their mental representations. Self-report (interoceptive sensibility, positive–negative affectivity, depression) and physiological measures (heart rate variability, HRV) have been collected to explore their possible association with emotional conceptual representation. Results indicate that emotional concepts typically associated with low arousal profit by contextual congruency, with faster responses and reduced uncertainty when contextual ambiguity decreases. The emotional maps recreate two almost orthogonal axes of valence and arousal, and the similarity measure captures the smooth boundaries between emotions. The emotional map of a subgroup of individuals with low positive affectivity reveals a narrower conceptual distribution, with variations in positive emotions and in individuals with reduced arousal (such as those individuals with reduced HRV). Our work introduces a novel methodology to study emotional conceptual representations, bringing the behavioural dynamics of decision-making processes and choice uncertainty into the affective domain.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences’.

Decades of research has shown that people rate things more favorably if they have recently chosen them and less favorably if they have recently rejected them. This spreading apart of the ratings of the alternative options (“spreading of alternatives” or SoA) has been described as choice-induced preference change, where the act of choosing causes evaluations to systematically differ after choices relative to before. An important study pointed out that SoA can be detected in the data even without it being caused by a choice, as the result of a statistical artifact. This potential alternative source of SoA has encumbered researchers who investigate the phenomenon, impeding progress in the field field – and a deeper investigation of the cognitive mechanisms behind SoA. Here, we present a novel approach to control for the statistical artifact explanation through the use of regression analysis supported by computational simulations. Our approach provides a logical and computational manner of distinguishing the possible sources of SoA in experimental data that is quick and easy to implement. We demonstrate our approach by comparing theoretical predictions of the statistical artifact and other possible explanations of SoA with empirical data, and show that the statistical artifact alone cannot account for the data.

Decision-making is traditionally described as a cognitive process of deliberation followed by commitment to an action choice, preceding the planning and execution of the chosen action. However, this is challenged by recent data suggesting that during situated decisions, multiple options are specified simultaneously and compete in premotor cortical areas for selection and execution. Previous studies focused on the competition during planning and left unaddressed the dynamics of decisions during movement. Does deliberation extend into the execution phase? Are nonselected options still considered? Here we studied a decision-making task in which human participants were instructed to select a reaching path trajectory from an origin to a rectangular target, where reward was distributed nonuniformly at the target. Critically, we applied mechanical perturbations to the arm during movement to study under which conditions such perturbations produce changes of mind. Our results show that participants initially selected the direction of movement toward the highest reward region and changed their mind most frequently when the two choices offered the same reward, showing that deliberation continues and follows cost–benefit considerations during movement. Furthermore, changes of mind were dependent on the intensity of the perturbation and the current state of the motor system, including velocity and distance to targets. Although reward remains most relevant, our results indicate tthat the state of the motor system when the perturbation occurs is a crucial determinant of changes of mind.

Contains fulltext : 250990.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) The field of motor control has long focused on the achievement of external goals through action (e.g., reaching and grasping objects). However, recent studies in conditions of multisensory conflict, such as when a subject experiences the rubber hand illusion or embodies an avatar in virtual reality, reveal the presence of unconscious movements that are not goal-directed, but rather aim at resolving multisensory conflicts; for example, by aligning the position of a person's arm with that of an embodied avatar. This second, conflict-resolution imperative of movement control did not emerge in classical studies of motor adaptation and online corrections, which did not allow movements to reduce the conflicts; and has been largely ignored so far in formal theories. Here, we propose a model of movement control grounded in the theory of active inference that integrates intentional and conflict-resolution imperatives. We present three simulations showing that the active inference model is able to characterize movements guided by the intention to achieve an external goal, by the necessity to resolve multisensory conflict, or both. Furthermore, our simulations reveal a fundamental difference between the (active) inference underlying intentional and conflict-resolution imperatives by showing that it is driven by two different (model and sensory) kinds of prediction errors. Finally, our simulations show that when movement is only guided by conflict resolution, the model incorrectly infers that is velocity is zero, as if it was not moving. This result suggests a novel speculative explanation for the fact that people are unaware of their subtle compensatory movements to avoid multisensory conflict. Furthermore, it can potentially help shed light on deficits of motor awareness that arise in psychopathological conditions. 23 december 2021 29 p.

The mastery of skills such as playing tennis or balancing an inverted pendulum implies a very accurate control of movements to achieve the task goals. Traditional accounts of skilled action control that focus on either routinization or perceptual control make opposite predictions about the ways we achieve mastery. The notion of routinization emphasizes the decrease of the variance of our actions, whereas the notion of perceptual control emphasizes the decrease of the variance of the states we visit, but not of the actions we execute. Here, we studied how participants managed control tasks of varying levels of complexity, which consisted in controlling inverted pendulums of different lengths. We used information-theoretic measures to compare the predictions of alternative theoretic accounts that focus on routinization and perceptual control, respectively. Our results indicate that the successful performance of the control task strongly correlates with the decrease of state variability and the increase of action variability. As postulated by perceptual control theory, the mastery of skills consists in achieving stable control goals by flexible means., Comment: 15 pages, 7 figures

The moral decisions we make during this period, such as deciding whether to comply with quarantine rules, have unprecedented societal effects. We simulate the "escape from Milan" that occurred on March 7th-8th 2020, when many travelers moved from a high-risk zone (Milan) to southern regions of Italy (Campania and Lazio) immediately after an imminent lockdown was announced. Our simulations show that fewer than 50 active cases might have caused the sudden spread of the virus observed afterwards in these regions. The surprising influence of the actions of few individuals on societal dynamics challenges our cognitive expectations -- as in normal conditions, collective dynamics are rather robust to the decisions of few "cheaters". This situation therefore requires novel educational strategies that increase our awareness and understanding of the unprecedented effects of our individual moral decisions., Comment: Published in "Social Sciences & Humanities Open" journal (Elsevier)

This paper presents a spatial navigation task on a mobile robot by employing a deep reinforcement learning algorithm (DQN) in the Neurorobotics Platform (NRP). The navigation task carried out with a Husky robot equipped with camera and laser sensors. The robot employs sensory readings and position information to select an action and detect a target. The preliminary results show that the NRP can be considered as a realistic virtual environment for robotic agents to perform a navigation task.

Visual lexical decision is a classical paradigm in Psycholinguistic, and numerous studies have assessed a so-called "lexicality effect" (i.e., better performance with lexical over non-lexical stimuli). Far less is know relative to the dynamics of choice, as many studies measure overal reaction times which are not informative of the underlying processes. To unfold visual lexical decision in time, we measured participants' hand movements toward one of two items alternatives by recording the streaming x,y coordinates of the computer mouse. Participants categorized as 'lexical' or 'non-lexical' four kinds of stimuli: high and low frequency words, pseudowords, and letter strings. Spatial attraction toward the opposite category was present for low frequency words and pseudowords. Increasing stimuli ambiguity lead to enhcanced movements' complexity and trajectories' attraction to competitors, as no such effect was present for high frequency words and letter strings. Results fit well with dynamic models of perceptual decision-making describing the process as a competition between alternatives guided by the continuous accumulation of evidence, as well as with a recent neural model of visual word recognition that highlights the role of top-down influences and predictions on perceptual processes. More broadly, our results point to a key role of statistical decision theory to study linguistic processing in terms of dynamic and non-modular mechanisms. Finally, we discuss two aspects that make our set-up challenging for current dynamical models of decision-making: 1) not all information (e.g. ortographic, phonological and semantic) is available at the same time, therefore the accumulation process is nonstationary; 2) the choice is not completed at the action onset, but can be revised at any time during the movement.

During joint actions, humans continuously exchange coordination signals and use nonverbal, sensorimotor forms of communication. Here we discuss a specific example of sensorimotor communication-"signaling"-which consists in the intentional modification of one's own action plan (e.g., a plan for reaching a glass of wine) to make it more predictable or discriminable from alternative action plans that are contextually plausible (e.g., a plan for reaching another glass on the same table). We first review the existing evidence on signaling in human-human interactions, discussing under which conditions humans use signaling. Successively, we distill these insights into a computational theory of signaling during online interactions. Central to our approach are the following ideas: 1) signaling endows pragmatic plans with communicative goals; 2) signaling can be understood within a cost-benefit scheme, balancing the costs for the signaling agent against its benefits for interaction success; and 3) signaling may be part of an interactive strategy that optimizes success when joint goals are uncertain. Finally, we exemplify the benefits of signaling in a series of simulations and discuss how endowing robots with signaling abilities can increase the quality of human-robot interactions by making their behavior more predictable and "legible" for humans.

Distributed and hierarchical models of control are nowadays popular in computational modeling and robotics. In the artificial neural network literature, complex behaviors can be produced by composing elementary building blocks or motor primitives, possibly organized in a layered structure. However, it is still unknown how the brain learns and encodes multiple motor primitives, and how it rapidly reassembles, sequences and switches them by exerting cognitive control. In this paper we advance a novel proposal, a hierarchical programmable neural network architecture, based on the notion ofprogrammabilityand an interpreter-programmer computational scheme. In this approach, complex (and novel) behaviors can be acquired by embedding multiple modules (motor primitives) in a single,multi-purposeneural network. This is supported by recent theories of brain functioning in which skilled behaviors can be generated by combining functional different primitives embedded in “reusable” areas of “recycled” neurons. Such neuronal substrate supports flexible cognitive control, too. Modules are seen asinterpretersof behaviors having controlling input parameters, orprogramsthat encode structures of networks to be interpreted. Flexible cognitive control can be exerted by aprogrammermodule feeding the interpreters with appropriate input parameters, without modifying connectivity. Our results in a multipleT-maze robotic scenario show how this computational framework provides a robust, scalable and flexible scheme that can be iterated at different hierarchical layers permitting to learn, encode and control multiple qualitatively different behaviors.

Turn-taking is a preverbal skill whose mastering constitutes an important precondition for many social interactions and joint actions. However, the cognitive mechanisms supporting turn-taking abilities are still poorly understood. Here, we propose a computational analysis of turn-taking in terms of two general mechanisms supporting joint actions: action prediction (e.g., recognizing the interlocutor's message and predicting the end of turn) and signaling (e.g., modifying one's own speech to make it more predictable and discriminable). We test the hypothesis that in a simulated conversational scenario dyads using these two mechanisms can recognize the utterances of their co-actors faster, which in turn permits them to give and take turns more efficiently. Furthermore, we discuss how turn-taking dynamics depend on the fact that agents cannot simultaneously use their internal models for both action (or messages) prediction and production, as these have different requirements--or, in other words, they cannot speak and listen at the same time with the same level of accuracy. Our results provide a computational-level characterization of turn-taking in terms of cognitive mechanisms of action prediction and signaling that are shared across various interaction and joint action domains.