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Fueled by its successful commercialization, the recommender system (RS) has gained widespread attention. However, as the training data fed into the RS models are often highly sensitive, it ultimately leads to severe privacy concerns, especially when data are shared among different platforms. In this paper, we follow the tune of existing works to investigate the problem of secure sparse matrix multiplication for cross-platform RSs. Two fundamental while critical issues are addressed: preserving the training data privacy and breaking the data silo problem. Specifically, we propose two concrete constructions with significantly boosted efficiency. They are designed for the sparse location insensitive case and location sensitive case, respectively. State-of-the-art cryptography building blocks including homomorphic encryption (HE) and private information retrieval (PIR) are fused into our protocols with non-trivial optimizations. As a result, our schemes can enjoy the HE acceleration technique without privacy trade-offs. We give formal security proofs for the proposed schemes and conduct extensive experiments on both real and large-scale simulated datasets. Compared with state-of-the-art works, our two schemes compress the running time roughly by 10* and 2.8*. They also attain up to 15* and 2.3* communication reduction without accuracy loss.

Searchable Encryption schemes provide secure search over encrypted databases while allowing admitted information leakages. Generally, the leakages can be categorized into access and volume pattern. In most existing SE schemes, these leakages are caused by practical designs but are considered an acceptable price to achieve high search efficiency. Recent attacks have shown that such leakages could be easily exploited to retrieve the underlying keywords for search queries. Under the umbrella of attacking SE, we design a new Volume and Access Pattern Leakage-Abuse Attack (VAL-Attack) that improves the matching technique of LEAP (CCS ’21) and exploits both the access and volume patterns. Our proposed attack only leverages leaked documents and the keywords present in those documents as auxiliary knowledge and can effectively retrieve document and keyword matches from leaked data. Furthermore, the recovery performs without false positives. We further compare VAL-Attack with two recent well-defined attacks on several real-world datasets to highlight the effectiveness of our attack and present the performance under popular countermeasures.

The transition from paper-based information to Electronic-Health-Records (EHRs) has driven various advancements in the modern healthcare-industry. In many cases, patients need to share their EHR with healthcare professionals. Given the sensitive and security-critical nature of EHRs, it is essential to consider the security and privacy issues of storing and sharing EHR. However, existing security solutions excessively encrypt the whole database, thus requiring the entire database to be decrypted for each access request, which is a time-consuming process. On the other hand, the use of EHR for medical research (e.g., development of precision-medicine, diagnostics-techniques), as well as optimisation of practices in healthcare organisations, requires the EHR to be analysed, and for that, they should be easily accessible without compromising the privacy of the patient. In this paper, we propose an efficient technique called E-Tenon that not only securely keeps all EHR publicly accessible but also provides the desirable security features. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work in which an Open Database is used for protecting EHR. The proposed E-Tenon empowers patients to securely share their EHR under multi-level, fine-grained access policies defined by themselves. Analyses show that our system outperforms existing solutions in terms of computational-complexity.

Sparse inner product (SIP) has the attractive property of overhead being dominated by the intersection of inputs between parties, independent of the actual input size. It has intriguing prospects, especially for boosting machine learning on large-scale data, which is tangled with sparse data. In this paper, we investigate privacy-preserving SIP problems that have rarely been explored before. Specifically, we propose two concrete constructs, one requiring offline linear communication which can be amortized across queries, while the other has sublinear overhead but relies on the more computationally expensive tool. Our approach exploits state-of-the-art cryptography tools including garbled Bloom filters (GBF) and Private Information Retrieval (PIR) as the cornerstone, but carefully fuses them to obtain non-trivial overhead reductions. We provide formal security analysis of the proposed constructs and implement them into representative machine learning algorithms including k-nearest neighbors, naive Bayes classification and logistic regression. Compared to the existing efforts, our method achieves $2$-$50\times$ speedup in runtime and up to $10\times$ reduction in communication.